United States v. Jeremie Saintvil

USCA11 Case: 22-10004 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 1 of 20

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10004

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JEREMIE SAINTVIL,

a.k.a. Jeremie Stvil,

a.k.a. Jeremie Saint Vil,

a.k.a. Jeremi Stvil,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10004

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00013-AW-GRJ-1

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jeremie Saintvil appeals his conviction and sentence for four

fraud-related crimes. 1 In short, Saintvil orchestrated an extensive

scheme to obtain Paycheck Protection Program 2 (“PPP”) loans for

illegitimate businesses that he created with information he stole

from elderly persons. On appeal, Saintvil contends that (1) the

district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the

indictment for duplicity and failing to strike surplusage from the

1

A jury found Saintvil guilty of each count with which he was charged: (1)

aiding and abetting bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2, (2)

submitting a false statement to a federally insured institution, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1014, (3) aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1028A(a)(1), and (4) making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1001(a).

2

In March 2020, “as a result of the coronavirus pandemic,” Congress passed

the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act which

authorized the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to administer funds

under the PPP to help businesses retain employees and pay other qualified

expenses. The CARES Act also included a “special allocation . . . of funds

committed directly [to] the [Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”)

program] to respond to the COVID pandemic.” The EIDL program provides

assistance to businesses affected by certain disasters—in this case, the

coronavirus pandemic.

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indictment, (2) venue was improper, and (3) his sentence is

substantively unreasonable. For the reasons below, we affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

From February 2018 through June 2020, Saintvil

“fraudulently obtained and possessed” the personal identifying

information of several elderly individuals in assisted or senior living

facilities. Alongside other fraudulent activities (i.e., opening lines

of credit, obtaining physical checks and debit cards, and

transferring funds), Saintvil used the stolen identities to create

fictitious businesses and apply for nine PPP loans. Seven of the

nine applications were approved, and funding was distributed. In

similar fashion, Saintvil also fraudulently applied for, and received,

an EIDL loan. One way or another, the distributed proceeds—

which totaled more than $1,000,000—ended up in Saintvil’s

control.

In its indictment against Saintvil, the grand jury detailed

Saintvil’s entire scheme as perpetrated against various banks and

financial institutions, but in Count One 3 it only charged a single

execution of bank fraud as against Florida Credit Union (“FCU”). 4

3

We focus on Count One for two reasons. First, Saintvil’s duplicity and

surplusage arguments are targeted at Count One. Second, the remaining

three counts reallege and incorporate by reference the factual allegations laid

out in Count One.

4

The indictment started by detailing Saintvil’s larger fraudulent scheme:

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10004

Specifically, the indictment focused on Saintvil’s use of a certain

individual’s identity (referred to as R.J.H.) to create the fictitious

business HEJ Holding, Inc. (“HEJ Holding”) and to apply to FCU

for a PPP loan. Accordingly, our recitation of the factual

background will focus primarily on facts pertinent to this

fraudulent instance.5

B. The Charge

Between on or about February 1, 2018, and on or about June

30, 2020, in the Northern District of Florida and elsewhere, the

defendant, . . . did knowingly and willfully execute and

attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud a federally

insured financial institution, that is, FCU, [and 12 other

institutions], and to obtain moneys owned by and under the

custody and control of FCU, [and 12 other institutions] by

means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses,

representations, and promises.

The indictment then narrowed in on the fraud related to FCU in outlining the

“execution” of Saintvil’s fraud.

D. Execution of the Scheme

Between on or about May 4, 2020, and on or about May 21,

2020, for the purpose of executing and attempting to execute

this fraudulent scheme, the defendant . . . did knowingly and

willfully submit false and fraudulent representations to FCU in

an SBA PPP loan application, and in supporting loan

documents and emails.

5

Saintvil’s use of R.J.H.’s identity to create HEJ Holding and apply for a loan

with FCU is part of a pattern. The rest of Saintvil’s scheme was perpetrated

in the same way; he just changed the identities and financial institutions that

he used.

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In May 2020, FCU—a federally insured credit union

headquartered in Gainesville, Florida—received an email

purportedly from R.J.H. who claimed to be the owner of HEJ

Holding. 6 The email contained numerous attachments in support

of HEJ Holding’s request for a PPP loan for $159,202.30. 7 The

attachments included a PPP Borrower Application Form, two

federal tax documents for HEJ Holding, a copy of R.J.H.’s Florida

Driver’s License, and a document showing the average monthly

6

The email was sent to Jane Harris, a FCU employee, from a Gmail address

that included R.J.H.’s name. The email read:

Good afternoon Jane, I’m a proud Veteran and owner of HEJ

Holding Inc. I have heard nothing but amazing reviews from

members of [FCU] about your handling of the SBA [PPP].

Unlike major banking institutions that has [sic] caused

tremendous hardship with ineffective processes, we’re in

desperate need for personalize [sic] banking attention that can

ensure funding as quickly as possible.

The pandemic has crippled my business and continue [sic] to

wreck incalculable havoc to me personally, my team and their

families. I beg of you to please help me with the prompt

submittal of my SBA PPP application. I’ve included all

necessary documents to ensure expeditious processing.

Thank you very much for all of your help Jane and I look

forward to hearing from you promptly.

Sincerely,

[R.J.H.]

7

According to the application, HEJ Holding had 17 employees and average

monthly payroll expenses of $63,680.92.

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10004

payroll for HEJ Holding. FCU did not immediately issue any

funding because it believed the application was fraudulent.

R.J.H. and FCU continued to communicate about the loan

application. In a series of emails over the next two-and-a-half

weeks, FCU was “able to capture the IP address from where the

email originated” which was later determined to be registered to

Saintvil’s mother and the physical address where the IP was

registered, in Delray Beach, Florida, was owned by Saintvil. And,

“[i]n one of the email exchanges between [R.J.H.] and FCU, a

completed PPP loan application was electronically signed.”

FCU, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(“FBI”) by this time, called R.J.H. to request his physical presence

in order to complete the loan application process. The FCU

employee who conducted the call testified that the male voice on

the other end of the line started the call by attempting to sound like

an older man but his voice “changed to frustration” as the call

progressed. The following morning, R.J.H. emailed FCU stating,

“we have officially concluded it is not in the best interest of our

team’s safety to have someone or myself drive from South Florida

to Gainesville to open an account in this day age [sic].”

Further investigation revealed that (1) R.J.H.’s address was

changed from a senior living facility to the address for HEJ Holding

in January 2020, (2) R.J.H. was alive and residing in a “memory

center, or assisted living facility, in Central Florida,” (3) when

contacted by the FBI, R.J.H.’s daughter stated that R.J.H. never

owned a business, never operated HEJ Holding, and did not

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control the email address or phone number associated with the

PPP loan, (4) HEJ Holding was not a registered business with the

Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, and the

State did not have any record of 2019 corporate income tax returns

for HEJ Holding, and (5) the service used to generate the payroll

document, Paychex Flex, advised that they could “find no record

of [HEJ Holding or R.J.H.].” In light of these findings, in June 2020,

the FBI obtained and executed a search warrant for the Delray

Beach residence (tied to the IP address from which the email

application was submitted).

Saintvil was at the residence when the search warrant was

executed. The FBI uncovered extensive evidence of Saintvil’s

fraudulent scheme, including the following evidence 8 specific to

the R.J.H./HEJ Holding fraud: “[C]redit cards, banking check

books, and other identification documents for [Saintvil], and

others, including a . . . debit card in the name of R.J.H.”; and a

computer on which agents were able to locate “emails pertaining

to [HEJ Holding’s] SBA PPP loan application, including the same

attachments that were submitted to FCU in support of the loan.”

B. Procedural History

In March 2021, a grand jury indicted Saintvil with bank

fraud, submission of a false statement to a federally insured

8

Significant evidence of Saintvil’s other fraudulent PPP applications was

uncovered—including numerous debit cards and check books in the names of

other individuals as well as a copy of one identity-theft victim’s driver’s license

on a photocopier.

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institution (specifically, FCU), aggravated identify theft, and

making a false statement to the government (specifically, the SBA).

Based on the indictment, Saintvil filed a Motion to Dismiss or

Strike Surplusage. He argued first that the district court “should

dismiss Count One . . . because it is duplicitous,” in that it

“improperly alleg[ed] two separate offenses in the same count.” In

other words, Saintvil argued that Count One was duplicitous

because the bank fraud statute has two subsections, 9 each

constituting separate offenses, so that he was improperly charged

with two crimes in a single count of the indictment. Alternatively,

Saintvil moved the court to “strike as surplusage from Count One

the allegations regarding the twelve financial institutions [other

than FCU] . . . and eight businesses [other than HEJ Holding]

. . . because [their inclusion was] not only irrelevant to the offenses

charged but also prejudicial to [Saintvil] and inflammatory.”

9

The bank fraud statute provides:

Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a

scheme or artifice—

(1) to defraud a financial institution; or

(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets,

securities, or other property owned by, or under the

custody or control of, a financial institution, by means

of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or

promises;

shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not

more than 30 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1344.

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The district court denied Saintvil’s motion. As to Saintvil’s

duplicity argument, the district court determined that the bank

fraud statute’s two subsections provided “alternative ways in

which the statute may be violated,” rather than separate offenses.

As such, the district court found that Count One was not

duplicitous. And, as to Saintvil’s surplusage argument, the district

court concluded that Saintvil had not met the “exacting standard”

for showing surplusage because he had not shown that the

information at issue was immaterial, inflammatory, or prejudicial.

After an eight-day jury trial in which Saintvil proceeded pro

se, the jury found Saintvil guilty of all four counts. After the verdict

but before sentencing, Saintvil filed a motion arguing that venue

was improper as to each count because his actions took place in the

Southern, rather than Northern, District of Florida. At sentencing,

the district court denied Saintvil’s motion, because “at trial there

was proof to support the venue that was presented,” i.e., the

Northern District of Florida, and Saintvil’s motion was further

“untimely” 10 and “unfounded.”

10

On this point, the district court questioned Saintvil as to why he had not

waived his motion by failing to raise it pretrial. Saintvil responded that he

“was not exposed to the government presentation at trial” so there was “no

record as to whether they were going to provide evidence to prove [venue].”

The district court found that venue was proper, but later clarified its statement

on the untimeliness of Saintvil’s motion:

I want to correct a misstatement I made earlier when I was

reviewing your venue motion. I asked if it was waived by not

raising it pretrial. Of course, you could raise – to the extent

you could waive it as an evidentiary matter, that time has

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10004

In total, the district court sentenced Saintvil to 204 months’

imprisonment. 11 The district court recognized that this sentence

was “above the guidelines,” but concluded that it was necessary

because Saintvil’s case was “out of the heartland of normal fraud

cases.” Specifically, the district court concluded that an above-

guideline sentence was proper because “the conduct was

egregious,” in that “[t]he overall fraud” and “amount of loss” were

extreme, the “breadth of fraud was extraordinary,” Saintvil

targeted many people “who were among the most vulnerable

people there are,” and Saintvil took advantage of the PPP program

that was intended to move money “quickly to the people who

need[ed] it.” The district court also considered Saintvil’s abilities

and education, criminal history, motive, and refusal to accept

responsibility, which when considered alongside the need to

protect the public from Saintvil, counseled in favor of a stronger

sentence. In sum, the district court concluded that “all of the

circumstances of the offense” showed that “a guideline sentence

would [not] be sufficient to reflect the seriousness of the offense.”

Saintvil timely appealed.

passed, too. There are different kinds of venue objections. At

any rate, I have denied that motion already.

11

The district court sentenced Saintvil to two concurrent terms of 180 months’

imprisonment as to Counts 1 and 2, as well as a term of 24 months’

imprisonment as to Count 3 to run consecutively with Counts 1 and 2.

Additionally, the district court imposed a term of 60 months’ imprisonment as

to Count 4 to run concurrently with Counts 1 and 2.

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II. Discussion

Saintvil puts forth three arguments on appeal. First, he

argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss

the indictment as duplicitous and failing to strike surplusage from

the indictment. Second, he argues that venue was improper.

Third, he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

We address each argument in turn, ultimately affirming Saintvil’s

conviction and sentence.

A. Duplicity and Surplusage

Saintvil’s first set of arguments concern the district court’s

denial of his motion to dismiss. We start with his argument that

Count One of his indictment improperly charged him with two

separate crimes and then consider his argument that the indictment

contained unlawful surplusage.

1. Duplicity

We review alleged deficiencies in an indictment de novo. See

United States v. Pacchioli, 718 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013).

“A count is duplicitous if it charges two or more separate

and distinct offenses.”12 United States v. Deason, 965 F.3d 1252, 1267

(11th Cir. 2020). Put differently, each count of an indictment may

12

“[D]uplicitous count[s] pose three dangers: (1) A jury may convict a

defendant without unanimously agreeing on the same offense; (2) A defendant

may be prejudiced in a subsequent double jeopardy defense; and (3) A court

may have difficulty determining the admissibility of evidence.” United States

v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 977 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).

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only charge a single offense. But “where a statute defines two or

more ways in which an offense may be committed, all may be

alleged in the conjunctive in one count.” United States v. Felts, 579

F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also United

States v. Burton, 871 F.2d 1566, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Where a

penal statute, . . . prescribes several alternative ways in which the

statute may be violated and each is subject to the same

punishment . . . the indictment may charge any or all of the acts

conjunctively, in a single count[.]”); id. at 1574 (“An indictment is

not duplicitous if, in one count, it charges a defendant with

violating the statute in both ways.” (footnote omitted)).

“Bank fraud is established under two alternative methods.”

United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). First,

to prove bank fraud under § 1344(1), “the government must

establish that the defendant (1) intentionally participated in a

scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property; and

(2) that the victim of the scheme or artifice was an insured financial

institution.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, to prove bank fraud

under § 1344(2), the government must establish “(1) that a scheme

existed in order to obtain money, funds, or credit in the custody of

the federally insured institution; (2) that the defendant participated

in the scheme by means of false pretenses, representations or

promises, which were material; and (3) that the defendant acted

knowingly.” Id. (quotation omitted). Finally, we have held that

“[a] conviction can be sustained under either section [of the bank

fraud statute] when the indictment . . . charge[s] both clauses.” Id.

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Saintvil relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in

Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014), which he argues held

that the bank fraud statute’s subsections establish different

offenses. Saintvil, however, misstates the law. In Loughrin, the

Supreme Court held that § 1344(1), unlike § 1344(2), requires a

showing of “intent to defraud a bank.” Id. at 359–62. That is, the

two subsections of the bank fraud statute have different elements.

It does not follow, however, that the two subsections therefore

define different offenses altogether. Rather, just as the district

court reasoned, and as we have held, see Dennis, 237 F.3d at 1303,

subsections (1) and (2) of the bank fraud statute are merely two

ways to prove the same offense—bank fraud. Loughrin hurts,

rather than helps, Saintvil’s case.

Without Loughrin, Saintvil’s position has no support.

Indeed, his argument collapses in light of our holdings that the

bank fraud statute provides alternative ways to prove the same

offense and that the two subsections can be charged together in

one count. See Dennis, 237 F.3d at 1303; Felts, 579 F.3d at 1344;

Burton, 871 F.2d at 1573.

We agree with the district court that Count One was not

duplicitous.13

2. Surplusage

13

We need not reach Saintvil’s argument that the jury instructions did not

properly account for the duplicity because we conclude that Count One was

not duplicitous.

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We review the district court’s refusal to strike alleged

surplusage for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Awan, 966

F.2d 1415, 1426 (11th Cir. 1992).

“A motion to strike surplusage from an indictment should

not be granted unless it is clear that the allegations are not relevant

to the charge and are inflammatory and prejudicial.” Id. (quotation

omitted). We have recognized that this threshold is a “most

exacting standard.” Id. (quotation omitted).

“For an indictment to be valid, it must contain the elements

of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprise the

defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” United States v.

Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted and

alterations adopted). Specifically for bank fraud, “[t]he allegation

of a scheme is an essential element[.]” United States v. Adkinson, 135

F.3d 1363, 1377 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1344). In other

words, an indictment that includes bank fraud as a charge should

“set forth the manner and means by which the scheme and artifice

to defraud operated.” Bobo, 344 F.3d at 1084.

Saintvil argues that the indictment included “surplusage”

because there was extraneous information in Count One (i.e.,

references to financial institutions other than FCU and fraudulent

businesses other than HEJ Holding) that referenced parts of his

scheme that were not directly charged in Count One. This

argument is a non-starter. Because an allegation of bank fraud

requires the government to prove the existence of a scheme, and

the scheme-related evidence is exactly the information that Saintvil

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argues is surplusage, he cannot prove that this information is not

“relevant to the charge.” Awan, 966 F.2d at 1426; see also Bobo, 344

F.3d at 1083–84. While the included information is extensive, the

scheme was extravagant and multi-faceted which necessitated the

inclusion of additional information in the indictment beyond his

actions vis-à-vis FCU and HEJ Holding. Because the additional

information was relevant and required in order to charge Saintvil

properly, 14 Saintvil fails to meet the “exacting standard” for a

motion to strike surplusage. See Awan, 966 F.2d at 1426. The

district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to

strike certain information from Saintvil’s indictment.

B. Venue

“We review de novo a determination that the government

established venue by a preponderance of the evidence.” United

States v. Smith, 22 F.4th 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2022). We view

venue-related evidence “in the light most favorable to the

government and make all reasonable inferences and credibility

determinations in favor of the verdict the jury returned.” Id.

“Like most rights, a defendant’s venue right is not absolute,

and it will be deemed waived unless asserted prior to trial.” United

States v. White, 590 F.3d 1210, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009); see also United

14

Because Saintvil clearly fails to meet one of three mandatory conditions for

a motion to strike surplusage, we need not reach his arguments as to the other

two conditions (that the allegations are inflammatory and prejudicial). We do

note, however, that his arguments as to the latter two elements also lack

persuasive force.

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States v. DiJames, 731 F.2d 758, 761 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that

“the right to be tried in the state and district where the crime was

alleged to have been committed may be waived voluntarily by the

defendant”). If, however, a defendant “has no notice of a defect of

venue until the [g]overnment rests its case,” the outer limit for

raising a venue objection is extended so that it “is timely if made at

the close of the evidence.” United States v. Daniels, 5 F.3d 495, 496

(11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1152

(11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a challenge to venue failed because

“appellant did not present his venue objection until the prosecution

had rested its case”).

“In many (and perhaps most) cases in which the defendant

fails to object to a defect in venue, the defendant’s silence may be

taken to imply a waiver of the venue right.” White, 590 F.3d at 1214

(alterations adopted and quotations omitted). We will not find

waiver, however, when “there is evidence which suggests that the

defendant has not waived his venue right.” Id. In White, for

example, we held that a defendant waived his venue right through

silence when he “did not object before or during trial” and instead

“waited until after he was convicted to complain [about venue].”

Id.

Here, Saintvil did not challenge venue before or at trial, but

rather waited a week prior to sentencing to file a motion

challenging venue. As such, he has waived his venue right. See id.

Indeed, Saintvil was put on notice as to a potential venue challenge

because the evidence adduced at trial revealed that his actions (i.e.,

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submitting the fraudulent documents and otherwise carrying out

his scheme) occurred in the Southern District of Florida rather

than the Northern District of Florida. Therefore, at the latest,

Saintvil should have challenged venue during trial. See Daniels, 5

F.3d at 496; Roberts, 308 F.3d at 1151–52.

C. Substantive Reasonableness

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a

deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A district court abuses its considerable

discretion and imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only

when it ‘(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that

were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an

improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of

judgment in considering the proper factors.’” United States v.

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United

States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). “The

party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the

sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a)

factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.”

Id.

Under § 3553(a), a sentencing court must impose a sentence

that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to

provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate

deterrence, and to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In addition, the sentencing court

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18 Opinion of the Court 22-10004

must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences

available, the guideline sentencing range, and the need to avoid

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. Id.

§ 3553(a)(1), (3)–(4), (6).

The district court may impose an upward variance based on

the § 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627,

637–38 (11th Cir. 2013), but sentences outside the guideline range

require sufficiently compelling justifications, Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.

For example, the district court may impose an upward variance if

it concludes that the guideline range insufficiently accounted for

the defendant’s criminal history. United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814

F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016). The district court may likewise

vary upward based on factors already accounted for in calculating

the guideline range. See United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619–

20 (11th Cir. 2015). A district court’s failure to discuss mitigating

evidence does not indicate that it ignored or failed to consider this

evidence. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).

Despite Saintvil’s contention otherwise, his sentence is

substantively reasonable. First, the district court quite clearly

“consider[ed] the extent of the deviation and ensure[d] that the

justification [for the deviation was] sufficiently compelling.” Gall,

552 U.S. at 50. The district court canvassed the applicable

considerations on the record, including: the breadth of the fraud,

the duration of the fraudulent scheme, the large number of victims,

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the vulnerability of those victims, the high loss amount, the

circumstances of the offense (i.e., Saintvil taking advantage of

emergency PPP funds), his history of fraudulent behavior, the need

for deterrence, the need to protect the public from his actions, and

his refusal to accept responsibility for his crimes. Each of these

considerations was explained to Saintvil during sentencing. Id.

(“After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the district court]

must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for

meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair

sentencing.”). Second, these same considerations support the

district court’s sentencing determination and cut against Saintvil’s

unfounded argument that he is less culpable than other defendants

(that he identifies in case law) who received upward variances.

Third, the district court’s extensive explanation shows that it

adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and determined that an

above-guideline sentence was necessary. See Osorio-Moreno, 814

F.3d at 1288. To the extent that the district court did not recite

each individual factor, that is not required anyway. Amedeo, 487

F.3d at 832. Fourth, and finally, Saintvil argues that the district

court erred in sentencing because “every single one of the grounds

used by the district court” to support the upward variance was

“accounted for in the sentencing guidelines.” This argument has

no support under our law. See Johnson, 803 F.3d at 620 (“[The

appellant] contends that all relevant factors for the district court to

consider in imposing a sentence already were incorporated into the

calculation of his advisory guidelines range, such that no fact or

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10004

circumstance warranted a variance. This argument is

meritless . . . .” (quotation omitted)).

Simply put, Saintvil has not carried his burden of

demonstrating that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256.

AFFIRMED.