The opinion
Case: 21-30625 Document: 00516751526 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/15/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
May 15, 2023
No. 21-30625 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Percy Taylor,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
James LeBlanc, Secretary,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:21-CV-72
______________________________
Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
We withdraw our prior opinion in this case, Taylor v. LeBlanc, 60 F.4th
246 (5th Cir. 2023), and substitute the following in its place.
***
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV. § 1. So it should go without saying that the
government cannot hold a prisoner without the legal authority to do so, for
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that would “deprive” a person of his “liberty . . . without due process of
law.” Id.
Consistent with these principles, “[o]ur precedent establishes that a
jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are timely released from prison.”
Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). “Detention of a prisoner
thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially
valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.”
Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections recently
conducted a study that uncovered a substantial number of inmates who were
detained long past the expiration of their sentences. See Crittindon v.
LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 183 (5th Cir. 2022). Many inmates are detained in jail
during trial or sentencing, and then transferred to the Department to serve
the rest of their sentence in prison. But the study discovered that some local
jails in Louisiana were often slow to communicate with the Department. As
a result, some inmates would not get credit for their jailtime in a timely
manner, and would therefore remain in prison past the length of their
sentences.
Percy Taylor was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence, but
for a different reason: Department officials gave him credit for time served
in pre-trial detention, but only for one (rather than both) of his two
consecutive sentences. That was the right thing to do under the law then in
effect. But Taylor was entitled to the more generous provision in effect at
the time his sentence was entered. As a result, he served over a year longer
than he should have.
After his release, Taylor brought suit against various Louisiana
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other claims. This appeal concerns
only one of those claims: Taylor’s claim against the head of the Department,
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Secretary James LeBlanc. LeBlanc appeals the denial of qualified immunity
arguing, inter alia, that his conduct wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light
of clearly established law.
The right to timely release is clearly established. But Taylor does not
show how LeBlanc’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law. Taylor contends that LeBlanc was objectively unreasonable
because he failed to assign the task of calculating release dates to an attorney.
But nothing in the Constitution requires that such actions be undertaken by
a member of the bar. Accordingly, we reverse.
I.
For purposes of this appeal, we accept the factual allegations in
Plaintiff’s complaint as true. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
Taylor was imprisoned for a Louisiana felony conviction. He was later
released on parole for good behavior.
While on parole, Taylor was arrested, detained pending trial, and
eventually convicted on another felony offense. His parole for his first
offense was revoked, and he was additionally sentenced to a second,
consecutive term of imprisonment.
During his imprisonment, Taylor concluded that Department officials
had miscalculated his release date. So he filed a grievance. He argued that
the time he spent in pre-trial detention prior to his second conviction should
have been credited to both of his sentences, rather than just his second
sentence. Relatedly, he also argued that his parole on his first conviction
should have been deemed revoked as of his arrest on the second offense,
rather than at the time of his conviction. A non-attorney Department
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employee denied the grievance, seemingly misconstruing it as a request for
good time credits he wasn’t entitled to.
Taylor appealed his grievance unsuccessfully. The denial order
explained that, under current law, the time Taylor spent in pre-trial detention
could not be credited toward his first sentence. See La. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 880(E). The order noted that overlapping credits are prohibited
when the sentences are consecutively, rather than concurrently, imposed.
See id. at 880(B).
Taylor sought review from the state district court. A commissioner
issued a report recommending that the court grant the petition for review.
The report concluded that Taylor’s time in jail should have been credited
toward both sentences, under the law in effect at the time his sentence was
entered.
The court adopted the recommendation and ordered that Taylor’s
release date be recalculated. According to the correctly calculated release
date, Taylor should have been released over a year earlier.
Taylor sued, bringing various claims seeking damages for false
imprisonment, including a § 1983 claim against LeBlanc. The operative
complaint alleged, inter alia, that LeBlanc—a final policymaker—failed to
implement policies to ensure his timely release, and failed to train or
supervise the employees who administer the grievance process. The
complaint alleged that LeBlanc was aware of concerns that a substantial
number of inmates were being overdetained.
The district court granted in part and denied in part the motion to
dismiss. As relevant here, the court denied the motion as to the claim against
LeBlanc, finding that he wasn’t entitled to qualified immunity.
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LeBlanc appealed the denial of qualified immunity. 1
II.
“Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review
orders denying qualified immunity.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 310
(5th Cir. 2022). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, accepting as true all well-pleaded
facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quotation omitted). “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity
unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We are free to decide which prong of the
qualified immunity analysis to address first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242
_____________________
1
Taylor argues that the district court shouldn’t have dismissed the other claims.
We lack jurisdiction to review those dismissals on interlocutory appeal. This court has
jurisdiction to review final decisions of a district court. Tracy v. Lumpkin, 43 F.4th 473, 475
(5th Cir. 2022). But the collateral-order doctrine presents a “narrow” exception to that
principle. Id. Under the collateral-order doctrine, “non-final orders are immediately
appealable if they: (1) conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) are effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. (cleaned up). Taylor’s remaining
claims don’t fall within this exception. Nor does pendant jurisdiction exist, because those
other claims are not “inextricably intertwined” with the denial of qualified immunity for
Secretary LeBlanc. Cutler v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 767 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir.
2014).
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(“[T]he judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals are in the best
position to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the
fair and efficient disposition of each [qualified immunity] case.”).
It is clearly established that inmates have the right to timely release
from prison consistent with the terms of their sentences. See Crittindon, 37
F.4th at 188; Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. But under prong two of the qualified
immunity analysis, Taylor must also show how Secretary LeBlanc’s “actions
were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of
the violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that “[w]hether an
official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an
allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal
reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were
clearly established at the time it was taken.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565
U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (cleaned up, emphasis added).
So a plaintiff must show that “the conduct of the defendants was
objectively unreasonable in the light of . . . clearly established law.” Hare v.
City of Corinth, Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis omitted).
See also, e.g., Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 2021) (defendant
“is entitled to qualified immunity unless his actions were objectively
unreasonable in light of clearly established law”) (quotations omitted); Blake
v. Lambert, 921 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2019) (qualified immunity turns on
whether defendant’s conduct is “objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law”); Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 669 (5th Cir. 2015)
(same).
But the objectively unreasonable standard is not “that an official
action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question
has previously been held unlawful; but it is . . . that in the light of pre-existing
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law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739
(2002) (citation omitted). The critical consideration is fair warning. See id.
at 739–41.
III.
Department officials declined to credit Taylor’s pre-trial detention to
both of his consecutive sentences. That was correct under current law. See
La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 880(B). But it was wrong here, because
Taylor’s release date should have been governed by the law applicable at the
time of his sentence. That would have allowed Taylor to credit his jail time
to both of his sentences.
This appeal, however, does not concern the conduct of lower-level
officials at the Department. Rather, the question before us is whether
LeBlanc was objectively unreasonable in how he supervised the entire
Department.
Taylor contends that LeBlanc should have delegated the calculation
of release dates to lawyers rather than non-lawyers—and that his failure to
do so was objectively unreasonable. But Taylor does not point to anything
that suggests the Constitution requires these determinations be made by
attorneys.
We reverse.
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