Jordan Darrell Morris v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Humphreys, Beales, Huff, O’Brien, AtLee, Malveaux,

PUBLISHED

Athey, Fulton, Ortiz, Causey, Friedman, Chaney, Raphael, Lorish, Callins and White

Argued at Richmond, Virginia

JORDAN DARRELL MORRIS

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 1194-21-2 JUDGE LISA M. LORISH

MAY 9, 2023

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

UPON A REHEARING EN BANC

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY

Randall G. Johnson, Jr., Judge

H. Pratt Cook, III (Law Office of H. Pratt Cook, III, on briefs), for

appellant.

Stephen J. Sovinsky, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Virginia’s overdose reporting statute, Code § 18.2-251.03, shields from arrest or

prosecution individuals who, in good faith, seek or obtain emergency medical assistance because

they are experiencing a drug overdose. The trial court found Morris did not qualify for immunity

under the statute. A panel of this Court reversed, dividing on how to interpret and apply the

definition of “overdose” set out in Code § 18.2-251.03(A), as well as the requirement that an

individual be “experiencing an overdose.” After rehearing en banc, we affirm the trial court for a

different reason—Morris failed to meet the independent requirement in Code

§ 18.2-251.03(B)(2) that he “remain[] at the scene of the overdose or at any alternative location

to which he . . . has been transported until a law-enforcement officer responds to the report of an

overdose.”

BACKGROUND

After law enforcement first encountered Jordan Darrell Morris outside the Short Pump

emergency room, Morris was charged with possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance

(in violation of Code § 18.2-250) and driving under the influence of drugs, first offense (in

violation of Code § 18.2-266).

The Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to use at trial a lab analysis showing that

Morris’s blood tested positive for cocaine and that cocaine residue was found on a smoking

device in the car he was driving. Morris moved to suppress the drug evidence and to dismiss the

drug-possession charge under the immunity provision of Code § 18.2-251.03. Morris argued that

he “was actively seeking medical care for himself when the Henrico police developed the

evidence against him.” The motion explained:

Morris was trying to seek medical attention at Short Pump

Emergency Room when he stopped the vehicle in the middle of the

roadway adjacent to the emergency hospital. Henrico police

officers Cirillo and Steelman observed that Morris was under the

influence of drugs, and Morris told them he had recently smoked

crack cocaine. Morris told the officers he was contemplating

suicide because of drugs and made suicidal statements at the

hospital.

The Commonwealth’s written opposition asserted that Morris “had produced no evidence or

testimony from any medical personnel present that evening, nor any other evidence, that he was

experiencing an overdose.”

At a hearing on Morris’s suppression motion and motion to dismiss, both sides “agreed to

proffer the facts.” Paraphrasing the police report, Morris’s counsel represented that Henrico

police officers observed a white Ford Edge trying to turn onto the road next to the Short Pump

emergency room. The vehicle nearly struck a curb in the turn lane and then stopped in the

middle of the road, blocking through-traffic. The officers approached the vehicle, driven by

-2-

Morris, and asked him to park the car. Morris said that “he was there to get help,” telling the

officers that he had smoked crack cocaine. The officers thought he appeared to be under the

influence of drugs and escorted Morris into the emergency room.

As medical personnel drew a blood sample, Morris “made suicidal statements.” In

response to law enforcement questioning, Morris said that he worked at Food Lion; he was high

while at work and asked to sit in his boss’s car to call his mother; he had called his mother

“because he was thinking about committing suicide”; and he had driven away from the Food

Lion and had driven around awhile before heading to the Short Pump emergency room. When

asked whether his mother had told him to “go to the ER,” Morris said he “chose to do so

himself” because “he was thinking about suicide.” When an officer asked why he was

considering suicide, Morris responded, “drugs.” Morris said that he used heroin, fentanyl, and

cocaine, that he had smoked crack cocaine in his boss’s car, and that he “came to the ER to get

help for the suicidal thoughts and his drug problem.” Morris alerted the officers to a crack pipe

in the vehicle, which they found tucked in the crevice of the passenger seat. The Commonwealth

agreed to “the Defense version” of the facts.

The Commonwealth argued that Morris was required to present expert testimony that he

was in fact experiencing an overdose and that it was not enough to simply take his word for it.

Morris’s counsel argued that the immunity statute applied because the lab tests showed cocaine

in Morris’s blood, Morris drove himself to the emergency room seeking treatment, and he said

three times that he was suicidal because of his drug use.

Ruling from the bench, the trial court denied Morris’s motions to suppress the drug

evidence and to dismiss the drug possession charge. The court saw “no evidence that [Morris]

was experiencing a life-threatening condition.” It was “not going so far as to say” that a medical

professional had to be called as a witness to prove an overdose—circumstantial evidence could

-3-

suffice. But the court found the proffer insufficient: “[J]ust because” the drugs “affected his

behavior [did] not mean we’re in a life-threatening situation.” The court also observed that there

must be “some showing” that Morris’s expression of wanting to kill himself “was caused by the

ingestion of cocaine and this overdose situation.”

Morris subsequently pleaded no contest to the charges against him, reserving his right to

appeal the immunity ruling on the drug-possession charge. The trial court accepted the pleas,

finding Morris guilty on both charges.

ANALYSIS

The proper interpretation of Code § 18.2-251.03 is a question of law that we review de

novo. Broadous v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 265, 268 (2017).

Virginia’s overdose reporting statute was first enacted in 2015, 2015 Va. Acts chs. 418,

436 (codified at Code § 18.2-251.03), and has been amended three times since then, each time

expanding its protections. In its current form, the statute provides full immunity from “arrest or

prosecution” for qualifying individuals (prior versions had characterized the immunity as an

“affirmative defense”). And it now covers not only someone who helps another experiencing an

overdose, but also the person who “is experiencing an overdose”—assuming other criteria in the

statute are met. Before these expansions, we observed that the “clear purpose” of the law was to

“encourage . . . prompt emergency medical treatment [for] those who have suffered an overdose

as a result of ingesting a controlled substance.” Broadous, 67 Va. App. at 271. The recent

amendments reinforce this goal.

We briefly review the structure of the statute before applying it to the facts proffered

below. The statute opens by defining “overdose” as “a life-threatening condition resulting from

the consumption or use of a controlled substance, alcohol, or any combination of such

-4-

substances.” Code § 18.2-251.03(A). Then, the statute sets out four requirements before an

individual is shielded from “arrest or prosecution” for specified controlled substance offenses:

1. Such individual (i) in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency

medical attention (a) for himself, if he is experiencing an overdose,

or (b) for another individual, if such other individual is

experiencing an overdose; (ii) is experiencing an overdose and

another individual, in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency

medical attention for such individual, by contemporaneously

reporting such overdose to [specified emergency responders]; or

(iii) in good faith, renders emergency care or assistance, including

[specified means];

2. Such individual remains at the scene of the overdose or at any

alternative location to which he or the person requiring emergency

medical attention has been transported until a law-enforcement

officer responds to the report of an overdose. If no

law-enforcement officer is present at the scene of the overdose or

at the alternative location, then such individual shall cooperate

with law enforcement as otherwise set forth herein;

3. Such individual identifies himself to the law-enforcement officer

who responds to the report of the overdose; and

4. The evidence for the prosecution of an offense enumerated in

this subsection was obtained as a result of the individual seeking or

obtaining emergency medical attention or rendering emergency

care or assistance.

Code § 18.2-251.03(B). Next, the statute includes a carve-out from immunity:

The provisions of this section shall not apply to any person who

seeks or obtains emergency medical attention for himself or

another individual, to a person experiencing an overdose when

another individual seeks or obtains emergency medical attention

for him, or to a person who renders emergency care or assistance

to an individual experiencing an overdose while another person

seeks or obtains emergency medical attention during the execution

of a search warrant or during the conduct of a lawful search or a

lawful arrest

Code § 18.2-251.03(C). The remaining parts of the statute are not relevant here.

The trial court found Morris had not shown that he was experiencing a life-threatening

condition caused by controlled substances. We conclude instead that the “the best and narrowest

-5-

ground for decision is the determination that the trial court reached the right result for a reason

different than the one upon which it appears ultimately to have relied.” Vandyke v.

Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 723, 731 (2020); see Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419

(2017) (recognizing the doctrine of judicial restraint requires appellate courts to decide cases on

the best and narrowest grounds). As this case proceeded by agreed proffer,1 all of the “evidence

necessary to that alternate ground was before the trial court,” and that evidence was

“undisputed.” Vandyke, 71 Va. App. at 732.

Where, as here, the individual (allegedly) experiencing the overdose is the one seeking

immunity, the statute does not apply unless the individual “remains at the scene of the overdose

or at any alternative location to which he . . . has been transported until a law-enforcement

officer responds to the report of an overdose.” Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(2).2 The subsection

continues: “If no law-enforcement officer is present at the scene of the overdose or at the

alternative location, then such individual shall cooperate with law enforcement as otherwise set

forth herein.” Id. The Commonwealth argued on brief that Morris cannot meet this requirement

because he “borrowed a car and drove to the emergency room—failing to stay at the scene of the

alleged overdose” and he also had not “been transported” to the hospital. At oral argument,

1

The fact that Morris proceeded by limited proffer below is one of the reasons that it

would be unwieldy to resolve whether Morris met the definition of “overdose,” or whether the

evidence was sufficient to show he was “experiencing” an overdose. Layered on this slim

factual showing, Morris’s counsel incorrectly argued below that the statute set out an

“affirmative defense” (relying on the prior version of the law), and the trial court appears to have

relied on that representation, which further obscures our ability to review these questions.

2

For purposes of this analysis, we assume, without deciding, that suicidal ideation meets

the definition of overdose in Code § 18.2-251.03(A). See McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 296 Va.

489, 501 (2018) (recognizing that “where the ability of the Court to review an issue on appeal is

in doubt . . . ‘assum[ing] without deciding’ that the issue can be reviewed” may allow the Court

“to resolve the appeal on the best and narrowest grounds”).

-6-

Morris contended that the “scene of the overdose” was fluid and continuous, following him

everywhere that he went while experiencing suicidal thoughts.

While the “remains at the scene” requirement has been a part of every version of

Virginia’s overdose reporting statute, we have never analyzed it until now. As always, when

interpreting a statute, “our primary objective is ‘to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent,’

as expressed by the language used in the statute.” Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of

Va., 283 Va. 420, 425 (2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418 (2011)).

“[W]e examine a statute in its entirety, rather than by isolating particular words or phrases.”

Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77 (2001). And the “plain, obvious, and rational meaning of

a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction.” Brown v.

Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 388, 405 (2022) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456,

459 (1983)).

Morris urges us to strip the words “scene” and “overdose” from all surrounding context.

As his argument goes, anywhere a person is experiencing “a life-threatening condition resulting

from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, alcohol, or any combination of such

substances” is the “scene” of the overdose. By merely existing in a state of overdose at any

location, a person has then, necessarily, remained at the scene. And as long as they eventually

cooperate with law enforcement, they would meet the statutory criteria.

The problem with Morris’s interpretation is that it renders superfluous most of Code

§ 18.2-251.03(B)(2). The only rational reading of the legislature’s choice of the word “remain”

is that the individual stay in place—either at the “scene” where the overdose occurred, or the

-7-

“alternative location” to which the person has been transported.3 “Remain” would be

superfluous if the individual need not in fact “remain” anywhere. The problem extends to the

second half of the sentence about “any alternative location to which he . . . has been transported.”

Any such “alternative location” would already be covered by Morris’s expansive proposed

reading of “scene.” Indeed, if the legislature had intended this outcome, the statute as applied to

the individual experiencing the overdose could just say:

Such individual remains at the scene of the overdose or at any

alternative location to which he or the person requiring emergency

medical attention has been transported until a law-enforcement

officer responds to the report of an overdose. If no

law-enforcement officer is present at the scene of the overdose or

at the alternative location, then such individual shall cooperate

with law enforcement as otherwise set forth herein.

We reject this reading, which would cause us to run aground of a fundamental principle of

statutory interpretation: we must presume that every part of a statute has “some effect and no part

will be considered meaningless unless absolutely necessary.” City of Richmond v. Va. Elec. &

Power Co., 292 Va. 70, 75 (2016) (quoting Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs. v. Cook, 276 Va. 465,

483 (2008)).4

3

As for this latter option, we assume that when the legislature used the phrase “to which

he has been transported” (emphasis added), the “legislature understood the basic rules of

grammar.” Petit Frere v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 460, 464 (1995). “Voice shows whether

the subject acts (active voice) or is acted on (passive voice)—that is, whether the subject

performs or receives the action of the verb.” The Chicago Manual of Style § 5.115 (16th ed.

2010). Thus, absent context suggesting the legislature intended a different result, “any

alternative location to which he or the person requiring emergency medical attention has been

transported” excludes a location to which the person experiencing an overdose has transported

himself. (Emphasis added).

4

Because the conditions set forth in Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)-(4) are conjunctive, we

respectfully disagree with our concurring colleague that it is inharmonious to read (B)(1) as

establishing the three categories of individuals who may qualify for immunity and (B)(2) as

adding additional necessary criteria.

-8-

Instead, we conclude the statute requires an individual experiencing an overdose to

remain at the location where the “life-threatening condition” began, or at the location to which he

has been transported by another. The overdose reporting statute is designed to save lives and to

encourage individuals experiencing an overdose, and those around them, to seek medical

attention without fear. An interpretation that would permit individuals actively under the

influence of controlled substances or alcohol to operate a motor vehicle could endanger lives.

Turning to the proffered facts here, Morris was “high” at work when he asked to borrow

his boss’s car. He smoked crack cocaine in that car. He also called his mother from the car

“because he was thinking about committing suicide.” At some point, Morris drove himself away

from the Food Lion and drove around for a “little bit” before heading to the Short Pump

emergency room. Police officers observed the car trying to turn onto the road next to the Short

Pump emergency room, but then the vehicle nearly struck a curb in the turn lane and stopped in

the middle of the road, blocking through-traffic. Officers then approached the vehicle. Morris

said that “he was there to get help,” and the officers then escorted Morris into the emergency

room.

Based on these facts, we cannot pinpoint the exact location where the event giving rise to

the need for emergency care occurred. But we need not determine the exact location to know

that the scene of the purported overdose was necessarily a location where Morris was before he

decided to seek medical care, and thus somewhere other than where he stopped the car in the

middle of the road next to the emergency room.5 To receive immunity from prosecution, the

5

Any suggestion that Morris first expressed a need for medical care only after law

enforcement approached his vehicle stopped in the middle of the road runs aground on Code

§ 18.2-251.03(C). This subsection complements the statute’s earlier good faith requirement by

excluding from immunity anyone who first seeks medical care only after law enforcement has

begun “execut[ing] . . . a search warrant” or “conduct[ing] . . . a lawful search or a lawful arrest.”

Id.

-9-

statute required Morris to remain wherever he began experiencing the drug-induced

life-threatening condition. He did not do so. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to

dismiss the drug possession charge.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court below.

Affirmed.

- 10 -

Raphael, J., with whom Ortiz, J., joins, concurring.

I agree with the majority that this appeal can be decided on narrower grounds that do not

resolve the main issues briefed during our rehearing en banc. I also agree that Morris was not

entitled to immunity from prosecution because he did not “remain[] at the scene of the overdose”

and was not transported by someone else to an “alternative location,” as contemplated by

subsection (B)(2) of Code § 18.2-251.03. The earlier panel decision focused, instead, on

whether subsection (B)(1) called for a subjective or objective standard in determining that Morris

was “experiencing an overdose.” Morris v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 257, 268-77 (2022).

Writing for the panel majority, I concluded that the statute applied a subjective standard. Id.

The dissent thought that an objective standard applied. Id. at 287-96 (Russell, J., dissenting).

During en-banc review, the Commonwealth argued for the first time that Morris was not immune

from prosecution because he did not remain at the scene of the overdose, as required by

subsection (B)(2). In reversing the panel and affirming the trial court, the Court here properly

relies on that argument under the right-for-a-different-reason doctrine, consistent with our

obligation to “look for the best and fewest grounds on which to resolve this appeal.” Theologis v.

Weiler, 76 Va. App. 596, 603 (2023).

I do agree with Judge Callins that the majority’s plain-language reading of subsection

(B)(2) will lead to odd results when, for example, a person suffering an overdose within walking

distance of an emergency room is denied immunity if he walks there himself, rather than calling

the police or waiting for medical transport. Still, the majority has the better reading of the

statutory text that drives that conclusion, and I therefore concur in the majority’s opinion.

I write separately to address the issues that go unresolved here, which may arise in future

litigation and which the General Assembly may wish to clarify.

- 11 -

I.

Since New Mexico enacted the first medical-amnesty law in 2007, see 2007 N.M. Laws

260, every State in the country has followed suit except Kansas and Wyoming.6 States have

taken different approaches to incentivize seeking medical help for persons overdosing on drugs

or alcohol. Some permit defendants to use the summoning of medical help in response to an

overdose event as a mitigating circumstance at sentencing; some permit the defendant to raise the

summoning of assistance as an affirmative defense to criminal liability; and some provide

immunity from arrest and prosecution.7

One 2020 survey noted that such statutes are “[o]ften called ‘medical amnesty laws’

(MALs), ‘medical immunity laws,’ or ‘Good Samaritan laws.’”8 Some States have called them

“Good Samaritan Overdose Laws” or “911 Immunity Laws,” Morris, 75 Va. App. at 266

(quoting Nicole Schill, The Fatal Shortcomings of Our Good Samaritan Overdose Statutes and

Proposed Model Statute, 25 Cardozo J. Equal Rts. & Soc. Just. 123, 126 (2018)), even though

these statutes typically protect the victim as well as the good Samaritan, and even if help arrives

without calling 911. Until the General Assembly tells us what to call Code § 18.2-251.03, I find

that “medical amnesty” best captures the essence of the statute in the fewest words. As this

Court explained six years ago, “[t]he clear purpose of the statute is to provide what amounts to a

6

For helpful jurisdictional surveys, see Legislative Analysis & Public Policy Association,

Good Samaritan Fatal Overdose Prevention and Drug-Induced Homicide: State Laws (Dec.

2021), http://legislativeanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/GOODSA1.pdf; Government

Accounting Office, Most States Have Good Samaritan Laws and Research Indicates They May

Have Positive Effects (Mar. 2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-248.pdf.

7

See GAO Report, supra note 6, at 12-13; see also Nicole Schill, The Fatal

Shortcomings of Our Good Samaritan Overdose Statutes and Proposed Model Statute, 25

Cardozo J. Equal Rts. & Soc. Just. 123, 138-42 (2018).

8

See Thomas M. Griner, et al., State-by-State Examination of Overdose Medical Amnesty

Laws, 40 J. Legal Med. 171, 174 (2020).

- 12 -

‘safe harbor’ from prosecution to encourage the provision of prompt emergency medical

treatment to those who have suffered an overdose as a result of ingesting a controlled substance.”

Broadous v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 265, 271 (2017).

As enacted in 2015, Virginia’s statute first followed the “affirmative defense” approach.

2015 Va. Acts chs. 418, 436 (codified at Code § 18.2-251.03). As Broadous recognized, the

General Assembly “obviously made a policy determination that encouraging others, who may

themselves be guilty of violating the laws involving controlled substances, to call 911 in an effort

to save a life is more important than their prosecution.” 67 Va. App. at 271. Still, we concluded

that the statute’s plain language did “not extend the affirmative defense protection to another

individual who merely receives emergency medical attention because someone else reported the

overdose.” Id. at 272.

The General Assembly has revisited the statute three times since then, each time

expanding its protections. The 2019 amendment eliminated a requirement that the defendant

must have cooperated in any criminal investigation relating to the substance that caused the

overdose. 2019 Va. Acts ch. 626 (deleting Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(4)).

The 2020 amendment made two more changes. 2020 Va. Acts ch. 1016. It upgraded the

nature of the amnesty from an “affirmative defense” to an immunity from “arrest or

prosecution.” Code § 18.2-251.03(B) (Supp. 2020). The amendment also superseded the ruling

in Broadous, extending immunity to a person who “is experiencing an overdose” when “another

individual, in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency medical attention for such individual.” See

Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(ii); McCarthy v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 630, 646 (2021)

(describing the 2020 amendments).

The 2021 amendment further expanded the amnesty provided to good Samaritans. The

amendment immunizes a person who, “in good faith, renders emergency care or assistance,

- 13 -

including cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or the administration of naloxone or other opioid

antagonist for overdose reversal, to an individual experiencing an overdose while another

individual seeks or obtains emergency medical attention in accordance with this subdivision.”

2021 Va. Acts Sp. Sess. I ch. 29 (codified at Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(iii)).

Because State medical-amnesty laws like ours are relatively new, numerous questions

about their scope and interpretation need to be resolved to clarify how these laws should operate

in practice. This case has revealed a number of those legal wrinkles.

II.

The Court’s resolution of this appeal on a single narrow ground leaves unanswered the

main question briefed by the parties during en-banc review: does an objective or subjective

standard govern whether a person is “experiencing an overdose” within the meaning of Code

§ 18.2-251.03(B)(1)? Three possible standards could apply: two of them are objective; one is

subjective.

The first possibility would be a “scientifically objective standard”: the trier of fact must

be persuaded that the person experiencing an overdose was, in fact, overdosing. To date, no

State appears to have adopted that standard, although one dissenting judge recently argued for it.

See State v. Rowe, 354 So. 3d 1187, 1196 (La. 2022) (Crain, J., dissenting). As Justice Crain

explained, “‘Overdose’ is a medical term requiring medical evidence to prove.” Id. He would

have held that Louisiana’s statute provided immunity only when the defendant or the person he

was trying to save was suffering “an actual ‘overdose,’” not when the victim “only appears to

have overdosed.” Id. at 1197. But the majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected that

standard, noting that such a “narrow and highly-technical reading subverts the purpose of the

law, which is to remove the fear of prosecution and to encourage bystanders to seek help.” Id. at

1194.

- 14 -

If a third party fears that an apparent overdose may not be severe

enough to later receive confirmation by a medical expert, the

witness might equivocate about calling 911. The chilling effect of

the application of the law endorsed by the [court of appeals]

majority in this case could counteract the very problem sought to

be addressed by the provision.

Id.

The earlier panel opinion here noted the same problem. See Morris, 75 Va. App. at 274-

75. As I wrote for the majority, a scientifically objective standard would frustrate our statute’s

“‘clear purpose . . . to encourage . . . prompt emergency medical treatment’ for overdose

victims.” Id. at 274 (alterations in original) (quoting Broadous, 67 Va. App. at 271). To have

immunity, the defendant would have to prove—likely through medical evidence and expert

testimony—that he was in fact overdosing, or that the victim for whom he called for emergency

medical assistance was overdosing. That high bar would discourage reporting; it would chill

overdose victims from seeking help and deter good Samaritans from calling for help for fear of

their own liability for drug possession. Id. at 274-75.

The second possible standard would be a reasonable-person standard: would a reasonable

person in the defendant’s position have believed that he was experiencing an overdose, or that

the victim for whom he called for assistance was experiencing an overdose? Thirty-five States

have codified a reasonable-person standard in their medical-amnesty laws.9 The reasonable-

9

See Ark. Code Ann. § 20-13-1703 (“that a reasonable person would believe to be

resulting from, the consumption or use” of alcohol or drugs (emphasis added)); Cal. Health &

Safety Code § 11376.5(e) (“a reasonable person of ordinary knowledge would believe the

condition to be a drug-related overdose that may result in death, disability, or serious injury”

(emphasis added)); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-279(d) (exempting “any person (1) who in good faith,

seeks medical assistance for another person who such person reasonably believes is experiencing

an overdose . . . , (2) for whom another person, in good faith, seeks medical assistance,

reasonably believing such person is experiencing an overdose . . . , or (3) who reasonably

believes he or she is experiencing an overdose” (emphases added)); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16,

§ 4769(a)(2) (“if a layperson could reasonably believe that the condition is in fact an overdose

and requires medical assistance” (emphasis added)); D.C. Code § 7-403(a)(1)(A)-(C) (protecting

- 15 -

“a person who: (A) Reasonably believes that he or she is experiencing a drug or alcohol-related

overdose . . . .; (B) Reasonably believes that another person is experiencing a drug or alcohol-

related overdose . . . .; (C) Is reasonably believed to be experiencing a drug or alcohol-related

overdose . . .; or (D) Is a bystander to a situation described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C)”

(emphases added)); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-5(a)(1) (“that a reasonable person would believe to

be resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance or dangerous drug by the

distressed individual” (emphasis added)); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 329-43.6(a)(2) (“that a layperson

would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that requires medical assistance”

(emphasis added)); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(12) (“an individual who reasonably

appeared to be in need of medical assistance due to the use of alcohol or a controlled substance”

(emphasis added)); Iowa Code § 124.418(1)(a)(3) (“The person’s condition is the result of, or a

prudent layperson would reasonably believe such condition to be the result of, the consumption

or use of a controlled substance.” (emphasis added)); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.133(1)(a)

(“that a layperson would reasonably believe requires medical assistance” (emphasis added)); Md.

Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 1-210(c) (“reasonably believes that the person is experiencing a

medical emergency after ingesting or using alcohol or drugs” (emphasis added)); Mich. Comp.

Laws § 333.7403(7)(a) (“that a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug overdose that

requires medical assistance” (emphasis added)); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.05, Subd. 5 (“that a

layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug overdose that requires immediate medical

assistance” (emphasis added)); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-149.1(2)(a) (“that a layperson would

reasonably believe to be resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance or

dangerous drug for which medical assistance is required” (emphasis added)); Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 195.205(1) (“that a person would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that

requires medical assistance” (emphasis added)); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-472(6) (“which condition a

layperson would reasonably believe requires emergency medical assistance” (emphasis added));

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453C.150(5) (“that an ordinary layperson would reasonably believe to be a

drug or alcohol overdose that requires medical assistance” (emphasis added)); N.H. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 318-B:28-b(I)(a) (“an acute condition resulting from or believed to be resulting from the

use of a controlled drug which a layperson would reasonably believe requires medical

assistance” (emphasis added)); N.Y. Penal Law § 220.78(3)(a) (“if a prudent layperson,

possessing an average knowledge of medicine and health, could reasonably believe that the

condition is in fact a drug or alcohol overdose and (except as to death) requires health care”

(emphasis added)); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-96.2(a) (“that a layperson would reasonably

believe to be a drug overdose that requires medical assistance” (emphasis added)); N.D. Cent.

Code § 19-03.1-23.4 (“the overdosed individual must have been in a condition a layperson would

reasonably believe to be a drug overdose requiring immediate medical assistance” (emphasis

added); Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-413.1(A)(1) (directing peace officer not to take person into

custody for “offense involving a controlled dangerous substance . . . if the peace officer . . .

reasonably believes that . . . the person requested emergency medical assistance for an individual

who reasonably appeared to be in need of medical assistance due to the use of a controlled

dangerous substance” (emphases added)); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.898(7)(b) (“that a person

would reasonably believe to be a condition that requires medical attention” (emphasis added));

35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113.7(f) (“a prudent layperson, possessing an average knowledge of

medicine and health, would reasonably believe that the condition is in fact a drug overdose and

requires immediate medical attention” (emphasis added)); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-1910(2)

- 16 -

person standard is objective because it does not turn on whether the defendant subjectively

believed that he was overdosing or that the person for whom he called for help was overdosing.10

(“that a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that requires

medical assistance” (emphasis added)); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20A-109(1) (“that a person

would reasonably believe to be a drug overdose that requires medical assistance” (emphasis

added)); Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-156(a)(2) (“that a reasonable person would believe to be

resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance or other substance by the

distressed individual” (emphasis added)); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(16)(a)(i) (“reasonably

believes that the person or another person is experiencing an overdose event due to . . . a

controlled substance or other substance” (emphasis added)); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4254(a)(1)

(“that a layperson would reasonably believe requires medical assistance” (emphasis added));

W. Va. Code § 16-47-4(a) (“a person who reasonably appears to be experiencing an overdose

(emphasis added)); Wis. Stat. § 961.443(1)(a) (“if a reasonable person would believe him or her

to be, suffering from an overdose of, or other adverse reaction to, any controlled substance”

(emphasis added)).

Some States that use a reasonable-person standard have other provisions suggesting a

hybrid approach. Compare Mont. Code Ann. § 50-32-609(1)(a) (protecting good Samaritan who

“seeks medical assistance for another person who is experiencing an actual or reasonably

perceived drug-related overdose” (emphasis added)), with id. § 50-32-609(1)(b) (protecting

defendant “who experiences a drug-related overdose and is in need of medical assistance”). See

also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-711(5) (“that a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug or

alcohol overdose that requires medical assistance” (emphasis added)). But see People v.

Harrison, 465 P.3d 16, 23 (Colo. 2020) (holding that Colorado’s statute requires “requires both

that a person report in good faith what she subjectively perceives is an acute condition caused by

the consumption or use of drugs or alcohol and that a layperson would reasonably believe that

the reported condition is a drug or alcohol overdose needing medical assistance”).

Louisiana has a textually different standard for alcohol- than drug-overdose events.

Compare La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:403.9(A)(1) (directing peace officer not to take person into

custody for “offense involving alcohol” if the peace officer “reasonably believes” that the person

in good faith “requested emergency medical assistance for an individual who reasonably

appeared to be in need of medical assistance” (emphases added)), with La. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 14:403.10(B)(1) (providing immunity for drug-possession offenses for “person who

experiences a drug-related overdose and is in need of medical assistance” (emphasis added)).

But see Rowe, 354 So. 3d at 1195 (harmonizing those two code sections by imposing a

reasonable-person gloss on § 14:403.10(B)).

10

Cf. Allison v. Brown, 293 Va. 617, 629 n.5 (2017) (describing an “objective standard”

in the context of informed-consent law by reference to what “a reasonably prudent person in the

plaintiff’s position” would have done, while a “subjective standard” asks what “this patient”

would have done); Pergolizzi v. Bowman, 76 Va. App. 310, 338 (2022) (noting that the objective

standard may still account for the party’s subjective belief in determining what a reasonable

person in the same position would have done).

- 17 -

The third possible standard would be a subjective one: did the defendant subjectively

believe that he was overdosing or that the victim for whom he sought medical assistance was

overdosing? As the Commonwealth acknowledged at oral argument, several State medical-

amnesty laws use a subjective standard. For instance, Florida’s law immunizes a person who

seeks medical assistance for himself if the defendant “experiences, or has a good faith belief that

he or she is experiencing, an alcohol-related or a drug-related overdose and receives medical

assistance.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 893.21(3) (emphasis added). A similar standard applies when the

defendant seeks medical assistance for a third person “believed to be experiencing” an overdose.

Id. § 893.21(1). Maine uses the term “suspected drug-related overdose” in its immunity statute.

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1111-B. And Texas uses “possible overdose” in its affirmative-

defense statutes. See, e.g., Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.115(g), 481.041(e).

Which of those three standards best describes Virginia’s medical-amnesty statute?

Virginia extends medical amnesty to a defendant who, “in good faith, seeks or obtains

emergency medical attention (a) for himself, if he is experiencing an overdose, or (b) for another

individual, if such other individual is experiencing an overdose.” Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(i).

Immunity is also available to a defendant who “is experiencing an overdose and another

individual, in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency medical attention for such individual.”

Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(ii). Virginia is not alone. Eight other States use variations of the

- 18 -

“experiencing an overdose” formulation in their medical-amnesty laws.11 Courts in those

jurisdictions have not yet determined, however, whether such language imposes a subjective

standard, a reasonable-person standard, or a scientifically objective standard.

The three-judge panel here divided on that question. Compare Morris, 75 Va. App. at

268-77 (opinion by Raphael, J.), with id. at 290-96 (Russell, J., dissenting). I continue to believe

that it creates a subjective standard for the reasons explained before. But I acknowledge that

reasonable jurists can disagree about that.

In light of that uncertainty, our General Assembly may wish to clarify whether

experiencing an overdose calls for a subjective or an objective standard. It could make

unmistakably clear that the standard is subjective. For instance, Florida’s statute asks whether

the defendant “has a good faith belief that he or she is experiencing” an overdose, Fla. Stat. Ann.

§ 893.21(2), a subjective inquiry. It could adopt a reasonable-person standard, like most of our

sister States have done. See supra note 9. Or it could follow Justice Crain’s dissenting view in

Rowe and make clear that scientific evidence of an actual overdose is required.

Without such clarification, however, doubt will linger. The Attorney General pointed out

during our en-banc argument that the General Assembly used a “believed to be experiencing”

formulation in a different part of the Code; Code § 54.1-3408 authorizes medical professionals in

specified cases to “dispense naloxone or other opioid antagonist . . . for overdose reversal to a

11

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3423(A) (“someone experiencing a drug-related

overdose”); Idaho Code Ann. § 37-2739C(2) (“experiences a drug-related medical emergency”);

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.11(B)(2)(a)(viii) (“who is experiencing a drug overdose”); Mass.

Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 94C, § 34A(b) (“who experiences a drug-related overdose”); N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:35-30(a), (b)(1) (“someone experiencing a drug overdose”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-31(a)

(“who experiences a drug overdose”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-27.1(B) (“who experiences an

alcohol- or drug-related overdose”); R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28.9-4(a) (“someone experiencing a

drug or alcohol overdose”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 69.50.315(2) (“who experiences a drug-

related overdose”).

- 19 -

person who is believed to be experiencing or about to experience a life-threatening opioid

overdose.” Code § 54.1-3408(X) (emphasis added). Our jurisprudence has often noted that such

drafting differences are meaningful.12 The omission of that believed-to-be-experiencing

formulation in Code § 18.2-251.03 unquestionably adds doubt to how our medical-amnesty

statute should be interpreted.13

Today’s en-banc decision leaves these important questions for another day. The answer

will have to come through future litigation or, better yet, clarifying language from the General

Assembly.

III.

Another question raised by this case but not answered today is who bears the burden of

proof when determining whether the defendant is entitled to immunity. Courts in other States

have divided on that issue. Compare People v. Harrison, 465 P.3d 16, 23 (Colo. 2020) (“[T]he

prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was not legally

authorized by the affirmative defense.”), with People v. O’Malley, 183 N.E.3d 928, 935-36

(Ill. App. Ct. 2021) (imposing burden of production and persuasion on defendant), appeal

denied, 175 N.E.3d 148 (Ill. 2021), State v. W.S.B., 180 A.3d 1168, 1183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

12

See, e.g., Morgan v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Dec. 29, 2022) (“[W]hen the

General Assembly has used specific language in one instance but omits that language or uses

different language when addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the Code, [the Court] must

presume that the difference in the choice of language was intentional.” (second alteration in

original) (quoting Zinone v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 282 Va. 330, 337 (2011))).

13

The absence of such language, however, does not necessarily prove that the unadorned

“experiencing an overdose” formulation is an objective one. It simply begs the question of

whether the unadorned version imposes a subjective standard to begin with. Even assuming that

the standard is objective, that still would not tell us whether to apply a scientifically objective

standard or a reasonable-person standard. Any doubt about the proper construction, moreover,

would have to be resolved in favor of the defendant under both the rule of lenity and the doctrine

of liberally construing remedial statutes. See Morris, 75 Va. App. at 273-74.

- 20 -

Div. 2018) (same), and State v. Williams, 888 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (same). That

question was not answered here because both sides assumed that Morris bore the burden of

proving his entitlement to immunity under the statute. See Morris, 75 Va. App. at 280 n.10.

A related question is whether it makes any practical difference that the 2020 amendment,

2020 Va. Acts ch. 1016, changed Virginia’s medical-amnesty law from an “affirmative defense”

statute to one that makes the defendant “immune from prosecution,” Code § 18.2-251.03(E).

That immunity means that a covered defendant will not be “subject to arrest or prosecution” on

drug- or alcohol-possession charges. Code § 18.2-251.03(B). It is unclear, however, how that

apparently stronger protection works in practice.

Still, the parties’ assumption here that the defendant bears the burden of production and

persuasion was probably correct under Code § 18.2-263. That statute imposes “the burden of

proof” on the defendant to establish “any exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption contained in

this article [Article 1, Drugs] or in the Drug Control Act [Code §§ 54.1-3000 to -3472].” Code

§ 18.2-263. The medical-amnesty statute resides in Article 1 of title 18.2. So Code § 18.2-263

appears to impose the burdens of both production and persuasion on the defendant. The General

Assembly did not say otherwise when it converted the medical-amnesty law from an affirmative-

defense statute to an immunity statute.

When the defendant bears the burden of persuasion, it is perilous to proceed by proffer,

as Morris did here. The statute calls for an inquiry into whether the alleged-overdose condition

was one “resulting” from drug or alcohol use, Code § 18.2-251.03(A), whether the defendant “in

good faith” sought emergency medical attention, § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(i), and whether the

defendant or the person for whom he was seeking emergency attention was “experiencing an

overdose,” id. As Judge Callins demonstrates in her concurrence, these issues may involve

tricky causation questions. Given the array of elements needed to establish immunity, an

- 21 -

evidentiary hearing may provide a better vehicle than a proffer to enable the factfinder to see the

evidence, hear the witnesses’ testimony, and make appropriate factual findings and credibility

determinations.

IV.

Today’s decision also leaves open for another day the extent to which drug-induced

suicidal ideation qualifies as an “overdose” within the meaning of the statute. All members of

the prior three-judge panel agreed that suicidal ideation may qualify, depending on the

circumstances. See Morris, 75 Va. App. at 277-78 & n.9 (opinion by Raphael, J., joined by

Ortiz, J.); id. at 297 n.24 (Russell, J., dissenting). The Commonwealth agreed, as long as a clear

causal link is shown. See Brief for the Commonwealth En Banc at 32 n.16 (“The

Commonwealth’s position is . . . that suicidal ideations cannot satisfy the statute (absent a

showing of a direct causal, perhaps neurological, link).”).

States have taken different approaches to defining “overdose” in their medical-amnesty

laws. Virginia’s statute defines an overdose by reference to a measurable standard: “a life-

threatening condition resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, alcohol,

or any combination of such substances.” Code § 18.2-251.03(A) (emphasis added). Several

States use a similar standard. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.71.311(b) (“life-threatening

emergency”); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 570/414(a) (“life-threatening emergency”). Other States

identify conditions short of life-threatening ones that also qualify as an overdose, such as an

“acute medical condition” that might result in “disability” or “serious injury,” Cal. Health &

Safety Code § 11376.5(e); “an acute condition” that “a layperson would reasonably believe

requires medical assistance,” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318-B:28-b(I)(a); or simply “a condition a

layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug overdose requiring immediate medical

assistance,” N.D. Cent. Code § 19-03.1-23.4.

- 22 -

Many States have defined an overdose by creating a list of conditions that qualify. For

instance, Arkansas defines an overdose as a drug- or alcohol-induced “acute condition . . .

including without limitation: (A) Extreme physical illness; (B) Decreased level of consciousness;

(C) Respiratory depression; (D) Coma; (E) Mania; or (F) Death.” Ark. Code Ann.

§ 20-13-1703(1). Most States using this approach, like Arkansas, make clear that the listed

symptoms are only examples of overdose conditions, not an exclusive list.14 Although none of

our sister States specifically mentions suicidal ideation when listing such examples, twenty

States include “mania.”15 And more than a dozen of those list “hysteria” as well.16

Some States follow a hybrid approach, combining a standard that defines when an

overdose occurs with a list of sample conditions. Some follow an either-or model. Hawaii, for

14

See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-711(5) (“including, but not limited to”); Del. Code Ann. tit.

16, § 4769(a)(2) (same); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-5(a)(1) (same); Iowa Code § 124.418(1)(a)

(same); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.05, Subd. 5 (“an acute condition, including”); Miss. Code Ann.

§ 41-29-149.1(2)(a) (“including, but not limited to”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 195.205(1)(1) (same);

W. Va. Code § 16-47-3(1) (same). But see D.C. Code § 7-403(i)(3) (“an acute condition of

physical illness, coma, mania, hysteria, seizure, cardiac arrest, cessation of breathing, or death,

which is or reasonably appears to be the result of consumption or use of drugs or alcohol and

relates to an adverse reaction to or the quantity ingested of the drugs or alcohol, or to a substance

with which the drugs or alcohol was combined”).

15

See Ark. Code Ann. § 20-13-1703(1)(E); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-711(5); Del. Code

Ann. tit. 16, § 4769(a)(2); D.C. Code § 7-403(i)(3); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-5(a)(1); Haw. Rev.

Stat. § 329-43.6(a)(1); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.133(1)(a); Mich. Comp. Laws

§§ 333.7403(7)(a), 333.7404(6)(a); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.05, Subd. 5; Miss. Code Ann.

§ 41-29-149.1(2)(a); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 195.205(1)(1); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-472(6); N.C. Gen.

Stat. Ann. § 90-96.2(a); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453C.150(5); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 220.78(3)(a),

90-96.2(a); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.898(7)(b); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113.7(f); S.C. Code

Ann. § 44-53-1910(2); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20A-109(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-156(a)(2);

W. Va. Code § 16-47-3(1).

16

See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-711(5); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4769(a)(2); D.C. Code

§ 7-403(i)(3); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 218A.133(1)(a); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.05, Subd. 5; Neb.

Rev. Stat. § 28-472(6); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.898(7)(b); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113.7(f);

N.Y. Penal Law §§ 220.78(3)(a), 90-96.2(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-96.2(a); S.C. Code Ann.

§ 44-53-1910(2); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20A-109(1); W. Va. Code § 16-47-3(1).

- 23 -

example, defines a drug or alcohol overdose as either (1) “A condition, including but not limited

to extreme physical illness, decreased level of consciousness, respiratory depression, coma,

mania, or death, that is the result of consumption or use of a controlled substance or alcohol,” or

(2) “A condition that a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that

requires medical assistance.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 329-43.6(a).17 Other States require both

showings. Thus, Kentucky defines an overdose as “[1] an acute condition of physical illness,

coma, mania, hysteria, seizure, cardiac arrest, cessation of breathing, or death which reasonably

appears to be the result of consumption or use of a controlled substance . . . and [2] that a

layperson would reasonably believe requires medical assistance.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 218A.133(1)(a) (emphasis added).18

The General Assembly, of course, is better suited than the judiciary to decide whether

overdose is best defined by a standard, a list of conditions, or both. It is also best suited to

evaluate the medical evidence surrounding the connection between drug use and acute medical

conditions, including suicidal ideation. In the meantime, under the standard in our current

medical-amnesty law, an urge to kill oneself—at least depending on the degree of the impulse

and its causal relation to the drugs ingested—certainly appears to qualify as an overdose

17

For States with similar either-or approaches, see Mich. Comp. Laws

§§ 333.7403(7)(a), 333.7404(6)(a); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 453C.150(5); N.Y. Penal Law

§ 220.78(3)(a); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113.7(f).

18

For other States using this both-and approach, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-472(6); N.C.

Gen. Stat. Ann. § 90-96.2(a); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 475.898(7)(b); S.C. Code Ann.

§ 44-53-1910(2); S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20A-109(1); Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-156(a)(2).

- 24 -

condition—“a life-threatening condition resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled

substance, alcohol, or any combination of such substances.” Code § 18.2-251.03(A).

***

In a recent report mandated by Congress, the General Accounting Office reviewed 17

studies on the effectiveness of State “Good Samaritan Laws.” See Government Accounting

Office, Most States Have Good Samaritan Laws and Research Indicates They May Have Positive

Effects (Mar. 2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-248.pdf.19 The GAO “found a

consistent pattern between enactment of Good Samaritan laws and lower rates of overdose

deaths,” but “the effectiveness of these laws is likely to vary across jurisdictions based on several

factors.” Id. at 25. Those factors include “public awareness of Good Samaritan laws,” the

public’s “willingness to call 911,” and “law enforcement knowledge.” Id. at 25-27. The GAO

also noted that State laws differ across the country in whether they offer immunity from arrest or

prosecution, an affirmative defense to criminal liability, or a mitigating factor in sentencing. Id.

at 12. The report did not identify any data, however, to illuminate how differences among State

laws might correlate with reduced overdose deaths.

Predicting that relationship calls for legislative judgment that falls outside the judiciary’s

wheelhouse. This case has identified some of the key interpretive questions that remain open

under Virginia’s medical-amnesty law. Future cases may provide the opportunity to litigate

them. But the General Assembly is in the best position to provide definitive answers. And it can

do so by making judgments that we cannot make, given that our “judicial review does not

19

The GAO report was required by the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of

2016, § 703, Pub. Law No. 114-198, 130 Stat. 695, 741 (2016). The Act defined a “Good

Samaritan law” as “law of a State or unit of local government that exempts from criminal or civil

liability any individual who administers an opioid overdose reversal drug or device, or who

contacts emergency services providers in response to an overdose.” Id. § 703(b)(3)(1).

- 25 -

evaluate ‘the propriety, wisdom, necessity and expediency of legislation.’” Appalachian Power

Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Aug. 18, 2022) (quoting Willis v. Mullett, 263 Va.

653, 658 (2002)).

- 26 -

Callins, J., concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the majority that Morris does not meet the requirements to qualify for

immunity under Code § 18.2-251.03. But I write separately because I see narrower grounds

upon which to affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419

(2017) (“As we have often said, ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases

‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth

v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015))). The majority holds that Morris does not qualify for

immunity because he left the “scene of the overdose,” in contravention of Code

§ 18.2-251.03(B)(2). I would hold that Morris’s proffer was insufficient to establish a causal

nexus between his ingestion of a controlled substance and the overdose. See Code

§ 18.2-251.03(A).

Affirming on this alternative ground would foreclose the need to grapple with the

grammar in the (B)(2) requirement in Code § 18.2-251.03. The majority’s interpretation of this

requirement would render the entire statute inconsistent. See Oraee v. Breeding, 270 Va. 488,

498 (2005) (“[W]e have a duty, whenever possible, ‘to interpret the several parts of a statute as a

consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.’” (quoting Va. Elec. &

Power Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Supervisors of Prince William Cnty., 226 Va. 382, 388 (1983))). Thus,

this narrower pathway to an affirmance would “affect[] the least number of cases,” Butcher v.

Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392, 396 (2020), and align with our commitment to judicial restraint.

I. The trial court did not err in finding that Morris does not meet the requirements to

qualify for immunity under Code § 18.2-251.03.

Upon hearing argument on the application of Code § 18.2-251.03, the trial court posed

the following questions to counsel:

[E]ven if it’s determined that [Morris] is suicidal . . . does there not

have to be [s]ome kind of causation between the suicidal thoughts

- 27 -

and the overdose as opposed to some other reason? . . . Is there a

requirement that the suicidal thoughts life threatening situation was

caused by drugs and the overdose situation?

The trial court was unconvinced by Morris’s affirmative answer. Indeed, the trial court expressly

found that Morris’s proffer failed to show that Morris’s suicidal ideations were caused by his

ingestion of drugs. The trial court concluded,

But even though he said that he was ingesting, even though

he said he was thinking about killing himself, does not mean he

was suicidal in and of itself. I think there has to be something a

little bit more than just his expression that he’s thinking about

killing himself and that he’s thinking about that because of the use

of drugs.

[Morris is] a lay person. . . . [H]e doesn’t have the

qualifications from the facts presented to the Court to make that

determination. No more than somebody showing up and saying

my arm hurts, I have a pain in my heart region, because I ate

something this morning. No, the doctor is going to run tests and

make sure it’s not a heart attack. Just because a patient shows up

at the emergency room and says they have a symptom because of

something else, does not make it so. And the Court cannot rely on

that to make a legal determination.

So for those reasons, I am going to find that Mr. Morris has

failed to establish that he was experiencing a life-threatening

condition such that he can receive the benefit of Code Section

18.2-251.03.

The trial court did not go so far as to state that expert testimony is required to establish a causal

link between the ingestion of a drug and overdose.20 But neither did the trial court find that

20

Notwithstanding the trial court’s comments, it also noted that it only had available to it

the proffer of Morris’s “expression” and explained that “there has to be something a little bit

more than just his expression that he’s thinking about killing himself and that he’s thinking about

that because of the use of drugs.” Affirming the trial court’s finding that there was insufficient

evidence included in Morris’s proffer to establish a causal link does not foreclose the possibility

that such a link could be established with non-medical evidence.

In addition, the trial court found that expert testimony is not a necessary prerequisite to

establish an overdose, stating,

- 28 -

Morris’s proffer laid an evidentiary foundation sufficient to support his claim. The trial court did

not err in its finding that Morris did not qualify for the protections under Code § 18.2-251.03

because the evidence did not establish a firm causal link showing that Morris’s drug use caused

the suicidal ideation.21 While it is true that the two occurrences—the drug use and the suicide

ideation—were bounded together by time, the evidence falls short of showing a connection

between the two. And although, according to the proffer, Morris connected the drug use and the

suicidal ideations, the factfinder was entitled to disbelieve this uncorroborated tender. See

Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011). The evidence offered no insight into

when the onset of suicidal thoughts occurred and what precise role, if any, the drugs had in

causing those thoughts.

II. An alternative interpretation of (B)(2) that effects the intent of the legislature.

Rather than affirming on this ground, the majority stakes its analysis on Code

§ 18.2-251.03(B)(2), holding that “[t]o receive immunity from prosecution, the statute required

I’m not going to go so far as to say that [evidence of a

life-threatening condition] can only be presented through medical

personnel so that anybody presenting this motion has to summons

a doctor to Court. And it doesn’t have to be satisfied with direct

evidence. I think you can infer from the evidence that there is a

life-threatening situation.

Although I would hold that medical evidence is unnecessary to find either that an overdose has

taken place or a causal nexus between ingestion of a drug and an overdose, under these

circumstances, the trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence before it.

21

It is because Morris did not request an evidentiary hearing that the evidence before the

trial court was limited to Morris’s deficient proffer. As it did here, a trial court may find such a

proffer insufficient to show that Code § 18.2-251.03 applies, if it fails to establish a causal link

between an overdose and drug use. Cf. McCarthy v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 630, 649

(2021) (“Because that person could no longer be ‘subject to arrest or prosecution’ under the

current version of the statute, the person would at a minimum be able to seek some sort of

pre-trial relief when the prosecution is initiated and need no longer wait until trial to prove an

affirmative defense.”).

- 29 -

Morris to remain wherever he began experiencing the drug-induced life-threatening condition.”

As recognized, (B)(2) requires that an individual “remain[] at the scene of the overdose or at any

alternative location to which he or the person requiring emergency medical attention has been

transported . . . .” Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(2) (emphasis added). But for two reasons, I find that

the majority has settled on an interpretation of (B)(2) that essentially defeats the intent and

purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute, that is—as this Court unanimously agrees—to

save lives.

a. The (B)(2) and (B)(1) requirements must be harmonized.

First, the majority focuses on the use of the passive “has been” to hold that Morris cannot

receive immunity under the statute because he drove himself to the hospital. While the

majority’s interpretation of (B)(2) passes grammatical muster, it strictly adheres to the rules of

grammatical voice to the detriment of the entire statute. This interpretation of the (B)(2)

requirement fails to harmonize with other provisions in the statute. Specifically, (B)(1) provides

that the statute applies if “[s]uch individual (i) in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency medical

attention (a) for himself, if he is experiencing an overdose . . . .” Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)

(emphasis added). (B)(1) allows individuals to receive immunity if they seek or obtain

emergency medical attention for themselves when experiencing an overdose. Focusing on the

phrase “has been transported” in (B)(2) significantly impinges on (B)(1)’s protections for

individuals seeking or obtaining emergency medical care, where seeking or obtaining that care

would require leaving the scene of the overdose.

Under the majority’s interpretation, a person who overdoses a block away from a hospital

would not be able to walk over to the hospital to receive help and still receive protection under

the statute. Similarly, a lone individual who overdoses without access to a phone or a cellular

signal, and thus without the ability to call for help, could not seek or obtain needed emergency

- 30 -

medical care without forfeiting immunity under Code § 18.2-251.03. These examples reveal the

friction between the majority’s reading of (B)(2) and the protections in (B)(1).

As the majority notes, the statute’s “clear purpose” is to “encourage . . . prompt

emergency medical treatment [for] those who have suffered an overdose as a result of ingesting a

controlled substance.” Broadous v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 265, 271 (2017). The

majority’s holding conflicts with this legislative goal. Its reading of the statute would preclude

individuals from seeking or obtaining the emergency medical attention provided for in (B)(1),

rather than facilitate it, leaving those individuals in the same position that they would have been

in the statute’s absence. As such, this reading is neither consistent with (B)(1) nor with the

broader legislative goals encoded into Code § 18.2-251.03.

“[W]hile legislative intent ‘must be gathered from the words used, . . . unreasonable or

absurd results must not be reached by too strict adherence to literal interpretation.’” Colbert v.

Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 390, 394 (2006) (second alteration in original) (quoting Buzzard v.

Commonwealth, 134 Va. 641, 653 (1922)). The majority’s strict reading of (B)(2) results in an

inconsistency that impairs (B)(1), without an explanation of why the phrase “has been

transported” should take precedence over “seeks or obtains emergency medical attention.” The

majority acknowledges if there were “context suggesting the legislature intended a different

result,” it would impact their construction of (B)(2). The plain language of (B)(1) supplies

ample evidence that the legislature intended a different result. See Delaune v. Commonwealth,

76 Va. App. 372, 381 (2023) (“[O]ur primary objective is ‘to ascertain and give effect to

legislative intent,’ as expressed by the language used in the statute.” (alteration in original)

(quoting Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425 (2012))); see also

Colbert, 47 Va. App. at 394 (“The proper course [in] all these cases is to search out and follow

the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt that sense of the words which harmonizes best with

- 31 -

the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the

legislature.” (alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. Rhea, 130 Va. 345, 372 (1921))).

Accordingly, this strict adherence to literal interpretation renders a result that gives

priority to grammatical voice over the substantive terms of the statute, using the statute’s reliance

on the passive voice to vitiate (B)(1) to a point such that what remains is a near husk of a statute,

which fails to deliver on the legislature’s intent. However, there is an alternative that avoids

rendering the statute internally inconsistent. Rather than use The Chicago Manual of Style to

fashion an interpretation of (B)(2)’s use of the passive voice that impairs the statute, it is possible

to harmonize the substantive, clear terms of (B)(1) with (B)(2)’s use of the passive voice by

finding that (B)(2) echoes or amplifies (B)(1). This interpretive approach gives utility to both

subdivisions as opposed to rendering the earlier (B)(1) meaningless in light of the latter (B)(2).

Thus, I would take a harmonizing approach to interpret (B)(2)’s use of the passive voice in light

of the clear terms in (B)(1), holding that individuals who transport themselves to an alternative

location for medical attention satisfy the requirement in (B)(2) that “[s]uch individual remain[] at

the scene of the overdose or at any alternative location to which he . . . has been transported[.]”

Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(2).

b. The majority’s interpretation of (B)(2) is unworkable on its own terms.

Second, even as it acknowledges that pinning down the precise location of Morris’s

overdose sets before this Court an impracticable task, the majority nevertheless opines that “the

purported overdose was necessarily a location where Morris was before he decided to seek

medical care, and thus somewhere other than where he stopped the car in the middle of the road

next to the emergency room.” This holding assumes that the “scene” of an overdose can be

neatly delimited and traced to a geographically bounded location, a single set of coordinates on a

- 32 -

map. But Morris may have begun experiencing the purported overdose in a vehicle,22 which, by

its nature, is mobile. It is imaginable that there are circumstances in which the “scene” of an

overdose is transitory rather than immobile.

However, in holding both that “an individual experiencing an overdose [must] remain at

the location where the ‘life-threatening condition’ began” and that Morris did not meet the (B)(2)

requirement in Code § 18.2-251.03, the majority implicitly rejects the possibility of a transitory

overdose scene. Such rejection fashions a standard that will ultimately prove unworkable. Trial

courts will be required to perform the impossible task of teasing out the fixed location of where

an overdose began, even where a defendant was in a vehicle, on the move. And, even where a

defendant is not experiencing an overdose in a vehicle, the majority interpretation requires that

trial courts draw clear lines around the “scene” of an overdose, by requiring that they pinpoint

the place of its beginning.

The ingestion of a drug is not the same as an overdose. The two may happen in quick

succession, but they may not. It is also imaginable that an individual experiencing an overdose

may not have the cognitive awareness needed to stay in the location where that overdose began.

Requiring that trial courts sift through this morass and determine the precise location where an

overdose began is no more reasonable than requiring that an individual experiencing an overdose

stay at the location of the overdose, even when doing so may result in fatality or may be

22

The record lends credence to this inference. According to his proffer, Morris first

began experiencing suicidal ideations “in his boss’s car,” while on the phone with his mother.

Then, while driving, Morris decided to go to the emergency room because “he was thinking

about suicide.” The suicide ideations are what triggered the life-threatening condition. Morris

experienced the ideations in the vehicle.

- 33 -

otherwise infeasible. A harmonizing interpretation of the statute would obviate such outcomes

and, in turn, better serve trial courts, defendants, and the statute itself.

It is for these reasons that I concur in judgment only.

- 34 -

Chaney, J. dissenting from the judgment.

The General Assembly intended Code § 18.2-251.03 to save lives by encouraging persons

who have a good faith belief that they are experiencing a life-threatening condition due to a drug

overdose to seek medical treatment without fear of criminal prosecution. However, the majority’s

unreasonably narrow construction of Code § 18.2-251.03 would eliminate immunity for those who

either walk a few blocks to an emergency room or otherwise transport themselves to a hospital after

a drug overdose. To arrive at this counter-intuitive construction, the majority exploits a

grammatical awkwardness and arrives at counter-intuitive results because the location of the

overdose is wherever someone has a good faith belief that they have a life-threatening condition

relating to the ingestion of drugs. The only purpose of the statutory clause relating to being

transported is to require that the person seeking immunity not leave the scene for the purpose of

interfering with law enforcement since cooperation with law enforcement is required. It is

undisputed that Morris brought himself to law enforcement’s attention and cooperated. Thus, I

respectfully dissent.

- 35 -

VIRGINIA:

In the Court of Appeals of Virginia on Tuesday the 6th day of September, 2022.

PUBLISHED

Jordan Darrell Morris, Appellant,

against Record No. 1194-21-2

Circuit Court No. CR21-1545-00F

Commonwealth of Virginia, Appellee.

Upon a Petition for Rehearing En Banc

Before Chief Judge Decker, Judges Humphreys, Beales, Huff, O’Brien, Atlee, Malveaux, Athey, Fulton,

Ortiz, Causey, Friedman, Chaney, Raphael, Lorish, Callins and White

On August 16, 2022 came the appellee, by the Attorney General of Virginia, and filed a petition

requesting that the Court set aside the judgment rendered herein on August 2, 2022, and grant a rehearing en

banc on the issue(s) raised in the petition.

On consideration whereof and pursuant to Rule 5A:35 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia,

the petition for rehearing en banc is granted and the appeal of those issues is reinstated on the docket of this

Court. The mandate previously entered herein is stayed pending the decision of the Court en banc.

The parties shall file briefs in compliance with the schedule set forth in Rule 5A:35(b). The appellant

shall attach as an addendum to the opening brief upon rehearing en banc a copy of the opinion previously

rendered by the Court in this matter. An electronic version of each brief shall be filed with the Court and

served on opposing counsel.1

A Copy,

Teste:

A. John Vollino, Clerk

original order signed by a deputy clerk of the

By: Court of Appeals of Virginia at the direction

of the Court

Deputy Clerk

1

The guidelines for filing electronic briefs and appendices can be found at

www.courts.state.va.us/online/vaces/resources/guidelines.pdf.

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Russell,* Ortiz and Raphael

PUBLISHED

Argued at Richmond, Virginia

JORDAN DARRELL MORRIS

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 1194-21-2 JUDGE STUART A. RAPHAEL

AUGUST 2, 2022

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY

Randall G. Johnson, Jr., Judge

H. Pratt Cook, III (Law Office of H. Pratt Cook, III, on brief), for

appellant.

Stephen J. Sovinsky, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

This case presents two questions of first impression concerning Virginia’s medical-

amnesty statute, Code § 18.2-251.03, which shields from arrest or prosecution those persons who

seek emergency medical assistance because they are experiencing a drug overdose (or who seek

emergency medical assistance for others who are experiencing an overdose). First, suppose the

defendant seeking emergency medical assistance subjectively believes he is suffering a drug

overdose, but in fact he is not. Is the defendant entitled to amnesty, or must the trier of fact be

satisfied that the defendant, objectively, is having an overdose? We conclude from the statute’s

plain language that the General Assembly intended a subjective standard.

Second, does drug-induced suicidal ideation qualify as an “overdose” under the statute?

We conclude that it does. While an “overdose” from drugs in common parlance may not

*

Justice Russell participated in the hearing and prepared the dissent in this case prior to

his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

embrace the desire to kill oneself, the statute defines “overdose” as “a life-threatening condition

resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, alcohol, or any combination of

such substances.” Code § 18.2-251.03(A). A drug-induced impulse to kill oneself is “a life-

threatening condition” under that definition.

Because the circuit court erred in applying an objective standard to the defendant’s claim

that he was seeking emergency medical care for his drug-induced suicidal ideation, we vacate the

drug-possession conviction and remand this case for the trial court to determine whether the

defendant is entitled to medical-amnesty immunity under the correct legal standard.

BACKGROUND

Appellant Jordan Darrell Morris was arrested on November 16, 2020, outside the Short

Pump emergency room, and charged with possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance

(in violation of Code § 18.2-250) and driving under the influence of drugs, first offense (in

violation of Code § 18.2-266). He was released from jail on a $1,400 recognizance bond.

On June 16, 2021, the Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to use at trial a lab

analysis showing that Morris’s blood tested positive for cocaine and that cocaine residue was

found on a smoking device in the car he was driving. Morris, represented by counsel, moved to

suppress the drug evidence and to dismiss the drug-possession charge under the medical-amnesty

provision of Code § 18.2-251.03. Morris argued that he “was actively seeking medical care for

himself when the Henrico police developed the evidence against him.” The motion recited that

Morris was trying to seek medical attention at Short Pump

Emergency Room when he stopped the vehicle in the middle of the

roadway adjacent to the emergency hospital. Henrico police

officers Cirillo and Steelman observed that Morris was under the

influence of drugs, and Morris told them he had recently smoked

crack cocaine. Morris told the officers he was contemplating

suicide because of drugs and made suicidal statements at the

hospital.

-2-

The Commonwealth’s written opposition asserted that Morris “had produced no evidence or

testimony from any medical personnel present that evening, nor any other evidence, that he was

experiencing an overdose.”

On July 15, the trial court conducted a hearing on Morris’s suppression motion and

motion to dismiss, at which both sides “agreed to proffer the facts.” Paraphrasing the police

report, Morris’s counsel represented that Henrico police officers observed a white Ford Edge

trying to turn onto the road adjacent to the Short Pump emergency room. The vehicle nearly

struck a curb in the turn lane and stopped in the middle of the road, blocking through-traffic.

Officers Cirillo and Steelman approached the vehicle, driven by Morris, and asked him to park

the car. Morris said that “he was there to get help,” telling the officers that he had smoked crack

cocaine. The officers escorted Morris into the emergency room.

As medical personnel drew a blood sample, Morris “made suicidal statements.” In

response to questions from a third policeman, Officer Foley, Morris said that he worked at Food

Lion; he had asked to sit in his boss’s car to call his mother; he had called his mother “because

he was thinking about committing suicide”; he had driven away from the Food Lion and had

driven around awhile before heading to the Short Pump emergency room. When asked whether

his mother had told him to “go to the ER,” Morris said he “chose to do so himself” because “he

was thinking about suicide.” When Foley asked, why suicide, Morris responded, “drugs.”

Morris said that he had used heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine, that he had smoked crack cocaine in

his boss’s car, and that he “came to the ER to get help for the suicidal thoughts and his drug

problem.” Morris alerted the officers to a crack pipe in the vehicle, which they found tucked in

the crevice of the passenger seat.

-3-

The Commonwealth initially disagreed with certain aspects of the proffer. Pressed by the

trial court, however, the Commonwealth agreed to “the Defense version” to the extent there were

any inconsistencies.1

Both parties treated the statute as creating an “affirmative defense” to be proven by the

defendant. The Commonwealth argued that Morris was required to present expert testimony that

he was in fact experiencing an overdose and that it was not enough to simply take his word for it.

Morris’s counsel argued that the immunity statute applied because the lab tests showed cocaine

in Morris’s blood, Morris drove himself to the emergency room seeking treatment, and he said

three times that he was suicidal because of his drug use.

Ruling from the bench, the trial court denied Morris’s motions to suppress the drug

evidence and to dismiss the drug-possession charge. The court saw “no evidence that [Morris]

was experiencing a life-threatening condition.” It was “not going so far as to say” that a medical

professional had to be called as a witness to prove an overdose—circumstantial evidence could

suffice. But the court found the proffer insufficient. “[J]ust because” the drugs “affected his

behavior [did] not mean we’re in a life-threatening situation.” The court said there must be

1

Both the Commonwealth and Morris argue on brief that we should view the facts in the

“light most favorable” to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below. But “[w]e do not

permit litigants ‘to define Virginia law by their concessions.’” Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298

Va. 392, 395 (2020) (quoting Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 447, 454 n.6 (2013)).

The facts considered by the trial court were based on an oral proffer by defense counsel, to which

the prosecutor agreed. Cf. Massenburg v. City of Petersburg, 298 Va. 212, 216-17 (2019)

(explaining that the standard of appellate review of a ruling on a plea in bar depends on whether

evidence was heard below). The dissent argues that the light-most-favorable standard applies

because the parties stipulated the facts. But that conclusion does not follow from the premise.

See Farmer’s Ins. Exchange v. Enters. Leasing Co., 281 Va. 612, 617 (2011) (stating that, where

the circuit court granted “summary judgment relying on stipulated facts,” appellate courts

“review de novo the circuit court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts”). Because we

vacate the drug-possession conviction and remand this case for further proceedings, and because

the factual nuances of the proffer do not control the outcome, we need not decide whether the

light-most-favorable standard is appropriate.

-4-

“some showing” that Morris’s expression of wanting to kill himself “was caused by the ingestion

of cocaine and this overdose situation.”

Morris subsequently pleaded no contest to the charges against him, reserving his right to

appeal the immunity ruling on the drug-possession charge. The trial court accepted the pleas,

finding Morris guilty on both charges. The court sentenced Morris to five years’ incarceration

on the drug-possession charge, suspending all but two months. It sentenced him to twelve

months (all suspended) on the driving-under-the-influence charge.

Morris now appeals the trial court’s decision denying him medical-amnesty immunity on

the drug-possession charge (Case No. CR21-1545-00F).2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The proper interpretation of Code § 18.2-251.03 is a question of law that we review de

novo. E.g., Citland, Ltd. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kilgore, 45 Va. App. 268, 275 (2005) (“Pure

statutory construction, a matter within the ‘core competency of the judiciary,’ requires de novo

review.” (quoting Finnerty v. Thornton Hall, Inc., 42 Va. App. 628, 635 (2004))); Broadous v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 265, 268 (2017) (applying de novo review to interpretation of Code

§ 18.2-251.03).

ANALYSIS

Beginning with New Mexico in 2007, at least forty States have enacted laws providing

protection from criminal liability for persons seeking emergency medical assistance for a drug

overdose. See Nicole Schill, The Fatal Shortcomings of Our Good Samaritan Overdose Statutes

and Proposed Model Statute, 25 Cardozo J. Equal Rts. & Soc. Just. 123, 126 (2018). We will

refer to such statutes as “medical-amnesty laws,” but they are also sometimes called “Good

2

Morris did not appeal his driving-under-the-influence conviction (Case No.

CR21-1546-00M), so that conviction is not before us.

-5-

Samaritan Overdose Laws” or “911 Immunity Laws.” Id. at 126 n.17. Different States have

taken different approaches. Some permit the summoning of medical help to be used by the

defendant only “as [a] mitigating circumstance[]” at sentencing. Id. at 139-40 (describing Ind.

Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(12) (West 2017)). Some permit the defendant to raise the

summoning of assistance as an “affirmative defense,” establishing a “justification or excuse that

relieves them of criminal liability.” Id. at 140. And some provide “immunity from criminal

liability.” Id. at 141.

Virginia’s medical-amnesty statute was first enacted in 2015. 2015 Va. Acts chs. 418,

436 (codified at Code § 18.2-251.03). The original statute followed the “affirmative defense”

approach. For enumerated drug- and alcohol-possession charges, the law provided, in pertinent

part, “an affirmative defense . . . if [s]uch individual, in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency

medical attention for himself, if he is experiencing an overdose, or for another individual, if such

other individual is experiencing an overdose, by contemporaneously reporting such overdose.”

Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1) (Supp. 2015). For the affirmative defense to apply, the defendant was

required to remain at the scene of the overdose (or any alternative location to which the person

requiring emergency medical attention was transferred); identify himself to the responding law-

enforcement officer; and substantially cooperate with law enforcement in any criminal

investigation relating to the substance that caused the overdose. Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(2)-(4)

(Supp. 2015). The affirmative defense was limited to offenses based on evidence “obtained as a

result of the individual seeking or obtaining emergency medical attention.” Code

§ 18.2-251.03(B)(5) (Supp. 2015).

We considered the 2015 version of the statute in Broadous. 67 Va. App. at 268-73. We

said its “clear purpose” was to provide “a ‘safe harbor’ from prosecution to encourage . . .

prompt emergency medical treatment to those who have suffered an overdose as a result of

-6-

ingesting a controlled substance.” Id. at 271. We found that the General Assembly “obviously

made a policy determination that encouraging others, who may themselves be guilty of violating

the laws involving controlled substances, to call 911 in an effort to save a life is more important

than their prosecution.” Id.

Nonetheless, we were constrained by the language of the statute, as it was then written, to

conclude that it protected only a person who “seeks or obtains” emergency medical treatment for

himself or for another. Id. at 270-72. Broadous was not protected under that standard because,

although she had suffered a drug overdose, her boyfriend was the person who called for

emergency medical assistance, not Broadous. Id. at 273. We observed that other States provided

broader protection in their medical-amnesty statutes, extending amnesty to defendants who were

the beneficiaries of emergency-medical calls made by others. Id. at 272 (citing Ohio Code

§ 2925.11(B)(2)(a)(viii)). Such protection was “absent from Virginia’s statute,” we said,

“presumably because our legislature made a policy decision not to include it.” Id. at 273.

After Broadous, the General Assembly revisited the medical-amnesty statute three times,

each time expanding its protections. The 2019 amendment eliminated the requirement that the

defendant must have cooperated in any criminal investigation relating to the substance that

caused the overdose. 2019 Va. Acts ch. 626 (deleting Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(4)).

The 2020 amendment made two more changes. 2020 Va. Acts ch. 1016. It upgraded the

nature of the amnesty from an “affirmative defense” to an immunity from “arrest or

prosecution.” Code § 18.2-251.03(B) (Supp. 2020). The amendment also superseded Broadous,

expanding amnesty to protect defendants in Broadous’s situation: someone who “is experiencing

an overdose” when “another individual, in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency medical

attention for such individual.” Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(ii); see McCarthy v. Commonwealth,

73 Va. App. 630, 646 (2021) (describing the 2020 amendments).

-7-

Finally, the 2021 amendment broadened the amnesty for good Samaritans who

themselves provide medical aid to those experiencing an overdose. See 2021 Va. Acts, Sp. Sess.

I, ch. 29 (codified at Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(iii)) (shielding a person who, “in good faith,

renders emergency care or assistance, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or the

administration of naloxone or other opioid antagonist for overdose reversal, to an individual

experiencing an overdose while another individual seeks or obtains emergency medical attention

in accordance with this subdivision”).

With that statutory framework as the backdrop, we turn to the issues presented here.

A. A subjective standard determines whether the person in need of emergency

medical attention is experiencing an overdose.

The parties agreed at oral argument that the trial court used an objective standard in

applying Code § 18.2-251.03, requiring that Morris demonstrate that he was, in fact,

experiencing drug-induced suicidal ideation. The trial court denied Morris’s motion after

concluding that Morris failed to carry his burden.3

3

Morris and the Commonwealth assume that the defendant bears the burden of

persuasion on medical-amnesty immunity. We have previously observed that “there is no

uniform rule in Virginia regarding the burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses. Instead, the

determination of which party has the burden of persuasion turns on which affirmative defense is

being asserted.” Tart v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 272, 276 n.1 (2008). Courts in other

jurisdictions have divided on whether the prosecution or defense bears the burden of persuasion

on a medical-amnesty defense. Compare People v. Harrison, 465 P.3d 16, 23 (Colo. 2020)

(“[T]he prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was not

legally authorized by the affirmative defense.”), with People v. O’Malley, 183 N.E.3d 928, 935-

36 (Ill. App. Ct.) (imposing burden of production and persuasion on defendant), appeal denied,

175 N.E.3d 148 (Ill. 2021); State v. W.S.B., 180 A.3d 1168, 1183 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

2018) (same); State v. Williams, 888 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (same). But neither

Morris nor the Commonwealth has briefed that question under Code § 18.2-251.03, nor have

they addressed the relevance of Code § 18.2-263 (stating for referenced drug offenses that “the

burden of proof of any . . . exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption shall be upon the

defendant”). The parties’ failure to brief this issue persuades us that we should not decide it

here. See Butcher, 298 Va. at 395; Logan v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 168, 172 n.4 (2005)

(en banc). We therefore assume without deciding that the defendant bears the burden of proving

entitlement to immunity under Code § 18.2-251.03.

-8-

The trial court erred in its analysis because the medical-amnesty statute imposes a

subjective standard, not an objective one. We reach that conclusion based on the “plain

meaning” of the text and the “clear purpose of the statute,” as evidenced by the text. Broadous,

67 Va. App. at 271.4

“[W]e start with the text,” Levick v. MacDougall, 294 Va. 283, 292 (2017), considering

the statute’s application to a person, like Morris, who seeks medical assistance for himself. The

statute provides immunity from arrest or prosecution for drug possession if “[s]uch individual

(i) in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency medical attention . . . for himself, if he is

experiencing an overdose.” Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1) (emphasis added). Both terms—“good

faith” and “experiencing”—apply to the person seeking treatment. That person is entitled to

immunity if he is seeking medical attention “in good faith” because “he is experiencing” a drug

overdose.

4

The dissent would treat this issue as defaulted, claiming that Morris did not argue for a

“subjective” standard on brief. The dissent would simply hold that an objective standard

governs. In truth, however, neither Morris, nor the Commonwealth, nor the trial court used the

terms “subjective” or “objective.” We view Morris’s arguments, though at times inconsistent, as

sufficient to have preserved this issue for review. In the trial court, Morris’s counsel maintained

that “if you are thinking about committing suicide because you are having suicidal ideations,

then I think you’re in a life-threatening situation.” He added, “I think that’s enough under this

statute because they use the term life threatening . . . . I think that’s the important part because

the General Assembly is trying to get people that cause themselves to be in this kind of medical

condition to go seek the help.” On brief here, Morris argued that he “believed he was suicidal

because of his drug use.” He added that, “By expressing to the police that suicidal thoughts were

creeping into his mind because of his drug use[,] . . . he was in a ‘life-threatening’ condition as

defined by Virginia Code § 18.2-251.03.” The dissent quotes Morris’s albeit inconsistent

statement that “the query should be: under the totality of circumstances would a reasonably

prudent person believe that he was suffering from a life-threatening situation.” The dissent omits

the next sentence, that Morris “had every reason to believe that he was experiencing a ‘life-

threatening condition.’” When oral argument made the nomenclature clear to both parties,

Morris suggested that it involved both subjective and objective elements. We need not belabor

the point. His inconsistency does not force us to declare that an objective standard applies. “Our

fidelity to the uniform application of law precludes us from accepting concessions of law made

on appeal. Because the law applies to all alike, it cannot be subordinated to the private opinions

of litigants.” Logan, 47 Va. App. at 172.

-9-

The phrase “is experiencing” reflects the personal perspective of the accused—whether

“he is experiencing an overdose.” Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(i)(a) (emphasis added). In its verb

form, to experience means to “feel, suffer, undergo.” Experience, Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary (2002). “Experience indicates an actual living through something” or

knowing it “firsthand.” Id. The perspective, in other words, is from the point of view of the

person doing the “experiencing.”

The dissent tries unsuccessfully to show that is experiencing connotes an “objective”

standard. The dissent quotes Webster’s definition of experience in its noun form: a “direct

observation of or participation in events: an encountering, undergoing or living through things in

general as they take place in the course of time.” Id. Unlike the dissent, we see nothing in that

definition to show that the defendant must actually be having an overdose to experience one.

The dissent overlooks another of Webster’s noun-form definitions that thoroughly undercuts the

dissent’s argument; Webster’s also defines an experience as “something personally encountered,

undergone, or lived through.” Id. (emphasis added).

That inherently subjective viewpoint is reinforced by the requirement that the person

“experiencing” an overdose seek medical attention “in good faith.” The phrase “good faith”

comports with its usual, subjective meaning, a “state of mind consisting in . . . honesty in belief

or purpose.” Good Faith, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Good Faith,

Webster’s, supra (“[A] state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose” or “belief in

one’s legal title or right”). As our Supreme Court said in the context of Virginia’s Uniform

Commercial Code, “Good faith does not encompass a concept of negligence; the test is a

subjective one” and is “determined by looking to the mind” of the person in question. Lawton v.

Walker, 231 Va. 247, 251 (1986); see also Code § 8.1A-201(b)(20) (“‘Good faith’ means

honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”). The concept of “good faith” in the

- 10 -

medical-amnesty statute likewise calls for an assessment of the mind of the person seeking

medical attention.

If the General Assembly had wanted an objective standard, it would have spoken in terms

of whether a reasonable person would perceive the symptoms as an overdose; whether the victim

was, in fact, having an overdose; or—better yet—whether the victim was “overdosing.” By

treating the phrase “is experiencing an overdose” as if it read “is overdosing,” the dissent renders

the term “experiencing” mere surplusage, “contrary to the settled rule in this Commonwealth that

every provision in or part of a statute shall be given effect if possible.” Va. Elec. & Power Co. v.

State Corp. Comm’n, 300 Va. 153, 163 (2021) (quoting Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ely,

276 Va. 339, 345 (2008)); Blackwell v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 30, 50 (2021) (same).

The absence of such language in Virginia’s medical-amnesty statute is conspicuous given

that some States have expressly adopted an objective standard. Wisconsin’s amnesty statute

protects an “aider” who helps someone else seek emergency treatment for an overdose. Wis.

Stat. § 961.443. But it provides protection only if “a reasonable person would believe” the

victim to be suffering an overdose. Id.5 Colorado’s statute includes both a subjective and an

objective standard. See People v. Harrison, 465 P.3d 16, 22-23 (Colo. 2020). Similar to

Virginia’s statute, Colorado’s requires that the overdose victim (or good Samaritan) report “in

good faith” the overdose event—a “subjective standard.” Id. at 22 (citing Colo. Stat.

18-1-711(1)(a)). But unlike Virginia’s statute, and like Wisconsin’s, Colorado’s statute

5

Notably, the Wisconsin legislature adopted that objective standard in 2017, 2017 Wis.

Sess. Laws 33, after Wisconsin’s intermediate court observed in 2016 that the statute, as then

drafted, protected “an individual who aids a person he/she believes is suffering from an adverse

reaction to drugs.” Williams, 888 N.W.2d at 5. The court characterized that belief as relating

“personally to the defendant.” Id. at 6 (emphasis added). See generally Emily O’Brien, A

Willful Choice: The Ineffective and Incompassionate Application of Wisconsin’s Criminal Laws

in Combating the Opioid Crisis, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 1065, 1079 (2020) (“An objective reasonable

person standard replaced the aider’s subjective belief that the aided person was overdosing or

suffering an adverse reaction.”).

- 11 -

specifically defines an “overdose event” as “an acute condition . . . that a layperson would

reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that requires medical assistance.” Id. at 21

(quoting Colo. Stat. 18-1-711(5)). Colorado’s Supreme Court read that phrase to “inject[] an

objective standard into the analysis.” Id. at 22.

Virginia’s statute, by contrast, lacks that reasonable-person qualifier. It is “absent from

Virginia’s statute presumably because our legislature made a policy decision not to include it.”

Broadous, 67 Va. App. at 273. Virginia is not an outlier in using a subjective standard. Several

other States employ a similar subjective standard as well.6

The dissent seizes on Florida’s statute to show that “experiencing an overdose” requires

an objective standard. Florida’s statute refers to a “person who experiences, or has a good faith

belief that he or she is experiencing, an alcohol-related or a drug-related overdose and is in need

of medical assistance.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 893.21(2) (emphasis added). True, adding the italicized

phrase to Virginia’s statute would have reinforced that the standard is a subjective one. Had the

General Assembly done that, we likely would not be having this debate. But that begs the

question whether “experiencing an overdose” calls for a subjective or objective inquiry. And we

find the dissent’s argument unpersuasive that it is objective. Quite simply, “experiencing an

overdose” does not mean “actually having an overdose.”

Even assuming for argument’s sake that “experiencing an overdose” is susceptible of

either an objective or subjective construction, two longstanding interpretive principles would

6

E.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 20-13-1704(a)(2) (“The person is experiencing a drug overdose

and in good faith seeks medical assistance for himself or herself.”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 893.21(2)

(“A person who experiences, or has a good faith belief that he or she is experiencing, an alcohol-

related or a drug-related overdose and is in need of medical assistance . . . .”); Ga. Code Ann.

§ 16-13-5(b) (“Any person who in good faith seeks medical assistance for a person experiencing

or believed to be experiencing a drug overdose . . . .”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-30(a) (“A person

who, in good faith, seeks medical assistance for someone experiencing a drug overdose . . . .”);

Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-156(b) (“Any person who is experiencing a drug overdose and who in

good faith seeks medical assistance . . . .”).

- 12 -

require that we apply the subjective interpretation that favors defendants. First, the statute is

highly remedial and entitled to a liberal construction. Cf. Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 300 Va.

426, 435 (2022) (“Statutes that permit the trial court to impose alternatives to incarceration . . .

are highly remedial and should be liberally construed to provide trial courts valuable tools for

rehabilitation of criminals.” (alteration in original) (quoting Peyton v. Commonwealth, 268 Va.

503, 508 (2004))); Slusser v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 761, 773 (2022) (same). As we said

in Broadous, the purpose of medical amnesty is to “save a life,” a value that we said was more

important than obtaining a conviction for drug possession. 67 Va. App. at 271.

And second, the rule of lenity requires that we construe any ambiguity in a statute in the

defendant’s favor, “reducing exposure to criminal liability.” Fitzgerald v. Loudoun Cnty.

Sheriff’s Office, 289 Va. 499, 508 (2015). See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 296 (2012) (Canon 49, Rule of Lenity:

“Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the

defendant’s favor.”). The rule of lenity is “founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of

individuals, and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative

not in the judicial department.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820)

(Opinion by Marshall, C.J.), quoted in Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 Va. 821, 823 (1909). Put

simply, “when the government means to punish, its commands must be reasonably clear.” Scalia

& Garner, supra, at 299.7

7

The Supreme Court of Virginia has repeatedly applied this principle to resolve statutory

ambiguities in favor of criminal defendants. E.g., Blake v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 375, 386

(2014); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 280, 291-92 (2009); Harris v. Commonwealth,

274 Va. 409, 415-16 (2007); Waldrop v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 210, 214-15 (1998);

Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 218-19 (1994); Commonwealth v. Am. Booksellers

Ass’n, Inc., 236 Va. 168, 178-79 (1988); Harward v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363, 366-67

(1985); Martin v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 298, 300-01 (1982); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 211

Va. 815, 819 (1971); Berry v. City of Chesapeake, 209 Va. 525, 526-27 (1969); McKinney v.

Commonwealth, 207 Va. 239, 243 (1966); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 565-66

- 13 -

To be sure, the rule of lenity does not apply when it “would conflict with the implied or

expressed intent of [the legislature],” Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 295 Va.

177, 188 n.8 (2018) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985)), nor when it

would lead to “an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute,” McGinnis v.

Commonwealth, 296 Va. 489, 504 (2018). But neither of those exceptions applies here.

To the contrary, applying an objective standard would frustrate the statute’s “clear

purpose . . . to encourage . . . prompt emergency medical treatment” for overdose victims.

Broadous, 67 Va. App. at 271. The dissent effectively insists that defendants produce expert

testimony to prove that they were, in fact, having an overdose. The dissent would require Morris

to prove through “medical evidence” that “he actually was suicidal” and that his suicidal state

“was caused by his use or consumption of drugs.” Infra at 36. Such a begrudging standard

could cause people to hesitate before seeking emergency care. It could make them ask questions

like, “Am I really overdosing?” “Would a reasonable person be overdosing if they took what I

did?” “Do I need a note from my doctor before calling 911?” The deterrent effect of an

objective standard might be worse for the good Samaritan who, while using illegal drugs

alongside an overdosing victim, would have to decide whether to risk prosecution by calling for

help when the victim is “experiencing an overdose.” See Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(ii). The

good Samaritan might waver, worrying that a mistake about whether the victim is, in fact,

overdosing would trigger criminal liability for both of them.

This is not to say, of course, that persons using illegal drugs always behave as rational

actors during an overdose crisis. But it is for the General Assembly, not courts, to make such

(1944). So have we. E.g., Foley v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 186, 197-99 (2014); McMillan

v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 392, 401-02 (2009) (en banc); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 38

Va. App. 93, 96-97 (2002); Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 491, 496 (1997) (en

banc).

- 14 -

behavioral assumptions. And the premise of Virginia’s medical-amnesty statute—as we said in

Broadous—is that removing the threat of drug prosecutions will increase the provision of

medical care for overdose sufferers, thereby saving lives. 67 Va. App. at 271. The General

Assembly made an obvious “policy determination” that saving a life is more important than

prosecuting the drug-possession charge. Id. A subjective standard better advances that purpose

than an objective one.8

We are not persuaded by the Commonwealth’s claim at oral argument that a subjective

standard would make it “very difficult” if not “impossible” to rebut a defendant’s claim that he

subjectively believed he was contemplating suicide or experiencing an overdose. The

Commonwealth failed to explain why that would be. The statute forecloses the most obvious

scenario in which a subjective standard might be susceptible to abuse. Immunity is not available

if the claim for emergency medical treatment is made “during the execution of a search warrant

or during the conduct of a lawful search or a lawful arrest.” Code § 18.2-251.03(C). So a

defendant apprehended in a drug bust cannot immunize his illegal possession of drugs by

claiming to be suicidal or insisting that he needs to go the emergency room.

What is more, there are countless instances when criminal liability turns on a party’s

subjective belief or good faith, yet courts have not abandoned the subjective requirement as

somehow too hard to prove. First-degree murder requires the prosecution to prove that the

defendant committed a “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing,” while attempted murder

requires proof of a “specific intent to kill the victim.” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Herring, 288 Va. 59, 77 (2014)). Direct evidence of the

defendant’s intent is often not available but is also not required. “[I]ntent may be, and most

8

The dissent mistakenly attributes this policy judgment to judicial activism, without

citing Broadous and without acknowledging that Broadous derived the “clear” and “obvious[]”

purpose of the medical-amnesty statute from the text of the statute itself.

- 15 -

often is, proven by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from

proven facts.” Id. (quoting Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 301 (2005)); see, e.g., Bell v.

Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 530, 533-34 (1991) (finding that circumstantial evidence supported

intent-to-kill element of attempted capital murder). Similar specific-intent requirements are

found in crimes involving intent to defraud, e.g., Sarka v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 56, 67

(2021); crimes requiring proof of lascivious intent or sexual arousal, e.g., Holley v.

Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 158, 165-66 (2002); and crimes involving an intent to threaten,

e.g., Summerlin v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 288, 297-98 (2002). The Commonwealth has

failed to show that a subjective standard under the medical-amnesty statute would impose an

insurmountable obstacle to prosecutions in drug-possession cases compared to the myriad other

settings in which a subjective standard applies.

B. Suicidal ideation qualifies as an “overdose” when it is “a life-threatening

condition.”

At oral argument, the Commonwealth also maintained that an “overdose” under the

medical-amnesty statute does not include a drug-induced desire to kill oneself. The

Commonwealth argues that suicidal ideation is not within the “ordinary understanding” of the

term “overdose.”

We need not determine the ordinary meaning of “overdose,” however, because the

General Assembly specifically defined that term in the statute as “a life-threatening condition

resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, alcohol, or any combination of

such substances.” Code § 18.2-251.03(A). That defined term supersedes its ordinary meaning.

Cf. Worsham v. Worsham, 74 Va. App. 151, 168 (2022) (“[T]he ordinary meaning of such terms

does not control when, as in this case, ‘it is manifest from the [instrument] itself that other

definitions are intended.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Riverside Healthcare Ass’n,

Inc. v. Forbes, 281 Va. 522, 530 (2011))).

- 16 -

Drug-induced suicidal ideation that prompts an emergency-room visit qualifies as a “life-

threatening condition” under Code § 18.2-251.03(A). A “threat” is “[a]n indication of an

approaching menace” or a “thing that might well cause harm.” Threat, Black’s, supra. If a

person who is thinking about killing himself is concerned enough to seek emergency medical

attention to avoid doing so, such suicidal thoughts pose a threat, menace, or risk of harm to that

person’s life.9

Because drug-induced suicidal ideation falls within the statutory definition, it does not

matter if the General Assembly specifically contemplated a drug user’s risk of suicide when

enacting the medical-amnesty statute. Statutes “often go beyond the principal evil to cover

reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the

principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore

Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). Encouraging a person with drug-induced suicidal ideation

to seek emergency medical assistance falls within the “plain language” of the statute and serves

its “clear purpose” of helping to “save a life.” Broadous, 67 Va. App. at 271.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court erred in using an objective standard to test Morris’s immunity under

Code § 18.2-251.03. We vacate Morris’s drug-possession conviction (Case No.

CR21-1545-00F) and remand this case for the trial court to conduct a new hearing on Morris’s

motion to suppress and motion to dismiss that charge, consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and remanded.

9

We do not hold that every instance in which a defendant claims to be experiencing

suicidal ideation necessarily constitutes a life-threatening condition. See dissent, infra at note 24.

Rather, the fact finder should determine based on the evidence whether the defendant who claims

medical-amnesty immunity was seeking emergency medical attention in good faith because of a

life-threatening drug- or alcohol-induced desire to kill himself.

- 17 -

Russell, J., dissenting.

Unlike the political branches who actively formulate policy and seek out the matters in

which they are engaged, the judicial function, when properly performed, is a modest one. Courts

are charged with answering only those questions necessary to resolve the cases brought to us by

the litigants as opposed to questions we wish the litigants had raised. Courts are to decide cases

on the record before them, with appellate courts limited to the argument and evidence raised in

the proceedings below. Furthermore, in determining the meaning of statutes, we are governed by

the actual words adopted by the political branches. Policy questions are the province of the

political branches, and thus, we may not “add[] language to or delet[e] language from a statute”

in the guise of interpreting that statute. Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 284 Va.

695, 706 (2012) (citing BBF, Inc. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 274 Va. 326, 331 (2007)). Thus,

although it long has been recognized that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the

judicial department to say what the law is[,]” Fitzgerald v. Loudoun Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 289 Va.

499, 505 (2015) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)),

proper performance of that duty requires us not to stray outside our proper role.

Unfortunately, although no doubt well-intentioned, the majority violates the judicial

norms listed above. As explained below, I believe the majority’s departures from these norms

lead the majority to an incorrect conclusion: that a defendant may invoke the protections of the

overdose statute without actually experiencing an overdose. Accordingly, for the reasons that

follow, I respectfully dissent.

I. Proper view of the evidence

The manner in which an appellate court is required to view the evidence on appeal is well

established. We are required to view the evidence adduced below “in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Beck v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 259, 262

- 18 -

(2016) (quoting Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 625, 629 (2009)). Applying this

principle requires us to grant the Commonwealth any reasonable inferences that may be drawn

from such a view of the evidence. Id.

This view of the evidence governs even if most or all of the evidence is presented to the

trial court by way of stipulation instead of by way of testimony. Accordingly, if a stipulated fact

is susceptible to multiple interpretations, we are required to adopt the interpretation “most

favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Id. Similarly, the Commonwealth

is entitled to any reasonable inferences that flow from that interpretation. Id. Accordingly, in

my dissent, I view the evidence through that lens.

The majority suggests that this fundamental rule of appellate review might not apply in

this case. See supra note 1, at p. 4. In support of its novel proposition, the majority first cites

Massenburg v. City of Petersburg, 298 Va. 212, 216-17 (2019), a civil case involving whether

litigants are entitled to a jury trial on a plea in bar. It has no relevance here as no one contends

that a jury was required to resolve the issue before the trial court.

Next, the majority cites to Farmer’s Ins. Exchange v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 281 Va.

612, 617 (2011), a civil case involving a motion for summary judgment in a dispute over a rental

car contract, for the unremarkable proposition that, in summary judgment proceedings involving

undisputed facts, an appellate court “review[s] de novo the circuit court’s application of the law

to the undisputed facts.” Setting aside that summary judgment in Virginia is a unique animal

that rarely has application outside of the summary judgment context, the case provides no

instruction for when, as here, facts are in dispute.

The parties below stipulated that Morris stated on the night in question both that he was

suicidal and that he believed his suicidal ideation was caused by his drug use. There was no

stipulation that he was in fact suicidal or that, assuming he was suicidal, any suicidal ideation

- 19 -

actually was caused by his use or consumption of drugs. To the contrary, the Commonwealth

has always disputed these assertions of fact, and the trial court specifically found that Morris

failed to establish that any suicidal thoughts were caused by his use or consumption of drugs.10

Because this conclusion is supported by the record, we are bound by it and the inferences that

flow from it. The fact that we review legal questions de novo does not change that no matter

how much the majority wishes it were otherwise.

II. The majority’s reversal is improperly based on

an argument that Morris did not make and has rejected.

Before turning to the errors in the majority’s construction of the statute, I note that the

majority’s resolution, that the statute adopts a purely subjective standard, would be improper in

this case even if it were correct.11 In adopting that construction, the majority must ignore or

misstate portions of the record in this case and sua sponte advances an argument that even

Morris rejected. Thus, not only does the majority have to ignore the requirement of a

contemporaneous objection in the trial court and the requirement of assigning error to a judgment

of the trial court to reach its desired conclusion, it has to reject the arguments of the parties and

decide the matter on an argument that it alone crafted and champions. As noted above, the

proper role of an appellate court is to decide the cases brought to it by the litigants based on the

arguments and record made by the litigants. The crafting of appellate arguments is a function for

lawyers, not courts, and the majority’s doing so here simply is improper.12

10

To the extent that the stipulated evidence does not establish all of the facts necessary

for Morris to prevail, the majority, having concluded that Morris bore the evidentiary burden, is

duty-bound to affirm his conviction. After all, it is axiomatic that, in the absence of necessary

evidence, the party with the evidentiary burden loses.

11

As explained in detail below, it is not correct.

12

I recognize that we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. That standard

does not give us license to craft our own arguments or address arguments neither raised nor

- 20 -

In the proceedings below, neither Morris nor the Commonwealth argued anything other

than that Code § 18.2-251.03 employs an objective standard.13 Given that agreement, it is

unsurprising that, as the majority notes, “[t]he parties agreed at oral argument [in this Court] that

the trial court used an objective standard in applying Code § 18.2-251.03.”

Morris did not object to the trial court’s application of an objective standard, precluding

our reversing the trial court for that reason. Rule 5A:18 (providing that “[n]o ruling of the trial

court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable

certainty at the time of the ruling”); Farnsworth v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 490, 500 (2004)

(“Pursuant to Rule 5A:18, this Court ‘will not consider an argument on appeal [that] was not

presented to the trial court.’” (quoting Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308 (1998))),

aff’d, 270 Va. 1 (2005). Furthermore, likely because he agreed with the trial court, Morris did

not assign error to the trial court’s use of an objective standard, which also precludes us from

reversing the trial court for doing so. Delp v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 227, 236 n.7 (2020)

(holding that “[w]e are ‘limited to reviewing the assignments of error presented by the litigant’”

(quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 289 (2017))); see also Winston v.

Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 74, 82 n.4 (2007) (holding that because an appellant did not include

preserved by the litigants. Rather, it applies to the questions of statutory construction properly

raised, preserved, and consistently maintained by the litigants.

13

In addressing the failure of Morris to make any explicit argument that the statute

adopted a purely subjective standard, the majority asserts that certain arguments by Morris in the

trial court implicitly set out the argument. See supra note 4, at p. 9. Even absent context, it is a

creative reading of Morris’ position; with context, it conflates Morris’ answer to the question

with what the question is. In context, Morris’ statement that “if you are thinking about

committing suicide because you are having suicidal ideations, then I think you’re in a

life-threatening situation” is nothing more than his pointing to the evidence he believes

established that an objectively reasonable person would believe he was in a life-threatening

situation when he sought medical care. Any doubt that this was Morris’ meaning is extinguished

by a review of the argument he made in this Court that I discuss below.

- 21 -

an argument in his questions presented (now assignments of error), the Court would not address

it on appeal).

Compounding the impropriety of the majority reversing the decision of a trial court on

the basis of an objection never made and an alleged error never assigned is the fact that, in his

brief on appeal, Morris rejected the construction of the statute championed by the majority. As

he had from the outset of the case, Morris maintained on appeal that an objective standard

governs Code § 18.2-251.03, writing on brief that:

Morris submits that when determining whether a person is

having a “life-threatening” condition that the query should be:

under the totality of circumstances would a reasonably prudent

person believe that he was suffering from a life-threatening

situation.

(Emphasis added).

Generations of lawyers and even law students recognize that reference to the actions of

the “reasonably prudent person” signals an objective test. Certainly, that has been the consistent

position of Virginia’s appellate courts. See, e.g., Allison v. Brown, 293 Va. 617, 629 n.5 (2017)

(defining “an objective standard” as what “a reasonably prudent person” would have done); Va.

Elec. & Power Co. v. Dungee, 258 Va. 235, 252 (1999) (recognizing that “the objective test is

normally stated simply in terms of the reasonably prudent person”); A.H. v. Rockingham Pub.

Co., 255 Va. 216, 223 (1998) (stating that “duties are premised upon the objective concept of

what a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of reasonable care would have done in similar

circumstances”); Christian v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 704, 712 (2000) (noting that “the

objective test for reasonable suspicion . . . ‘is whether the reasonably prudent man in the

circumstances would be warranted in the belief’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27

(1968))); Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 169-70 (1995) (recognizing that the

“objective standard” regarding whether a person is seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment

- 22 -

turns on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances). It

is telling that the majority has failed to identify a single case in which the reasonably prudent

person standard was read as creating a subjective test.14

Not only does the majority fail to cite a case for this proposition, but the majority itself

also rejects the proposition when it is not attempting to create out of whole cloth an argument

never advanced by Morris. Specifically, in discussing the laws of other states, the majority

recognizes the fundamental principle that “reasonable person” language signals an objective test,

writing: “If the General Assembly had wanted an objective standard, it would have spoken in

terms of whether a reasonable person would perceive the symptoms as an overdose.” Supra, at

p. 11 (emphasis added).

Although at this point there should be no doubt that the majority’s subjective-standard

position is an argument it and not Morris has raised, oral argument in this Court further

demonstrates the point. When asked questions at oral argument that suggested the majority

wished to adopt a subjective standard, Morris steadfastly and resolutely continued to maintain

what his argument always has been: that the statute imposes an objective standard and that he

met it. In what charitably could be described as understatement and less charitably as

misleading, the majority characterizes the exchange as “[w]hen oral argument made the

nomenclature clear to both parties, Morris suggested that it involved both subjective and

objective elements.” The actual words that Morris used are more telling and invalidate the

position (and characterization) advanced by the majority.

14

Unable to address Morris’ reasonable person language choice directly, the majority

again offers snippets from his brief in which Morris references his subjective belief that he was

suicidal as a result of consuming drugs. Once again, this conflates the evidence Morris offers to

answer what he recognized was an objective question with the question itself.

- 23 -

Specifically, when essentially asked by the majority to agree that the statute utilizes a

subjective standard, Morris responded that his “argument is that his subjective view is one of the

facts that the [trial] court should take into account in determining the objective view.” Clearly,

as he has maintained from the beginning, Morris’ position is that his subjective beliefs are

evidence that the trial court had to consider in answering the objective question of whether he

was entitled to the protections of the statute. Simply put, the record makes clear that neither

Morris nor anyone else other than the majority has ever taken a different position in this case.

Thus, the machinations of the majority to recast the argument to one it wishes had been made are

unavailing.

What is more, they are improper. To answer a question that we are not asked and that is

not properly before the Court is to offer “an impermissible advisory opinion.” Va. Mfrs. Ass’n v.

Northam, 74 Va. App. 1, 21 (2021). The judiciary has a “duty ‘not to give opinions upon moot

questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the

matter in issue in the case before it.’” Va. Dep’t of State Police v. Elliott, 48 Va. App. 551, 554

(2006) (quoting Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach, 182 Va. 642, 644 (1944)).

The rationale for this long-held principle is readily apparent. Courts convene to decide

cases and controversies that are brought before them by litigants; courts do not choose the issues

they decide. Thus, even if there are questions of statutory construction that are interesting, we do

not answer those questions unless and until they are necessary to resolve the dispute brought to

us by the litigants.15 I now turn to the proper interpretation of Code § 18.2-251.03 as framed by

15

Faced with the fact that in both his brief and at oral argument in this Court, Morris not

only failed to advance, but rejected, the majority’s subjective standard construction of the statute,

the majority, citing our decision in Logan v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 168, 172 (2005) (en

banc), characterized Morris’ statements on brief and at argument as non-binding concessions of

law by a party. In doing so, the majority improperly conflates a concession of law with a failure

to preserve an argument or a waiver/abandonment of an argument that was at one time preserved.

Moreover, there is no question that the majority knows that it is improperly conflating the two

- 24 -

the record in this case and the actual arguments of the parties, i.e., what Morris was required to

show to avail himself of the statute’s protection and whether the trial court erred in finding he

failed to meet his burden.

III. Code § 18.2-251.03

As the majority notes, Code § 18.2-251.03 shields a person from prosecution for

specified drug offenses if certain statutory requirements are satisfied. As pertinent here, the

statute provides that Morris was not “subject to arrest or prosecution for . . . possession of a

controlled substance pursuant to § 18.2-250 . . . if . . . [he] in good faith, s[ought] or obtain[ed]

emergency medical attention . . . for himself, if he is experiencing an overdose[.]”

Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(i) (emphasis added). In short, to claim the protections of the overdose

statute, a person must, in fact, be suffering an overdose.

Despite this clear language, the majority concludes that Morris could be entitled to the

protections of the statute even if he was not “experiencing an overdose[,]” Code

§ 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(i), so long as he subjectively believed that he was or possibly might have

been. For the reasons that follow, this position cannot be reconciled with the text of the statute,

and therefore, occasions my dissent.

because we drew the distinction on the very page of Logan cited by the majority and, in footnote

3 of its opinion in this case, supra, at p. 8, the majority cites the very passage from Logan that

draws the distinction. In Logan, we expressly recognized that

This principle must be distinguished, however, from an appellant’s

concession of law that qualifies either as a waiver for purposes of

Rule 5A:18 or as an express withdrawal of an appellate challenge

to a trial court judgment. In either scenario, we may accept the

concession—not as a basis for deciding the contested issue of law,

but as a basis for not deciding it.

47 Va. App. at 172 n.4. The distinction is critical here because the initial issue this Court must

determine is whether the question is properly before us, not whether the statement is correct

should the matter be properly before us. The fact that the majority chooses to conflate the issues

despite being well aware of the distinction speaks volumes.

- 25 -

A. Definition of “overdose”

Although “overdose” is a common term with a known meaning, the General Assembly

provided a specific statutory definition of “overdose” in Code § 18.2-251.03. Virginia courts

long have recognized that, when the General Assembly provides a statutory definition, that

definition controls over the common or ordinary understanding of the word or phrase. See, e.g.,

Frias v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 193, 200 (2000) (citing Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tennessee

v. Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of Virginia, 178 Va. 46, 57 (1941)). Accordingly, the

statutory definition of “overdose” governs our review.

For the purpose of Code § 18.2-251.03, the General Assembly defined “overdose” to

mean “a life-threatening condition resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled

substance, alcohol, or any combination of such substances.” Code § 18.2-251.03(A). Thus, for

the protection afforded by Code § 18.2-251.03 to apply, it had to be established that Morris,

when he sought medical attention, “[wa]s experiencing” “a life-threatening condition resulting

from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, alcohol, or any combination of such

substances.” Code § 18.2-251.03. Accordingly, I turn to the meaning of “is experiencing” as

used in Code § 18.2-251.03.

B. Definition of “is experiencing”

Unlike with “overdose,” the General Assembly did not provide a statutory definition of

“is experiencing” in Code § 18.2-251.03. Consequently, we apply the plain and ordinary

meaning of the words. See Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P’ship, 255 Va. 335, 340 (1998) (holding

that if “a statute contains no express definition of a term, the general rule of statutory

construction is to infer the legislature’s intent from the plain meaning of the language used”

(citing City of Va. Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 358, 362 (1996); Marsh v. City of Richmond, 234

Va. 4, 11 (1987))); see also Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8, 35 (2000) (en banc)

- 26 -

(holding that “when a particular word in a statute is not defined therein, a court must give it its

ordinary meaning” (citing McKeon v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 24, 27 (1970))). In ascertaining

the plain and ordinary meaning of such undefined words and phrases, it is appropriate for courts

to turn to dictionary definitions. Eberhardt v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 23, 32 (2021) (citing

Jones v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 412, 415 (2018); Mollenhauer v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App.

318, 335 (2021)).

The plain and ordinary meaning of the word “is” should be sufficiently familiar as to

obviate the need for explanation; however, the majority’s interpretation of the statute suggests

otherwise. “Is,” a form of the verb “to be,” conveys a state of current reality, as opposed to past,

future, potential, or conditional existence. In its various forms, its meanings include “that which

is factual, empirical, [or] actually the case[.]” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

1197 (1981). Adopting the plain and ordinary meaning of “is” leads to the conclusion that the

General Assembly intended that whatever fact or condition follows “is” actually existed at the

time in question (as opposed to in the past or that may have come to be in the future) and was not

merely possible, theoretical, or imagined.16

I now turn to the word following “is” in the statute, “experiencing,” a form of the word

“experience.” As used in Code § 18.2-251.03, it conveys “a direct observation of or

participation in events; an encountering, undergoing, or living through things in general as they

take place in the course of time[.]” Webster’s, supra, at 800. Applying this plain and ordinary

meaning of “experiencing,” leads to the conclusion that, to be entitled to the protections of Code

§ 18.2-251.03, Morris had to be undergoing or living through an “overdose,” that is he had to be

16

It is telling that the majority does not address the fact that the word “is” connotes “that

which is factual, empirical, [or] actually the case” and not what may appear to be the case.

Acknowledging this fact would make clear that the majority’s construction of the statute is

erroneous, so the majority apparently concludes it is just best to ignore it.

- 27 -

facing “a life-threatening condition resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled

substance, alcohol, or any combination of such substances.”

Recognizing that this common understanding of what it means to experience something is

fatal to its preferred result, the majority digs deeper into the dictionary, citing alternative

definitions of “experience” to mean “something personally encountered, undergone, or lived

through.” The majority asserts that these alternative definitions “thoroughly undercut[]” the

notion that the statute is objective. A moment’s reflection reveals that not only is the majority’s

assertion overwrought, but it simply is also incorrect.

Adopting these alternative definitions of experience does not alter the outcome. Whether

the statute reads “is experiencing an overdose[,]” “is personally encountering an overdose,” “is

undergoing an overdose[,]” or “is living through an overdose[,]” the condition that must be

experienced, personally encountered, undergone, or lived through is “an overdose,” not “an

imagined overdose” or a “subjectively held belief that he was experiencing an overdose when he

was not.”17

Whether Morris or any defendant “is experiencing” “a life-threatening condition resulting

from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, alcohol, or any combination of such

substances” at the time he seeks or obtains medical treatment is a question of objective fact.18

Either the person is, at that moment, faced with a life-threatening situation caused by the

17

Throughout its opinion, the majority asserts that the focus of this particular portion of

the statute is on the individual seeking its protection. I wholeheartedly agree that the focus of

Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(i) is on the defendant as opposed to the world writ large. The

question is whether a defendant establishes that he was “experiencing an overdose[,]” not

whether someone else was. Thus, just like the majority, my focus is on the individual claiming

protection under the statute.

18

Because it presents a question of objective fact as opposed to belief, a court properly

applying the statute is not asked to determine either what the defendant subjectively believed or

what the hypothetical reasonable man would have believed. Rather, the question is whether

there is, in fact, an overdose as defined in the statute.

- 28 -

consumption or use of controlled substances/alcohol or he is not. The words chosen by the

General Assembly require that there actually be an overdose.19 In short, to claim the protection

of the overdose statute, a defendant actually must be “experiencing an overdose.”

Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(i). To hold otherwise ignores the plain meaning of the pertinent

words that appear in the statute.

IV. The majority’s erroneous adoption of a subjective standard

Despite the plain and ordinary meaning of “is experiencing an overdose[,]” the majority

maintains that the protections of the overdose statute do not require an actual overdose. The

majority concludes that even if, as a matter of objective, medical fact, the evidence establishes

that a defendant was not facing (and thus did not experience) “a life-threatening condition

resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, alcohol, or any combination of

such substances” at the time he sought or obtained medical treatment, he can claim the

protections of the statute so long as he believes that he may have been or was. In adopting the

subjective standard, the majority effectively reads out of the statute the express requirement that

a defendant be “experiencing an overdose[,]” Code § 18.2-251.03(B)(1)(i), and effectively

replaces it with “believes or imagines that he is or may be experiencing an overdose.”

This effective rewriting of the statute is outside the proper role of the judiciary because it

amounts to legislating from the bench. The Supreme Court recently reiterated that such judicial

editing of statutes is impermissible, noting that “[c]ourts are not permitted to rewrite statutes.

19

An example of the plain and ordinary meaning of “experiencing” in another medical

context makes this clear beyond all doubt. Assume a person is having severe chest pains and

goes to the emergency room because he subjectively believes he is having a heart attack. The

work-up that follows demonstrates no heart attack or cardiac condition whatsoever, but rather,

conclusively establishes that the chest pain was caused by indigestion. I do not believe anyone,

including the majority, would say that the person “was experiencing a heart attack” when he

sought treatment. To the extent that the majority, or anyone else, would use that formulation,

they would not be attempting to clearly communicate information based on the plain and

ordinary meaning of “experiencing,” but would do so in pursuit of some other agenda.

- 29 -

This is a legislative function. The manifest intention of the legislature, clearly disclosed by its

language, must be applied.” Chesapeake Hosp. Auth. v. State Health Comm’r, ___ Va. ___, ___

(May 19, 2022) (quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 560, 566 (1944)).

The majority claims it is doing no such thing and offers a multitude of reasons why its

preferred construction, that the statute is satisfied by an imagined overdose, is consistent with the

statutory language or, at the very least, the statute’s purpose as perceived by the majority.

Although I address specific infirmities in some of these reasons below, it is important to

recognize that the majority’s construction fails for the simplest of reasons: the plain and

ordinary meaning of the phrase “is experiencing an overdose” requires that a defendant actually

experience an overdose. Because any effort to hold that the overdose statute does not require an

overdose negates the plain meaning of the phrase, it is in error no matter how well written or

presented.20

A. The “good faith” red herring

Although unnecessary to properly interpret the phrase “is experiencing an overdose[,]”

the majority offers its definition of “good faith” as it is used in Code § 18.2-251.03. Citing both

a dictionary and a Supreme Court decision interpreting the U.C.C., the majority concludes that

“good faith” conveys a “subjective meaning” and thus, “calls for an assessment of the mind of

the person” whose good faith is in question. Supra, at pp. 10-11. Although this may be a

reasonable definition of “good faith,” it is largely beside the point because, given its placement

20

The majority refers to the statute as the “medical-amnesty statute” while I, on occasion,

refer to it as the “overdose statute.” I do so because the text of the statute requires that there be

an overdose. Presumably, the majority avoids such a characterization of the statute because

“medical-amnesty” sounds nicer and the majority’s construction of the statute removes the

requirement of an overdose from the statute.

- 30 -

in Code § 18.2-251.03, the phrase “good faith” does not modify “is experiencing an overdose[,]”

which is the issue in this case.21

As noted above, Code § 18.2-251.03 provides that an individual is “not subject to

prosecution” for certain drug offenses if he can meet certain statutory requirements. Among

those requirements is that “[s]uch individual (i) in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency

medical attention (a) for himself, if he is experiencing an overdose[.]” Applying ordinary rules

of English usage and grammar, it is clear that “good faith” modifies “seeks or obtains emergency

medical attention” but not “is experiencing an overdose.” After all, “good faith” appears next to

“emergency medical attention,” but is separated from “is experiencing” by many words, multiple

punctuation marks, and, importantly, the conditional introductory word “if,” rendering “he is

experiencing an overdose” a separate and distinct clause from that which preceded it.

Thus, this portion of the statute sets out two, distinct requirements. First, the individual

must seek or obtain medical care in “good faith,” that is the motivation to seek medical care was

to receive medical care as opposed to some other reason, such as avoiding prosecution. Second,

he must be “experiencing an overdose,” which, as noted above, is a question of objective fact

that does not turn on an individual’s belief. If the General Assembly had intended to engraft a

subjective, good faith component onto the overdose requirement, it easily could have done so,

e.g., “[s]uch individual (i) in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency medical attention (a) for

himself, if he in good faith believes he is experiencing an overdose.” Courts must respect the

21

Because “good faith” does not modify “is experiencing an overdose” in

Code § 18.2-251.03, the majority’s discussion of the meaning of “good faith” represents another

instance of the majority addressing an issue not before us in this appeal. The trial court did not

find that Morris failed to establish that he sought emergency medical treatment in good faith;

rather, it found he failed to establish that he was “experiencing an overdose” as required by the

statute. In both the trial court and on appeal, the Commonwealth has not argued an absence of

“good faith,” but rather, consistently has argued that Morris was not “experiencing an overdose.”

- 31 -

choice of the General Assembly not to do so, and therefore, the majority errs by failing to respect

that choice.

B. The majority’s selective misuse of the law of other states

The majority affords significant attention to reviewing the enactment of similar statutes in

other states and claiming that those statutes and the courts that have interpreted them

demonstrate that the General Assembly adopted a subjective standard when it enacted the “is

experiencing an overdose” language in 2015. For the reasons that follow, the laws of other states

compel no such conclusion and, in fact, an evenhanded application of the reasoning employed by

the majority would support equally the conclusion that the laws of other states demonstrate that

Virginia rejected a subjective standard.

At the outset, it is important to remember that when interpreting a Virginia statute, we

seek to discern the Virginia General Assembly’s meaning in enacting a statute, Williams v.

Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 271 (2003), not the meaning or intention of another legislative

body when it enacted a different statute. Thus, although reviewing such out-of-state authority

may be helpful in limited instances, the interpretation of statutes (or court decisions interpreting

those statutes) on the same topic from other states is at most persuasive and never controlling.

Furthermore, the persuasive effect of out-of-state authority is diminished when the out-of-state

statutes contain different words, as we are charged with determining the General Assembly’s

meaning from the words it adopted not from the word choices made by other legislatures.

Because there often will be potentially dispositive differences in the language in the

statutes of various states, the possibility arises that a court relying on out-of-state authority will

find persuasive those examples that suggest a preferred result rather than other examples which

do not. Unfortunately, the majority opinion demonstrates such inconsistent selection of

out-of-state authority.

- 32 -

The majority, citing Wisconsin and Colorado as examples, asserts that states employing

an objective standard have included language limiting the protections of the statute if “a

reasonable person would believe” or situations in which “a layperson would reasonably believe

to be a drug or alcohol overdose[.]” Supra, at pp. 11-12 (citations omitted). From this, the

majority reasons that the absence of such “reasonable person” language in Code § 18.2-251.03

means that the General Assembly rejects the objective approach adopted by Wisconsin and

Colorado, and therefore, employs a subjective approach like other states identified by the

majority. Id. at 10.

The majority identifies several states, including Florida, as states that have adopted the

subjective standard. Id. at 12, note 6. A review of the language of the Florida statute eviscerates

the majority’s argument regarding the absence of “reasonable person” language in the Virginia

statute. Florida employs the subjective standard not because its statute does not include

“reasonable person” language, but because its legislature included express language adopting a

subjective standard: the Florida statute insulates from prosecution a defendant “who

experiences, or has a good faith belief that he or she is experiencing, an alcohol-related or a

drug-related overdose and is in need of medical assistance[.]” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 893.21(2)

(emphasis added). Thus, had the majority compared Virginia’s statute to Florida’s (as opposed

to Wisconsin’s and Colorado’s) and applied its absence-of-language test, it necessarily would

conclude that Virginia rejects a subjective standard because Virginia did not include the

language “has a good faith belief that he or she is experiencing” an overdose that Florida, an

acknowledged subjective-standard state, includes in its statute.

I point this out not to say that the majority should have compared the Virginia statute to

the language of the Florida statute as opposed to the statutes in Wisconsin and Colorado, but

rather, to demonstrate the limited utility of such comparisons to out-of-state authority. It should

- 33 -

go without saying that Code § 18.2-251.03 does not mean one thing if a panel of this Court

compares it to a statute from Florida and the opposite if we instead opt to compare it to a statute

from Colorado.22 That the majority’s approach logically leads to that result indicates a problem

in the approach, not simply its application. Code § 18.2-251.03 has meaning independent of the

actions of legislatures in Florida, Colorado, and every other state, and we are tasked with

determining that independent meaning.

C. Canons of construction

The majority attempts to buttress its position by referencing various canons of statutory

construction. Specifically, it asserts that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed and that

criminal statutes are subject to the rule of lenity. The majority’s resort to these rules of

construction is inappropriate in this case.

As I have noted from the outset, our task is to determine “the plain meaning of

unambiguous statutory language[.]” Gunn v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 580, 587 (2006). Resort

to other canons of construction, such as the rule of lenity, is inappropriate in the absence of

actual ambiguity. See, e.g., Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 598 (2003) (“We do not

agree that the statutory language is ambiguous. Hence, we construe the language according to its

plain meaning without resort to rules of statutory interpretation.”); De’Armond v.

Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 26, 34 (2007) (“Only when a ‘penal statute is unclear’ do courts

apply the rule of lenity and strictly construe the statute in the criminal defendant’s favor.”

(quoting Waldrop v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 210, 214 (1998))).

22

To the extent that such c

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.