Disciplinary Counsel v. Reed

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Disciplinary Counsel v. Reed, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1420.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-1420

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. REED.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Reed, Slip Opinion No.

2023-Ohio-1420.]

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct,

including engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness

to practice law, knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a

tribunal, and failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a

client—Indefinite suspension, with credit for time served under interim

felony suspension, and restitution ordered.

(No. 2022-0955—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided May 2, 2023.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme

Court, No. 2021-027.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Ryan Shane Reed, of Urbana, Ohio, Attorney

Registration No. 0084670, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2009. On

May 28, 2020, we entered an interim remedial order suspending Reed’s license

pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(19). Disciplinary Counsel v. Reed, 161 Ohio St.3d 1223,

2020-Ohio-3113, 161 N.E.3d 726. On December 23, 2020, we suspended his

license on an interim basis following his conviction on multiple felony counts. See

In re Reed, 163 Ohio St.3d 1298, 2020-Ohio-6841, 171 N.E.3d 355. Those

suspensions remain in effect.

{¶ 2} In a four-count complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Reed

with 19 ethical violations—2 arising from his criminal convictions and the

remaining 17 arising from misconduct related to his representation of three clients.

The parties entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and

mitigating factors, and they submitted 90 stipulated exhibits. They also jointly

recommended that Reed be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with

certain conditions on his reinstatement. Reed and two other witnesses testified at a

hearing conducted by a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct.

{¶ 3} The panel found that Reed had committed 16 of the stipulated rule

violations. On relator’s motion, the panel unanimously dismissed the three other

alleged violations. After weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors and

considering our precedent, the panel recommend that we indefinitely suspend Reed

from the practice of law, credit him for 18 months of the time served under his

interim felony suspension, and place certain conditions on his reinstatement to the

profession. The board adopted the panel’s report in its entirety and no objections

have been filed.

{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and the recommended

sanction.

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January Term, 2023

MISCONDUCT

Count One: Reed’s Criminal Convictions

{¶ 5} In 2020, Reed’s girlfriend, P.S., and her then eight-year-old daughter

resided with Reed in his Urbana home. P.S. also worked as an administrative

assistant in Reed’s law office, which he operated out of his house.

{¶ 6} On May 5, 2020, P.S. found Reed “passed-out drunk” on the couch in

his office. Later that day, she and Reed got into an argument, and Reed shoved her

as she tried to enter her car. P.S. walked across the street to escape the assault.

Sometime after P.S. left, Reed slashed two of the tires on her car. After returning

the next morning, P.S. called the Urbana Police Department to file a report. She

informed police that Reed was likely in court and that he was intoxicated.

{¶ 7} That morning, Reed had appeared for a final evidentiary hearing in a

Champaign County domestic-relations matter. After the hearing, Urbana police

officers arrested Reed in the courthouse. As the officers escorted Reed to their

cruiser, Reed removed the mask he was wearing due to the COVID-19 pandemic,

at which point the officers noted an odor of alcohol coming from his person. The

arresting officers administered several field-sobriety tests, which Reed failed. Reed

was charged with domestic violence and assault related to the incident with P.S. the

previous day. And because Reed had driven to the courthouse that morning, the

police also charged him with operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol

(“OVI”), a first-degree misdemeanor.

{¶ 8} Reed was arraigned around 8:30 a.m. on May 7. The judge issued a

temporary protection order (“TPO”) in favor of P.S. but gave Reed until noon that

day to retrieve his belongings from his home.

{¶ 9} On May 14, despite the TPO, Reed returned to his home when P.S.

and her daughter were present. He fled when P.S. called 911. That evening, when

police questioned Reed over the telephone about his whereabouts that day, Reed

denied that he had been in Urbana. At the officer’s urging, Reed agreed to surrender

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himself to authorities the next morning. Reed failed to do so, and a warrant was

issued for his arrest.

{¶ 10} On May 16, Reed contacted P.S. by text message and telephone in

violation of the TPO. Later that day, he crawled through a window of his home but

fled when the police arrived. He was quickly apprehended and arrested—and found

to be wearing a bulletproof vest.

{¶ 11} In early June, the Champaign County Grand Jury returned a nine-

count indictment charging Reed with two felony counts of burglary, two felony

counts of violating a protection order, two misdemeanor counts of violating a

protection order, and one misdemeanor count each of OVI, domestic violence, and

assault. On June 18, Reed was arraigned on those charges in Champaign C.P. No.

2020 CR 100. He posted bond and was released the same day.

{¶ 12} On June 22, Reed, while holding a knife, told his mother that he was

going to his home to kill P.S. Reed’s mother promptly informed Reed’s behavioral-

health counselor of the threat. Reed’s counselor immediately alerted the police,

and a high-speed chase ensued. During the chase, Reed drove his car at more than

99 m.p.h., lost control, and crashed into a tree. He was arrested at the scene with a

blood-alcohol level of 0.17. Reed was arraigned on charges of failure to comply

with an order or signal of a police officer, OVI, and inducing panic in Champaign

C.P. No. 2020 CR 135. The court set bond at $150,000. The next day, the judge

presiding over Reed’s earlier criminal case revoked Reed’s bond in that matter.

{¶ 13} In early July, the Champaign County Grand Jury returned a four-

count indictment charging Reed with a felony count of failure to comply with an

order or signal of a police officer, two misdemeanor counts of OVI, and a single

misdemeanor count of inducing panic.

{¶ 14} In late October, Reed pleaded guilty to amended counts of attempted

burglary (a third-degree felony), trespassing in a habitation (a fourth-degree

felony), and domestic violence (a first-degree misdemeanor) in Champaign C.P.

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January Term, 2023

No. 2020 CR 100. The state dismissed the six other counts in that case. In

Champaign C.P. No. 2020 CR 135, Reed pleaded guilty to an amended count of

attempted failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer (a fourth-

degree felony) and OVI (a first-degree misdemeanor). The state dismissed the two

remaining counts.

{¶ 15} On December 3, 2020, the court sentenced Reed to 24 months in

prison in Champaign C.P. No. 2020 CR 100 and 18 months in prison in Champaign

C.P. No. 2020 CR 135, to be served concurrently, and imposed a three-year period

of mandatory postrelease control for the attempted burglary offense.

{¶ 16} Reed stipulated and the board found that his conduct violated

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that

adversely reflects on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness) and 8.4(h)

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the

lawyer’s fitness to practice law). The board determined that the Prof.Cond.R.

8.4(h) violation captured Reed’s convictions that fall outside the scope of

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) but nonetheless adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law.

We find that his domestic-violence, attempted-failure-to-comply, and OVI

convictions fall outside of the scope of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) but are violations of

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-

Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 21 (holding that a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h)

must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer engaged in

misconduct that while not specifically prohibited by the rules, nonetheless

adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). We adopt these findings

of misconduct.

Count Two: The Thomas and Baker Matters

{¶ 17} On January 1, 2018, Brandon Thomas retained Reed and paid him

$7,000 to represent him in a criminal matter. Reed did not deposit Thomas’s

payment into his client trust account. After Reed entered a notice of appearance

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and waived the preliminary hearing, Thomas was released on bond and returned to

his home in California. In late February 2018, the Miami County Grand Jury

secretly indicted Thomas on five felony charges and a warrant was issued for his

arrest. Thomas was arrested in California on the outstanding warrant in late June

or early July 2019. After Thomas’s arraignment, Reed filed a standard discovery

request and a motion to modify travel restrictions included in Thomas’s bond

conditions so that he could return to his job in California; the bond motion was

denied.

{¶ 18} Thomas had difficulty communicating with Reed regarding the

status of his case. Consequently, he retained another attorney to serve as Reed’s

cocounsel. That attorney filed a notice of appearance in mid-January 2020, along

with a renewed motion for modification of Thomas’s travel restrictions. The court

granted that motion six days later, and Thomas returned to California. At the end

of January, the prosecutor informed Reed of the state’s plea offer, which the

prosecutor agreed to keep open through February 2020, but Reed did not

communicate that offer to Thomas.

{¶ 19} After several continuances, the court set Thomas’s case for a

telephone status conference on May 7, 2020. Reed attended the arraignment in one

of his own criminal cases earlier that morning and joined the status conference

approximately 15 minutes late. The judge presiding over Thomas’s case asked

Reed if he had communicated the state’s plea offer to Thomas. Reed told the judge

that he had not spoken to Thomas because he “had no access to his client files due

to a domestic violence situation with a protection order in place.” However, that

protection order had been issued just moments before Reed joined the status

conference, and Reed had been aware of the plea offer for more than three months.

{¶ 20} The judge then asked Reed why he had failed to appear for a May 5

pretrial conference in the case of another client, Dameek Curry Baker, which was

set for trial the following week. Reed stated that he did not appear because he “did

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January Term, 2023

not have his client file,” and that as a result, he also could not prepare for Baker’s

upcoming jury trial. But Reed has stipulated that he did not appear for that pretrial

conference because he was “passed-out drunk.” Moreover, the TPO issued against

him gave him until noon that day to retrieve items from his home. Based in part on

Reed’s false representations to the court, the judge vacated Baker’s impending trial

date. After learning of Reed’s interim remedial suspension, the judge appointed a

public defender to represent Baker. Additionally, Thomas retained new lead

counsel. Although Reed did not complete Thomas’s representation, he kept the

entire $7,000 fee.

{¶ 21} The parties stipulated and the board found that Reed’s conduct

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably

informed about the status of a matter), 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit

advance legal fees and expenses into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the

lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred), 1.16(e) (requiring a lawyer to

promptly refund any unearned fee upon the lawyer’s withdrawal from

employment), 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false

statement of fact or law to a tribunal), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from

engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). We adopt

these findings of misconduct.

Counts Three and Four: The Diehl and Kermode Matters

{¶ 22} In March 2020, Stacy Diehl met with Reed and paid him a $2,450

flat fee to represent her in a divorce action and, according to Diehl, a related civil-

protection-order (“CPO”) proceeding. Reed did not deposit those funds into his

client trust account. Over the next two weeks, Diehl was unable to reach Reed. He

did not respond to an email about the CPO, and after he failed to attend a hearing

on the matter, the court denied the CPO and dismissed the case.

{¶ 23} Reed filed a complaint initiating Diehl’s divorce action in late May

or early June 2020. But he failed to respond to several emails and a telephone call

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from Diehl seeking information about her case, due in part to his arrest on June 22.

After learning that Reed was in custody, Diehl terminated his representation and

retained new counsel. Reed waited almost a year before he refunded Diehl’s

retainer, less $400 that he had deposited with the court for costs.

{¶ 24} In December 2019, Tina Kermode, a foster parent who was pursuing

the adoption of four foster children, retained Reed to represent her on a child-

endangering charge. She paid a flat fee of $1,500, but Reed did not deposit those

funds into his client trust account. Although Reed advised Kermode that she would

need to appear for her arraignment, he did not respond to her emails inquiring about

her case. He met her at the courthouse shortly before her arraignment to introduce

himself and spent approximately five minutes with her before she entered a not-

guilty plea.

{¶ 25} Afraid that the children would be removed from her home, Kermode

emailed Reed seeking reassurance and asking additional questions about her

defense. Reed sent Kermode three emails, giving cursory answers to her questions

and transmitting the discovery he had received from the prosecutor. Kermode then

emailed Reed asking an additional question and attempting to schedule a time to

speak with him before her next court appearance; Reed replied, stating that he

would call her, but he failed to do so. Reed met with Kermode for approximately

five minutes on the morning of her pretrial conference and advised her to enter a

no-contest plea. Kermode followed his advice. The court found her guilty of the

charged offense and scheduled a sentencing hearing.

{¶ 26} Kermode made numerous attempts to communicate with Reed after

her foster-parent caseworker told her that a conviction for child endangering would

disqualify her from serving as a foster parent and could be cause for removal of the

children from her home. Unable to reach Reed, she terminated his representation

and hired a new attorney. In early February, Reed told Kermode that he would

withdraw from her case, but he waited nearly three weeks to do so.

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January Term, 2023

{¶ 27} The court granted Kermode’s motion to withdraw her plea, but she

ultimately entered another no-contest plea to the same charge. Although Kermode

was permitted to adopt the foster children who had been in her care, she had to

relinquish her foster-parent license due to her conviction. Reed acknowledged that

he owes Kermode a refund of $750 because he failed to complete his representation

of her.

{¶ 28} The parties stipulated and the board found that Reed’s conduct in the

Diehl and Kermode matters violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act

with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to

comply as soon as practicable with a client’s reasonable requests for information),

1.15(c), and 1.16(e), and that his conduct in the Diehl matter also violated

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). We adopt these findings of misconduct.

RECOMMENDED SANCTION

{¶ 29} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all

relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the

aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions

imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 30} The parties stipulated and the board found that four aggravating

factors are present in this case: Reed acted with a dishonest or selfish motive,

committed multiple offenses, harmed vulnerable clients, and failed to make

restitution to Thomas and Kermode. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2), (4), (8), and (9).

The parties also stipulated to four mitigating factors—namely, that Reed made full

and free disclosure to the board and exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the

disciplinary proceedings, presented evidence of his good character and reputation,

had other penalties or sanctions imposed for his misconduct, and presented

evidence of other interim rehabilitation related to his diagnosed mental and alcohol-

use disorders. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4), (5), (6), and (8).

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{¶ 31} The board adopted the parties’ stipulated mitigating factors and

noted that the testimony of Reed and his counselor established that Reed had been

diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder and a severe alcohol-use disorder that

was in sustained remission (with the qualifier that Reed’s remission had been in a

controlled environment). Reed presented evidence that he regularly attends

Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings and counseling sessions, has entered into

a contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), has been sober

since his incarceration began in June 2020, and is firmly committed to recovery.

Although Reed testified that his alcoholism affected every aspect of his life, he did

not sufficiently establish that it contributed to his misconduct. Consequently, the

board did not find his diagnosed mental and substance-use disorders to be a

mitigating factor. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). It did, however, attribute

mitigating effect to Reed’s clean disciplinary record, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1),

and noted that Reed accepted full responsibility for his actions.

{¶ 32} The parties jointly recommended that Reed be indefinitely

suspended from the practice of law and that he not be permitted to apply for

reinstatement until he has completed the postrelease control imposed in his criminal

cases and made full restitution of $4,000 to Thomas and $750 to Kermode. The

parties also recommend that we place conditions on Reed’s reinstatement to ensure

that he continues to comply with his treatment regimen and is mentally fit to resume

the practice of law. In addition, they agree that Reed should receive some credit

for the time served under his interim felony suspension.

{¶ 33} In determining the appropriate sanction to recommend for Reed’s

misconduct, the board relied on three cases in which we imposed indefinite

suspensions with similar conditions for reinstatement on attorneys who committed

crimes and engaged in professional misconduct while abusing alcohol.

{¶ 34} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Deters, 155 Ohio St.3d 478, 2018-Ohio-

5025, 122 N.E.3d 159, an attorney was convicted of misdemeanor counts of

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January Term, 2023

maintaining physical control of a vehicle while under the influence, excessive

speed, improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, assault, obstructing

official business, and twice violating a domestic-violence CPO that had been issued

in favor of his estranged wife, id. at ¶ 7-10. Deters also accepted fees but failed to

complete the work in 18 cases, failed to inform many of his clients of his

incarceration, failed to return their telephone calls, and failed to file two appellate

briefs, which resulted in the dismissal of one client’s case. Id. at ¶ 12, 15, 17. As

a result of Deters’s failure to appear at scheduled hearings, warrants were issued

for two of his clients and he was found in contempt of court. Id. at ¶ 6, 12. At the

time of his disciplinary hearing, Deters owed an aggregate amount of roughly

$29,000 in restitution to his former clients. Id. at ¶ 24.

{¶ 35} Three aggravating factors were present—Deters engaged in a pattern

of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, and harmed vulnerable clients. Id. at

¶ 20. The only mitigating factors were Deters’s cooperation in the disciplinary

proceedings and the imposition of other sanctions. Id. at ¶ 21. Although Deters

had been diagnosed with alcohol and substance-use disorders and an underlying

mental disorder, he made no claim that they qualified as a mitigating factor under

Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). Id. at ¶ 22. We indefinitely suspended Deters from the

practice of law, ordered him to make restitution to 14 clients, and imposed

conditions on his reinstatement requiring that he comply with his OLAP contract

and receive a prognosis from a qualified healthcare professional of his ability to

return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. Id. at ¶ 23-25.

{¶ 36} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Tinch, 160 Ohio St.3d 165, 2020-Ohio-

2991, 154 N.E.3d 78, we imposed a similar sanction on an attorney who committed

71 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his criminal

conduct and his professional misconduct in 12 separate client matters. Id. at ¶ 2, 6,

9-11. In contrast to Reed, Tinch established the existence of a mitigating substance-

use disorder, id. at ¶ 15, but he also had an interim default suspension imposed for

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his failure to respond to the disciplinary proceedings, id. at ¶ 2. His eventual

cooperation was tempered by his failure to accept responsibility and his lack of

remorse for the harm he had caused to his clients. Id. at ¶ 14-15. We indefinitely

suspended Tinch and afforded him no credit for the time served under his interim

remedial and default suspensions. Id. at ¶ 20.

{¶ 37} Finally, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Wilson, 160 Ohio St.3d 528,

2020-Ohio-3050, 159 N.E.3d 1141, an attorney committed a felony “with the intent

to thwart or hamper the prosecution of a felony domestic-violence case” that was

pending against the partner of Wilson’s former secretary. Id. at ¶ 35. He also

committed a series of ethical violations with respect to eight clients, which included

the neglect of client legal matters, the failure to reasonably communicate with

clients, a false statement made to a tribunal, the failure to deposit unearned fees into

a client trust account, and the failure to promptly refund unearned fees. Id. at ¶ 13,

17, 24, 26, 33. At the time of his disciplinary hearing, Wilson owed just $200 in

restitution to one client. Id. at ¶ 32.

{¶ 38} The aggravating and mitigating factors in Wilson were comparable

to those present in this case, id. at ¶ 35-36, and like Reed, Wilson failed to establish

his existing mental-health and substance-use disorders as mitigating factors, id. at

¶ 36. We indefinitely suspended Wilson from the practice of law, credited him for

the time served under his interim felony suspension, which by then had exceeded

two years, and imposed treatment-centered conditions on his reinstatement. Id. at

¶ 43.

{¶ 39} After considering Reed’s misconduct, the applicable aggravating

and mitigating factors, and the sanctions imposed in Deters, Tinch, and Wilson, the

board concluded that an indefinite suspension coupled with an order of restitution

and the parties’ proposed conditions for reinstatement is the appropriate sanction

for Reed’s misconduct. Citing the condition that Reed not be permitted to petition

for reinstatement until he has successfully completed his term of postrelease

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January Term, 2023

control, his genuine remorse and acceptance of responsibility for his wrongdoing,

and his commitment to his treatment program, the board recommends that he

receive credit for 18 months of the time he has served under his interim felony

suspension. Having reviewed the record in this case and our precedent, we agree

with the board’s recommendation.

CONCLUSION

{¶ 40} Accordingly, Ryan Shane Reed is indefinitely suspended from the

practice of law in Ohio and ordered to make restitution of $4,000 to Brandon

Thomas and $750 to Tina Kermode within 90 days of this order. He shall receive

18 months’ credit for the time served under his interim felony suspension, but he

shall not be eligible to petition for reinstatement until he successfully completes

any terms of postrelease control imposed in relation to his convictions in State v.

Reed, Champaign C.P. Nos. 2020 CR 100 and 2020 CR 135 (Dec. 4, 2020). In

addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(25), Reed’s reinstatement shall be

conditioned on proof of (1) his compliance with his May 31, 2022 OLAP contract,

(2) his continued participation in AA, and (3) his continued treatment with Journey

4 Self, L.L.C., or another provider approved by OLAP. Reed shall also be required

to submit an opinion from his treatment provider stating that he is able to return to

the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. Costs are taxed to Reed.

Judgment accordingly.

KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,

and DETERS, JJ., concur.

_________________

Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Assistant

Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.

Coughlan Law Firm, L.L.C., and Jonathan E. Coughlan, for respondent.

_________________

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