The opinion
Filed 4/28/23 Thompson v. Los Angeles County Civil etc. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JANELLE THOMPSON, B317647
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCP00922)
v.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mitchell Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Charles Goldwasser and Charles A.
Goldwasser, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hausman & Sosa, Jeffery M. Hausman and Larry D.
Stratton, for Defendants and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
(Department) suspended, and later discharged, appellant Janelle
Thompson from her position as a deputy sheriff. Thompson
appealed both her suspension and discharge to the Los Angeles
County Civil Service Commission (Commission), but later
withdrew her discharge appeal.
The Department then asked the Commission to dismiss
Thompson’s suspension appeal, relying primarily on Zuniga v.
Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th
1255 (Zuniga) and related cases. Zuniga held that the
Commission lost jurisdiction over the suspension appeal of an
employee who retired before the conclusion of Commission
proceedings, reasoning in part that “[t]here is no provision in the
[Los Angeles County] charter granting the Commission authority
to hear a wage claim brought by a former civil servant.” (Id. at
pp. 1259–1260.) Well over a decade later, its holding stands as a
“ ‘bright-line proposition.’ ” (Deiro v. Los Angeles County Civil
Service Com. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 925, 930 (Deiro).)
The Commission dismissed Thompson’s suspension appeal,
and she filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the
Commission’s decision. The trial court denied her petition. On
appeal, Thompson contends that Zuniga was wrongly decided
and that we should revisit its holding.
As described below, we adhere to Zuniga and the cases
following it and agree that once Thompson withdrew her
discharge appeal, the Commission lost jurisdiction over her
suspension appeal. We thus affirm.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Background
The material facts underlying this case are not in dispute.
Thompson was a deputy sheriff with the Department. In April
2013, a federal grand jury indicted Thompson for conspiring to
defraud and defrauding the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD).
Two months later, the Department suspended Thompson
without pay based on the criminal charges. The Department’s
notice of suspension cited Los Angeles County Civil Service Rule
18.01, which authorizes a suspension and provides that where
the basis of a suspension is a “criminal complaint or indictment
filed against [an] employee, the period of suspension may exceed
30 calendar days and continue until, but not after, the expiration
of 30 calendar days after the judgment of conviction or the
acquittal of the offense charged in the complaint or indictment
has become final.” (L.A. County Civil Service Rules, rule 18.01.)1
Thompson appealed her suspension to the Commission. The
Commission held that appeal in abeyance.
Then, in March 2015, the Department discharged
Thompson. According to the discharge notice, in February 2014,
Thompson pled guilty to four misdemeanor counts of defrauding
HUD and was placed on probation. Based on its investigation of
the same conduct at issue in the criminal case, the Department
concluded that Thompson had violated various Department rules
and regulations. Thompson appealed her discharge to the
1 All subsequent undesignated references to Rule refer to Los
Angeles County Civil Service Rules, codified at Appendix 1 of
Title 5 of the Los Angeles County Municipal Code.
3
Commission. The Commission later consolidated Thompson’s
discharge appeal with her suspension appeal.
II. Commission proceedings
In November 2015, Thompson withdrew her discharge
appeal. According to her writ petition, Thompson “was required
to sever her employment” with the Department to satisfy a term
of the plea agreement in the criminal case, and did so by
withdrawing her appeal of the discharge.
In her letter to the Commission withdrawing the appeal,
Thompson acknowledged that “she was convicted of four
misdemeanor counts as alleged in the notice of discharge,” but
“denie[d] any other wrongdoing.” Thompson further stated that
she “wishe[d] to proceed with the appeal of” her suspension.
The Commission granted Thompson’s request to withdraw
her discharge appeal in February 2016. Shortly thereafter, the
Department moved to dismiss Thompson’s remaining suspension
appeal. Citing Zuniga and related cases, the Department argued
that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over Thompson’s
suspension appeal because she was no longer an employee and
sought only a backpay remedy.
Thompson opposed the Department’s motion. She
contended that Zuniga was wrongly decided, and further, that
she was entitled to a hearing as a matter of due process.
The Commission dismissed Thompson’s suspension appeal
at its meeting in March 2016. Its notice of decision stated that
the Commission granted the Department’s motion to dismiss
Thompson’s appeal “due to lack of jurisdiction.”
4
III. Writ proceedings
In March 2019, Thompson filed a petition for writ of
mandate against the Commission and the Department pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 challenging the
Commission’s dismissal of her suspension appeal. She sought “an
order . . . compelling the Commission to grant her right under the
law to appeal the suspension and loss of pay.”
The Department opposed the petition, again relying on
Zuniga and related cases.
The trial court denied Thompson’s writ of mandate.
Construing her petition as a writ of administrative mandate
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 and applying de
novo review, the trial court determined that the Commission
properly dismissed her appeal. The court concluded that it was
bound “by the clear line of authority on the issue from the Courts
of Appeal,” i.e., Zuniga and cases following it. It therefore held
that “after [Thompson] withdrew the appeal of her discharge
from the Department, she lost her status as an employee,” and
that her “status as a non-employee thereafter deprived the
Commission of any jurisdiction to consider the appeal of her
[Rule] 18.01 suspension.” The trial court thereafter entered
judgment against Thompson.
Thompson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Thompson contends Zuniga was wrongly
decided and urges us to conclude the Commission erred in
dismissing her suspension appeal. After discussing Zuniga and
related precedent, we explain why we adhere to Zuniga.
5
I. Standard of review
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 establishes the scope
of a court’s inquiry when a party seeks a writ of administrative
mandate: “The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the
questions whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in
excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and
whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of
discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in
the manner required by law, the order or decision is not
supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by
the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)
The material facts here are undisputed. The only issue is
whether the Commission retained jurisdiction to decide
Thompson’s suspension appeal after she withdrew her discharge
appeal. “Lack of jurisdiction ‘constitutes a pure question of law’
[citation], and so our review is de novo.” (Deiro, supra, 56
Cal.App.5th at p. 929 [applying de novo review in action under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 where “[t]he only issue is
whether the commission retained jurisdiction to decide plaintiff’s
appeal after he retired”]; Hi-Desert Medical Center v. Douglas
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 717, 730 [“ ‘As to questions of law,
appellate courts perform essentially the same function as trial
courts in an administrative mandate proceeding, and the trial
court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.’ ”].)
II. Zuniga and related cases
In Zuniga, a deputy sheriff of Los Angeles County was
suspended without pay pursuant to Rule 18.01 after being
charged with grand theft and attempted receipt of stolen
property. (Zuniga, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1257.) He
6
appealed the suspension to the Los Angeles County Civil Service
Commission, which granted a hearing but held the appeal in
abeyance pending conclusion of the criminal proceedings. (Ibid.)
The deputy retired during the pendency of commission
proceedings. (Id. at p. 1258.) The commission thereafter
sustained the deputy’s suspension, and the trial court denied his
petition for writ of mandate challenging the suspension. (Ibid.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the commission
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the deputy’s claim once he
resigned from the sheriff’s department. (Zuniga, supra, 137
Cal.App.4th at p. 1258.) It emphasized that “ ‘[a] civil service
commission created by charter has only the special and limited
jurisdiction expressly authorized by the charter.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1259.) The court then analyzed several charter provisions:
“Section 34 of the Los Angeles County Charter provides that the
Commission ‘shall serve as an appellate body in accordance with
the provisions of Sections 35(4) and 35(6) of this article and as
provided in the Civil Service Rules. [¶] The Commission shall
propose and, after a public hearing, adopt and amend rules to
govern its own proceedings.’ Section 35(4) of the Los Angeles
County Charter requires the Board of Supervisors to adopt rules
to provide for procedures for appeal of allegations of
discrimination. Section 35(6) of the Los Angeles County Charter
requires that the rules provide for ‘Civil Service Commission
hearings on appeals of discharges and reductions of permanent
employees.’ ” (Ibid.)
Based on its examination of these charter provisions, the
court concluded that “[t]here is no provision in the charter
granting the Commission authority to hear a wage claim brought
by a former civil servant.” (Zuniga, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at
7
p. 1259.) The court likewise found that the applicable civil
service rules “allow the Commission to exercise authority over
former employees in only a few limited circumstances” that were
inapplicable. (Ibid.) It then held as follows: “Zuniga requested a
hearing on the suspension during his employment, but resigned
before the hearing was held. The Commission does not retain
jurisdiction over a former employee in these circumstances.”
(Ibid.) Moreover, the court denied the deputy’s petition for
rehearing, which clarified that he had retired, not resigned.
(Id. at p. 1260.) The court found the distinction immaterial,
stressing that “[o]nce a person has separated from service, the
Commission has no further jurisdiction except in the limited
situations specified in the governing constitutional charter or
statutory provisions.” (Ibid.)
Following Zuniga, cases have applied its holding in similar
circumstances. For example, in County of Los Angeles Dept. of
Health Services v. Civil Service Com. of County of Los Angeles
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 391 (Latham), the court held that the Los
Angeles County Civil Service Commission lost jurisdiction over
the appeal of a Los Angeles County Department of Health
Services employee who retired during the pendency of
commission proceedings. Like the present case, the employee
was suspended and later discharged and appealed both actions to
the commission. (Id. at p. 394.) Although the employee retired
before commission proceedings concluded, the commission did not
dismiss the employee’s appeals. (Id. at p. 395.)
On appeal from the trial court’s grant of a writ of mandate
ordering the commission to vacate its decision, the employee
argued that her retirement “did not eliminate her claims that she
should have kept her job, and therefore should have been paid
8
from . . . when the Department discharged her, to . . . when she
took her retirement.” (Latham, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at
p. 397.) The Court of Appeal concluded as follows: “Zuniga
stands for the bright-line proposition that, where an employee
retires during the pendency of a civil service appeal, her future
status as an employee by definition is no longer at issue. The
then pending appeal becomes a ‘wage claim brought by a former
civil servant,’ and under Zuniga the Commission has no
jurisdiction over such a wage claim because neither the charter
nor Civil Service Rules vest such jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 401,
quoting Zuniga, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259.)
Relying on both Zuniga and Latham, in Monsivaiz v. Los
Angeles County Civil Service Com. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 236
(Monsivaiz), the Court of Appeal held that an employee’s death
divested the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission of
jurisdiction over the employee’s discharge appeal. There, a Los
Angeles County employee appealed his discharge to the
commission, which upheld the discharge. (Id. at p. 238.) The
employee then filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the
commission’s decision but died while his writ proceeding was
pending. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
the writ petition. It concluded that “the Commission has
authority to act as an appellate body in very narrow
circumstances related to appeals by employees (or applicants for
employment) of discrimination claims, or appeals by employees
regarding ‘discharges and reductions.’ Under the Commission’s
rules (codified in the L.A. County Mun. Code, tit. 5, appen. 1),
rule 2.24 defines employee as ‘any person holding a position in
the classified service of the county. It includes officers.’ A
9
deceased former employee does not fit within the description of’
‘employee’ under the Commission’s rules.” (Monsivaiz, supra, 236
Cal.App.4th at pp. 240–241.) The court further explained that
the “logic of Zuniga and Latham applies with equal force here.
Even more than the voluntary act of retiring or resigning from
service, the death of a former employee prevents restoration of
employment with the county. And, the Commission can only
resolve a claim for backpay in connection with the restoration of
an employee to service.” (Id. at p. 241.)
Most recently, in Deiro, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th 925, the
Court of Appeal examined the Zuniga line of cases in the context
of a disability retirement. There, a deputy sheriff of Los Angeles
County applied for a disability retirement, but the sheriff’s
department discharged him before his retirement was approved.
(Id. at pp. 927–928.) Following his appeal of the discharge to the
Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, the deputy’s
disability retirement was granted. (Id. at p. 928.) The sheriff’s
department then moved to dismiss the deputy’s appeal,
contending that the deputy’s disability retirement deprived the
commission of jurisdiction over the appeal. (Ibid.) The
commission granted the sheriff’s department’s motion and
dismissed the appeal. (Ibid.)
Affirming the trial court’s denial of the deputy’s petition for
writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal explained that the “essence
of the Zuniga/Latham rule is that a plaintiff’s future status as an
employee is not at issue after he has retired. In the ordinary
case, this is just as true of disability retirees as it is of retirees
who choose to retire” after their years of service. (Deiro, supra,
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 934.) “As in any other retirement case, only
10
a wage claim remains, over which the charter gives the
commission no authority.” (Ibid.)
III. Zuniga applies to the present case
We have little trouble concluding that the Zuniga line of
cases applies here. As Thompson admits in her writ petition, she
withdrew her discharge appeal from the Commission to “sever
her employment with the Sheriff’s Department.” Because
Thompson’s return to service with the Department was thus no
longer at issue, the only issue remaining before the Commission
was her entitlement to backpay for the period of her allegedly
wrongful suspension. As Zuniga and the cases following it have
held, the Commission does not have jurisdiction over backpay
claims by former employees whose future employment is no
longer at issue.
Nevertheless, Thompson argues that we should not follow
Zuniga for several reasons. We address each contention in turn.
First, she contends Zuniga failed to account for section
35(6) of the Los Angeles County Charter, which states that the
rules of the Los Angeles County Civil Service System shall
“provide for: . . . ‘Civil Service Commission hearings on appeals of
discharges and reductions of permanent employees.’ ” (Italics
added.) According to Thompson, her suspension was tantamount
to a “reduction” and thus provided a basis for her appeal to the
Commission.
We disagree. In Berumen v. Los Angeles Dept. of Health
Services (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 372, 374 (Berumen), the Court of
Appeal rejected the argument that the Los Angeles County Civil
Service Commission had jurisdiction over an employee’s claim
that she was subjected to a “ ‘constructive’ or ‘de facto’ demotion”
even though her title and salary remained the same. The court
11
explained that the Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules state
that “ ‘ “[r]eduction” and “demotion” are synonymous.’ Each is
defined as ‘a lowering in rank or grade.’ ”2 (Berumen, at p. 377,
quoting Rule 2.17.) Because “[d]emotion is defined as a reduction
in grade or rank, nothing more and nothing less,” the court ruled
that the employee’s claim was “simply not authorized by the civil
service rules.” (Id. at p. 378.)
Based on Berumen, we are unpersuaded by Thompson’s
attempt to liken her unpaid suspension to a “reduction.”
Thompson was not lowered in rank or grade in connection with
her suspension, and thus cannot meet the definition of
“reduction” under the applicable civil service rules. (See
Berumen, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 377–378.) Nor has
Thompson cited any pertinent authority supporting the
conclusion that we should construe her suspension as a
“reduction” even though she was not lowered in rank or grade.3
2 “Grade ‘as it pertains to classification, means one salary
range.’ (L.A. County Civ. Service Rules, rule 2.27.) Rank ‘as it
pertains to classification, means the level of difficulty and
responsibility of a class.’ (L.A. County Civ. Service Rules, rule
2.46.)” (Berumen, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 377.)
3 Thompson points out that Rule 18.02, titled “Discharge or
Reduction,” states that “[a] permanent employee . . . may be
discharged from county service or reduced in rank or
compensation . . . .” (Rule 18.02(a), italics added.) Thompson
argues that because Rule 18.02 mentions a reduction in
“compensation,” we should construe her unpaid suspension,
which resulted in a loss of pay, as a “reduction.” We are not
convinced that the reference to a reduction in “compensation” in
Rule 18.02 was intended to expand or alter the definition of
12
We thus need not reach the Department’s argument that,
regardless of whether Thompson was suspended or suffered a
“reduction,” under Zuniga the Commission had no jurisdiction
once she withdrew her discharge appeal.
Thompson next contends that “Zuniga and the cases that
follow it do not deal with the fact that a discharged employee who
appeals the discharge [is] not an employee when that appeal is
made to the Commission.” But, as Thompson acknowledges, the
Los Angeles County Charter states that the “Rules of the Civil
Service shall provide for: . . . Civil Service Commission hearings
on appeals of discharges and reductions of permanent
employees.” (Los Angeles County Charter, Art. IX, § 35(6), italics
added.) The Los Angeles County Charter thus expressly
authorizes appeals to the Commission in the case of discharges,
satisfying the rule described in Zuniga that a “ ‘civil service
commission created by charter has only the special and limited
jurisdiction expressly authorized by the charter.’ ” (Zuniga,
supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259.) Thompson does not direct us
to any similar provision in the Los Angeles County Charter
expressly authorizing an appeal of a suspension by a former
employee.
Thompson also urges us to abandon Zuniga and its progeny
in favor of Hughes v. County of San Bernardino (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 542 (Hughes). There, after the County of San
“reduction” in Rule 2.49, i.e., a “lowering in rank or grade.” (Rule
2.49 [“ ‘Reduction’ means a lowering in rank or grade . . . .
‘Reduction’ and ‘demotion’ are synonymous.”]; see also id., Rule
2.00 [“Unless otherwise required by context, words used in these
Rules are understood to have the following special meanings as
set out in Rules 2.01 through 2.58.”].)
13
Bernardino imposed an unpaid suspension on a deputy sheriff,
the deputy appealed the suspension to the San Bernardino
County Civil Service Commission. (Id. at pp. 544–545.) Before
the commission proceedings concluded, the deputy retired. (Id. at
p. 545.) The commission then dismissed the deputy’s suspension
appeal. (Ibid.)
On appeal from the denial of the deputy’s petition for writ
of mandate, the Court of Appeal concluded that the commission
retained jurisdiction over the deputy’s appeal after his
retirement. After discussing several cases, including Zuniga and
Latham, the court focused on the applicable San Bernardino
County personnel rules to determine whether the commission lost
jurisdiction after the deputy’s retirement. (See Hughes, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 550–551.) It concluded that the applicable
rules “do not provide that the [civil service commission’s]
jurisdiction over the appeal of an adverse personnel action, once
triggered by an employee’s proper invocation of this right to
appeal, is withdrawn when the employee leaves employment.”
(Id. at p. 553.) Additionally, the court stressed the “unfairness of
implying such a rule in the absence of a specific provision” in the
applicable personnel rules. (Ibid.)
Thompson contends that we should follow the reasoning of
Hughes, arguing that there is no specific provision in the Los
Angeles County Charter or civil service rules that deprives the
Commission of jurisdiction over a suspension appeal upon the
resignation of an employee. However, Hughes concerned San
Bernardino County’s personnel rules, not the civil service rules or
charter provisions of Los Angeles County. As at least one case
14
has concluded, that is reason enough for us not to follow Hughes.4
(See Deiro, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 934, fn. 2 [applying
Zuniga to dispute involving Los Angeles County Civil Service
Commission and distinguishing Hughes, noting the “Zuniga line
of cases concern the Los Angeles County charter and civil service
rules, not the San Bernardino County personnel rules”].) That
Zuniga has been consistently followed by the courts in our
District only strengthens our decision to adhere to it. (See
Latham, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 401 [stating that Zuniga
stands for a “bright-line proposition”]; see also Deiro, at p. 930
[same].)
Finally, Thompson contends that the absence of any post-
deprivation process, i.e., a hearing to challenge her unpaid
suspension, fails to satisfy the requirements of due process. She
relies on Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of
Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2011) 648 F.3d 986 (ALADS).
In ALADS, four Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs were
charged with felonies and later suspended without pay; they each
appealed their suspensions to the Los Angeles County Civil
Service Commission. (ALADS, supra, 648 F.3d at p. 990.) Before
4 Thompson states that “[t]he Hughes court acknowledged
that it was examining language in the personnel rules that
differed from that in Zuniga, but a review of the language in both
cases shows a remarkable similarity.” Despite making that
claim, Thompson fails to cite any specific provisions, either in the
San Bernardino County personnel rules or the Los Angeles
County Civil Service Rules, that support her claim of
“remarkable similarity.” We therefore do not analyze that
contention. (See Dills v. Redwood Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28
Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 [“We will not develop the appellants’
arguments for them”].)
15
the commission resolved their suspension appeals, the sheriff’s
department discharged the deputies based in part on the
allegations underlying the criminal charges; the deputies also
appealed their discharges to the commission. (Ibid.) Two of the
deputies, Wilkinson and Sherr, were granted disability
retirement before commission proceedings ended. (Ibid.) The
commission then dismissed the appeals of Wilkinson and Sherr,
and they never received a post-suspension hearing. (Ibid.)
Wilkinson and Sherr, along with the two other deputies, then
sued Los Angeles County, the Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors, the commission, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff
under 42 United States Code section 1983 alleging violations of
their due process rights. (ALADS, at p. 900.)
On appeal from the dismissal of their complaint, the Ninth
Circuit reversed in part. Finding it undisputed that the deputies
had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued
employment, the court concluded that they could not “be deprived
of that employment without due process of law.” (ALADS, supra,
648 F.3d at p. 991.) The court further held that “due process
requires that [the deputies] receive post-suspension hearings in
addition to the limited procedures they received before their
suspensions.”5 (Id. at p. 992.)
Relevant here, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
district court’s reliance on Zuniga in dismissing the complaint
was partially misplaced. While recognizing that “Zuniga held
5 The court found that the pre-suspension process described
in the complaint “consisted of nothing more than a determination
that felony charges had been filed, without any inquiry into the
veracity of the allegations underlying those charges.” (ALADS,
supra, 648 F.3d at p. 992.)
16
that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals from
retired employees,” the court concluded that “the fact that the
Commission is precluded from hearing Wilkinson’s and Sherr’s
appeals does not remove the County’s constitutional obligation to
provide some form of post-suspension hearings.” (ALADS, supra,
648 F.3d. at p. 993, fn. omitted.) As the court emphasized, the
“issue is not whether the Commission had jurisdiction, but
whether Wilkinson and Sherr received sufficient post-suspension
process to satisfy constitutional requirements.” (Ibid.)
The court applied similar reasoning in addressing the
defendants’ qualified immunity defenses. The Ninth Circuit
agreed “with the district court as to the individually named Civil
Service Commissioners, who after Zuniga had no authority to
hear Wilkinson’s and Sherr’s appeals. [Citation.] But Zuniga
does not protect the County Supervisors and the Sheriff.”
(ALADS, supra, 648 F.3d at p. 997.) As to those defendants, the
court found that a reasonable official in their position “should
have concluded that, because the Commission was stripped by
the state appellate court of its ability to adjudicate the
suspensions of retired employees, those suspensions would be
constitutionally suspect.” (Ibid.)
Thompson contends that, like the deputies in ALADS, she
“has not received any post-suspension process to satisfy
constitutional requirements.” According to Thompson, the
“question isn’t whether the Commission lacked jurisdiction,” but
instead “whether she was provided with the necessary due
process.”
We see it differently—the issue here is the scope of the
Commission’s jurisdiction. Indeed, Thompson’s petition for writ
of mandate sought “an order . . . compelling the Commission to
17
grant her right under the law to appeal the suspension and loss
of pay.” (Italics added.) Her brief in support of the petition for
writ of mandate asked for the same relief, i.e., it sought an order
“commanding . . . Respondent Civil Service Commission to set
aside its decision denying [Thompson’s] appeal, and to set the
matter for hearing . . . .” (Italics added.) Thompson’s brief on
appeal continues her focus on the Commission’s jurisdiction,
describing the question presented here as follows: “Did the . . .
Commission lose jurisdiction of [Thompson’s] appeal of her Rule
18.01 suspension when she separated from the Sheriff’s
Department prior to the appeal hearing?” (Italics added.)
Hence, on the issue Thompson pursues, ALADS is
unhelpful to her: It repeatedly recognized the continued validity
of Zuniga for purposes of determining the Commission’s
jurisdiction. (See ALADS, supra, 648 F.3d at p. 993 [“Zuniga
held that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals from
retired employees.”]; id. at p. 997 [agreeing with the district court
that qualified immunity applied “to the individually named Civil
Service Commissioners, who after Zuniga had no authority to
hear Wilkinson’s and Sherr’s appeals.”].) Whether Thompson can
state a claim for deprivation of due process, as did the plaintiffs
in ALADS, is not before us.6
6 To be sure, ALADS held that the Commission’s lack of
jurisdiction over the deputies’ suspension appeals did not absolve
other Los Angeles County defendants—there, the Sheriff and
Supervisors—of their obligation to provide the deputies with
adequate post-suspension hearings. (ALADS, supra, 648 F.3d at
p. 997.) We need not address whether, as a matter of due
process, Los Angeles County, the Department, or some other
County entity is required to provide Thompson with a post-
18
We thus conclude that the Commission correctly dismissed
Thompson’s suspension appeal after she withdrew her discharge
appeal, which left the Commission without jurisdiction under the
circumstances presented here.7
deprivation hearing where she can challenge her unpaid
suspension. As noted, both in the trial court and on appeal
Thompson’s focus was on requiring the Commission to hold such
a hearing. Hence, we also need not address the Department’s
arguments that Thompson failed to establish a due process
violation here, or that her due process claim is undermined by
her purported failure to exhaust other available remedies.
7 Because we affirm the judgment for the reasons stated
herein, we do not address the Department’s alternative basis for
affirming the judgment, namely, that Thompson failed to file a
government claim.
19
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Department shall recover
its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
BENKE, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
20