James Spann v. George Lombardi

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-3455

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James Spann, also known as Melvin Ford,

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee.

v.

George A. Lombardi, MO DOC Director; Dave Dormire, MO DOC Divisional

Director; Alan Earls, MO DOC Deputy Divisional Director; Jay Cassady, JCCC Superintendent,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants,

Brian Schmutz, FUM; Jim Wakeman, Maintenance Supervisor,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants,

Nick Miller,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant,

Timothy Murray, Correctional Officer; Noel Obi; April Purifoy, Mailroom Supervisor,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants,

Shane Counts, Correctional Officer,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant,

Michael Cahalin, JCCC Lieutenant; Raina Martin, JCCC FUM,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants,

Kelly Deardeuff, JCCC Correctional Officer,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City

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Submitted: November 16, 2022

Filed: April 24, 2023

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Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

James Spann sued Missouri prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

deprivations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated. The officials moved for

summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the district court denied the

motion on two sets of claims. The officials appeal a portion of the order, and we

reverse.

I.

Spann was an inmate in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections.

In April 2014, Spann’s cellmate accused him of sexual assault. A prison official

investigated the allegation and compiled a report that included interviews, witness

statements, photographs, and a test from the incident that detected a “stain consistent

with semen.”

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In July 2014, prison officials issued Spann notice of a “major conduct

violation” based on the investigation report. The notice informed Spann of his rights

and identified the alleged victim, the date of the sexual assault, and the prison rule

that he allegedly violated. Under the department’s policy, an inmate who is cited for

a major conduct violation is entitled to a disciplinary hearing in front of an adjustment

board. Before Spann’s hearing, one member of the adjustment board sent an e-mail

to another member stating, “[h]e is guilty.” After a hearing, the board found Spann

guilty of sexually assaulting the cellmate, and transferred him from general

population to administrative segregation as a result.

According to Spann’s evidence, he was housed in a single cell where the lights

were often left on for several days. He was confined to his cell for up to twenty-three

hours a day and had limited human interaction. He was prohibited from attending

religious services and was not permitted to attend vocational training or educational

programs. He also lost eligibility for parole due to his placement in administrative

segregation. Spann’s confinement status was subject to 90-day reviews, but he

remained in administrative segregation for almost six years until his release from

prison.

Between 2014 and 2016, Spann filed multiple grievances based on his

conditions of his confinement. After the grievances were filed, prison officials cited

Spann for two conduct violations—one for possessing tobacco and another for

passing prescription medications. Spann asserts that the allegations were falsified

and made in retaliation for his filing of grievances.

In three consolidated lawsuits, Spann sued several prison officials under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Among other claims, he alleged that officials conducted his

disciplinary hearing in violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, and that officials violated his rights under the First

Amendment by retaliating against him for filing grievances.

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In 2018, the district court denied a motion of the officials for summary

judgment, but this court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

Spann v. Lombardi, 960 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2020). On remand, the district court

denied a renewed motion for summary judgment on Spann’s due process and

retaliation claims. The court ruled that the officials allegedly violated due process

rights that were clearly established in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and

that genuine disputes of material fact existed as to the retaliation claims.

II.

A public official is entitled to qualified immunity on a motion for summary

judgment unless a plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to show that the official

violated a clearly established right of the plaintiff. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 232 (2009). For a right to be “clearly established,” the law must have been

sufficiently clear at the time of the official’s conduct to inform every reasonable

official that what he was doing violated that right. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,

741 (2011). A plaintiff need not cite “a case directly on point,” but “controlling

authority” or “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” must have placed

“the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. at 741-42 (internal

quotations omitted). “The dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of

particular conduct is clearly established.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)

(per curiam) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742).

The officials argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Spann’s due

process claim, because Spann had no clearly established liberty interest in avoiding

assignment to administrative segregation. See Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1179

(8th Cir. 2019). Prisoners have a liberty interest in freedom from conditions of

confinement that impose “atypical and significant hardship” relative to “ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The duration

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and degree of restrictions bear on whether a change in conditions imposes such a

hardship. Id. at 486.

Spann maintains that Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), clearly

establishes a liberty interest on comparable facts. In Wilkinson, the Court held that

Ohio prisoners had a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to a maximum-security

prison where the inmates experienced indefinite placement with only annual reviews,

disqualification from parole consideration, and an environment with little human

contact. 545 U.S. at 223-24. Officials in this case reviewed Spann’s status in

administrative segregation more frequently, but we need not decide whether

Wilkinson nonetheless clearly establishes that Spann’s transfer to administrative

segregation interfered with a liberty interest.

Even assuming for the sake of analysis that Spann enjoyed a clearly established

liberty interest in avoiding assignment to administrative segregation, it was not

clearly established that he was entitled to the procedures set forth in Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539. Wolff involved the deprivation of good-time credits that

resulted in a longer term of imprisonment. Id. at 554. In Wilkinson, however, the

Court conducted a procedural due process analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424

U.S. 319 (1976), and concluded that the Wolff procedures do not apply when a

prisoner is transferred to administrative segregation. 545 U.S. at 225. Instead, a

transfer to administrative segregation requires only informal, nonadversary due

process procedures like those set forth in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), and

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1

(1979). See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 228-29; Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 684 (7th

Cir. 2012).

In view of Wilkinson, Hewitt, and Greenholtz, a reasonable official could have

believed that the procedures applied in Spann’s case were constitutionally sufficient.

Informal due process requires only “some notice of the reasons for the inmate’s

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placement . . . and enough time to prepare adequately for the administrative review.”

Westefer, 682 F.3d at 684 (internal quotations omitted). An inmate must be given “an

opportunity to present his views” to a neutral decisionmaker, but is not entitled to a

hearing with the inmate present. Id. at 685 (internal quotation omitted). “If the

prison chooses to hold hearings, inmates do not have a constitutional right to call

witnesses or to require prison officials to interview witnesses.” Id. Informal due

process also requires a periodic review of placement in administrative segregation.

Id. at 686.

The procedures applied here meet the informal due process standard. The

officials gave Spann adequate notice of the reasons for his placement. The notice

informed Spann of his rights and identified the alleged victim, the date of the sexual

assault, and the prison rule that he allegedly violated. After receiving notice, Spann

had nearly a month before the hearing to prepare a defense, and he was able to present

a written statement in his defense. Officials satisfied the periodic review requirement

by assessing Spann’s status in administrative segregation every ninety days.

Spann complains that one of the decisionmakers allegedly prejudged the

disciplinary decision by asserting Spann’s guilt in an e-mail to a colleague before the

hearing. He cites no authority, however, that an official who expresses a view on a

disciplinary matter before the hearing occurs is not a “neutral decisionmaker” or

otherwise deprives the inmate of due process. No final disciplinary decision was

rendered in Spann’s matter until the decisionmakers conducted a hearing and received

Spann’s submission. We may assume that it would be best for a decisionmaker to

withhold comment until the proceedings are completed, but there is no clearly

established constitutional right to that pristine process.

For these reasons, we conclude that the procedures afforded to Spann were

adequate under the standard of informal, non-adversary due process approved in

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Wilkinson for a transfer to administrative segregation. The officials are therefore

entitled to qualified immunity on Spann’s due process claim.

III.

On Spann’s allegations of unlawful retaliation under the First Amendment, the

officials appeal only a claim concerning alleged retaliatory discipline. This claim is

governed by Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2008). Hartsfield

established that “[a]n inmate may maintain a cause of action for retaliatory discipline

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where a prison official files disciplinary charges in retaliation

for an inmate’s exercise of constitutional rights.” Id. at 829. Claims of retaliation

fail, however, if the inmate actually violated a prison rule. Id. “Thus, a defendant

may successfully defend a retaliatory discipline claim by showing ‘some evidence’

the inmate actually committed a rule violation.” Id. “[A] report from a correctional

officer, even if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other evidence, legally

suffices as ‘some evidence’ upon which to base a prison disciplinary violation, if the

violation is found by an impartial decisionmaker.” Id. at 831.

Spann maintains that officials issued two false conduct violations in retaliation

for his filing of grievances. The first violation report, filed by Officer Deardeuff,

accused Spann of possessing tobacco. The second report, prepared by Officer

Counts, alleged that Spann impermissibly asked an official to deliver prescription

medication to another inmate. Both reports relied on the reporting officer’s personal

knowledge and detailed the conduct underlying the charges with specificity. An

impartial decisionmaker found the violations after an informal hearing at which

Spann was allowed to call witnesses and to make a statement. The violation reports

regarding Spann’s misconduct meet the “some evidence” standard established in

Hartsfield, and the officials are thus entitled to qualified immunity on the claims

alleging retaliatory discipline.

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* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the district court denying

qualified immunity on Spann’s due process claims and retaliation claims arising from

prison disciplinary actions. The officials do not appeal the denial of summary

judgment on Spann’s other retaliation claims, and those allegations remain pending

in the district court.

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