The opinion
Case: 21-20302 Document: 00516717667 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/19/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 19, 2023
No. 21-20302 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Alfred Dewayne Brown,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of Houston, Texas; Harris County, Texas; Breck
McDaniel; Ted C. Bloyd; D. L. Robertson,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:17-CV-1749
Before Wiener, Graves, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Circuit Judge:
We previously certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court in this
matter, asking whether the Tim Cole Act, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code §§ 103.001 et seq., bars maintenance of a federal lawsuit involving the
same subject matter that was filed before the claimant received compensation
under the Tim Cole Act. Having received a response from the Texas
Supreme Court, we AFFIRM the judgment below.
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No. 21-20302
I. Facts and Procedural Background
Brown spent more than twelve years in state prison—including ten on
death row—because of his wrongful conviction for the murders of a Houston
police officer and a store clerk. In 2015, the state district court granted the
Harris County District Attorney’s motion to dismiss the charges against
Brown, and Brown was released from prison.
In 2016, Brown filed a petition with the Texas Office of the
Comptroller for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, which provides state
compensation to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted of state
crimes in state courts.1 His petition was denied because (1) it was not based
on a finding that Brown was “actually innocent,” (2) Brown had not received
a pardon, and (3) the district attorney had not filed a qualifying motion. In
March 2019, following an investigation into Brown’s claim of actual
innocence, the Harris County District Attorney filed a motion to dismiss the
charges against Brown, which the state court granted. In May 2019, Brown
filed another petition for compensation under the Tim Cole Act. It too was
denied. Following that rejection, Brown sought a writ of mandamus from the
Texas Supreme Court.2 In December 2020, the Texas Supreme Court
overturned the Comptroller’s decision and ordered the State of Texas to pay
Brown the compensation he was owed under the Tim Cole Act.3 The State
then paid Brown’s Tim Cole Act claim.
1
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.001(a). Under this statute, “[a]
person is entitled to compensation if: (1) the person has served in whole or in part a
sentence in prison under the laws of this state; and (2) the person . . . has received a full
pardon on the basis of innocence for the crime for which the person was sentenced.” Id.
2
For a more extensive background of the case, see In re Brown, 614 S.W.3d 712,
713–16 (Tex. 2020).
3
Id. at 723–24.
2
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While Brown was pursuing compensation under the Tim Cole Act, he
brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court in June 2017.4
Brown alleged that the City of Houston, Harris County, and various state
officials had violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights
because of his wrongful prosecution, conviction, and detention in state
custody.5 Some claims survived a motion to dismiss, and others were
dismissed without prejudice.6 Defendants-Appellees eventually moved for
summary judgment.
In May 2021, the federal district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Defendants-Appellees and dismissed the remainder of Brown’s
§ 1983 claims with prejudice.7 In doing so, the court explained that “[a]
state’s payment for wrongful conviction under the [Tim Cole] Act provides
immunity to suits against state and local governmental entities and
employees seeking additional payment for the same wrongful conviction.”8
The court reasoned that “the Texas Supreme Court would likely . . .
conclude that § 103.153(b) bars Brown’s lawsuit.”9 The court acknowledged,
however, that this case presents “a novel issue of Texas law” as “[t]he Texas
Supreme Court has considered the Tim Cole Act several times, but it has not
addressed the specific issue presented here.”10 Brown timely appealed.
4
Brown v. City of Houston, 297 F. Supp. 3d 748, 756–57 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
5
Id.
6
Id. at 778.
7
Brown v. City of Houston, 538 F. Supp. 3d 725, 735 (S.D. Tex. 2021).
8
Id. at 731.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 730.
3
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This appeal addresses the viability of Brown’s federal lawsuit under
§ 1983. It is uncontested that Brown met the criteria of the Tim Cole Act and
received compensation under it, but the parties dispute the impact of
§ 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act on Brown’s federal suit. Section 103.153(b)
states:
A person who receives compensation under this chapter may
not bring any action involving the same subject matter,
including an action involving the person’s arrest, conviction,
or length of confinement, against any governmental unit or an
employee of any governmental unit.11
Brown contends that he may maintain his § 1983 suit because he filed
it before he received compensation under the Tim Cole Act. He explains that
he is simply maintaining his earlier-filed lawsuit and that the statute’s plain
language only proscribes bringing an action subsequent to receiving Tim Cole
Act compensation. Defendants-Appellees, on the other hand, assert that
“the Texas Supreme Court understands § 103.153(b) [as providing that] the
State’s payment provides immunity to suits against state and local
governmental entities and employees seeking additional payment for the same
wrongful conviction.”12 They contend that the Tim Cole Act presents an
open offer of settlement to which Brown knowingly and willingly agreed.
In April 2022, we certified the following question to the Texas
Supreme Court:
Does Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act bar maintenance
of a lawsuit involving the same subject matter against any
11
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.153(b).
12
(emphasis added).
4
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governmental units or employees that was filed before the
claimant received compensation under that statute?13
In February 2023, the Texas Supreme Court answered in the affirmative,
explaining that “Brown’s acceptance of Tim Cole Act compensation means
that he has agreed not to ‘bring’ a lawsuit in any forum against governmental
entities or employees that involves the same subject matter as his Tim Cole
Act claim. ‘Bringing’ an action in this context entails maintaining it.”14 We
now analyze the district court’s grant of Defendants-Appellees’ summary
judgment motion in light of this clarified meaning of § 103.153(b) of the Tim
Cole Act.
II. Standard of Review
“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
legal standards as the district court.”15 Summary judgment is proper “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”16 “We view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.”17
13
Brown v. City of Houston, No. 21-20302, 2022 WL 989364, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 1,
2022), certified question answered sub nom. Brown v. City of Houston, 660 S.W.3d 749 (Tex.
2023).
14
Brown, 660 S.W.3d at 759–60.
15
Tex. Ent. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 504 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Certain
Underwriters at Llyod’s, London v. Axon Pressure Prods. Inc., 951 F.3d 248, 255 (5th Cir.
2020)).
16
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
17
King v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 853 F. App’x 971, 973 (5th Cir. 2021).
5
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III. Analysis
Because the Texas Supreme Court had not yet answered the certified
question, the district court made an Erie guess that Brown’s federal suit was
barred because of his receipt of compensation under the Tim Cole Act.18 The
district court analyzed past instances when the Texas Supreme Court had
interpreted the Tim Cole Act, then held that “presented with the facts in this
case, the Texas Supreme Court would . . . conclude that § 103.153(b) bars
Brown’s lawsuit.”19 The Texas Supreme Court later concluded in response
to our certified question that Brown’s federal lawsuit is barred by his
acceptance of Tim Cole Act compensation.20
IV. Conclusion
We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees and its dismissal of Brown’s
remaining § 1983 claims with prejudice.
18
Brown, 538 F. Supp. 3d at 731–32.
19
Id. at 730–31.
20
Brown, 660 S.W.3d at 759–60 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6