The opinion
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11918
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TRUMAN BILLINGSLEY, JR.,
a.k.a. Truman Billingsley,
a.k.a. Tru,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11918
D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cr-00232-MHH-HNJ-1
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Truman Billingsley, a 45-year-old federally incarcerated
man, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). After care-
ful consideration, we affirm.
I.
In 2016, Billingsley pled guilty to possessing marijuana with
the intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime, and possessing a firearm after being con-
victed of a felony. The district court sentenced him to 84 months’
imprisonment followed by 60 months of supervised release. 1
In June 2020, Billingsley filed a pro se motion for compas-
sionate release, which was supplemented soon after by his court-
appointed counsel. Billingsley stated that the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for re-
ducing his sentence to time-served, as his prior bout with skin
cancer and his family history of diabetes placed him at a higher
risk of severe illness or death from the virus. Though he had al-
ready tested positive for COVID-19 in prison once before,
1 Billingsley’s projected release date is June 18, 2024.
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22-11918 Opinion of the Court 3
Billingsley argued that he was at risk of continued or additional
complications if he remained incarcerated. Billingsley also ex-
pressed his desire to return home and help care for his 96-year-old
stepfather.
The government opposed his motion, contending that
Billingsley had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, that
he posed a danger to the public, and that he had not shown any
extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief.
The district court denied Billingsley’s motion, stating that
he had not satisfied any of the grounds for compassionate release
under the applicable policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Billings-
ley appeals, asking us to vacate the district court’s judgment and
remand the case for further consideration.
II.
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States
v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). We also review de
novo questions of statutory interpretation. Id. After eligibility is
established, we review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion. Id. We liberally
construe pro se filings. Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d
1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015). 2
2 The government asserts that plain error review applies because Billingsley
raises his argument for the first time on appeal. Billingsley disagrees. None-
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11918
III.
Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may reduce an im-
posed term of imprisonment if, after considering the factors con-
tained within 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it concludes that “extraordinary
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and the reduc-
tion is “consistent with” the applicable policy statement in the
Sentencing Guidelines: § 1B1.13. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see
Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262. “[T]he only circumstances that can rise
to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons for compas-
sionate release are limited to those extraordinary and compelling
reasons as described by [§] 1B1.13.” United States v. Giron,
15 F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2021).
The application notes for § 1B1.13 contain four groups of
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate re-
lease: (A) serious or terminal medical conditions, (B) advanced
age, (C) family circumstances, and (D) “[o]ther [r]easons . . . [a]s
determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(D). Under our precedent, courts may not
decide the contents of that fourth “catch-all” category of “other
reasons”—such discretion is reserved solely for the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262–65.
theless, “[a]s the district court’s order was not erroneous, plain or otherwise,
we do not determine whether plain error review is applicable.” United States
v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1320 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2012).
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22-11918 Opinion of the Court 5
Here, the district court did not err in denying Billingsley’s
motion for compassionate release. On appeal, Billingsley does not
contend that his reasons for relief fall within any of the extraordi-
nary and compelling circumstances listed in § 1B1.13. Instead, he
argues that the district court improperly concluded that § 1B1.13
contained an exhaustive list of reasons that could justify his com-
passionate release—asserting that § 3582(c)(1)(A) empowers
courts to identify other extraordinary and compelling reasons for
relief so long as those justifications are “consistent with” those in
§ 1B1.13.
This argument is foreclosed by our precedent in Bryant and
Giron, however, and Billingsley has not demonstrated why those
prior decisions should not be controlling here.
Bryant held that “district courts are bound by the . . . defi-
nition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in [§]
1B1.13,” and therefore they must apply that definition when as-
sessing motions for compassionate release. 996 F.3d at 1262.
Likewise, Giron instructed that “the only circumstances that can
rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons for com-
passionate release are limited to those extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons as described by [§] 1B1.13.” 15 F.4th at 1346 (empha-
sis added). Thus, our precedent directly contradicts Billingsley’s
argument that district courts can identify extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons for release outside of those contained in § 1B1.13.
Under the prior-panel-precedent rule, we are bound by the
holdings of Bryant and Giron unless they have been “overruled or
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11918
undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or
by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d
1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
Billingsley argues that Bryant and Giron are not controlling
under our prior-panel-precedent rule for three reasons. First, he
argues that Bryant is inapplicable because it did not expressly de-
termine whether § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed district courts to find
reasons for relief that are different from, but consistent with,
those in § 1B1.13. Second, he contends that the relevant statement
from Giron—that the only circumstances compelling and ex-
traordinary enough for compassionate release were those in
§ 1B1.13—is mere dicta, as it was unnecessary under the facts of
that case to hold that § 1B1.13 contained an exhaustive list of rea-
sons for relief. Third, he says that the Supreme Court’s recent de-
cision in Concepcion v. United States, which emphasized the im-
portance of judicial discretion in sentencing matters, runs contra-
ry to Bryant and Giron. 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2396–2402 (2022). We ad-
dress each argument in turn.
First, Bryant is on-point and controlling for this case.
There, we held that district courts are bound by § 1B1.13 when
assessing motions for compassionate release, “mean[ing] that
courts may grant defendant-filed motions . . . but they must apply
[§] 1B1.13’s definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’”
in doing so. 996 F.3d at 1262 (emphasis added). Consequently, by
mandating the application of § 1B1.13’s definition of “extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons,” Bryant leaves no room for a district
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22-11918 Opinion of the Court 7
court to do what Billingsley requests—define other extraordinary
and compelling circumstances that could justify compassionate
release. 3 See id.
Second, Giron’s pronouncement that § 1B1.13 lists the only
circumstances sufficient for compassionate release is not dicta; it
is a holding that binds us. 15 F.4th at 1346. Billingsley correctly
suggests that, in general, a proposition qualifies as a holding only
when it is necessary to the judgment of a case. See United States
v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019). 4 But, contrary to
Billingsley’s assertions, the line concerning § 1B1.13’s exhaustive-
ness was essential to the panel’s ultimate decision. Giron, 15 F.4th
at 1346. The statement functioned as an explicit rejection of two
3 In arguing that Bryant is not on point, Billingsley states that “[a]ny lan-
guage in Bryant that suggests or implies [that courts cannot find extraordi-
nary or compelling reasons outside of § 1B1.13] is dicta, and dicta is not bind-
ing.” Appellant’s Br. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, it is
difficult to square this argument with his admission that Bryant held § 1B1.13
to be applicable to all compassionate-release motions. Bryant explained that
the language that mandates the use of § 1B1.13’s definition of “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” serves as the panel’s explanation of what it meant
for § 1B1.13 to be “applicable” to § 3582(c)(1)(A). 996 F.3d at 1252–62.
4 Although it is generally true that a proposition must be necessary to the
judgment of a case to qualify as a holding, we have also recognized that in
some circumstances a statement may be afforded “holding status” even if it is
not “strictly necessary” to a court’s ultimate decision. See United States v.
Files, 63 F.4th 920, 926–27 (11th Cir. 2023). But we need not discuss that
“grey area” because, as explained above, the Giron statement at issue was
plainly necessary to the court’s judgment. Id. at 927.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11918
arguments brought on appeal: (1) courts could independently as-
sess whether reasons for compassionate release existed outside of
those listed in § 1B1.13, and (2) medical reasons warranted relief.
Id. at 1345–47. The rejection of these two points was necessary to
conclude that there were no compelling or extraordinary reasons
for relief, which in turn, was necessary to affirm the district
court’s decision to deny compassionate release. Id. at 1345–47, 50.
Thus, the Giron panel’s conclusion that § 1B1.13 contained an ex-
haustive list of reasons for compassionate release was necessary to
the final judgment in the case. It is not dicta.
Third, the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion did not
overrule or abrogate our precedent that courts can grant compas-
sionate release only for the reasons listed in § 1B1.13. “While an
intervening decision of the Supreme Court can overrule the deci-
sion of a prior panel of our court, the Supreme Court decision
must be clearly on point.” Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Applying this standard, we are not per-
suaded that Concepcion overruled or abrogated our decisions in
Bryant and Giron.
In Concepcion, the Supreme Court discussed the factors
that a district court could consider when deciding sentence-
reduction motions for crack-cocaine convictions under § 404 of
the First Step Act of 2018. 142 S. Ct. at 2401–04. The Court held
that when a district court was deciding whether to exercise its dis-
cretion and award an eligible defendant a sentence reduction, it
could “consider other intervening changes of law . . . or changes
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22-11918 Opinion of the Court 9
of fact,” reasoning that there were no statutory constraints in
place that prevented district courts from doing so. Id. at 2396,
2400.
However, because Concepcion’s holding did not address
compassionate-release motions, we cannot conclude that the de-
cision overruled or abrogated our precedent in Bryant and Giron
about the types of circumstances that are extraordinary and com-
pelling enough for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Indeed, Concep-
cion recognized that for some sentencing matters, Congress “lim-
ited district courts to considering only certain factors” by “requir-
ing [them] to abide by the Sentencing Commission’s policy
statements”—citing § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate-release mo-
tions as an example where judicial discretion is “expressly cab-
ined” by congressional decree. 142 S. Ct. at 2400–01. This differ-
entiation shows that Concepcion is not “clearly on point.” Archer,
531 F.3d at 1352 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result,
Concepcion did not overrule or abrogate our prior decisions re-
garding § 3582(c)(1)(A) and § 1B1.13.
Thus, because our precedent forecloses the only argument
that Billingsley brings on appeal, and because that precedent has
not been overruled or abrogated, we must conclude that the dis-
trict court did not err in denying Billingsley’s motion for compas-
sionate release.
AFFIRMED.