Tracy Presson v. Darrin Reed

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-1198

___________________________

Tracy Todd Presson

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Darrin Reed, Sheriff; Jeff Lane

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

Submitted: October 20, 2022

Filed: April 12, 2023

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Before SMITH, Chief Judge, BENTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

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SMITH, Chief Judge.

Tracy Todd Presson, a former pretrial detainee in the custody of the Ozark

County Sheriff’s Department, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming

that Darrin Reed and Jeff Lane acted with deliberate indifference to Presson’s serious

medical needs by denying him prescription medication. Reed and Lane moved for

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court1 denied the

motion. They appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. We affirm.

I. Background

“We recite the facts in the light most favorable to [Presson], as the nonmoving

part[y].” K.W.P. v. Kan. City Pub. Sch., 931 F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 2019) (second

alteration in original) (quoting O’Brien v. Dep’t of Agric., 532 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir.

2008)).2

The Ozark County Sheriff’s Department arrested Presson on October 2, 2018.

Following his arrest, he was confined at the Ozark County Jail and remained there

until November 19, 2018.

Prior to and during Presson’s detention, Darrin Reed was the Ozark County

Sheriff, and Deputy Jeff Lane worked at the jail.

At the time of his arrest, Presson was prescribed the following medications to

treat various diagnosed conditions: (1) cyclobenzaprine (muscle relaxant for a back

injury); (2) Adderall (for attention deficit disorder); (3) omeprazole (for

1

The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

2

In construing the facts in the light most favorable to Presson, we include those

facts set forth in Presson’s verified complaint and verified amended complaint. See

Roberson v. Hayti Police Dep’t, 241 F.3d 992, 994–95 (8th Cir. 2001) (“A plaintiff’s

verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of summary

judgment, and a complaint signed and dated as true under penalty of perjury satisfies

the requirements of a verified complaint. Although a party may not generally rest on

his pleadings to create a fact issue sufficient to survive summary judgment, the facts

alleged in a verified complaint need not be repeated in a responsive affidavit in order

to survive a summary judgment motion.” (citations omitted)).

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gastroesophageal reflux disease); and (4) Ambien (for insomnia). Prior to his arrest,

on September 10, 2018, Presson had filled his 30-day prescription for Adderall.

Presson was instructed to “take one capsule by mouth every 24 hours as needed.” J.A.

at 281 (all caps omitted). Presson had filled a ten-day prescription for

cyclobenzaprine on September 27, 2018. He was instructed to “take one tablet by

mouth every 8 hours.” Id. at 273 (all caps omitted).

Presson’s brother delivered each prescription to the jail. Presson informed Reed

that Presson “needed his long-term prescription medications[,] including Adderall,

[o]meprazole, Ambien, and ‘muscle relax[ants] for a back injury.’” Presson v. Reed,

No. 6:19-cv-03192-RK, 2022 WL 107105, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2022).

The jail’s medical administration record for Presson (“medical log”) reflects

that Presson was to receive “[o]meprazole” and “Ambien,” both with a frequency of

“1.” J.A. at 142 (all caps omitted). It does not list Adderall or cyclobenzaprine. It

shows that “MEDS” were administered to Presson sometimes once, twice, or three

times a day at varying times from October 4, 2018, to November 18, 2018, except for

November 8, 2018, when no medication is recorded as having been administered.3

J.A. at 143–44. This record, however, does not specify what medications were

administered to Presson on these dates and times. See id.

3

Additionally, “the medical log does not include a record of medication being

given in the morning on several days: October 15 through October 19, 2018; October

22 through October 26, 2018; October 29, 2018; November 2, 2018; November 6,

2018; November 9, 2018; and November 12 through November 14, 2018.” Presson,

2022 WL 107105, at *8. And Presson did not receive medication on November 15

and 16, 2018, when Presson was receiving medical treatment at the Ozark Medical

Center after his suicide attempt.

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According to the medical log, various jail personnel, including Lane,

administered medication to Presson.4 According to Presson, he “begged [Deputy] Jeff

Lane multiple times a day to get [his] medication but [Lane] refused.” Presson, 2022

WL 107105, at *7. And while Reed did not administer any medications to Presson,

Lane told Presson that Reed’s approval was required to give Presson his prescription

medications. See id. at *9 (“At that point I told Jailer Jeff Lane and he stated he could

not give medication without Sheriff Darrin Reed[’]s approval.” (alteration in original)

(quoting R. Doc. 13, at 6)). Additionally, according to Presson, “while he was

detained and asking for his prescription medications, . . . Reed told him, ‘[y]ou will

get them tomorrow but tomorrow never comes.’” Id. at *11 (second alteration in

original).

During his detention at the jail, Presson, for reasons unclear in the record, did

not receive his prescribed cyclobenzaprine. Presson also did not receive his

prescribed Adderall. “[B]ecause [Adderall] is a controlled substance, it is not

administered to any detainee at the jail pursuant to policy.” Id. at 2 (second alteration

in original). The jail manual, however, does not include this “controlled substance

policy.” Instead, “the jail’s manual includes the following policy regarding

administration of detainees’ prescription medication: ‘Medications: Jail staff will

administer legally prescribed medications according to the prescribing physicians. Jail

staff will not deviate from the physician’s instructions.’” Id. at 3.

Presson “‘repeatedly’ told [the] [d]efendants his Ambien prescription was for

one tablet per day at bedtime, as needed, and not for more than 7–10 days at a time.”

4

“Lane’s badge number is ‘937.’” Presson, 2022 WL 107105, at *8 (quoting

R. Doc. 118, at 14, ¶ 11). The medical log lists this badge number “on nine occasions:

‘10/04/2018 [at] 08:30:05’; ‘10/05/2018 [at] 08:41:39’; ‘10/10/2018 [at] 08:12:25’;

‘10/11/2018 [at] 08:17:58’; ‘10/12/2018 [at] 08:30:47’; ‘10/30/2018 [at] 08:16:14’;

‘10/31/2018 [at] 08:17:10’; ‘11/01/2018 [at] 08:44:50’; and ‘11/05/2018 [at]

08:17:15.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting R. Doc. 111-3, at 5–6).

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Id. at 2. Contrary to Presson’s instructions, the “[d]efendants gave him Ambien

‘multiple times a day’ including at times other than bedtime, and for more than 7–10

days.” Id.

“[A]s a result of not receiving his prescription medications as prescribed for

several weeks, [Presson] suffered ‘severe pain, depression, and throwing up bile,’ and

ultimately attempted suicide.” Id. On October 17, 2018, Presson told Lane that he was

having chest pain. Presson alleges that, over time, his pain and vomiting had become

so severe that he thought he was having a heart attack. Lane moved Presson to a

holding cell. Later, Presson was taken for medical treatment to a local medical clinic.

The clinic’s medical records show that Presson reported “‘shortness of breath,’ ‘chest

pain,’ ‘throwing up acid,’ and that his ‘right lung feels on fire.’” Id. at 2–3. Presson

informed the doctors that he had not had his omeprazole medication for 17 days. “The

doctor recommended [that Presson] ‘[r]estart[] [o]meprazole.’” Id. at 3 (second and

third alterations in original).

“Then, beginning on November 8, 2018, journal entries . . . reflect [Presson]

contemplating suicide by taking ‘30 sleeping pills’ he had. On November 15, 2018,

[Presson] ingested 20–30 prescription Ambien pills he had collected and was taken

to the Ozark Medical Center Emergency Room.” Id. Medical records reflect that

Presson informed the emergency room staff that he

took about 20–30 pills. He states that he collected this [sic] pills over the

loss [sic] several weeks in order to have enough to kill himself. It

happened several hours prior to the ED visit. He reports that he tried to

kill himself. He also reports that he tried to hurt himself by hitting his

head to the wall.

R. Doc. 61, at 5 (alterations in original) (quoting R. Doc. 50-13, at 7). While in the

emergency room, Presson attempted “to hurt himself again by throwing himself from

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the bed. He fell on the ground. He was taken to . . . radiology again and a new CT of

the brain was done which was negative.” Id. (quoting R. Doc. 50-13, at 7).

Presson’s doctors discontinued his Ambien prescription due to the overdose.

They recommended that Presson take a different medication for depression and

insomnia and seek outpatient mental health treatment. They “further recommended

that ‘[Presson] be maintained on suicide precautions while incarcerated and that

mouth checks be done after medication administration to ensure compliance rather

than cheeking5 medication.’” Id. (quoting R. Doc. 50-13, at 14). Presson remained at

the hospital overnight.

Presson returned to the jail on November 16, 2018, at 10:30 p.m. Three days

later, he was transferred to another county jail.

Presson then brought this prisoner pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that Reed and Lane violated his Eighth Amendment rights and were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by withholding and

misadministering his various prescription medications. In his amended verified

complaint, Presson alleged that the defendants misadministered his Ambien and

omeprazole prescriptions and withheld his Adderall and cyclobenzaprine

medications, despite his repeated requests. He further alleged that the

misadministration and withholding of his medications resulted in him (1) suffering

severe pain and throwing up bile to the degree that he required emergency medical

treatment for a possible cardiac event, and (2) attempting suicide.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity. The district court analyzed Presson’s deliberate-indifference claim under

5

“Based on the record ‘cheeking’ appears to occur when someone secrets a pill

in his/her cheek to save the pill.” Id. at 5 n.7 (citing R. Doc. 50-13, at 16.)

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the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Eighth Amendment because Presson was

a pretrial detainee at the time of the events. The district court denied the defendants’

motion.

First, the district court rejected the defendants’ argument that Presson could not

establish a violation of his constitutional rights. The court concluded that genuine

material issues of fact existed as to whether Presson had an objectively serious

medical need and whether the defendants were subjectively aware of the need but

disregarded it taking into account the facility’s policy and the schedule used to

dispense medication.

Second, the district court concluded that “when viewed in the light most

favorable to [Presson], . . . a fact-finder could conclude [the] [d]efendants were

deliberately indifferent to [Presson’s] serious medical need in their misadministration

and withholding of [Presson’s] various prescription medications.” Presson, 2022 WL

107105, at *10. According to the court, “the [d]efendants had fair warning about the

unconstitutionality of failing to provide prescription medication for a serious medical

need.” Id.

The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that they were entitled to

summary judgment on Presson’s claim for punitive damages because he “‘was treated

appropriately’ and ‘was not denied medical care.’” Id. at *11. “At this juncture,” the

court stated, “this argument is plainly unpersuasive given the various issues of fact

that exist on this summary judgment record.” Id.

II. Discussion

The defendants argue that the district court erroneously denied their motion for

summary judgment on Presson’s deliberate-indifference claim based on qualified

immunity. According to the defendants, “[t]he material facts establish there was no

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need as a matter of law” for the following

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reasons: (1) they provided Presson with “medical care and transferred [him] to the

hospital twice, once for complaints of chest pain and again, after he hoarded his

prescription sleep medication and tried to commit suicide by overdose”; and (2)

Presson failed to produce an “expert medical opinion that any actions of [the

defendants] caused an adverse effect on his health or prognosis.” Appellants’ Br. at

13. “[A]side from [Presson’s] failure to establish a constitutional violation,” the

defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because “their

individual actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 14.

A. Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, Presson argues that even though “this [c]ourt has

appellate jurisdiction to review on an interlocutory basis a district court’s denial of

summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, such a review is limited to purely

legal issues. In their instant appeal, Reed and Lane instead improperly argue the

sufficiency of the evidence regarding their conduct.” Appellee’s Br. at 7. Presson

maintains that “[s]uch factual inquiries are solidly within the realm of the [d]istrict

[c]ourt and, regardless, cannot be the basis for interlocutory appeal. Because the

material and predicate facts underlying this appeal are in dispute, this [c]ourt lacks

jurisdiction.” Id.

This court has authority under the collateral order doctrine to hear

an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity. Jurisdiction

over an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity

extends only to abstract issues of law, not to determinations that the

evidence is sufficient to permit a particular finding of fact after trial.

Appellate review in these circumstances is therefore limited to

determining whether all of the conduct that the district court deemed

sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment violated the

plaintiff’s clearly established federal rights. When there are questions of

fact the district court did not resolve, we determine the facts that it likely

assumed by viewing the record favorably to the plaintiff as in any other

summary judgment motion, unless the plaintiff’s version of the facts is

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blatantly contradicted by the record. In other words, we review whether

the official is entitled to qualified immunity based on the summary

judgment facts as described by the district court, along with those facts

that the district court likely assumed. We do not have jurisdiction to

review whether a factual dispute is genuine, but we do have jurisdiction

to review the purely legal question whether a dispute identified by the

district court is material.

The qualified immunity inquiry involves two questions: (1)

whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2)

whether the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.

The defendant is entitled to qualified immunity unless the answer to

both of these questions is yes. The court may consider them in either

order. For a right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must

be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that right. While prior cases need not have

expressly determined that the action in question is unlawful, in the light

of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. We review a

district court’s qualified immunity determination on summary judgment

de novo.

McDaniel v. Neal, 44 F.4th 1085, 1088–89 (8th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

Here, the district court denied qualified immunity because “when viewed in the

light most favorable to [Presson], . . . a fact-finder could conclude [d]efendants were

deliberately indifferent to [Presson’s] serious medical need in their misadministration

and withholding of [Presson’s] various prescription medications.” Presson, 2022 WL

107105, at *10. “At this stage, we[, too,] view the facts in the light most favorable to

[Presson].” McDaniel, 44 F.4th at 1090. When doing so, we may answer the legal

question of whether Presson’s constitutional rights were violated and, if so, whether

the law was clearly established at the time of the violation. See id. Therefore, we have

jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal.

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B. Qualified Immunity

1. Constitutional Violation

“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”

Johnson v. Leonard, 929 F.3d 569, 575 (8th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Presson was a pretrial detainee,

not a prisoner, at the time he was in the Ozark County Jail. “As a pretrial detainee,

[Presson] [was] ‘entitled to at least as much protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment as under the Eighth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Hartsfield v. Colburn,

371 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 2004)). “It is clear that a pretrial detainee has a

constitutional right to adequate medical care while in custody.” Dadd v. Anoka Cnty.,

827 F.3d 749, 756 (8th Cir. 2016).

“Deliberate indifference is more than negligence, more even than gross

negligence. It may be found where medical care is so inappropriate as to evidence

intentional maltreatment.” Johnson, 929 F.3d at 575 (cleaned up); see also Holden

v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 343 (8th Cir. 2011) (“The level of culpability required to

demonstrate deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials is equal to criminal

recklessness.”). To succeed on his deliberate-indifference claim, Presson must “clear

a substantial evidentiary threshold.” Johnson, 929 F.3d at 576 (quoting Nelson v.

Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 448–49 (8th Cir. 2010)). He must establish that “(1) he

suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and (2) defendants knew of the

need yet deliberately disregarded it.” Id. at 575 (quoting Hartsfield, 371 F.3d at 457).

Here, Presson clears the evidentiary bar.

a. Serious Medical Need

We have “defined a ‘serious medical need’ as ‘one that has been diagnosed by

a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Davis v. Buchanan

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Cnty., 11 F.4th 604, 623–24 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d

174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995)).

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Presson, he has established

that he suffered from “serious medical need[s]” at the time he was in the Ozark

County Jail because his conditions were “diagnosed by a physician” and “requir[ed]

treatment.” Id. Specifically, Presson was diagnosed with a back injury, attention

deficit disorder, gastroesophageal reflux disease, and insomnia. Medical professionals

had prescribed cyclobenzaprine, Adderall, omeprazole, and Ambien to treat his

conditions during the time that he was in the Ozark County Jail. Thus, Presson has

established the objective component of deliberate indifference.

The defendants do “not controvert or dispute that at the time [Presson] was

detained at the jail, he had [the aforementioned] valid prescriptions.” Presson, 2022

WL 107105, at *5. Instead, the defendants have consistently argued that they are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Presson provided no expert medical

evidence of any adverse effect on his prognosis resulting from their allegedly

unconstitutional acts. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that

Presson “need not provide evidence of an ‘adverse effect on his prognosis’” because

his “constitutional claim rests on the misadministration and the withholding of his

prescription medications—rather than a discrete constitutional claim based on a delay

in treatment.” Presson, 2022 WL 107105, at *6.

“When the inmate alleges that a delay in medical treatment rises to the level of

an Eighth Amendment violation, the objective seriousness of the deprivation should

also be measured by reference to the effect of delay in treatment.” Laughlin v.

Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005) (first emphasis added) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “A prisoner alleging a delay in treatment must present verifying

medical evidence that the prison officials ignored an acute or escalating situation or

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that these delays adversely affected his prognosis.” Redmond v. Kosinski, 999 F.3d

1116, 1121 (8th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Holden, 663 F.3d at 342).

Here, Presson has not alleged that the defendants delayed providing treatment

for his conditions. Instead, he alleges that they misadministered his prescribed

Ambien and withheld giving him his prescribed cyclobenzaprine, Adderall, and

omeprazole for already-diagnosed conditions. Furthermore, “submission of verifying

medical evidence [is] unnecessary” when the “need for medical attention . . . would

have been obvious to a layperson.” Hartsfield, 371 F.3d at 457. Construing the facts

in the light most favorable to Presson, Presson’s “prescription

medications—presented to the jail after [Presson’s] arrival—and his complaints and

visible adverse physical condition including pain and vomiting bile” sufficiently

demonstrate Presson’s serious medical need. Presson, 2022 WL 1071045, at *6 n.6.

b. Deliberate Disregard

We now turn to the subjective prong of the inquiry. “Under the subjective

prong, to show deliberate indifference, the official must know of and disregard the

inmate’s serious medical need.” Davis, 11 F.4th at 624 (cleaned up). Presson “must

establish a mental state [of the defendants] akin to criminal recklessness: disregarding

a known risk to the arrestee’s health.” Id. (cleaned up). “In other words,” Presson has

to demonstrate “that the [defendants] recognized that a substantial risk of harm

existed and knew that their conduct was inappropriate in light of that risk.” Id.

(emphasis added) (quoting Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 2015)).

“The factual determination that a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a

substantial risk may be inferred from circumstantial evidence or from the very fact

that the risk was obvious.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 786 (8th Cir. 1997).

“Generally, [an] actor manifests deliberate indifference by intentionally

denying or delaying access to medical care, or intentionally interfering with treatment

or medication that has been prescribed.” Davis, 11 F.4th at 624 (emphasis added)

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(internal quotation marks omitted). “When an official denies a person treatment that

has been ordered or medication that has been prescribed, constitutional liability may

follow.” Dadd, 827 F.3d at 757 (emphasis added).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Presson, the defendants knew

of and disregarded Presson’s serious medical need. First, the defendants “were aware

of [Presson’s] serious medical needs,” Dadd, 827 F.3d at 755, based on the following

evidence: (1) Presson’s brother delivered Presson’s prescriptions to the Ozark County

Jail; (2) Presson told Reed that he needed his long-term prescription medications,

including Adderall, omeprazole, Ambien, and “muscle relax[ants] for a back injury,”

Presson, 2022 WL 107105, at *2; (3) “while [Presson] was detained and asking for

his prescription medications, . . . Reed told him, ‘[y]ou will get them tomorrow but

tomorrow never comes,’” id. at *11 (third alteration in original); (4) Lane told

Presson that it was Reed who had to approve Presson’s medications; (5) Lane was

one of the deputies who administered medication to Presson; and (6) Presson “begged

[Deputy] Jeff Lane multiple times a day to get [his] medication but [Lane] refused,”

id. at *7.

Second, the defendants disregarded Presson’s serious medical need by (1) not

giving Presson his cyclobenzaprine prescription medication or his Adderall

prescription; (2) misadministering his Ambien prescription by giving him Ambien

“‘multiple times a day’ including at times other than bedtime and for more than 7–10

days” despite Presson “repeatedly” telling them that “his Ambien prescription was for

one tablet per day at bedtime, as needed, and not for more than 7–10 days at a time,”

id. at *2; and (3) denying Presson his omeprazole from October 2 until October 17,

2018, when he was taken to a local medical clinic for complaints of “shortness of

breath, chest pain, throwing up acid, and . . . his right lung fe[eling] on fire” and the

medical clinic doctor recommended that Presson “restart [o]meprazole,” id. (cleaned

up). The failure to give cyclobenzaprine, Adderall, and omeprazole and the

misadministration of Ambien constitute disregard of Presson’s serious medical needs.

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The asserted existence of a “controlled substance policy” does not alter this

result. The defendants claim that they did not provide Presson a controlled substance,

like Adderall, just as they denied controlled substances to all other inmates at the jail.

As previously explained, the jail manual does not include this “controlled substance

policy.” In fact, a portion of the jail manual actually provides: “Medications: Jail staff

will administer legally prescribed medications according to the prescribing

physicians. Jail staff will not deviate from the physician’s instructions.” Presson,

2022 WL 107105, at *2. Ultimately, the controlled substance policy does not impact

our analysis of Presson’s constitutional claim. Cf. Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334

(8th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he issue is whether the government official violated the

Constitutional or federal law, not whether he violated the policies of a state agency.”).

Instead, it is the defendants’ “knowing failure to administer prescribed medicine

. . . itself [that] constitute[s] deliberate indifference.” Phillips v. Jasper Cnty. Jail, 437

F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Dadd, 827 F.3d at 757. “The decision not to

give [Presson] the physician[-]prescribed [Adderall] was based on the policy of the

detention center that it was a [controlled-substance] free facility. No exercise of

medical judgment was involved.” McAdoo v. Martin, No. 6:13-cv-06088, 2017 WL

1091348, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 21, 2017) (determining prison officials were

deliberately indifferent in refusing to give plaintiff a pain medication prescribed by

emergency room doctors based on the detention center’s policy as a “narcotic free

facility”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 899 F.3d 521 (8th Cir.

2018).6

6

Cf. Vaughan v. Lacey, 49 F.3d 1344, 1346 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding defendants

entitled to summary judgment because they were not deliberately indifferent to

plaintiff’s medical needs when the record showed they “responded promptly” to

plaintiff’s requests for medical and psychiatric care; initially followed the advice of

which medications plaintiff should be given and when they should be given; followed

the advice of a subsequent examining physician; administered medications as

prescribed; and refilled those prescription medications until plaintiff left the detention

center).

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For similar reasons, the defendants’ argument that they were not deliberately

indifferent to Presson because his prescriptions for cyclobenzaprine and Adderall

would have expired “very soon into detention anyway” also fails. Appellants’ Br. at

13. Again, the defendants’ knowing failure to give these medications, as prescribed,

is sufficient to show deliberate indifference. See Phillips, 437 F.3d at 796.

The defendants further argue that they were not deliberately indifferent to

Presson’s serious medical needs because they provided him with medical care when

he experienced chest pain and vomiting and later overdosed on Ambien. But this is

not Presson’s claim. Presson claims their deliberate indifference resulted from failing

to administer or misadministering his prescriptions. This failure caused adverse

physical and mental symptoms and effects that, in turn, required acute medical

treatment and care.

Furthermore, the facts construed in the light most favorable to Presson show

that Reed and Lane were responsible for the failure to administer or

misadministration of the prescriptions. Lane is recorded as administering medication

to Presson. His badge number appears on the medication log on nine occasions.

Notably, the medical log does not include a record of medication being given in the

morning on several days: October 15 through October 19, 2018; October 22 through

October 26, 2018; October 29, 2018; November 2, 2018; November 6, 2018;

November 9, 2018; and November 12 through November 14, 2018; and no

medication is recorded as being given at any time on November 8, 2018. According

to Deputy Lane, he could not administer medication to Presson without Reed’s

approval; in turn, Reed told Presson that “[y]ou will get them [the medication]

tomorrow but tomorrow never comes.” Presson, 2022 WL 107105, at *11 (first

alteration in original).

In summary, Presson has sufficiently demonstrated that “[t]he defendants were

subjectively aware of but disregarded a serious medical need.” Id. at *9. The facts

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construed in the light most favorable to Presson show that the “[d]efendants, who are

not medical personnel, substituted their controlled substance ‘policy’ and their

schedule for administering [or failing to administer] medication for that of a treating

physician.” Id.

2. Clearly Established

“We [now] turn our inquiry to the clearly established prong of the analysis. A

right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Furlow v. Belmar,

52 F.4th 393, 404 (8th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). This means that

“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “We do not require a case directly on

point. . . . Clearly established law is dictated by controlling authority or a robust

consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 38 F.4th

684, 690 (8th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

“Showing that a right was clearly established requires identifying controlling

precedent with a close correspondence to the particulars of the present case.” Rusness

v. Becker Cnty., 31 F.4th 606, 615 (8th Cir. 2022). In other words, “the right in

question must be construed fairly narrowly and that facts in the present case must

align with facts in precedent.” Id. Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court has cautioned courts

not to define clearly established law at too high a level of generality.” Ivey v. Audrian

Cnty., 968 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148,

1152 (2018) (per curiam)). “We have recognized this principle in cases involving

deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee’s objectively serious medical needs.” Id.

(citing Ryan v. Armstrong, 850 F.3d 419, 426–27 (8th Cir. 2017); Barton v. Taber,

820 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 2016)). Our obligation is to “close[ly] examin[e] . . . the

facts to determine what right is at issue and thus whether qualified immunity is

appropriate.” Rusness, 31 F.4th at 615.

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Dadd makes “[i]t . . . clear that [(1)] a pretrial detainee has a constitutional right

to adequate medical care while in custody,” 827 F.3d at 756, and that (2)

“constitutional liability may follow” “[w]hen an official denies a person treatment

that has been ordered or medication that has been prescribed,” id. at 757. In Dadd, the

pretrial detainee “arrived at the jail with instructions from his doctor in the form of

a Vicodin prescription, and the deputies and the jail nurse ignored his complaints of

pain and requests for treatment. When [the pretrial detainee] was prescribed

additional medication by a jail doctor, he did not receive it.” Id. at 757. We held that

“the defendants had fair warning about the unconstitutionality of a failure to provide

pain medication for serious dental conditions.” Id. Thus, the pretrial detainee’s “right

to adequate treatment was clearly established, and the district court properly denied

the defendants qualified immunity.” Id.

Here, the “facts in the present case . . . align with [the] facts in [Dadd],”

Rusness, 31 F.4th at 615, and gave Reed and Lane “fair warning” that

misadministering prescriptions or failing to provide Presson with his prescribed

medication violated Presson’s constitutional rights, Dadd, 827 F.3d at 757. Dadd

involved the failure to provide prescribed medication to the pretrial detainee despite

the defendants’ knowledge that the pretrial detainee was prescribed a pain reliever

following his dental surgery and the pretrial detainee’s repeated complaints of pain

to the defendants. The same is true here. Reed and Lane failed to administer or

misadministered the medication to Presson despite knowing a doctor prescribed them

and despite Presson’s repeated requests for his medication.

Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Presson, his “right to

adequate treatment was clearly established, and the district court properly denied the

defendants qualified immunity.” Id.7

7

The defendants also argue that the district court erred in denying their motion

for summary judgment on Presson’s claim for punitive damages because no evidence

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III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

exists of their evil intent, malice, or callous indifference. “Because a jury must decide

whether [Reed] and [Lane] acted with deliberate indifference, the district court

properly refused to dismiss [Presson’s] claim[] for punitive damages against them.”

Erickson v. Holloway, 77 F.3d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1996).

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