The opinion
2023 IL 128051
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 128051)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
VONZELL WHITEHEAD, Appellant.
Opinion filed March 23, 2023.
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet and Holder White concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
Justices Cunningham, Rochford, and O’Brien took no part in the decision.
OPINION
¶1 After a jury trial, the defendant, Vonzell Whitehead, was found guilty of two
counts of aggravated battery in a place of public accommodation and sentenced to
42 months’ imprisonment with a 1-year term of mandatory supervised release. On
appeal, Whitehead argued, inter alia, that his conviction for aggravated battery
should be reduced to simple battery because the offense was not committed “on or
about a public place of accommodation.” The appellate court rejected Whitehead’s
assertions and affirmed his conviction, finding that the stoop upon which the victim
was battered was a public place of accommodation pursuant to section 12-3.05(c)
of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2018)). 2021
IL App (2d) 210104-U, ¶¶ 28-31, 33, 36.
¶2 We allowed Whitehead’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). For the following reasons, we now
reverse the judgment of the appellate court, vacate Whitehead’s conviction for
aggravated battery, and enter a conviction for simple battery.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Circuit Court Proceedings
¶5 Whitehead was charged with two counts of aggravated battery pursuant to
section 12-3.05(c) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2018)) for striking
Steven Box with his fist and with a cane on the stoop in front of Box’s residential
doorway.
¶6 During Whitehead’s trial, Box testified that on November 5, 2019, he was living
in an apartment complex and Edna Parks was his next-door neighbor. On the
evening of November 5, 2019, Box heard Whitehead yelling inside Parks’s
apartment. Box also heard banging on the wall inside Parks’s apartment as well as
“rumbling” near the door. Upon hearing these noises, Box opened his door to see
what was happening. Box then heard Parks ask Whitehead to go home. Moments
later, Whitehead exited Parks’s apartment, stood on the stoop directly in front of
his and Parks’s apartment doors, looked at Box, asked Box what he was looking at,
and struck Box in the face with a closed fist. After being struck in the face, Box fell
backward into his apartment. Upon arising, Box noticed that Whitehead had placed
his foot in his doorway. To prevent Whitehead from entering his apartment, Box
placed both of his hands on his doorframe and started kicking Whitehead. During
this exchange, Box grabbed his cane that he kept near the door and struck
Whitehead with it. Whitehead then grabbed the cane and struck Box with it, causing
him to fall to the ground again. While Box lay on the ground, Whitehead repeatedly
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struck Box with his cane. Box managed to shut his door just as Whitehead took the
cane and hit the shut door with such force that it dented the door. Box then called
the police but remained inside his apartment during the entire altercation.
¶7 Parks, Whitehead’s mother, testified that on November 5, 2019, she was living
in an apartment located next door to Box. Around 7:30 p.m. that same night,
Whitehead entered Parks’s apartment upset and yelling. According to Parks,
Whitehead smelled like he had been drinking alcohol earlier that day. Because
Whitehead was so loud, Parks asked him to leave her apartment, and Whitehead
responded by punching her apartment wall. As Whitehead exited the apartment,
Parks heard him ask Box why he was standing in the doorway. Whitehead walked
onto the stoop immediately in front of Box’s apartment door, and Parks saw him
make a hand gesture in Box’s direction. Parks explained that, because she was
standing in her own doorway, she was unable to see if Whitehead hit Box. Parks
did, however, see Box hit Whitehead with his cane, after Whitehead moved his
hand in Box’s direction. Parks observed Whitehead take the cane from Box and hit
him back. Thereafter, Whitehead walked to the sidewalk and yelled at Parks to “call
the police.” Parks explained that, although she never saw Whitehead hit Box, she
informed the police that he hit Box because she was relying on what Box told her.
She stated that she believed Box’s recitation of what happened at the time.
¶8 Officer Robert Ogden testified that on November 5, 2019, he was dispatched to
Box’s apartment in response to a call about a disturbance. When Officer Ogden
arrived, he noticed a sidewalk leading from the side of the street to the apartment
building where the incident took place. After exiting his vehicle, Officer Ogden
observed a loud and agitated Whitehead, who smelled strongly of alcohol, walking
toward him with a bent cane in his hand.
¶9 At the conclusion of Officer Ogden’s testimony, the State moved for leave to
amend two of the aggravated battery counts from “public way” 1 to “public place
of accommodation.” Over defense counsel’s objection, the Lake County circuit
court granted the State leave to amend the counts. After amending the counts, the
1
The charging instrument originally read, in pertinent part, that Whitehead was charged with
aggravated battery “in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) in that the said defendant, in committing
a battery, knowingly caused bodily harm to Steven Box, other than by discharge of a firearm, while
on a public way.”
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State rested. The defense moved for a directed finding of not guilty on all six counts.
The court granted the motion as to the aggravated battery counts based on Box’s
disabilities but denied the motion as to the counts based on the offense occurring in
a public place of accommodation and Whitehead committing the offense with a
deadly weapon.
¶ 10 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Whitehead not guilty of two counts
of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon but guilty of two counts of aggravated
battery in a public place of accommodation. Whitehead was then sentenced to 42
months in prison to run concurrently, followed by a 1-year term of mandatory
supervised released.
¶ 11 B. Appellate Court Proceedings
¶ 12 On appeal, Whitehead argued, inter alia, that his conviction for aggravated
battery should be reduced to simple battery where the State failed to establish that
the stoop in front of Box’s apartment door was a “public place of accommodation”
within the purview of section 12-3.05(c) of the Code. The appellate court rejected
Whitehead’s argument and affirmed his conviction finding that the stoop
immediately in front of Box’s apartment door was a public place of accommodation
within the purview of section 12-3.05(c) of the Code (2021 IL App (2d) 210104-U,
¶ 31) because “members of the public could approach Box’s door and stand on his
stoop” (id. ¶ 35). Specifically, the appellate court noted that Whitehead’s access to
the stoop was “unobstructed and unrestricted in any way” as a “point of ingress into
the home.” Id. ¶ 33. Additionally, the appellate court conceded that the stoop was
curtilage of the home as defined by the fourth amendment but reasoned that whether
the stoop is curtilage has “no bearing on this case” because prior cases have given
no consideration to a location being curtilage when determining whether that
location is a public place of accommodation. Id. ¶ 32. The appellate court further
reasoned that, in addition to the stoop being curtilage, “society recognizes an
implicit license allowing the general public to approach Box’s door.” Id. ¶ 33. In
other words, the appellate court reasoned that categorizing the stoop as curtilage
(which implicitly invites the general public to approach) strengthens its finding that
the stoop is a public place of accommodation. This court allowed Whitehead’s
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appeal.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Whitehead maintains that his conviction for aggravated battery should be
reduced to simple battery because the stoop upon which he stood when he
committed the battery was not a public place of accommodation within the purview
of section 12-3.05(c) of the Code. Therefore, the sole issue before this court is
whether a stoop in front of the door of an apartment is considered a public place of
accommodation pursuant to section 12-3.05(c) of the Code, such that a battery
committed thereon would enhance the offense to aggravated battery.
¶ 15 A. Standard of Review
¶ 16 Whether the stoop in front of an apartment is a public place of accommodation
requires the court to engage in statutory interpretation, which presents a question
of law that we must review de novo. Board of Education of Chicago v. Moore, 2021
IL 125785, ¶ 18 (statutory construction of a statute presents a question of law);
Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21; People v. Stoecker, 2014 IL
115756, ¶ 21.
¶ 17 B. Interpreting Section 12-3.05(c) of the Code
¶ 18 The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
true intent of the legislature. Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’
Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 20; Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519,
533 (1997). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is found in the statutory
language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. McChriston, 2014 IL
115310, ¶ 15. We are to strictly construe criminal or penal statutes in favor of the
accused and take nothing by “intendment or implication beyond the obvious or
literal meaning of the statute.” People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002). When
construing a statute, courts are to assume that the legislature did not intend to
produce absurd or unjust results. Sheffler v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 2011 IL
110166, ¶ 77. When the statute contains undefined terms, we may use the aid of a
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dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms. McChriston,
2014 IL 115310, ¶ 15. We may also rely on prior cases construing those terms.
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315
Ill. App. 3d 552, 561 (2000) (reviewing courts may consider “Illinois case law for
guidance as to the interpretation” of undefined statutory terms). In addition to
considering the language chosen by the legislature, the court should also consider
the reason for the law, the evil to be remedied, and the purpose to be obtained
thereby. In re A.G., 325 Ill. App. 3d 429, 434 (2001).
¶ 19 Section 12-3.05(c) provides, in pertinent part, “A person commits aggravated
battery when, in committing a battery, *** he or she is or the person battered is on
or about a public way, public property, a public place of accommodation or
amusement, a sports venue, or a domestic violence shelter.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c)
(West 2018).
¶ 20 The statute itself does not define “public place of accommodation or
amusement”; therefore, we will rely on the aid of dictionaries to ascertain the plain
and ordinary meaning of those terms. McChriston, 2014 IL 115310, ¶ 15. “Public
place,” according to Black’s Law Dictionary, is “[a]ny location that the local, state,
or national government maintains for the use of the public, such as a highway, park,
or public building.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1351 (9th ed. 2009). Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “accommodation” as “[a] convenience supplied by someone,
esp., lodging and food.” Id. at 17. Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines
“accommodation” as “something supplied for convenience or to satisfy a need: such
as *** lodging, food, and services or traveling space and related services.”
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/accommodation (last visited Mar. 1, 2023) [https://perma.cc/59SU-
7ZC6]. “Amusement” is defined by Merriam-Webster as “a means of amusing or
entertaining,” “the condition of being amused,” and “pleasurable diversion.”
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/amusement (last visited Mar. 1, 2023) [https://perma.cc/K4N7-HUDG].
¶ 21 Considering these definitions, we hold that a “public place of accommodation
or amusement” is a place for the use of the general public that is supplied for
convenience, to satisfy a need, or to provide pleasure or entertainment. When we
consider the stoop, which is the subject of this litigation, we find that it does not fit
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within the purview of the dictionary definition of the individual words in the
statutory phrase “public place of accommodation or amusement.”
¶ 22 The commonly understood purpose of a stoop or step in front of a private
dwelling is to provide convenient access to a home. However, while this
convenience may be enjoyed by certain members of the public (such as invited
guests or delivery personnel), the convenience is not provided to the public. The
purpose of the stoop is for the owner or resident of the private dwelling to access
his or her home. The fact that certain members of the public may access the stoop
is secondary to the purpose of the stoop.
¶ 23 It is clear that, when enacting section 12-3.05(c) of the Code, the legislature
was attempting to deter violence committed in public places of accommodation
because it believed that batteries committed in public areas represent a more serious
threat to the community than batteries committed in other places. People v. Foster,
2022 IL App (2d) 200098, ¶ 44; see People v. Brown, 2019 IL App (1st) 161204,
¶ 48 (a battery “presents a greater threat to society when done in a public place”);
People v. Lee, 158 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1036 (1987) (“[O]ur legislature was of the
belief that a battery committed in an area open to the public constitutes a more
serious threat to the community than a battery committed elsewhere.” (Emphasis
omitted.)).
¶ 24 Therefore, the intent of the legislature in enhancing the offense from simple
battery to aggravated battery was to protect the public from increased harm in
public places. The stoop in front of a private dwelling—even if that stoop is shared
by a neighbor—hardly constitutes a public place. We believe expanding the
definition of “public place of accommodation” to include the stoop, step, or small
walkway in front of a private home would amount to an absurd or unjust result.
Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 39 (courts must construe statutes in a
way that will avoid absurd, unreasonable, or unjust results).
¶ 25 Our research establishes that public accessibility, alone, is insufficient to
transform a stoop, step, or walkway into a “public place of accommodation or
amusement.” Instead, a “public place of accommodation or amusement,” at
minimum, must refer to a place that is not only accessible to the public but is also
a place where the general public is invited to enjoy a good, service, or
accommodation being provided. Defining a stoop in front of a private dwelling as
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a public place of accommodation or amusement would expand the reach of the
statute beyond what is reasonable. Such expansion could potentially cause any
portion of privately owned property that is remotely accessible to the public to be
considered public property. For example, if public accessibility is the only qualifier,
a private driveway, a private deck, or a private backyard that is unobstructed by
fencing or some other barrier could be considered a public place of accommodation
or amusement, such that a battery occurring thereon could be enhanced and become
an aggravated battery.
¶ 26 We recognize that our appellate court has routinely interpreted “public place of
accommodation” to mean an area made accessible to the public. However, we find
the State’s reliance on these cases misplaced.
¶ 27 For example, in People v. Ward, 95 Ill. App. 3d 283, 284-85 (1981), the
defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery for an offense that occurred in a
Holiday Inn parking lot. According to the Ward court, whether the parking lot “was
actually publicly owned and, therefore, ‘public property’ rather than a privately
owned ‘public place of accommodation’ is irrelevant; what is significant is that the
alleged offense occurred in an area accessible to the public.” Id. at 287-88. Since
Ward, the appellate court has consistently interpreted “a public place of
accommodation or amusement” to mean a place made available to the public. See,
e.g., Lee, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 1036 (finding that a parking lot outside a convenience
store was a public place of accommodation—“[w]e see no logical or reasonable
basis for interpreting the language of this subsection so as to distinguish between
the premises within the ‘public place of accommodation’ and the parking lot
immediately outside its door”); People v. Logston, 196 Ill. App. 3d 96, 100 (1990)
(finding that the trial court committed harmless error when it instructed the jury
that a tavern was a public place of amusement because it was open to a portion of
the public—specifically, adults and not minors); People v. Pergeson, 347 Ill. App.
3d 991, 994 (2004) (relying on Ward, 95 Ill. App. 3d 283, and finding that an area
50 feet in front of a shopping mall entrance was indistinguishable from the hotel
parking lot in Ward and was a public place of accommodation).
¶ 28 In 2022, the appellate court in Foster found that an office inside a gas station
and convenience store was a public place of accommodation. 2022 IL App (2d)
200098, ¶ 48. In Foster, the office door was open during business hours, and the
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office was regularly accessed by customers needing assistance. Id. Therefore, the
Foster court found the office was a public place of accommodation, over the
defendant’s assertion that the office was not “ ‘meant for’ ” the public. Id. ¶¶ 46,
48. The fact common to all of these cases is the fact that the area where the offense
occurred was associated with a business, which provided some good or service that
met a need or offered a convenience to the general public. In the case under review,
the stoop was not associated with a business, a park, a recreation center, or any
other place providing a good or service for the benefit of the general public. While
the stoop can be accessed by members of the public who approach the residence,
accessibility without more does not convert a stoop in front of a private residence
into a public place of accommodation or amusement for the general public.
¶ 29 Relying on many of the aforementioned cases, the State would have us adopt
the definition of public place of accommodation or amusement to include “any and
all locations made available for the convenience of its members or to otherwise
satisfy their needs.” Even if we were to adopt this definition, a stoop connected to
a private residence still would not qualify as a public place of accommodation or
amusement because it is not provided for the convenience of the general public.
Members of the general public may use the stoop in limited circumstances, but the
stoop is for the convenience of the private owner of the residence to access his or
her residence. The fact that the general public can access something that is for
private use does not transform it into a public place of accommodation or
amusement. Concluding otherwise would yield unworkable and absurd results.
Illinois State Treasurer, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 39 (courts must construe statutes in a
way that will avoid absurd, unreasonable, or unjust results).
¶ 30 Additionally, we are unpersuaded by the State’s argument that, because the
battery drew the attention of neighbors in the apartment complex and could have
harmed more members of the public than Box, the stoop was a public place of
accommodation or amusement. It is expected that neighbors in a residential
neighborhood, specifically neighbors in the same complex, would bear witness to
an offense taking place within that residential area. The fact that members of the
community saw the offense does not automatically convert the stoop into a public
place of accommodation or amusement any more than a battery taking place on a
private deck viewed by residents in the neighborhood would make the private deck
a public place of accommodation or amusement.
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¶ 31 Moreover, the legislature did not intend for the term “public place of
accommodation or amusement” to be so broadly construed as to include any place
accessible to the public no matter how limited that access or minor the convenience.
According to the statute, simple battery is enhanced to aggravated battery where
the offense occurs “on or about a public way, public property, a public place of
accommodation or amusement, a sports venue, or a domestic violence shelter.” 720
ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2018). The statute provided a list of specific locations that
could be accessed by members of the public. Therefore, to define “public place of
accommodation or amusement” as any place accessible to the public renders every
other clause of the statute superfluous. See Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96,
106 (2001) (reasoning that statutes should be construed so that no term is rendered
superfluous or meaningless). It would be meaningless for the legislature to identify
specific locations that could be accessed by members of the public—“public way,”
“public property,” “sports venue,” or “domestic violence shelter”—if the
legislature intended “public place of accommodation or amusement” to mean any
location that is accessible to the public. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2018).
¶ 32 Therefore, we hold that the accessibility of a location to the public, standing
alone, is insufficient to transform a location into a public place of accommodation,
nor can it be used to enhance an offense from simple battery to aggravated battery.
¶ 33 C. Curtilage
¶ 34 Whitehead asserts that the stoop upon which the offense occurred is within the
curtilage of the home as defined by fourth amendment jurisprudence. While the
State does not expressly argue that the stoop is not curtilage, it maintains that the
whether the stoop is curtilage is irrelevant to this court’s analysis of whether the
stoop is a public place of accommodation. We agree with Whitehead and find that
the stoop is within the curtilage of the home. See People v. Bonilla, 2018 IL 122484,
¶¶ 25-27 (holding that the hallway inside an unlocked apartment building in the
common area immediately outside the door of the suspect’s apartment fell within
the curtilage of the home); People v. Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶¶ 37, 44 (finding that
the third-floor landing outside defendant’s apartment door within a locked
apartment building was within the “curtilage” of defendant’s residence); see also
People v. Taylor, 399 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576-77 (Crim. Ct. 1977) (finding that “the
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hallway and porch or stoop of the defendant’s two-family house are not public
places,” “[t]hat the area in which he was found is part of the curtilage of his home,”
and that a misdemeanor charge rather than a felony was appropriate). Our United
States Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]he protection afforded the curtilage is
essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked
to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are
most heightened.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986). Recognizing
the heightened expectation of privacy in the curtilage of the home, it is illogical for
this court to conclude that a stoop, which is within the curtilage of the home, is a
“public place of accommodation” under the statute. See Illinois State Treasurer,
2015 IL 117418, ¶ 39 (courts must construe statutes in a way that will avoid absurd,
unreasonable, or unjust results).
¶ 35 Additionally, to interpret the aggravated battery statute in a way that the
curtilage of a person’s apartment would constitute a “public place of
accommodation” would be inconsistent with the legislature’s intent to enhance the
penalty only for those batteries occurring in a public place. Simple battery is
enhanced to aggravated battery in “ ‘circumstances under which “great harm might
and usually does result.” ’ ” People v. Clark, 70 Ill. App. 3d 698, 700 (1979)
(quoting People v. Lockwood, 37 Ill. App. 3d 502, 509 (1976)). This subsection was
“designed to deter the possibility of harm to the public.” People v. Handley, 117
Ill. App. 3d 949, 952 (1983). This legislative purpose is not advanced by enhancing
the penalty for a battery committed within the curtilage of an apartment. Given the
facts of this case—Whitehead standing on the stoop at the doorway of Box’s
apartment, while Box remained inside his apartment—there was no possibility of
harm to the general public. Therefore, the legislative purpose is not furthered by
elevating simple battery to aggravated battery.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 Whitehead received a sentence of 42 months for his aggravated battery
conviction on June 22, 2020. Simple battery is a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS
5/12-3 (West 2018)), which carries a sentence of imprisonment of less than one
year (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55 (West 2018)). Whitehead challenges only that elevation,
from simple battery to aggravated battery. Because Whitehead has received a 42-
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month sentence that exceeds the less-than-1-year sentence imposed for a simple
battery conviction and because he has already served 40 months, there is no need
to remand this cause to the circuit court for resentencing. Accordingly, we
(1) reverse the judgment of the appellate court, (2) vacate Whitehead’s conviction
for aggravated battery, (3) enter a conviction for simple battery, and (4) direct the
clerk of the supreme court to issue the mandate instanter but stay it for seven days
to provide the State with an opportunity to file a petition for rehearing.
¶ 38 Appellate court judgment reversed.
¶ 39 Circuit court judgment affirmed as modified.
¶ 40 JUSTICES CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
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