The opinion
Filed 3/22/23 Thanawalla v. Bd. of Ed. for the Santa Monica Malibu USD CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
ANN MAGGIO B318341
THANAWALLA,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No.
20STCV18799)
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION
FOR THE SANTA MONICA
MALIBU UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert S. Draper, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeff Lewis Law, Jeffrey Lewis, and Sean C. Rotstan for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost, Jessica E. Ehrlich, and Lynn
M. Beekman for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________________
Ann Maggio Thanawalla sued the Board of Education for
the Santa Monica Malibu Unified School District (SMMUSD)
alleging that the board violated the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov.
Code, § 54950 et seq.) by posting an agenda for the board’s March
5, 2020 meeting that did not adequately describe an agenda item.
Shortly after the March 5 meeting, the Governor issued executive
orders addressing COVID-19 that affected Brown Act
requirements for public meetings. Thanawalla filed a first
amended complaint (FAC)—the operative complaint in this
action—alleging violations of the Brown Act as affected by the
Governor’s executive orders.
The board moved for, and the trial court granted, summary
judgment. Pertinent to Thanawalla’s arguments here, the trial
court concluded that the description of the challenged agenda
item for the March 5, 2020 board meeting substantially complied
with the Brown Act’s notice requirements and that SMMUSD
had instituted practices to deal with the other issues Thanawalla
had raised that rendered Thanawalla’s lawsuit moot.
On appeal, Thanawalla contends that the only way to moot
a Brown Act lawsuit is through “unconditional commitment.”
She also argues that “the existence of substantial compliance
with the Brown Act is a factual question” that cannot be
determined on summary judgment.
We disagree with Thanawalla’s contentions and will affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
A. March 5, 2020 School Board Meeting Agenda
On February 28, 2020, SMMUSD posted an electronic
version of the agenda for the March 5, 2020 school board meeting
2
on its Web site. The agenda included item J 4: “4. TIME
CERTAIN 7 p.m. – Approval of the 2019-20 Second Interim
Report (60 min).” The agenda posted on February 28, 2020 also
contained a detailed summary of the agenda item that, under the
heading “Recommended Motion,” stated, “It is recommended that
the Board of Education approve the 2019-20 Second Interim
Report and the corresponding budget adjustments.” The agenda
also contained a heading entitled “Rationale,” that explained:
“Education Code (EC) Sections §35035 (g), §42130, and §42131
require the governing board of each local educational agency
(LEA) to certify at least twice a year as to the LEA’s ability to
meet its financial obligations for the remainder for that fiscal
year and for the subsequent two fiscal years. [¶] The 2019-20
First Interim Budget was adopted by the Board of Education on
December 12, 2019, and was approved by the Los Angeles County
Office of Education (LACOE). [¶] This Second Interim Report
reflects changing conditions that have necessitated adjusting the
District budget.”
The agenda was text-searchable using either a keyword
search tool or the CTRL + F search function.
The district posted supporting materials for agenda item
J 4 on March 3, 2020.
The board met on March 5, 2020. Thanawalla and another
member of the public addressed the board regarding agenda item
J 4. The board then voted to approve the report, consistent with
the recommendation on the agenda.
Before the March 5, 2020 board meeting, the agenda for the
meeting was accessible on the district’s Web site by clicking on
the “Board of Education” tab at the top of the district’s home
page. That tab linked to “Board Meetings,” which linked to
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“Agendas,” where anyone accessing the district’s Web site could
find the March 5, 2020 agenda. The following week—on or before
March 11, 2020—the district installed on its home page a direct
link to the most current board meeting agenda.
B. COVID-19 and Public Attendance and Comment at
Board Meetings
On March 17, 2020, Governor Newsom signed Executive
Order N-29-20. It stated, in pertinent part, that “[A] local
legislative body or state body is authorized to hold public
meetings via teleconferencing and to make public meetings
accessible telephonically or otherwise electronically to all
members of the public seeking to observe and to address the local
legislative body or state body. All requirements in both the
Bagley-Keene Act and the Brown Act expressly or impliedly
requiring the physical presence of members, the clerk or other
personnel of the body, or of the public as a condition of
participation in or quorum for a public meeting are hereby
waived.” (Governor’s Exec. Order No. N-29-20 (Mar. 17, 2020).)
The Executive Order continued: “A local legislative body or state
body that holds a meeting via teleconferencing and allows
members of the public to observe and address the meeting
telephonically or otherwise electronically . . . shall have satisfied
any requirement that the body allow members of the public to
attend the meeting and offer public comment. Such a body need
not make available any physical location from which members of
the public may observe the meeting and offer public comment.”
(Ibid.) The order concluded: “All state and local bodies are urged
to use sound discretion and to make reasonable efforts to adhere
as closely as reasonably possible to the provisions of the Bagley-
Keene Act and the Brown Act, and other appliable local laws
4
regulating the conduct of public meetings, in order to maximize
transparency and provide the public access to their meetings.”
(Ibid.)
As part of its COVID-19 mitigation efforts, the district
shifted its board meetings to Zoom. The Zoom software requires
users to display an identifier. It does not require that the
identifier be the user’s real name. Additionally, the district has
provided instructions for public comment at Zoom meetings that
include a Google survey that requests identifying information so
that the board can identify which Zoom participant needs to be
unmuted when it is that person’s time to comment. The Google
survey does not require an individual to provide their real name.
The district has since also offered dial-in telephonic conferencing
for those who wish to participate that way, as well.
C. Thanawalla’s April 3, 2020 Email
On April 3, 2020, Thanawalla sent an email to the board
with a subject line that read: “March[ ] 5 Brown Act Violation
Notice.”1 The email alleged that the board had violated the
Brown Act by “failing to post ‘an agenda containing a brief
general description of each item of business to be transacted or
discussed at the meeting . . . ,’ ” by failing to post the agenda on
the district’s home page “through a prominent, direct link to the
current agenda,” by failing to post an agenda that was text
searchable, and by failing to post agendas on the district’s Web
site in reverse chronological order. The email alleged that the
“public raised the Brown Act violations both prior to the meeting
via emails and at the meeting during public comment,” and asked
the board to refrain from taking action on agenda item J 4. The
1The email purported to be dated April 2, 2020, but
indicates that it was sent on the afternoon of April 3, 2020.
5
email demanded that the district “cure and correct” the alleged
Brown Act violations by withdrawing the second interim report
that it approved in agenda item J 4, and take certain other
actions within 30 days of the date of the email.
On May 14, 2020, Thanawalla’s attorney attached the
email to a letter and mailed it to the board’s secretary.
Thanawalla filed her original complaint in this matter on
May 18, 2020. The complaint alleged violations of the Brown Act
based on the district’s alleged failure to adequately describe item
J 4 on the March 5, 2020 agenda, the alleged failure to post a link
to the agenda directly from the district’s home page, the alleged
failure to post an agenda that was text searchable, and the
alleged failure to post agendas on the district’s Web site in
reverse chronological order.
D. Thanawalla’s August 20, 2020 Letter
On August 20, 2020, Thanawalla’s attorney sent the board
secretary another letter. This letter purported to be a notice
regarding “Continuing Brown Act Violations / Cease and Desist
Letter.” This letter alleged what it referred to as “continuing” or
ongoing violations of the Brown Act, and listed what it termed
examples of the violations.
The letter alleged that the Brown Act “requires that
agendas contain a brief description of each item to be discussed
by the Board,” for example, and then alleged that the “Board
routinely does not include the action proposed to be taken. By
way of example,” the letter alleged, “the March 5, 2020 agenda
had an agenda item called ‘Second Interim Report,’ but did not
include the word budget. As a result, the public had no way of
knowing that the Board was going to vote about the budget. This
happens routinely.”
6
Similar to the allegations in Thanawalla’s April 3, 2020
email, the letter also alleged that the board “routinely” fails to
post agendas through a prominent direct link on the district
home page, fails to post agendas that contain “a brief general
description of each item of business to be transacted or discussed
at the meeting,” fails to provide “retrievable, downloadable,
indexable, and electronically searchable” agendas.
The August 20, 2020 letter also included allegations that
Thanawalla’s April 3, 2020 email did not. The August 20, 2020
letter alleged that the board failed to post agendas 72 hours
before meetings because materials supporting agenda items were
posted less than 72 hours before meetings.
The August 20, 2020 letter also alleged that the steps the
board had taken to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and the
Governor’s executive orders also violated the Brown Act because
the public could not participate by telephone, but rather was
required to “download Zoom and complete a Google Survey.” The
letter argued that “[t]he Board needs to institute a telephone
access or a non-Zoom method for members of the public to
participate in order to comply with the Brown Act, even as
relaxed by Executive Order.” The letter further alleged that the
“Brown Act forbids local agencies from requiring that members of
the public identify themselves or provide an address as a
condition to speaking,” but that the Zoom/Google survey format
the board had adopted for public participation “requires that
members of the public provide login credentials, including a valid
email address.”
The August 20, 2020 letter purported to “constitute[ ] Ms.
Thanawalla’s Cease and Desist letter.” It advised that the board
“has the option to, without admitting violations of the Brown Act,
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enter into an unconditional commitment to remedy the above
violations,” and alleged that the “commitment must be in the
form set forth in Government Code, section 54960.2, subdivision
(c)(1).”
E. The First Amended Complaint & Summary
Judgment
Thanawalla filed the FAC on November 16, 2020. In it,
Thanawalla alleged a single cause of action for declaratory relief
based on the following alleged violations of the Brown Act and
the Governor’s COVID-19 executive orders:
• The district allegedly violated Government Code section
54954.2, subdivision (a)(1) by “failing to post ‘an agenda
containing a brief general description of each item of
business to be transacted or discussed at the
meeting . . .’ ” because the title of agenda item J 4 for the
March 5, 2020 meeting was “Second Interim Report” and
the description did not include the word “budget” and
the agenda item did not include a recommended action.
• The district allegedly violated Government Code section
54954.2, subdivision (a)(2)(A) because the district did
not have a “prominent direct link” to the March 5, 2020
agenda on its Web site home page. (The FAC
acknowledges that “subsequent to the public raising the
Brown Act violations at the March 5 meeting, the
District added a school board agenda link to the District
homepage.”)
• The district allegedly violated Government Code section
54954.2, subdivision (a)(2)(B) because the March 5, 2020
agenda was not “[r]etrievable, downloadable, indexable,
8
and electronically searchable by commonly used
Internet search applications.”
• The district allegedly violated Government Code section
54954.2, subdivision (a)(2)(C) because agendas available
on the district’s Web site were not posted in reverse
chronological order. (Again, the FAC acknowledges that
the district corrected this in March 2020.)
• The district allegedly violated the Governor’s executive
orders and Government Code section 54953.3 because
“[t]he sole way for the public to participate at a Board
meeting [during COVID was] to download Zoom and
complete a Google Survey,” which the FAC alleged
required the participant to “identify themselves by name
before being allowed to address the Board.” According to
the FAC, “[t]he Board needs to institute a telephone
access or a non-Zoom method for members of the public
to participate in order to comply with the Brown Act,
even as relaxed by Executive Order[, presumably
because t]he public must be permitted to anonymously
address the Board.”
• The district allegedly “routinely” violated the Brown Act
because it posted supporting materials for agenda items
less than 72 hours in advance of meetings.
On August 30, 2021, the district filed a motion for summary
judgment. The trial court heard and granted the motion on
November 15, 2021.
In its ruling, the trial court concluded that Thanawalla’s
request to nullify the board’s approval of the second interim
report pursuant to agenda item J 4 at the March 5, 2020 meeting
was moot, as Thanawalla had conceded.
9
The trial court granted summary adjudication as to
Thanawalla’s allegations under Government Code section
54954.2, subdivisions (a)(2)(A) (link to the board’s current agenda
on the board’s home page), (a)(2)(C) (agendas posted in reverse
chronological order), and (a)(2)(B) (text searchable agendas)
because based on the evidence before it, the trial court concluded
that Thanawalla had not sent the district a cease and desist
letter until August 20, 2020, and Government Code section
54960.2 requires that a cease and desist letter must be sent “by
postal mail or facsimile transmission” before litigation is
initiated.
The trial court concluded that Thanawalla’s allegations
regarding public access and anonymity of attendees and public
participants were moot. The board had provided evidence that
Zoom attendees could change their Zoom identifiers to not reveal
their true names. The board also produced evidence that a dial-
in option had been provided since January 2021. “Because of the
introduction of the dial-in option,” the trial court concluded, “the
public is able to attend the [b]oard’s meetings telephonically,
which would ensure their anonymity. [Thanawalla] has failed to
present any evidence to suggests that this option will not be
offered in the future.”
Finally, the trial court concluded that the agenda for the
March 5, 2020 board meeting substantially complied with the
Brown Act. The undisputed material facts established that the
agenda was posted more than 72 hours before the March 5, 2020
meeting. The agenda, if viewed on a computer, “provided the
following summary of the agenda item: ‘Recommended Motion:
It is recommended that the Board of Education approve the
10
2019-20 Second Interim Report and corresponding budget
adjustments.’ ” And finally, Thanawalla had identified no “legal
authority that would require simultaneous postings of the agenda
and supporting materials. Supporting materials that are part of
the public record and relates [sic] to an agenda item may be
‘distributed less than 72 hours prior to [the] meeting.’
(Government Code[,] § 54957.5.)”
The trial court concluded that Thanawalla’s request to
nullify approval of the second interim report was moot and there
were no triable issues of material fact regarding the remaining
alleged Brown Act violations. On that basis, the trial court
granted the district’s motion for summary judgment. The trial
court entered judgment dismissing the FAC on January 7, 2022.
Thanawalla filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
“[I]n moving for summary judgment, a ‘defendant . . . has
met’ his ‘burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if’
he ‘has shown that one or more elements of the cause of
action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete
defense to that cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met
that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause
of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff . . . may not rely upon
the mere allegations or denials’ of his ‘pleadings to show that a
triable issue of material fact exists but, instead,’ must ‘set forth
the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact
exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.’ ” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.)
“On appeal after a motion for summary judgment has been
granted, we review the record de novo, considering all the
11
evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except
that to which objections have been made and sustained.” (Guz v.
Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) “[W]e must decide
independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute
warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. . . .’
[Citation.] Put another way, we exercise our independent
judgment, and decide whether undisputed facts have been
established that negate plaintiff’s claims.” (Nazir v. United
Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 253.)
“On review of a summary judgment, the appellant has the
burden of showing error, even if he did not bear the burden in the
trial court. [Citation.] ‘The fact that we review de novo a grant
of summary judgment does not mean that the trial court is a
potted plant in that process.’ [Citation.] ‘[D]e novo review does
not obligate us to cull the record for the benefit of the appellant
in order to attempt to uncover the requisite triable issues. As
with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s
responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore,
to point out the triable issues the appellant claims are present by
citation to the record and any supporting authority. In other
words, review is limited to issues which have been adequately
raised and briefed.’ ” (Claudio v. Regents of the University of
California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230.)
Thanawalla does not challenge each of the trial court’s
conclusions. Rather, she focuses on two of the trial court’s
conclusions that she argues relate to four of the board’s alleged
violations of the Brown Act. First, she contends that short of
going through the unconditional commitment process outlined in
the Brown Act, no public entity can ever render a Brown Act
lawsuit moot through voluntary remedial action. Thanawalla
12
argues that this contention relates to the district’s past failure to
link to current agendas on its Web site home page, the district’s
past failure to allow for anonymous public speakers at board
meetings during COVID-19 (before the board provided a dial-in
option in January 2021), and the district’s past failure to provide
a non-Zoom method to hear the public at board meetings (again,
before the board provided a dial-in option in January 2021).
Second, Thanawalla argues that the trial court erred when it
concluded that the J 4 item on the March 5, 2020 meeting agenda
substantially complied with the Brown Act because, Thanawalla
contends, “the existence of substantial compliance with the
Brown Act is a factual question.”
A. Unconditional Commitment
Thanawalla concedes that the district has instituted
remedial measures sufficient to address each of her stated
concerns. Specifically, the district has added a link to the most
current agenda on its home page and has offered options to
address her board meeting attendance and comment allegations.
Initially, we note that the trial court did not conclude that
Thanawalla’s complaint regarding the district’s failure to link its
most current agenda to the district’s home page was moot. The
trial court granted summary adjudication on that issue based on
Thanawalla’s failure to serve a cease and desist letter that
complied with Government Code section 54960.2 before initiating
litigation. The trial court expressly declined to address other
arguments associated with this particular issue. Thanawalla has
not challenged this conclusion on appeal. Consequently, we will
not reach a contrary conclusion here. (See Wall Street Network,
Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1177.)
13
The trial court did conclude, however, that the board’s
remedial measures had rendered Thanawalla’s allegations
regarding public participation and comment at board meetings
moot. “ ‘A declaratory relief action requires an actual controversy
relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties.’ ”
(TransparentGov Novato v. City of Novato (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th
140, 148 (Novato).) “[A] person seeking . . . declaratory relief
under the Brown Act for an allegedly illegal past practice of a
legislative body [must] show not only compliance with section
54960.2, subdivision (a)(1) but also the existence of a justiciable
controversy, meaning one that . . . has not been rendered moot.”
(Id. at p. 149.)
Thanawalla acknowledges that a public entity can render a
Brown Act lawsuit moot. Thanawalla argues, however, that the
only way to do that is through the unconditional commitment
process outlined in Government Code section 54960.2,
subdivision (c). In Novato, TransparentGov Novato sent a cease
and desist letter to the Novato City Council regarding actions it
took at a council meeting. The City of Novato responded with an
unconditional commitment as to some of its actions, but then
later adopted “an additional remedial measure” outside of the
unconditional commitment procedure outlined in Government
Code section 54960.2, subdivision (c). (Novato, supra, 34
Cal.App.5th at p. 145.)
The Novato court concluded that TransparentGov’s Brown
Act claims regarding both the unconditional commitment and its
subsequent unilateral remedial measures were moot. In doing
so, the court rejected the same argument Thanawalla makes
here: “In arguing that the action is not moot,
14
TransparentGov . . . claims that ‘a unilateral rule change does
not comply with an agency’s . . . [required] response to a cease-
and-desist demand under § 54960.2.’ This argument misses the
point. The jurisdictional requirement of an actual, nonmoot
controversy in the context of a request for . . . declaratory relief
exists separate and apart from the procedural requirements of
section 54960.2. True enough, section 54960.2 requires a court to
dismiss a claim involving a past action when the public entity
makes an unconditional commitment to refrain from repeating
the action. But that does not mean that a court must entertain
every other claim about a past action even when the
circumstances demonstrate that there is no ongoing dispute
about it.” (Novato, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 150.) The court
then went on to reject other arguments TransparentGov made
about the mootness of its claim vis-à-vis the City’s unilateral
remedial measures and concluded that TransparentGov had “not
demonstrated a justiciable controversy warranting . . .
declaratory relief . . . .” (Id. at p. 153.)
The unconditional commitment argument that the Novato
court rejected is the only argument Thanawalla makes regarding
whether her claims about public participation and comment were
rendered moot by the district’s remedial measures. As did the
Novato court, we also reject the argument.
B. Substantial Compliance
Thanawalla’s remaining argument is that the trial court
erred when it concluded that the district had substantially
complied with the Brown Act because, according to Thanawalla,
“the existence of substantial compliance with the Brown Act is a
factual question.” (Citing Hernandez v. Town of Apple Valley
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 194, 203 (Hernandez).)
15
Thanawalla’s citation to Hernandez does not assist her.
Her brief cites to the factual and procedural background of that
case, and specifically refers to an argument that a party made,
and not a proposition of law. (See Hernandez, supra, 7
Cal.App.5th at p. 203.) Moreover, in San Diegans for Open
Government v. City of Oceanside (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 637, 647
(Oceanside), the court discussed what constitutes compliance
with the Brown Act’s agenda requirements, and concluded
specifically that “[a]lthough the statute does not itself permit
substantial rather than strict compliance with its requirements,
substantial compliance is presumed to satisfy the intent of the
Legislature: ‘ “Unless the intent of a statute can only be served
by demanding strict compliance with its terms, substantial
compliance is the governing test.” ’ [Citation.]”
“At least 72 hours before a regular meeting, the legislative
body of the local agency, or its designee, shall post an agenda
containing a brief general description of each item of business to
be transacted or discussed at the meeting, including items to be
discussed in closed session. A brief general description of an item
generally need not exceed 20 words.” (Gov. Code, § 54954.2, subd.
(a)(1), italics added.) “Although there is not a great deal of direct
authority with respect to what satisfies the Ralph M. Brown Act’s
requirement of a ‘brief general description’ of items to be
considered by a local agency, we can discern from the statute
itself, cases discussing the statute as well as closely related
statutes, and other authority, a general principle that agenda
drafters must give the public a fair chance to participate in
matters of particular or general concern by providing the public
with more than mere clues from which they must then guess or
16
surmise the essential nature of the business to be considered by a
local agency.” (Oceanside, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 643.)
In Moreno v. City of King (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 17, 26-27
the court concluded that an agenda item that stated “Public
Employee (employment contract)” was insufficient to signal that
“the dismissal of a public employee would be discussed at the
meeting.” The City in that case could have complied with section
54954.2 with “an agenda that said simply ‘Public Employee
Dismissal.’ ” (Id. at p. 27.)
In Hernandez, an agenda that read “Wal-Mart Initiative
Measure” was not compliant to signal that the Town of Apple
Valley would consider entering into a memorandum of
understanding with Walmart that authorized the acceptance of a
gift from Walmart to pay for a special election. (Hernandez,
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at pp. 197, 208.)
By contrast, in Oceanside, “the city met [the Brown Act’s]
somewhat elastic standard” to notify the public that it would be
considering an agreement with a developer to remit to the
developer $11 million in transient occupancy taxes from a hotel
the developer agreed to build with an agenda that “stated that
the council would consider: the developer’s agreement to
guarantee development of the subject property as ‘a full service
resort’; an agreement ‘to provide a mechanism to share Transient
Occupancy Tax (TOT) generated by the Project’; and a report,
required by statute ‘documenting the amount of subsidy provided
to the developer, the proposed start and end date of the subsidy,
[and] the public purpose of the subsidy.’ ” (Oceanside, supra, 4
Cal.App.5th at pp. 640-641, 645.)
Here, Thanawalla’s argument centers on her contention
that the agenda description for item J 4 for the March 5, 2020
17
meeting “did not contain the word ‘budget’ and yet the Board at
that meeting voted on a budget.” “The absence of the word
‘budget’ is material, relevant, and not abandoned,” Thanawalla
contends.
There are two significant problems with Thanawalla’s
argument.
First, the agenda description did include the word “budget.”
The agenda that the district posted online on February 28,
2020—more than 72 hours before the board’s March 5, 2020
meeting—included agenda item J 4: “4. TIME CERTAIN 7 p.m.
–Approval of the 2019-20 Second Interim Report (60 min.)” and a
detailed summary of the agenda item that stated: “It is
recommended that the Board of Education approve the 2019-20
Second Interim Report and the corresponding budget
adjustments.”
Second, although the “second interim report” was about the
status of the district’s budget, it was not a budget. Thanawalla’s
contention that the district voted on a budget is factually
incorrect. What the board actually voted on was a report that the
Education Code required the district’s superintendent to give to
the district’s governing board, and a certification that the
Education Code required of the district’s governing board. (See
Ed. Code, §§ 42130, 42131.)
The district contends, and we agree, that Thanawalla’s
argument represents a fundamental misunderstanding of what
the “second interim report” was. Education Code section 42130
provides that “[t]he superintendent of each school district shall,
in addition to any other powers and duties granted or imposed
upon him or her, submit two reports to the governing board of the
district during each fiscal year. The first report shall cover the
18
financial and budgetary status of the district for the period
ending October 31. The second report shall cover the period
ending January 31. Both reports shall be approved by the district
governing board no later than 45 days after the close of the period
being reported.” (Ed. Code, § 42130, italics added.) “Pursuant to
the reports required by Section 42130, the governing board of
each school district shall certify, in writing, within 45 days after
the close of the period being reported, whether the school district
is able to meet its financial obligations for the remainder of the
fiscal year and, based on current forecasts, for the subsequent
two fiscal years. . . . These certifications shall be based upon the
financial and budgetary reports required by Section 42130 but
may include additional financial information known by the
governing board of the school district to exist at the time of each
certification.” (Ed. Code, § 42131.)
And while it is clear that Thanawalla misunderstood what
the second interim report was, Thanawalla’s misunderstanding
does not mean that the district was required to be more
descriptive in its agenda description. Indeed, the district did
include the very word that Thanawalla contends would have put
her on notice that the district was “vot[ing] on a budget.”
Thanawalla’s real argument appears to be that because she
did not see the language when she accessed the agenda on her
cell phone, that the district was required to do something more
than what it did to ensure that she specifically was able to see
the information on her particular device. However, as the trial
court pointed out in its order granting the motion for summary
judgment, Thanawalla made “no statement as to whether she
attempted to access the . . . agenda on a computer. Thus, even
though there may have been technical issues with the mobile
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phone format, the [trial court found] that the [b]oard acted with
substantial compliance when it posted the March 5, 2020
meeting’s agenda.” We agree.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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