Opinion

Jason Payne v. Joseph Biden, Jr.

  • 62 F.4th 598
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Mar 21, 2023
Status
Published
Cited by
2 cases
Authority
More cited than 46.5%

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 2, 2022 Decided March 21, 2023

No. 22-5154

JASON PAYNE,

APPELLANT

v.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., PRESIDENT, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:21-cv-03077)

Gene P. Hamilton argued the cause for appellant. On the

brief was Reed D. Rubinstein. Andrew Block entered an

appearance.

Daniel Winik, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, and Charles W. Scarborough and Casen Ross,

Attorneys.

Before: WILKINS and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and

ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.

2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: In 1978, Congress enacted the

Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”) to provide a subset of

federal employees with access to administrative and judicial

review to contest certain adverse employment actions. The

Supreme Court has confirmed, as recently as 2012, that

Congress intended this statutory scheme to preclude district

court jurisdiction over certain claims. Elgin v. Dep’t of

Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 5 (2012). In practice, such preclusion

does not obstruct an employee’s access to judicial review, but

instead redirects the avenue through which the employee may

proceed.

In September 2021, President Biden issued Executive

Order No. 14,043, mandating that all executive branch

employees obtain the COVID-19 vaccination, subject to

medical or religious exception. Exec. Order No. 14,043, 86

Fed. Reg. 50,989 (Sept. 9, 2021). This Order also directs the

Safer Federal Workforce Task Force to provide guidance as to

how the vaccine mandate should be implemented. Id. at

50,989–90; see Exec. Order No. 13,991, 86 Fed. Reg. 7045,

7046 (Jan. 20, 2021) (establishing the Safer Federal Workforce

Task Force). In doing so, the Task Force outlined certain

disciplinary measures to which noncompliant federal

employees may be subject. Petitioner Jason Payne is a civilian

employee of the Department of the Navy who contests the

vaccine mandate and has declined to comply.

On November 22, 2021—the day federal employees

were required to be vaccinated—Mr. Payne filed suit in District

Court, challenging the mandate’s constitutionality.

Characterizing Mr. Payne’s suit as a “workplace dispute

involving a covered federal employee,” the District Court

found Mr. Payne’s claims were precluded under the CSRA and

3

dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Payne

v. Biden, 602 F. Supp. 3d 147, 151 (D.D.C. 2022). On appeal,

Mr. Payne insists that he challenges the vaccine mandate’s

constitutionality, as opposed to contesting a workplace dispute

under the CSRA. According to his complaint, however, he

alleges that the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional—at least

in part—because it requires that he obtain the vaccine to avoid

adverse employment action. For the reasons discussed below,

Mr. Payne’s claims contesting such adverse employment

action necessarily fall under the CSRA’s statutory scheme.

Accordingly, we affirm the District Court.

I.

The sole issue before us is whether the District Court

correctly found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate Mr. Payne’s claims. This jurisdictional

determination rises and falls with the CSRA’s construction.

A.

The CSRA is an “‘integrated scheme of administrative

and judicial review’ for aggrieved federal employees []

designed to replace an ‘outdated patchwork of statutes and

rules’ that afforded employees the right to challenge employing

agency actions in district courts across the country.” Elgin, 567

U.S. at 13–14 (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439,

444–45 (1988)). The previous system gave rise to inconsistent

decisions concerning similar issues and “a double layer of

judicial review” that the Supreme Court has repeatedly

described as “wasteful and irrational.” Elgin, 567 U.S. at 14

(citing Fausto, 484 U.S. at 445). In response, the CSRA

“prescribe[d] in great detail the protections and remedies”

available to federal employees challenging adverse personnel

4

actions and also outlined “the availability of administrative and

judicial review.” Fausto, 484 U.S. at 443.

The CSRA has three primary sections regulating

adverse personnel action, two of which are relevant here:

Chapter 23 and Chapter 75. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq;

Fausto, 803 U.S. at 445–47.

Chapter 23 outlines the “merit system principles”

agencies must uphold. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b). Violations of these

principles constitute “prohibited personnel practices,” and

Chapter 23 establishes the process through which employees

may contest such practices. Id. § 2302(a). Under this process,

an employee alleging a personnel practice violation has the

option of first filing charges with the Office of Special Counsel

(“OSC”), and if the employee has “reasonable grounds to

believe that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred,

exists, or is to be taken which requires corrective action,”

Chapter 12, governing the investigation of prohibited

personnel practices, provides that the OSC “shall report the

determination together with any findings or recommendations”

to the Merits Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”).

Id. § 1214(b)(2)(B). Should the violation continue, the OSC

“may petition the Board,” id. § 1214(b)(2)(C), and the MSPB

may at that point issue corrective action. The OSC may also

“bring petitions for stays, and petitions for corrective action[.]”

Id. § 1212(a)(2)(A). Importantly, the CSRA grants the United

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit jurisdiction to

review the MSPB’s final orders. See id. §§ 1214(c),

7703(b)(1)(A).

Chapter 75 addresses major adverse actions against

employees. The first subchapter governs suspensions of

fourteen days or less, see id. §§ 7501–04, and the second

subchapter governs more serious actions—involving removal,

5

suspensions over fourteen days, grade reduction, pay reduction,

and furlough up to thirty days, see id. §§ 7511–15. Subchapter

II provides that a covered employee “against whom an action

is proposed is [generally] entitled to[:]” a minimum of “30

days’ advance written notice[;]” the opportunity to respond

orally and in writing; representation; and “a written decision

and the specific reasons therefor at the earliest practicable

date.” Id. § 7513(b). Decisions under Subchapter II are

appealable, first to the MSPB, id. § 7513(d), and then to the

Federal Circuit, id. § 7703(b). And if successful, relief under

either chapter may include reinstatement, back pay, and

attorneys’ fees. See id. §§ 1204(a)(2), (m), 5596(b); see also

Elgin, 567 U.S. at 6.

Thus, while both chapters require a covered employee

to first challenge certain action before an administrative body,

as opposed to a district court, both chapters also prescribe that

it is the Federal Circuit, not this Court, that must handle any

potential judicial review. With this understanding, we turn to

the facts and consider whether the claims at issue could be

adjudicated under either chapter.

B.

In September 2021, President Biden issued Executive

Order No. 14,043 as part of the Executive’s response to

COVID-19. Exec. Order No. 14,043, 86 Fed. Reg. 50,989

(Sept. 9, 2021). The Order requires that all federal employees

be vaccinated subject to “exceptions only as required by law.”

Id. at 50,990. President Biden also created a Safer Federal

Workforce Task Force to help guide the implementation

process. According to the Task Force, employees should have

received a “final vaccination dose by November 8, 2021,” so

they would be “fully vaccinated by November 22, 2021,” and

enforcement against noncompliant employees could begin on

6

November 9, 2021. J.A. 49–51. “Progressive enforcement

actions” may include “[a] 5-day period of counseling and

education;” a short suspension of up to 14 days without pay;

and removal “for failing to follow a direct order.” J.A. 63–64.

As for legally required exemptions—provided “on the basis of

a medical condition or circumstance or a sincerely held

religious belief, practice or observance”—the Task Force

advises agencies to abstain from implementing disciplinary

measures against employees with pending exemption requests.

J.A. 64. And in the case of denial, the employee should be

provided two weeks to obtain vaccination if they so choose.

At the motion to dismiss stage, we must treat the

following well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true.

See Hurd v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir.

2017). Mr. Payne is a civilian employee with the Department

of the Navy, serving as an engineer for the Office of Naval

Research. He claims to have gained “natural immunity”

against COVID-19 after having contracted and recovered from

the disease. Compl. ¶ 7. Accordingly, Mr. Payne informed his

supervisors of his decision to decline vaccination.

On November 22, 2021, the day that all non-exempt

federal employees were required to be fully vaccinated, Mr.

Payne sued President Biden and several other federal officials

and agencies. Seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief,

Mr. Payne claims the vaccine mandate violates the separation

of powers and his Fifth Amendment right to privacy, and places

an unconstitutional condition on his employment.

The government contested Mr. Payne’s suit on

jurisdictional grounds, arguing that Congress divested district

courts of subject matter jurisdiction over claims challenging an

Executive Order, such as these, when it enacted the CSRA.

The District Court agreed and granted the government’s

7

Motion to Dismiss. In its view, the claims could be

characterized as a challenge to either “working conditions”

under Chapter 23 of the CSRA, or a termination decision under

Chapter 75 of the CSRA. Payne, 602 F. Supp. 3d at 157–59.

Because Mr. Payne could obtain administrative and

judicial review under either chapter, the District Court held that

the CSRA applies and dismissed the case for lack of

jurisdiction. This timely appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a suit

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See RICU LLC v. HHS,

22 F.4th 1031, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2022). In doing so, we construe

the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor and grant him the benefit

of all reasonable inferences. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642

F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Applying these principles

here, we come to the same conclusion as the District Court.

As a general matter, the power of the federal courts

stems from constitutional and statutory authorization. See

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375,

377 (1994). Congress, thus, may determine certain

jurisdictional bounds. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,

212–13 (2007). And when Congress establishes a specific

statutory review scheme, “it is ordinarily supposed that

Congress intended that procedure to be the exclusive means of

obtaining judicial review in those cases to which it applies.”

Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing City of

Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). To

ensure that this is the case, however, reviewing courts employ

a two-part inquiry put forth in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.

Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994). First, we determine whether

Congress’s intent to replace district court jurisdiction with an

8

alternative process of review is “fairly discernible in the

statutory scheme.” Id. at 207. Second, we analyze whether the

“claims are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed

within this statutory structure.” Id. at 212.

A.

Proceeding to step one under Thunder Basin, we begin

by identifying Congress’s intent. “To determine whether it is

fairly discernible that Congress precluded district court

jurisdiction over [Mr. Payne’s] claims, we examine the

CSRA’s text, structure, and purpose.” Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10

(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court

acknowledges that it has examined the congressional intent

behind the CSRA multiple times. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10.

And as the Fourth Circuit recently noted when deciding a

similar case, such Supreme Court precedent resolves this first

step. See Rydie v. Biden, No. 21-2359, 2022 WL 1153249, at

*4 (4th Cir. Apr. 19, 2022) (“Thus, Elgin resolves step one. It’s

‘fairly discernible’ that Congress intended the CSRA to

foreclose judicial review in at least some circumstances.”)

(quoting Elgin, 567 U.S. at 23).

In Elgin, the Supreme Court considered whether the

CSRA precluded district court jurisdiction such that

petitioners—federal employees who were discharged for

failing to register for the Selective Service as required by

statute—had to challenge the statute pursuant to the CSRA.

Under this first step, the Elgin Court found that the CSRA’s

“elaborate framework” clearly “demonstrates Congress’ intent

to entirely foreclose judicial review to employees to whom the

CSRA denies statutory review.” 567 U.S. at 11 (internal

quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Thus, Elgin instructs

that given “the painstaking detail with which the CSRA sets

out the method for covered employees to obtain review of

9

adverse employment actions, it is fairly discernible that

Congress intended to deny such employees an additional

avenue of review in district court.” Id. at 11–12. To further

clarify, the Elgin Court explained that the “only one situation”

in which an otherwise covered employee could proceed before

the district court, and thus outside the statutory scheme, occurs

when the employee alleges discrimination through a violation

of an enumerated federal employment law. Id. at 13.

Accordingly, the Elgin Court rejected the petitioners’

attempt to carve out an exception based on the type of

constitutional challenge raised, and ultimately held that “the

CSRA provides the exclusive avenue to judicial review when a

qualifying employee challenges an adverse employment action

by arguing that a federal statute is unconstitutional.” Id. at 5.

In reviewing the same statutory scheme here, we apply Elgin

and find it “fairly discernible” that Congress intended to

preclude judicial review over claims falling within the CSRA’s

purview.

B.

Continuing to the second step of the Thunder Basin

framework, we consider whether Mr. Payne’s constitutional

challenge is the type of claim Congress planned to be assessed

under the CSRA. A claim generally falls outside of the special

statutory scheme only when: “(1) a finding of preclusion might

foreclose all meaningful judicial review; (2) the claim is wholly

collateral to the statutory review provisions; and (3) the claim[]

[is] beyond the expertise of the agency.” Arch Coal, Inc. v.

Acosta, 888 F.3d 493, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see AFGE, AFL-

CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (same).

These three points function as “general guideposts,” as

opposed to a strict formula, and each one helps shape our

analysis. Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 17. As applied here, all three

10

factors direct us to find the CSRA precludes Mr. Payne’s

claims.

1.

Under the first factor, we consider whether Mr. Payne

has access to meaningful judicial review. It is important to

note that the availability of meaningful judicial review is not so

strictly defined as to require that every legal question related to

a litigant’s claim be decided in the first instance. Rather, a

statutory scheme, precluding district court jurisdiction in favor

of an administrative body that cannot adjudicate constitutional

questions pertaining to federal law, may still satisfy this factor

when such determinations are reviewable before a court of

appeals. See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 17.

Mr. Payne’s primary argument is that the CSRA

deprives him of meaningful judicial review because it does not

allow him to challenge the vaccine mandate through a pre-

enforcement claim. In practice, Mr. Payne contends that this

means he must continue declining vaccination until adverse

employment action is enforced against him. He argues that

such a requirement would unfairly obligate him to “bet the

farm” and “violate a rule before challenging the rule’s

validity.” Appellant Br. at 32 (citing Free Enter. Fund. v. Pub.

Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 490–91 (2010)); see

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 134 (2007)

(finding that a plaintiff need not “bet the farm” by destroying a

building and risking 80 percent of business prior to seeking a

legal declaration of its rights). Mr. Payne takes issue with the

District Court’s characterization of his claims as contesting a

proposed adverse personnel action because, as he explains on

appeal, he is challenging an unconstitutional vaccine mandate.

See Appellant Br. at 33. But such re-framing is inconsistent

11

with his overarching argument and does not alter the

jurisdictional outcome.

At the same time that Mr. Payne hinges his standing to

challenge the vaccine mandate on the promised termination

that will follow his continued noncompliance, he also

maintains that the CSRA cannot offer him meaningful review

because he is not challenging any proposed personnel action.

Again, the jurisdictional question before the Court is whether

Mr. Payne may challenge the vaccine mandate under the CSRA

in district court. Whether Mr. Payne characterizes his claims

as challenging the immediate injury he faces under the vaccine

mandate, or the vaccine mandate’s existence in general, we

find that either Chapter 23 or Chapter 75 provides him with a

path forward. Because Mr. Payne’s argument on appeal is

more focused on the threat of termination, we begin with

Chapter 75.

As previously explained, Chapter 75 entitles “an

employee against whom an action [including removal] is

proposed” to notice, reasonable time to answer and present

supporting evidence, representation, and a reasoned written

decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b); see id. §§ 7511 (defining which

employees are covered under the subchapter), 7512 (outlining

the actions covered under the subchapter). If action is taken,

the employee “is entitled to appeal” to the MSPB where the

employee is entitled to a hearing and legal representation.

Id. § 7513(d); see id. § 7701(a). And once the MSPB issues its

decision, the employee may appeal this final order to the

Federal Circuit. Id. § 7703(b)(1)(A).

The CSRA therefore covers pre-enforcement removal

challenges like Mr. Payne’s because while he has not yet been

terminated, Chapter 75 provides meaningful review for

employees “against whom an action is proposed.”

12

Id. § 7513(b) (emphasis added). And although the CSRA does

not define “proposed,” we agree with the Fourth Circuit that

the nature of these claims makes such a definition unnecessary

to deciding this jurisdictional issue. See Rydie, 2022

WL1153249, at *7. Mr. Payne argues that the government

“threaten[s]” disciplinary action, and under the alleged facts,

the government could not have threatened the action without

having proposed it. Appellant Br. at 30 n.3. The Complaint

reinforces such a finding because Mr. Payne alleges that

“[D]efendants have promised [Mr. Payne] will lose his job,”

the defendants are implementing the vaccine mandate, and

given that the vaccine mandate has been “declared a condition

of federal employment, Mr. Payne . . . will be disciplined,

suspended without pay, and removed from Federal service for

failing to follow a direct order.” Compl. ¶¶ 2, 58 (cleaned up).

The second way Mr. Payne may obtain judicial review

is by challenging a “prohibited personnel practice” under

Chapter 23. 5 U.S.C. § 2302. An example of “personnel

action,” as defined by statute, includes the “significant change

in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions[.]”

Id. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). Chapter 23 prohibits supervisory

employees from participating in any act constituting a

“prohibited personnel practice.” Id. § 2302(a), (b). One of the

enumerated prohibited practices includes “tak[ing] or fail[ing]

to take any other personnel action if the taking of or failure to

take such action violates any law, rule, or regulation

implementing, or directly concerning, the merit system

principles contained in section 2301[.]” Id. § 2302(b)(12).

And one such merit system principle involves the failure to

accord “proper regard for [the covered employee’s] privacy

and constitutional rights.” Id. § 2301(b)(2).

While Mr. Payne does not dispute that he is a covered

employee, he maintains that his claims do not qualify as

13

prohibited personnel practices because he challenges the

mandate as opposed to challenging the masking or testing

requirements. Furthermore, Mr. Payne’s counsel also

represented at oral argument that the mask requirement has

since been withdrawn. Oral Arg. Tr. 8:23–25. But even

without the mask requirement—or any of the other COVID-19

related requirements initially alleged and relied upon by the

District Court—Mr. Payne still has the option of filing a

complaint before the OSC, arguing that the vaccine mandate,

and the disciplinary action he faces for his continued

noncompliance, constitute personnel practices taken without

“proper regard for [his] . . . constitutional rights.”

Id. § 2301(b)(2); see id. § 2302(b)(12).

Thus, Mr. Payne may access meaningful review by

following the procedures described under either Chapter 75,

covering proposed removal, or Chapter 23, covering prohibited

personnel practices. In so finding, we note that to the extent

that Mr. Payne finds support in our pre-1994 precedent

identifying certain exceptions to a statutory scheme’s

preclusive effect, see Appellant Br. 23 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of

Fed. Emps. v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 938–40 (D.C. Cir.

1987); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 485–87 (D.C.

Cir. 1989); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 229–30 (D.C.

Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam)), such exceptions cannot

survive the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions in Thunder

Basin and Elgin—clarifying that a statutory scheme may

exclusively preclude jurisdiction when Congress’s intent to do

so is “fairly discernible.” Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207;

Elgin, 567 U.S. at 12; see also See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps.,

AFL-CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We

once suggested in a footnote [citing Weinberger, 818 F.2d at

940 n.7] that the Statute would not allow us to review

constitutional claims that the FLRA could not consider,” but

14

such a “suggestion cannot survive the Supreme Court’s

decision in Thunder Basin”).

2.

We next consider whether the claims are “wholly

collateral to a statute’s review provisions.” Thunder Basin, 510

U.S. at 212 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Claims are not wholly collateral if they serve as the “vehicle by

which [the plaintiff] seek[s] to reverse” the adverse

employment action. Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 23 (citing Elgin, 567

U.S. at 22). As we have emphasized, “an exception to an

otherwise exclusive scheme for constitutional challenges in

general, or facial attacks on a statute in particular, or some other

as-yet-undefined category of constitutional claims, would

encourage respondents in administrative enforcement

proceedings to frame their challenges to the [agency’s] actions

in those terms and thereby earn access to another forum” for

review. Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 25. Such gamesmanship would

be inconsistent with Congress’s intent to set the boundaries of

an exclusive avenue for review.

By arguing that his claims are wholly collateral, Mr.

Payne seeks an exception to the CSRA’s exclusivity. Indeed,

he attempts to circumvent the CSRA’s procedure and proceed

in district court because his challenge pertains to the

Constitution rather than CSRA-covered personnel action. But

while Mr. Payne certainly alleges that the vaccine mandate is

unconstitutional, he does so—at least in part—because of the

mandate’s “promis[e] to deprive [him] of public employment

unless” he complies. Compl. ¶ 86. Adopting Mr. Payne’s

theory would thus enable scores of litigants challenging an

employment requirement to skip over the CSRA’s process by

characterizing the requirement as unconstitutional. “Such suits

would reintroduce the very potential for inconsistent

15

decisionmaking and duplicative judicial review that the CSRA

was designed to avoid.” Elgin, 567 U.S. at 14.

All attempts to characterize his argument as anything

but a challenge to adverse employment action fail for

jurisdictional purposes, because Mr. Payne himself admits that

his standing to challenge the vaccine mandate is rooted in the

looming disciplinary action he now faces as a result of his

continued noncompliance. In other words, Mr. Payne

challenges the vaccine mandate to maintain his employment

while continuing to defy the mandate that he views as

unlawful. And while his constitutional arguments are relevant

to the merits, they do not change the fact that one of Mr.

Payne’s interests in this suit is to avoid the impending adverse

employment action. Mr. Payne’s claims are not wholly

collateral because challenges to adverse employment actions

are the type of claims that the MSPB regularly adjudicates.

3.

Like the first two factors, the third factor—agency

expertise—is interpreted broadly. Courts may find this factor

satisfied by considering “the many threshold questions that

may accompany a constitutional claim and to which the MSPB

can apply its expertise.” Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22. Mr. Payne

argues that his claims fall outside the agency’s expertise

because, again, he frames his claims as constitutional

challenges unrelated to the CSRA’s procedures. We reject this

argument because the MSPB’s expertise remains applicable to

the various threshold questions attached to the claims and any

preliminary issues particular to the employment context. See

id. at 22–23 (noting preliminary issues such as those involving

a statute that MSPB often interprets; “statutory or

constitutional claims that the MSPB routinely considers[;]” or

“a constitutional challenge to a federal statute”). Also, it

16

remains possible that the MSPB finds the promised disciplinary

action violates the statutory requirement that major adverse

employment action “promote the efficiency of the service.”

5 U.S.C. §§ 7503(a), 7513(a). If so, the MSPB could issue a

ruling in Mr. Payne’s favor, possibly rendering his

constitutional claims moot.

Based on the foregoing, all three factors weigh in the

government’s favor and Mr. Payne’s claims fall within the

CSRA’s framework. We thus conclude that Congress

precluded the District Court from reviewing Mr. Payne’s

claims.

III.

There is but one permissible conclusion given our well-

established precedent guiding jurisdictional preclusion issues

of this nature. By reframing the issue as “whether the CSRA

removes district court jurisdiction” as opposed to “whether it

permits it,” Mr. Payne attempts to introduce nuance where

none exists. Appellant Reply Br. at 4 (emphases in original).

The law is clear that where the CSRA provides judicial review,

it does so exclusively. Thus, in finding that Mr. Payne may

proceed through the CSRA’s scheme, we necessarily find that

should Mr. Payne choose to continue challenging the vaccine

mandate, he must do so through the CSRA’s scheme. Such is

the nature of an “exclusive avenue to judicial review.” Elgin,

567 U.S. at 5.

***

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District

Court’s judgment.

So ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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