Jessica N. Rogers v. Sheriff of Santa Rosa County Florida

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13994

____________________

JESSICA N. ROGERS,

As personal representative of the estate of Jose F. Escano-Reyes and

as parent and natural guardian of Y.C., a minor child,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

SHERIFF OF SANTA ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA,

In his official and individual capacity,

Defendant-Appellant,

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13994

JOHN GADDIS,

In his official and individual capacity,

Defendant,

MICHELLE BAUMAN,

In her official and individual capacity,

Defendant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-00571-TKW-EMT

____________________

Before LAGOA and BRASHER, Circuit Judges, and BOULEE,* District

Judge.

BOULEE, District Judge:

This case arises from the suicide of an inmate, Jose Francisco

Escano-Reyes, at Florida’s Santa Rosa County Jail. Jessica Rogers,

the mother of Escano-Reyes’ minor child, brought claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against John Gaddis and Michelle Bauman, deputies

* Honorable J. P. Boulee, United States District Judge for the Northern District

of Georgia, sitting by designation.

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21-13994 Opinion of the Court 1

employed the Santa Rosa County Sheriff’s Office, alleging deliber-

ate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Rogers also sued Bob Johnson, the Sheriff of Santa

Rosa County, in his official capacity under § 1983 and Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), asserting that

the suicide-monitoring practices at the Santa Rosa County Jail vio-

lated Escano-Reyes’ constitutional rights. The matter proceeded

to trial.

After Rogers rested her case, the Sheriff moved for judgment

as a matter of law on the grounds that the evidence failed to show

that the Jail’s policies, practices, or customs were deliberately indif-

ferent to the risk of suicide. The district court denied the motion.

After the evidence closed, the jury determined that the deputies

were not liable under § 1983. More specifically, the jury found that

the deputies were aware of and deliberately indifferent to the risk

that Escano-Reyes would commit suicide but that their deliberate

indifference did not cause his death. The jury found that the Sher-

iff, however, was liable under Monell.

Following the verdict, the Sheriff renewed his motion for

judgment as a matter of law, again asserting that the evidence was

insufficient to show that the Jail’s policies, practices, or customs

were deliberately indifferent to the risk of suicide. The Sheriff

moved in the alternative to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Without a finding that the

deputies were individually liable under § 1983, the Sheriff argued

that Rogers’ Monell claim necessarily failed and that he should be

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13994

removed from the judgment as a liable party. The district court

denied relief on both grounds.

Upon de novo review, we find sufficient evidence in the rec-

ord showing that the Jail’s policies constituted deliberate indiffer-

ence to the risk that Escano-Reyes would commit suicide. Moreo-

ver, we have previously considered the question of whether indi-

vidual liability under § 1983 is a necessary component of Monell

liability, and in Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir.

2020), we held that it is not. In light of Barnett, the district court

did not abuse its discretion by denying relief under Rule 59(e).

With the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the district court on

all grounds.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Escano-Reyes’ Arrest and Detention

On January 3, 2016, the Okaloosa County Sheriff’s Office ar-

rested Escano-Reyes for driving without a license. Escano-Reyes,

a Honduran citizen, was in the country illegally, and on January 7,

2016, he was placed in the custody of the Santa Rosa County Sher-

iff’s Office and detained at the Santa Rosa County Jail (the “Jail”)

pending removal proceedings.

Escano-Reyes’ mental health deteriorated while in custody,

and on April 2, 2016, he informed Jail officials that he wanted to die

and planned to kill himself. Medical staff at the Jail transferred

Escano-Reyes to the medical unit and placed him on a suicide-

watch protocol. Inmates on suicide watch are provided with a

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21-13994 Opinion of the Court 3

suicide-prevention garment, or “suicide smock.” Suicide smocks

are ordinarily stiff and unpliable but can become more flexible with

time and wear. Escano-Reyes was provided with a suicide smock;

however, the Jail did not evaluate the condition of the smock given

to Escano-Reyes, nor did it know how old the smock was.

B. The Jail’s Suicide-Watch Protocol

The Jail’s suicide-watch protocol requires supervising depu-

ties to comply with a number of the Jail’s written policies. The

Jail’s standard operating procedure, for example, provides that sui-

cidal inmates must be under “direct visual observation by a dep-

uty/nurse 24 hours a day.” The Florida Model Jail Standards, with

which the Jail must comply, define “direct observation” as “contin-

uous visual observation 24 hours each day.” Additionally, super-

vising deputies at the Jail are expected to follow General Order O-

030II(D), which requires suicidal inmates who are housed in a sin-

gle cell to be “under direct continuous observation with docu-

mented staggered 15-minute physical checks.” Deputies must

complete a close-watch form to certify that they checked on the

inmate in question every fifteen minutes. Jail staff are expected to

comply with the suicide-watch protocol whether the inmate is

housed in the medical unit or elsewhere.

In reality, though, the Jail followed certain customs and

practices for monitoring suicidal inmates that differed from these

written policies. For instance, the Jail did not require deputies to

continuously or directly observe a suicidal inmate to confirm his

safety, nor did the Jail require deputies to physically walk to the

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door of an inmate’s cell to look inside the window and check on

him. Instead, being in the general area of the inmate such that the

deputy was “available” and “capable” of performing the staggered

fifteen-minute check was deemed sufficient. The Jail also consid-

ered a solely visual check to constitute an adequate physical check

on the inmate’s safety. More specifically, a deputy, even if seated

some distance away, could comply with the Jail’s customs by

glimpsing some part of an inmate through the exposed portion of

a cell window.

Suicidal inmates who were disruptive to the medical staff

were often moved to the Admissions, Classification, and Release

(“ACR”) Unit. Cell one of the ACR unit, or ACR-1, was the only

cell in the ACR unit with a metal partition on which a ligature

could be fastened; nonetheless, ACR-1 was used to house suicidal

inmates. ACR-1 was not far from the Jail’s booking desk, but the

deputies who monitored the ACR unit from that desk had only an

obscured view of ACR-1. The Jail covered the main windows of

the ACR cells (including ACR-1) with curtains and the bottom half

of the cells’ smaller windows, which were positioned along the

length of the door, with plastic bags. 1 In sum, curtains and bags

concealed much of ACR-1’s interior from outside view. That, com-

bined with the cell’s position relative to the Jail’s booking desk,

1 The Jail explained that the purpose of this practice was to conceal, particu-

larly from the view of female deputies, inmates who were naked or mastur-

bating.

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meant that a deputy would have to physically walk to the door of

ACR-1 and look through the portion of the smaller windows left

uncovered to see fully inside the cell. The Jail’s booking desk and

the interior of ACR-1 were recorded by video cameras and audio

equipment, but the video feed inside ACR-1 was not visible from

the booking desk. Instead, that video feed was displayed in a cen-

tral control room where one person watched hundreds of other

monitors.

C. Escano-Reyes’ Suicide

On April 6, 2016, following a period of erratic behavior,

Escano-Reyes—who remained on suicide watch—was moved

from the medical unit to the ACR unit, where he was housed in

ACR-1. On April 7, 2016, around 6:45 AM, deputies Gaddis and

Bauman began their shifts at the Jail. During their daily briefing

that morning, Gaddis and Bauman were informed that Escano-

Reyes was on suicide watch and that they were responsible for su-

pervising him.

Video footage from inside ACR-1 shows that Escano-Reyes

woke up on April 7, 2016, around 8:15 AM. Forty-five minutes

later, he removed his suicide smock and tied it into a knot around

the cell’s metal partition. He removed the smock from the parti-

tion a few minutes later and put it on before, again, taking it off and

tying the smock to the partition to create a ligature. Naked and

agitated, Escano-Reyes then paced his cell while yelling in Spanish.

The deputies could hear him shouting for over an hour, but

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because they did not speak Spanish, they could not understand

what he was shouting.2

The close-watch form for Escano-Reyes on April 7, 2016, has

fifteen entries. At trial, Gaddis admitted that he falsified the close-

watch form by documenting checks—specifically, the first five en-

tries—that he did not, in fact, perform. The next two entries indi-

cate that a deputy checked on Escano-Reyes and that he was lying

down. Five entries have a code that Escano-Reyes was “shouting,”

but notably, the Jail did not permit solely auditory checks. The fi-

nal three entries on the close-watch form, at 9:32 AM, 9:45 AM and

10:00 AM, read “DOOR,” presumably indicating that the deputies

could see flashes of movement through the exposed portion of

ACR-1’s window, pursuant to the Jail’s policy of permitting solely

visual checks. Importantly, Gaddis and Bauman remained seated

at the booking desk between 9:30 AM and 10:25 AM. At no point

during this period did either deputy physically walk to the door of

ACR-1 to check on Escano-Reyes.

Between 9:30 AM and 10:25 AM, Escano-Reyes placed his

head into the ligature created with the suicide smock at least five

times. He tried to hang himself at least nine times. At 10:25 AM,

Escano-Reyes was able to hang himself. His body was not discov-

ered for twenty minutes. At 10:45 AM, a member of the Jail’s jani-

torial staff walked by Escano-Reyes’ cell, looked through the

2 Although the Jail recorded audio and video of ACR-1, the audio portion of

the recording from April 7, 2016, is unavailable.

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portion of the exposed window and informed the deputies that

Escano-Reyes was “hanging.”

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Rogers filed an action in the Northern District of Florida as

the personal representative of Escano-Reyes’ estate and on behalf

of her and Escano-Reyes’ minor child. Rogers brought claims un-

der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs 3 against Gaddis and Bauman

in their individual capacities and a § 1983 claim under Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against the

Sheriff of Santa Rosa County in his official capacity. 4 Rogers also

brought state-law claims for negligence against Gaddis and Bau-

man. The Sheriff moved for summary judgment, as did the depu-

ties on the grounds of qualified immunity. The district court de-

nied both motions.5

3 There is no dispute in this case that inmates on suicide watch have a serious

medical need.

4 Because “a suit against a public official in his official capacity is considered a

suit against the local government entity he represents,” Owens v. Fulton

County, 877 F.2d 947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989), we refer to “the Sheriff” and

“the Jail” interchangeably in this opinion.

5 The deputies filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immun-

ity, and we affirmed the district court’s ruling. See Rogers v. Santa Rosa Cnty.

Sheriff’s Off., 856 F. App’x 251, 256 (11th Cir. 2021).

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Rogers’ § 1983 claim against the Sheriff (and her § 1983 and

state-law claims against Gaddis and Bauman) proceeded to a jury

trial. Rogers presented evidence that the Jail had the following pol-

icies: (1) permitting the covering of two of the three windows of

ACR-1; (2) housing suicidal inmates in ACR-1, although the cell

contained a metal partition and its interior could not be fully

viewed from the Jail’s booking desk; and (3) allowing deputies to

perform visual checks on suicidal inmates by glimpsing the inmate

through a cell window while the deputy remained seated at the

booking desk. 6

Both parties presented witnesses to provide evidence about

the Jail’s policies. Captain Barbara Stearns testified as the repre-

sentative of the Jail. James Upchurch, a corrections professional

with a forty-five-year career and the former Assistant Secretary of

Institutions for the State of Florida, testified as an expert for Rog-

ers. 7

Stearns testified that placing a suicidal inmate in a cell with

partially concealed windows impeded adequate monitoring and

posed an obvious risk. Stearns conceded that the Jail followed cer-

tain practices when monitoring suicidal inmates that differed from

its written policies, specifically regarding the obligation to provide

direct and continuous observation of inmates on suicide watch.

6 We refer to these three practices as “the Jail’s policies.”

7 The Sheriff did not proffer an expert witness.

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Stearns also explained that under the Jail’s policies, a “physical”

check on an inmate could occur if a deputy, even one seated some

distance away, simply glimpsed some part of the inmate through a

cell window.

Upchurch opined that placing a suicidal inmate in a cell with

a metal partition (like the one in ACR-1) and obstructing the win-

dows of cells used to house suicidal inmates did not show regard

for human life. According to Upchurch, permitting deputies to

monitor inmates from a distant seated position—rather than re-

quiring direct, continuous observation—would have “negative

consequences” for preventing inmate suicide. Similarly, Upchurch

explained, allowing checks that consisted solely of momentarily

seeing the inmate through a window were not only insufficient to

ensure the inmate’s safety but dangerous as a matter of practice.

After Rogers rested her case, the Sheriff moved for judgment

as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, arguing that none of the Jail’s policies were unconstitu-

tional. The district court found sufficient evidence in the record to

support a jury finding that the Jail’s policies were deliberately indif-

ferent to the risk that Escano-Reyes would commit suicide, and

thus the court denied the Sheriff’s motion. The deputies also

moved for judgment as a matter of law, and the district court like-

wise denied their motions. The jury returned a verdict for Rogers

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13994

on the Monell claim and for the deputies on the individual § 1983

claims.8

Although the verdict as to Gaddis and Bauman is not on ap-

peal, some of the jury’s findings specific to the deputies (such as the

jury’s answers on the verdict form) are relevant to our analysis of

the Sheriff’s liability under Monell. We thus review those findings

now.

To find Gaddis or Bauman liable under § 1983, the verdict

form required the jurors to conclude that (1) Gaddis or Bauman

had subjective knowledge of the risk that Escano-Reyes would

commit suicide; (2) Gaddis or Bauman were deliberately indiffer-

ent to that risk; and (3) their deliberate indifference caused his sui-

cide. Therefore, the jury had to answer “yes” to all three of these

questions to find that either Gaddis or Bauman were individually

liable under § 1983. However, to reach the issue of the Sheriff’s

liability under Monell, the verdict form only required the jurors to

answer “yes” to questions one and two: that Gaddis or Bauman (1)

had subjective knowledge of the risk that Escano-Reyes would

commit suicide and (2) were deliberately indifferent to that risk.

In the end, the jury answered “yes” to questions one and two

on the verdict form. In other words, the jury found that Gaddis

and Bauman had subjective knowledge of the risk that Escano-

8 The jury found for Rogers on the state-law claims against Gaddis and Bau-

man and awarded her $1,762,500 in damages.

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Reyes would commit suicide and that they were deliberately indif-

ferent to that risk. However, the jury did not find that their delib-

erate indifference caused Escano-Reyes’ death and therefore deter-

mined that Gaddis and Bauman were not liable under § 1983. But

the jury made the requisite finding on the verdict form to address

the Sheriff’s liability under Monell, and as we noted, it returned a

verdict for Rogers on that claim.

After trial, the Sheriff renewed his prior motion for judg-

ment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b). In the alternative, the

Sheriff sought relief under Rule 59(e), asking the district court to

remove him from the judgment. Before these motions were de-

cided, the Sheriff timely appealed to this Court.

In his Rule 50(b) motion, the Sheriff argued that Rogers

failed to introduce evidence that the Jail’s policies were deliberately

indifferent to a known or obvious risk of suicide. The Sheriff con-

tended that he should otherwise be removed from the judgment

under Rule 59(e). According to the Sheriff, the jury’s finding that

Gaddis and Bauman were not individually liable under § 1983 con-

stituted a determination that Escano-Reyes’ constitutional rights

were not violated. And without a constitutional violation, the

Sheriff argued, an element of Monell liability was missing, and the

judgment should be amended to remove him as a liable party. The

district court denied relief, finding “no basis . . . to set aside the ver-

dict or the resulting judgment against the Sheriff under Rule 50(b)

or Rule 59(e).” The Sheriff then amended his notice of appeal to

include the denial of his post-trial motions.

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13994

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

“A Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law is re-

viewed de novo, and this Court applies the same standards em-

ployed by the district court.” Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1337

(11th Cir. 2000). “In deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of

law, we review all the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party.” Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Ban-

corp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 724 (11th Cir. 2012). However, “the non-

movant must put forth more than a mere scintilla of evidence sug-

gesting that reasonable minds could reach differing verdicts.” Abel,

210 F.3d at 1337. Accordingly, granting a motion under Rule 50 is

only “proper when the evidence is so weighted in favor of one side

that that party is entitled to succeed in his or her position as a mat-

ter of law.” Thorne v. All Restoration Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1264,

1266 (11th Cir. 2006).

B. Amending a Judgment

“We review the denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of dis-

cretion.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). Im-

portantly, “Rule 59(e) allows courts to alter judgments only where

there is ‘newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or

fact.’” Samara v. Taylor, 38 F.4th 141, 149 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting

EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 842 F.3d 1333, 1349 (11th Cir.

2016)).

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Sheriff’s Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law

The Sheriff contends that the evidence at trial failed to show

that the Jail’s policies constituted deliberate indifference to a

known or obvious consequence of suicide. He thus claims that the

district court should have granted his motions for judgment as a

matter of law. Having reviewed the evidence de novo, we do not

agree.

To succeed on a § 1983 claim under Monell, a plaintiff must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, “(1) that his constitu-

tional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom

or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitu-

tional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.”

McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004); see also

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. In a jail suicide case, a § 1983 claim under

the Fourteenth Amendment requires the plaintiff to show that the

defendant “displayed ‘deliberate indifference’ to the prisoner’s tak-

ing of his own life.” Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274–75

(11th Cir. 1989). “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard

of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known

or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of

Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). More specifically,

the deliberate indifference standard “requires a strong likelihood

rather than a mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will

occur.” Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th

Cir. 1990).

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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13994

The record in this case contains sufficient evidence that the

Jail’s policies constituted deliberate indifference to Escano-Reyes’

constitutional rights. The Jail knew that Escano-Reyes was sui-

cidal. Nonetheless, the Jail’s policies allowed Escano-Reyes to be

placed in a cell with a metal partition on which a ligature could be

tied and with the majority of its windows concealed by curtains or

other coverings. And contrary to the Jail’s written procedures, its

custom allowed deputies to monitor Escano-Reyes by performing

a solely visual check—in this case, merely seeing flashes of move-

ment—from the booking desk rather than confirming that he was

safe. While liability is inappropriate where only “the mere oppor-

tunity for suicide, without more,” exists, Tittle v. Jefferson Cnty.

Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994), the evidence in this

case established far more than the mere possibility that Escano-

Reyes would inflict self-harm.

We are not persuaded by the Sheriff’s arguments that the

circumstances were insufficient to create a known or obvious risk

of suicide. The Sheriff contends, for instance, that he lacked notice

of the risk that Escano-Reyes would commit suicide with the sui-

cide smock. But the United States Supreme Court has held that “a

factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial

risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer v. Bren-

nan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994). 9 Here, the Jail’s own representative

9 Farmer concerned a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth

Amendment. 511 U.S. at 828–29. Although Rogers’ Monell claim arises under

the Fourteenth Amendment, Farmer remains relevant for our analysis. See

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conceded at trial that the practice of housing suicidal inmates in a

cell with a partially concealed interior both impeded adequate

monitoring and posed an obvious risk. Moreover, an official need

not have knowledge of the precise risk that ultimately materializes;

awareness of “an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety” is

enough. Id. at 843. In this case, the evidence at trial showed that

the Jail’s policies—placing an inmate in a cell with partially con-

cealed windows and with a partition on which a ligature could be

tied, and allowing deputies to monitor that inmate by catching mo-

mentary glimpses of him through a window—created an obvious

risk of suicide.

Our task is to “determine ‘whether or not reasonable jurors

could have concluded as this jury did based on the evidence pre-

sented.’” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1526 (11th

Cir. 1997) (quoting Quick v. Peoples Bank, 993 F.2d 793, 797 (11th

Cir. 1993)). We have reviewed the record de novo, and we con-

clude that Rogers presented sufficient evidence of deliberate indif-

ference to require submitting this matter to a jury in the first in-

stance and to support the jury’s ultimate verdict. As such, the

Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1539 (noting that “[w]hether the alleged violation is reviewed

under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial” because, in either

posture, a plaintiff in a prisoner suicide case must show that a jail official acted

with deliberate indifference).

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Sheriff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the

district court did not err by denying his Rule 50 motions.

B. The Sheriff’s Motion to Amend the Judgment

The Sheriff asserts that the jury was required to find either

Gaddis or Bauman liable under § 1983 as an element of Monell lia-

bility. He is incorrect.

We begin by briefly explaining the Sheriff’s argument. As

stated previously, a plaintiff bringing a Monell claim must show (1)

the violation of a constitutional right, (2) that a municipality had a

custom or policy of deliberate indifference to that right and (3) that

the custom or policy caused the violation. McDowell, 392 F.3d at

1289. In the Sheriff’s view, the first component—a constitutional

violation—requires a plaintiff to establish the same elements that

form an individual § 1983 claim. That is, to show a constitutional

violation for the purposes of Monell liability, a plaintiff must estab-

lish, as to an individual, “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2)

the [individual’s] deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causa-

tion.” Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir.

1995). But in this case, the jury found only (1) and (2) as to Gaddis

and Bauman and attributed (3), causation, to the Sheriff instead.

According to the Sheriff, because the jury found that Gaddis and

Bauman were not liable under § 1983, no constitutional violation

occurred, and Rogers’ Monell claim necessarily failed.

The issue before us, then, is whether individual liability un-

der § 1983 is a necessary element of municipal liability under

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21-13994 Opinion of the Court 17

Monell. We addressed this question in Barnett v. MacArthur, 956

F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2020). In that case, a deputy arrested the plain-

tiff for driving under the influence and transported her to jail. Id. at

1295. The jail’s hold policy required detaining a DUI arrestee for

eight hours, even in the absence of positive test results and even if

the arrestee posted bond. Id. Two breath samples showed no al-

cohol or drug content, and the plaintiff posted bond—but she was

nonetheless detained for eight hours pursuant to the jail’s hold pol-

icy. Id. at 1295–96. The plaintiff sued the arresting deputy under §

1983 and the sheriff under § 1983 and Monell, alleging against both

the violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 1293. The

district court granted summary judgment to the sheriff on the Mo-

nell claim, and later, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the deputy.

Id. The plaintiff appealed, and we reversed the district court’s sum-

mary judgment ruling. Id.

On appeal, the sheriff argued that he could not be liable be-

cause “the jury verdict mean[t] that there was no Fourth Amend-

ment violation, and without a Fourth Amendment violation there

cannot be municipal liability under Monell.” Id. at 1301. We re-

jected this “superficially seductive” “syllogism” and reiterated our

prior holding that “Monell . . . and its progeny do not require that

a jury must first find an individual defendant liable before imposing

liability on local government.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 686 (11th Cir. 1985)).

Indeed, “municipal liability can exist if a jury finds that a

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18 Opinion of the Court 21-13994

constitutional injury is due to a municipal policy, custom, or prac-

tice, but also finds that no officer is individually liable for the viola-

tion.” Id.

Such is the case here. The jury’s verdict represents a finding

that the Jail’s policies—not the actions of the individual deputies—

were the “‘moving force’ [behind] the constitutional violation.”

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (alteration in orig-

inal) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). The Sheriff conflates the

elements of a § 1983 claim against an individual officer with Mo-

nell’s requirement of a constitutional violation. They are not one

and the same. Barnett forecloses the Sheriff’s argument, and ac-

cordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s de-

nial of relief under Rule 59(e). 10

10 The Sheriff also contends that the verdict form was incorrect because it

allowed the jurors to reach the question of Monell liability without finding all

three elements of individual § 1983 liability as to either Gaddis or Bauman. He

did not, however, raise this issue while the jury was still empaneled. To the

extent that the Sheriff’s argument sounds in verdict inconsistency, he likely

waived it by failing to timely assert the issue. See Reider v. Philip Morris USA,

Inc., 793 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “[a] party must object

to a verdict as inconsistent before the jury has been dismissed” and that “fail-

ure to object to an inconsistent verdict before the jury is excused forfeits the

objection”). But because Barnett is dispositive of the relationship between in-

dividual liability under § 1983 and liability under Monell, we assume without

deciding that the Sheriff did not waive this argument.

USCA11 Case: 21-13994 Document: 63-1 Date Filed: 03/20/2023 Page: 21 of 21

21-13994 Opinion of the Court 19

V. CONCLUSION

We have reviewed the record in this case and found no error

in the district court’s denial of the Sheriff’s motions for judgment

as a matter of law. Likewise, the district court did not abuse its

discretion by denying the Sheriff’s motion to amend the judgment

under Rule 59(e).

AFFIRMED.