Stewart Merritts, Jr. v. Leslie Richards

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 19-1335

___________

STEWART MERRITTS, JR.,

Appellant

v.

LESLIE RICHARDS, in both her official and individual

capacity as an official of the Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation; EDWARD BETTWY, in both his official and

individual capacity as an official of the Pennsylvania

Department of Transportation; MARK CHAPPELL, in both

his official and individual capacity as an official of the

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation;

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION; COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 3-18-cv-00212)

District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson

Argued: January 12, 2021

Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.



Judge Ambro took senior status on February 6, 2023.

(Filed: March 16, 2023)

____________

Stewart Merritts, Jr.

39947 Rivers Edge Lane

Lovettsville, VA 20180

Pro Se Appellant

Johanna Dennehy

John L. Jacobus

Laura A. Lane-Steele [ARGUED]

Alice E. Loughran

STEPTOE & JOHNSON

1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

Court-Appointed Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant

Stewart Merritts, Jr.

Anthony T. Kovalchick

Kemal A. Mericli

Daniel B. Mullen

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA

1251 Waterfront Place

Mezzanine Level

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Caleb C. Enerson [ARGUED]

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & INDUSTRY

Office of General Counsel

651 Boas Street

10th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17121

Counsel for Appellees Leslie Richards, Edward

Bettwy, Mark Chappell, Pennsylvania Department of

Transportation, and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

2

___________

OPINION OF THE COURT

___________

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.

U.S. Route 22 spans about 650 miles, from Newark, New

Jersey in the east, through Pennsylvania and West Virginia,

into Ohio, with a western terminus in Cincinnati. To improve

a one-mile stretch of the highway in Frankstown Township,

Pennsylvania, outside of Altoona, the Pennsylvania

Department of Transportation, commonly referred to as

‘PennDOT,’ sought two right-of-way easements from a nearby

parcel of land for new drainage pipes and their installation.

Together, the easements covered less than one-tenth of an acre,

but the property owner, Stewart Merritts, Jr., a citizen of

Virginia, opposed those encumbrances on his land. PennDOT

initiated a condemnation action, and over Merritts’s objections,

it acquired title to and possession of the easements.

With no success in that state-court proceeding, Merritts

commenced this suit in District Court claiming that

PennDOT’s acquisition of the easements and the compensation

offered for them violates the U.S. Constitution and

Pennsylvania law. None of his claims got far in District Court.

In response to a motion to dismiss by the defendants –

Pennsylvania, PennDOT, and three PennDOT officials in their

official and individual capacities – the District Court dismissed

all claims with prejudice, some based on Eleventh Amendment

immunity, the remainder under Burford abstention, a doctrine

that protects “complex state administrative processes from

undue federal interference.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.

Council of City of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 250, 362

(1989).

3

Through this timely appeal, Merritts challenges the

dismissal of some of his claims for constitutional violations,

which he brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He argues that his

§ 1983 claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the

PennDOT officials in their official capacities should have

survived dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment due to the

Ex parte Young exception. He also contends that the District

Court erred in dismissing his § 1983 claims for damages

against the PennDOT officials in their individual capacities

under Burford abstention. Through supplemental briefing, the

parties have also addressed whether any of Merritts’s § 1983

claims against the PennDOT officials in their individual

capacities are jurisdictionally barred under Rooker-Feldman as

impermissible appeals of state-court judgments.

On de novo review, Merritts’s § 1983 claims for damages

against the PennDOT officials in their individual capacities for

a denial of just compensation should not have been dismissed.

But the remainder of his § 1983 claims cannot proceed in

District Court. The Ex parte Young exception does not allow

Merritts’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against

the PennDOT officials in their official capacities because he

does not seek prospective relief from an ongoing violation.

Merritts’s § 1983 claims for damages against the PennDOT

officials in their individual capacities for allegedly unlawfully

acquiring the easements for PennDOT cannot be dismissed

under Burford abstention, but they are jurisdictionally barred

under Rooker-Feldman because they seek impermissible

review and rejection of the judgment in the condemnation

proceeding. Although several of his § 1983 claims needed to

be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment and Rooker-Feldman

grounds, those dismissals should have been without prejudice.

Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand

with instructions to adjudicate Merritts’s § 1983 just-

compensation-related claims for damages against the

PennDOT officials in their individual capacities and to dismiss

the remainder of his claims without prejudice.

4

I. BACKGROUND

In 2016, as part of improving U.S. Route 22 near Canoe

Creek State Park in Blair County, PennDOT sought to

modernize the Flowing Springs Road intersection. Part of that

project involved replacing the existing drainage pipes with

wider ones. To do so, PennDOT sought two easements on

Merritts’s one-and-a-half-acre property: a drainage easement

with an area of 1,150 square feet and a two-year construction

easement with an area of 2,896 square feet. PennDOT offered

$400 for the first easement and $100 for the second. Merritts

rejected those offers, so PennDOT commenced an in rem

condemnation action in the Court of Common Pleas for Blair

County. To initiate that proceeding, PennDOT filed a

declaration of taking, which, when coupled with the offer to

pay compensation, conferred title to the easements to

PennDOT and enabled it to later obtain a writ of possession.

See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 302, 307(a).

Merritts disputed the declaration of taking by filing

preliminary objections. Procedurally, those objections are the

exclusive means in a condemnation action in Pennsylvania

court for challenging a taking and the transfer of title, see id.

§ 306(a)(3); W. Whiteland Assocs. v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp.,

690 A.2d 1266, 1268 & n.1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997), but they

may not be used to contest the amount of compensation

offered, see 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 306(b); In re Condemnation

by Pa. Dep’t of Transp., of Right of Way for State Route 79,

Section W10, 798 A.2d 725, 731–32 (Pa. 2002). Pennsylvania

law instead permits a property owner to dispute the amount of

compensation by filing a petition for the appointment of

viewers to assess the value of the condemned property, but

Merritts did not file such a petition. See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 502; see also id. § 504(a)(1) (requiring a court to appoint

three viewers).

After holding an evidentiary hearing on Merritts’s

preliminary objections, the Common Pleas Court overruled

them and granted PennDOT a writ of possession. On appeal,

5

the Commonwealth Court affirmed that judgment, and Merritts

let lapse the time for petitioning the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court to review that decision. See Pa. R. App. P. 1113(a)

(allowing thirty days for such a petition).1

Merritts then sought federal-court review of the

Commonwealth Court’s order. Thirty days after that order, he

removed the case to the United States District Court for the

Western District of Pennsylvania. See In re Condemnation by

Pa. Dep’t of Transp., of Right-of-Way for State Route 0022,

Section 034, 2018 WL 4100032, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 28,

2018). But the thirty days permitted for removal starts upon a

defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading or summons – not

upon an adverse order from a state appellate court.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). PennDOT, however, did not

object within the thirty days permitted for challenging the

untimeliness of the removal. See In re Right-of-Way for State

Route 0022, 2018 WL 4100032, at *2; see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c). Instead, it moved to dismiss the removed action.

See In re Right-of-Way for State Route 0022, 2018 WL

4100032, at *1. The District Court granted that motion

principally on Rooker-Feldman grounds and remanded the

case to state court. See id. at *3; see also id. at *4–5

(identifying Burford abstention and the well-pleaded

complaint rule as alternative bases for dismissal). After

moving unsuccessfully for reconsideration, see In re

Condemnation by Pa. Dep’t of Transp. of Right-of-Way for

State Route 0022, Section 034, in the Twp. of Frankstown,

351 F. Supp. 3d 943, 947 (W.D. Pa. 2018), Merritts appealed,

and this Court dismissed his case for lack of appellate

jurisdiction. See In re Condemnation by Pa. Dep’t of Transp.,

of Right-of-Way for State Route 022, Section 034, in the Twp.

of Frankstown, 2019 WL 13220103, at *1 (3d Cir. June 10,

1

Much later, after he filed this appeal, Merritts unsuccessfully

petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for leave to file an

out-of-time petition for review of the Commonwealth Court’s

decision.

6

2019); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Trans Penn Wax Corp. v.

McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995).

Having lost his removal gambit in the condemnation action,

Merritts filed this suit against the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, PennDOT, and three PennDOT officials in their

official and individual capacities. His complaint included

several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of

his constitutional rights for which he sought $500,000 in

compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages, as

well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Many of those claims

challenged PennDOT’s acquisition of the easements: Merritts

asserted that it was an unlawful taking, an unreasonable

seizure, and a violation of substantive and procedural due

process. He also claimed that the amount of compensation that

PennDOT offered for the easements was unjust and that the

defendants conspired to offer him a deficient amount. In

addition to those § 1983 claims, Merritts pursued an array of

claims under Pennsylvania law, seeking the same relief.2

The defendants moved to dismiss the case for a lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction and for a failure to state a claim for

relief. The District Court granted that motion and dismissed

Merritts’s complaint with prejudice. Merritts v. Richards,

2019 WL 176182, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2019). It rejected

the claims against the Commonwealth, PennDOT, and the

PennDOT officials in their official capacities due to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Id. at *3–6. And it denied the

2

Those claims were for negligence, gross negligence,

conversion, trespass, civil conspiracy, and violations of

Article I, § 1 and § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In their

motion to dismiss, the defendants did not specifically attack the

plausibility of any of these claims, nor did they address

whether, as a matter of law, Pennsylvania recognizes a

freestanding civil cause of action for violations of any

provisions of its constitution.

7

remaining individual-capacity claims against the PennDOT

officials under Burford abstention. Id. at *6–7.

Merritts timely appealed that final order, bringing the case

within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. Although he had counsel in District Court, Merritts

represents himself on appeal. His opening brief challenged

two facets of the District Court’s judgment. First, it invoked

the Ex parte Young exception to argue that the claims for

declaratory and injunctive relief against the PennDOT officials

should have survived dismissal. Second, it disputed the

dismissal of the § 1983 claims for damages against the

PennDOT officials in their individual capacities under Burford

abstention.

Following the briefing of those issues, we appointed amicus

counsel to argue in favor of reversing the District Court’s

judgment. With the benefit of the participation of amicus

counsel,3 the panel also requested supplemental briefing on

three topics: Rooker-Feldman, claim preclusion, and the effect

(if any) of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Knick

v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), on the

availability of sovereign immunity for federal takings claims.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Merritts’s Claims for Injunctive and

Declaratory Relief Against the PennDOT

Officials Are Not Permitted under Ex parte

Young.

Under the Ex parte Young exception, Eleventh Amendment

immunity gives way so that a state official may, under certain

conditions, be sued in federal court in his or her official

capacity by a citizen of another state for injunctive or

declaratory relief. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56

3

We express gratitude for the pro bono services contributed by

appointed amicus counsel in this case.

8

(1908); see also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,

521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997). Relying on that doctrine, Merritts

seeks to enjoin the three PennDOT officials in several respects:

from claiming ownership to his land; from physically intruding

onto the land; from denying him just compensation; and from

otherwise interfering with his property rights. Merritts also

seeks a declaratory judgment that his federal constitutional

rights have been violated. But for the Ex parte Young

exception to apply, there must be both an ongoing violation of

federal law and a request for relief that can be properly

characterized as prospective. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). Merritts’s

claims do not satisfy either of those requirements.

First, there is no ongoing violation of federal law. Merritts

pursues injunctive and declaratory relief based on two claimed

past violations of federal law: acquiring the easements without

justification and not providing just compensation. Although

those earlier actions may have present effect, that does not

mean that they are ongoing. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 277–78 (1986) (“Young has been focused on cases in

which a violation of federal law by a state official is ongoing

as opposed to cases in which federal law has been violated at

one time or over a period of time in the past . . . .”). Here, after

Merritts refused the offer of $500 for the easements, PennDOT

acquired them through a condemnation proceeding that

concluded before this lawsuit was filed. The lingering effects

of that discrete past action do not convert it into an ongoing

violation.

Second, Merritts does not request prospective relief. By

seeking an injunction to cure past injuries – PennDOT’s

alleged wrongful acquisition of the easements and the alleged

lack of just compensation – Merritts asks for a reparative

injunction. See Dan B. Dobbs & Caprice L. Roberts, Law of

Remedies § 2.9(1) (3d ed. 2018) (“The reparative injunction

requires defendant to restore plaintiff to a preexisting

entitlement.”). Such an injunction cannot be fairly

9

characterized as prospective. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651, 668 (1974) (refusing to extend Ex parte Young to claims

that amounted to monetary relief for past wrongs even when

stylized as “equitable restitution”); see also Coeur d’Alene,

521 U.S. at 287–88 (declining to apply Ex parte Young to a

request to enjoin a state from continually using and interfering

with lands). For similar reasons, Merritts’s request for a

declaratory judgment also fails to seek prospective relief. See

Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985) (“[T]he issuance of

a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would have

much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or

restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being

of course prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

Without meeting either of the Ex parte Young conditions,

the Eleventh Amendment prevents Merritts, himself a citizen

of Virginia, from bringing his claims against the PennDOT

officials in their official capacities for injunctive and

declaratory relief in federal court. See U.S. Const. amend. XI.

But Eleventh Amendment immunity is a “threshold, nonmerits

issue” that “does not entail any assumption by the court of

substantive law-declaring power,” Sinochem Int’l Co. v.

Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 433 (2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted), and a dismissal on that

basis, like dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, should normally

be without prejudice. See Aldossari ex rel. Aldossari v. Ripp,

49 F.4th 236, 262 (3d Cir. 2022). Thus, the dismissals of the

claims against Pennsylvania, PennDOT, and the PennDOT

officials in their official capacities should have been without

prejudice. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s

order of dismissal with instructions on remand to dismiss the

claims against these parties without prejudice.4

4

Because a dismissal ‘with prejudice’ is generally “an

appealable final order under § 1291,” district courts may be

drawn to that phrase to signal that a ruling on a threshold issue

10

B. The District Court Erred in Abstaining under

Burford.

The District Court relied on Burford abstention to dismiss

all of Merritts’s § 1983 claims for damages against the

PennDOT officials in their individual capacities. See generally

Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Merritts now

argues that the District Court erred in doing so. He is correct.

The District Court overextended Burford abstention,

treating it as encompassing any challenge to the exercise of a

state’s eminent domain power. Although eminent domain is

“intimately involved with sovereign prerogative,” that alone

does not suffice for Burford abstention. La. Power & Light Co.

v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959). Instead, Burford

abstention protects “complex state administrative processes

is a final, appealable order. Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med.

Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). But that practice

distances the term ‘with prejudice’ from its primary function,

which is to indicate that a judgment has preclusive effects. See

Papera v. Pa. Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607, 611 (3d

Cir. 2020) (“A dismissal with prejudice ‘operates as an

adjudication on the merits,’ so it ordinarily precludes future

claims.” (quoting Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 832–33 (3d

Cir. 1992))). And dismissals on threshold grounds, while

potentially final orders for purposes of appellate review, see

28 U.S.C. § 1291, typically should not have preclusive effects.

See Cottrell v. Alcon Lab’ys, 874 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2017);

9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2369 (4th ed. 2022) (explaining that a

“dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, as is true of various other

threshold matters, is not an adjudication of a claim’s merits and

thus dismissing with prejudice would be premature”).

Consequently, a dismissal with prejudice on a threshold ground

should ordinarily be vacated and remanded with instructions

for the claim to be dismissed without prejudice. See Aldossari,

49 F.4th at 262.

11

from undue federal interference” in two specific

circumstances: “when there are ‘difficult questions of state law

bearing on policy problems of substantial public import” or

when federal review would disrupt “state efforts to establish a

coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public

concern.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361–62 (quoting Colo. River

Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814

(1976)); see Matusow v. Trans-Cnty. Title Agency, LLC,

545 F.3d 241, 247–48 (3d Cir. 2008). But even in those

situations, abstention is still “an extraordinary and narrow

exception to the ‘virtually unflagging obligation of the federal

courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’” Ky. W. Va.

Gas Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 791 F.2d 1111, 1114 (3d

Cir. 1986) (quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817).

Consistent with that scope, Burford abstention does not

allow a federal court to dismiss claims for damages. See

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996)

(“[W]hile we have held that federal courts may stay actions for

damages based on abstention principles, we have not held that

those principles support the outright dismissal or remand of

damages actions.”). Abstention doctrines are rooted in federal

courts’ historical equitable powers, and when a federal plaintiff

prays for damages, the equitable discretion upon which

abstention rests does not permit dismissal. See County of

Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 190 (1959)

(reversing the dismissal of a just compensation claim on

abstention grounds). But cf. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30

(affirming the stay of a just compensation suit pending the

resolution of a state challenge). Because Merritts’s § 1983

claims against the PennDOT officials in their individual

capacities seek damages, they cannot be dismissed on

abstention grounds. See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 721.

12

C. Under Rooker-Feldman, Merritts’s § 1983

Claims Related to the Unlawful Acquisition of

the Easements Must Be Dismissed.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents district courts from

mistakenly relying on their original jurisdiction to engage in

appellate review of state-court orders. See Verizon, 535 U.S.

at 644 n.3 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely recognizes

that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and

does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate

jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has

reserved to [the Supreme] Court . . . .” (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257(a))); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622 (1989)

(“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine interprets 28 U.S.C. § 1257 as

ordinarily barring direct review in the lower federal courts of a

decision reached by the highest state court, for such authority

is vested solely in this Court.”). The doctrine’s namesake cases

– Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462 (1983) – supply four conditions, which, when all satisfied,

require the dismissal of a claim for lack of jurisdiction. See

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

284 (2005); Great W. Mining & Min. Corp. v. Fox Rothschild

LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (interpreting Exxon

Mobil as setting forth four Rooker-Feldman requirements for

appellate jurisdiction). Those four conditions may be

evaluated in any sequence, and an efficient approach here is to

analyze the two procedural conditions before the two

substantive conditions. See Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of

Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005). In that order, the

necessary conditions for dismissal on Rooker-Feldman

grounds are the following:

1. The federal plaintiff must lose in a

state-court judicial proceeding;

2. The state-court judgment or decree

must be rendered before the federal

action was filed;

13

3. The federal plaintiff must invite the

review and rejection of the state-court

judgment; and

4. The federal plaintiff must complain of

injuries caused by the state-court

judgment.

See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d

at 166.

For the reasons below, Merritts’s § 1983 claims for

damages premised on the allegedly unlawful acquisition of the

easements meet the four conditions for dismissal under

Rooker-Feldman, but his claims for denial of just

compensation and conspiracy to deny just compensation do

not.

1. State-Court Loser Status

One condition for Rooker-Feldman dismissal is that the

federal plaintiff must be a state-court loser. At the outset, this

requirement limits appellate jurisdiction to the review of

proceedings that were judicial in character, and not

“legislative, ministerial, or administrative” decisions.

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479. From there, as a general rule, the

federal plaintiff must be a party to such a state-court

proceeding and have received an adverse ruling. See Lance v.

Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (per curiam); Johnson v.

De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994); Vuyanich v.

Smithton Borough, 5 F.4th 379, 388 (3d Cir. 2021); cf. Karcher

v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77 (1987) (“[T]he general rule [is] that

one who is not a party or has not been treated as a party to a

judgment has no right to appeal therefrom.”). But in limited

instances, a non-party to the state-court judicial proceeding

may be a state-court loser for purposes of Rooker-Feldman.

That may occur, for example, in subpoena litigation: if a state

court rules against a non-party with respect to a subpoena, that

non-party may be a state-court loser. Cf. Union Planters Bank

Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2004). A

14

non-party can also qualify as a state-court loser in other

situations, such as in the context of successor liability when a

judgment of a state court inflicts precisely the same legal injury

on a party and a non-party who is in a position to challenge that

ruling. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 466 n.2; Vuyanich, 5 F.4th at

388. But these exceptions are not coextensive with privity

principles under res judicata, and orthodox privity with a

losing party in state-court is not an automatic proxy for status

as a state-court loser under Rooker-Feldman. See Lance,

546 U.S. at 466; see also Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp.,

349 U.S. 322, 329 & n.19 (1955) (identifying three “orthodox

categories of privies” as “those who control an action although

not parties to it . . . ; those whose interests are represented by

a party to the action . . . ; [and] successors in interest” (quoting

Restatement (First) of Judgments § 83 cmt. a (1942))).

Merritts is a state-court loser with respect to his claims for

damages under § 1983 premised on PennDOT’s allegedly

unlawful acquisition of the easements. The in rem

condemnation action qualifies as a state-court judicial

proceeding. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 477 (“A judicial inquiry

investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on

present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.”

(quoting Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226

(1908))). And PennDOT prevailed in that proceeding – it

obtained title to and a writ of possession for the two easements

that it previously lacked. Although that was an in rem action

to which Merritts was not a party, it still determined the status

of his property with respect to all possible interest holders,

including him as owner. See Restatement (First) of Judgments

§§ 2, 73; see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877)

(“The law assumes that property is always in the possession of

its owner . . . .”). Since the state-court ruling in favor of

PennDOT in the in rem action had the same legal consequences

for Merritts as for his property, he qualifies as a state-court

loser for purposes of his § 1983 claims that are premised on the

unlawful acquisition of the easements. See Dorce v. City of

New York, 2 F.4th 82, 102 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Someone who loses

15

an ownership interest in property through a state in rem

foreclosure proceeding against the property has lost in state

court.”).

But Merritts is not a state-court loser with respect to his

just-compensation and conspiracy-to-deny-just-compensation

claims. Those claims hinge on a denial of just compensation,5

and because the obligation to provide such compensation arises

upon a taking, these claims actually depend on the correctness

of the judgment in the condemnation action. See Knick, 139 S.

Ct. at 2172 (“[A] property owner acquires an irrevocable right

to just compensation immediately upon a taking.”). Also, as a

matter of Pennsylvania procedure, just compensation cannot be

adjudicated in a condemnation proceeding. See 26 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 306(b) (“Issues of compensation may not be raised by

preliminary objections.”); In re Right of Way for State Route

79, 798 A.2d at 731 (reserving issues of compensation for “the

second distinct proceeding,” the inverse condemnation action

(quoting W. Whiteland Assocs., 690 A.2d at 1268)). Because

the state-court ruling in the condemnation proceeding did not

(and could not) resolve any just compensation claims, Merritts

cannot be a state-court loser with respect to those claims.6

5

Conspiracy under § 1983 is not a freestanding claim, cf.

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), but only a means of establishing

vicarious liability over a person who, absent the conspiracy,

would not be acting under color of state law. See In re

Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 789

(3d Cir. 1999). Thus, Merritts cannot succeed on his § 1983

claim alleging a conspiracy to deny just compensation without

establishing a denial of just compensation. See Dondero v.

Lower Milford Twp., 5 F.4th 355, 362 n.1 (3d Cir. 2021).

6

Another consequence of the inability to adjudicate just-

compensation claims in the condemnation action is that those

claims are not precluded under Pennsylvania law. See Balent

v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. 1995) (“Res

judicata applies not only to claims actually litigated, but also

16

Without satisfying this condition, Rooker-Feldman does not

require the dismissal of the § 1983 claims against the

individual-capacity defendants related to just compensation.7

to claims which could have been litigated during the first

proceeding if they were part of the same cause of action.”);

Wilmington Tr., Nat’l Ass’n v. Unknown Heirs, 219 A.3d 1173,

1179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (“Under the doctrine of res

judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second

suit on the same cause of action or one that could have been

brought in the prior action.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738;

Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542,

548 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In determining the applicability of

principles of res judicata, we must give the same preclusive

effect to the judgment in the common pleas court case that the

courts in Pennsylvania, the state in which the judgment was

entered, would give.”).

7

The holding that these claims are not jurisdictionally

foreclosed by Rooker-Feldman does not validate the legal

viability of just-compensation claims under § 1983 against

individual-capacity defendants who did not personally acquire

any interests in the property taken. That is an open question in

this Circuit and one on which other courts have reached

different conclusions. Compare Asociación de Subscripción

Conjunta del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio v. Flores

Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2007) (declining to

exclude individual-capacity suits for denial of just

compensation from the reach of § 1983 despite a recognition

that the amount of liability in such suits would be “ruinous and

probably uncollectible”), with Vicory v. Walton, 730 F.2d 466,

467 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding no support for the contention “that

an individual may commit, and be liable in damages for, a

‘taking’ under the fifth amendment”). That issue, along with

qualified immunity and the type of damages available for

individual-capacity just compensation claims, if actionable

under § 1983, see generally Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,

17

2. Prior State-Court Judgment

Another necessary condition for dismissal under Rooker-

Feldman is that the federal suit must have been filed after the

state-court judgment or decree was rendered. See Lance,

546 U.S. at 460; Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166. This

Circuit, like others, has required an “effectively final” state-

court judgment to precede the federal suit. Malhan v. Sec’y

U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 459 (3d Cir. 2019); see

generally RLR Invs., LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, 4 F.4th 380,

400–01 (6th Cir. 2021) (Clay, J., dissenting) (collecting cases

from other circuits adopting the same approach).8 And at the

time of this suit, the state-court judgment in the in rem action

had become effectively final because the time to appeal in state

court had expired. See Malhan, 938 F.3d at 459. Merritts had

until March 28, 2018, to appeal the order of the

Commonwealth Court to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and

259 (1978) (explaining that remedies for violations of

constitutional rights “should be tailored to the interests

protected by the particular right in question” and allowing only

nominal damages), remain for the parties to address in the first

instance in District Court.

8

The ‘effectively final’ standard functions as a waive-or-

exhaust rule for federal claims in state courts, such that a state-

court judgment becomes effectively final in three scenarios:

(i) the highest state court has issued a terminal ruling, see

Malhan, 938 F.3d at 459; (ii) a lower state court has issued a

ruling for which the time to appeal has expired, or the parties

have voluntarily terminated the case, see id.; or (iii) all

questions of federal law have been resolved by the highest state

court, notwithstanding any surviving state law or factual

issues, see id. at 459–60; see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,

420 U.S. 469, 477–83 (1975) (treating as final for purposes of

§ 1257 four categories of cases “in which the highest court of

a State has finally determined the federal issue present in a

particular case, but in which there are further proceedings in

the lower state courts to come”).

18

he missed that deadline. See In re Condemnation by Dep’t of

Transportation, of Right-Of-Way for State Route 0022, Section

034 in Twp. of Frankstown v. Commonwealth, 194 A.3d 722,

737 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018) (order issued Feb. 26, 2018); Pa.

R. App. P. 1113(a) (providing 30 days to appeal a

Commonwealth Court judgment). Months after the expiration

of that appeal period, on October 22, 2018, he commenced this

federal action. At that time, the state-court judgment was

effectively final.9 See Malhan, 938 F.3d at 459.

3. The Invitation to Review and Reject a

State-Court Judgment

Dismissal under Rooker-Feldman also requires that the

claim invite review and rejection of a state-court ruling.

See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; In re Phila. Ent. & Dev.

Partners, 879 F.3d 492, 503 (3d Cir. 2018). This condition is

satisfied for claims that seek “to determine whether [the state

court] reached its result in accordance with law,” Great W.

Mining, 615 F.3d at 169 (quoting Bolden v. City of Topeka,

441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006)), or “to have the state-

court decisions undone or declared null and void,” Geness v.

Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 360 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Great W.

Mining, 615 F.3d at 173). See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416

(holding that a federal district court did not have jurisdiction to

adjudicate a constitutional challenge to a state-court judgment

because to declare the state-court order void would require “an

exercise of appellate jurisdiction,” and district courts possess

“strictly original” jurisdiction).

9

This conclusion is not altered by the later out-of-time petition

that Merritts made to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on

October 17, 2019. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

allows nunc pro tunc petitions in limited circumstances,

see Pa. R. App. P. 1113(d), the possibility of such a filing does

not change the effective finality of the Commonwealth Court’s

order. See Malhan, 938 F.3d at 459.

19

Merritts’s § 1983 claims premised on allegations that

PennDOT unlawfully acquired the easements satisfy this

condition because they seek review and rejection of the

judgment in the condemnation proceeding. Each of those

claims – for an unlawful taking, an illegal seizure, and

deprivation of property without substantive or procedural due

process – depends on PennDOT lacking title to and possession

of the easements. For example, if PennDOT had those

property interests, it could not take them unlawfully. Likewise,

it could not illegally seize a property interest that it already

possessed. Nor could PennDOT deprive Merritts of a property

interest that he did not own without due process. But contrary

to the premise of those claims, PennDOT legally acquired the

easements through the condemnation proceeding. Thus, for

any of those claims to succeed, the District Court would have

to review and reject the legality of the judgment in the

condemnation proceeding.

4. Legal Injuries Caused by the State-

Court Judgment

The final condition for Rooker-Feldman dismissal is that a

federal plaintiff must complain of a legal injury caused by the

state-court ruling. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; Great W.

Mining, 615 F.3d at 166. And for Merritts’s unlawful-

acquisition claims under § 1983, the source of his legal injury

is the judgment in the condemnation proceedings. As a result

of that ruling, PennDOT acquired title to and possession of the

two easements. Accordingly, a judicial ruling, not a prior

independent action by PennDOT or its officials, caused

Merritts’s legal injuries related to the acquisition of the

easements. Thus, this condition, like the three before it, is

satisfied for Merritts’s unlawful-acquisition claims, and they

should have been jurisdictionally dismissed without prejudice.

See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 433.

20

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District

Court’s judgment, and we will remand to the District Court

with instructions to adjudicate the just-compensation-related

§ 1983 claims for damages against the PennDOT officials in

their individual capacities and to dismiss all other claims

without prejudice.

21