“[A] judge acting in his or her judicial capacity—i.e., performing a ‘function normally performed by a judge’—is immune from suit on all judicial acts, as long as the judge was not acting in the complete absence of jurisdiction.” (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12)
How later courts described this case
- “[A] judge acting in his or her judicial capacity—i.e., performing a ‘function normally performed by a judge’—is immune from suit on all judicial acts, as long as the judge was not acting in the complete absence of jurisdiction.” (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12)
- describing a long line of Supreme Court precedents that have found “judge[s] . . . immune from . . . suit for money damages”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FELICIA BINION WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 23-312 (RDM)
v.
BERYL A. HOWELL, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Felicia
Williams’s nearly one-thousand-page complaint against two United States District Court Judges,
Dkt. 5, as well as Williams’s motion to remand this case to Superior Court, Dkt. 4. The Court
will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 5, and will DENY Williams’s motion to
remand, Dkt. 4.
Williams’s complaint must be dismissed for several reasons. Most basically, the Court
cannot discern the nature of Williams’s claim from the complaint that she filed, although she
does appear to be seeking damages. Dkt. 1-1 at 1 (requesting $10,001 in damages). The
complaint is for the most part comprised of various unlabeled documents that Williams has
annotated by hand. See generally id. Her annotations reference matters such as copyright law,
workplace harassment, the Merit Systems Protection Board, whistleblowers, the FDA, due
process of law, fraud, and other assorted terms. Although pleadings by pro se litigants such as
Williams are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), they must still comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon
which the Court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Rule is designed to “give the defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Williams’s complaint does not comply with Rule 8. It offers no intelligible description of
the factual basis for her claims, what injuries she allegedly suffered, and why she is entitled to
the relief she seeks. Even construed liberally, Williams’s allegations, such as they are, leave the
Court and Defendants in the dark. Put another way, Williams has not given Defendants or the
Court adequate notice regarding the claims she intends to assert, because her complaint lacks “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).
Even if the nature of Williams’s claims was more apparent, dismissal would still likely be
in order under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judicial immunity extends to “all actions taken
in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless the[ ] actions are taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.” Sindra v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991) (describing a long line of Supreme Court precedents that have found
“judge[s] . . . immune from . . . suit for money damages”). Here, Williams’s complaint
repeatedly references another action in which she is involved and over which Defendant Judge
Contreras is presiding, Williams v. Department of Health and Human Services et al., Civil
Action No. 22-1084 (RC). See, e.g., Dkt. 1-1 at 4, 22, 29 (Compl.). Thus, venturing a guess, the
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Court infers that Williams is seeking relief against Judge Contreras for actions he took or did not
take in his judicial capacity. As such, Judge Contreras is entitled to absolute immunity. See
Jenkins v. Kerry, 928 F. Supp. 2d 122, 134 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[A] judge acting in his or her
judicial capacity—i.e., performing a ‘function normally performed by a judge’—is immune from
suit on all judicial acts, as long as the judge was not acting in the complete absence of
jurisdiction.” (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12)). Although the basis for Williams’s action
against Chief Judge Howell is even more elusive, it appears that she may be attempting to hold
Chief Judge Howell liable based on a mistaken belief that, as Chief Judge, Judge Howell
supervises Judge Contreras. If that is what Williams has in mind, Chief Judge Howell is also
entitled to immunity.
The Court must also deny Williams’s motion to remand. Dkt. 4. Defendants properly
removed the action to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because they are federal officers
(apparently) being sued in their official capacities, see Jefferson Cty, Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423,
431 (1999).
The Court will, accordingly, GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 5, and will
DISMISS Williams’s Complaint, Dkt. 1-1, without prejudice. The Court will also DENY
Williams’s motion to remand, Dkt. 4.
A separate order will issue.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: March 6, 2023
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