The opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
LISA CROFT, DOCKET NUMBER
Appellant, SF-1221-16-0254-W-1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DATE: February 23, 2023
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1
Steven Granberg, Esquire, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the appellant.
Adam A. Chandler, Washington, D.C., for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
denied her request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA) for
whistleblower retaliation. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in
the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
1
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
this Final Order to clarify that the appellant failed to prove, by preponderant
evidence, that she made any protected disclosure, we AFFIRM the initial
decision. We VACATE the administrative judge’s alternative finding that the
agency proved it would have taken the same actions in the absence of the
appellant’s disclosures.
¶2 In the instant whistleblower retaliation appeal, the appellant alleged that she
made several protected disclosures. E.g., Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1
at 19-20, Tab 26 at 7-8, Tab 42, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-3. Though organized
differently below, we will organize these disclosures based on their content to
ensure clarity of the issues involved.
¶3 In Disclosure (1), the appellant reportedly disclosed that her first -level
supervisor at the time, the Pacific Islands Regional Office (PIRO) Regional
Administrator (RA), was orchestrating a number of budget irregularities or
improprieties. IAF, Tab 1 at 19, Tab 6 at 6-9, Tab 26 at 7. The appellant alleged
that she made this disclosure on several occasions between July 2012 and
December 2013. IAF, Tab 1 at 19, Tab 6 at 6-9, Tab 26 at 7. The recipients were
her second-level supervisor, the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Operations
3
(DAAO), and a Chief Financial Officer (CFO). IAF, Tab 1 at 19, Tab 6 at 6-9,
Tab 26 at 7.
¶4 In Disclosure (2), the appellant reportedly disclosed that her first -level
supervisor at the time, the PIRO RA, was engaging in or condoning intimidating,
threatening, and aggressive behavior toward her. IAF, Tab 1 at 19, Tab 6 at 6-9,
Tab 26 at 7-8. The appellant alleged that she made this disclosure to her
second-level supervisor, the DAAO, in July 2012. IAF, Tab 1 at 19, Tab 6 at 6-9,
Tab 26 at 7-8.
¶5 In Disclosure (3), the appellant reportedly disclosed that her first -level
supervisor at the time, the PIRO RA, intended to violate the Endangered Species
Act, Federal regulations, and agency policy as it related to recovery actions f or
false killer whales. IAF, Tab 1 at 20, Tab 6 at 6, 9-11, Tab 26 at 8. The appellant
alleged that she made this disclosure to her second-level supervisor, the DAAO,
in or around December 2013. IAF, Tab 1 at 20, Tab 6 at 6, 9-11, Tab 26 at 8.
¶6 Because of the aforementioned disclosures, the appellant alleged that she
suffered various retaliatory personnel actions. IAF, Tab 6 at 11-12, Tab 26
at 8-9. Personnel Action (1) was her February 2014 reassignment from the
position of Fisheries Administrator to the position of Fisheries Program
Specialist, which the agency characterized as a product of the appellant’s
misconduct. IAF, Tab 1 at 10-11, Tab 26 at 8. Personnel Action (2) was the
appellant’s 2014 performance rating. IAF, Tab 26 at 9. Personnel Action (3) was
the appellant’s relocation from Hawaii to Maryland, which the agency
characterized as inexorably linked to the aforementioned reassignment , delayed to
accommodate the appellant’s medical needs. IAF, Tab 26 at 9, Tab 40 at 7.
¶7 After exhausting her administrative remedies with the Office of Special
Counsel (OSC), the appellant filed the instant IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 1. The
administrative judge found that the appellant established jurisdiction and, as a
result, held the requested hearing. IAF, Tab 39, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD).
However, he denied corrective action, finding that the appellant failed to prove
4
that she made any protected disclosures. ID at 7-14. Alternatively, the
administrative judge found that if the appellant had met her bu rden of proof, the
agency proved that it would have taken the same personnel actions,
notwithstanding the disclosures. ID at 14-24. The appellant has filed a petition
for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3. The agency has filed a
response. PFR File, Tab 5.
¶8 Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), the
Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has exhausted her
administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that
(1) she made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
(C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor
in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5
(2016). A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an
allegation of facts that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a
matter that a reasonable person in her position would believe evidenced one of
the categories of wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id., ¶ 6. The
test to determine whether a whistleblower has a reasonable belief in the
disclosure is an objective one: whether a disinterested observer with knowledge
of the essential facts known to and readily ascertain able by the employee could
reasonably conclude that the actions of the agency evidenced a violation of law,
rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. Id.
¶9 If an appellant establishes jurisdiction over her IRA appeal, she is entitled
to a hearing on the merits of her claim, which she must prove by preponderant
evidence. Id., ¶ 5. If the appellant proves that a protected disclosure or protected
activity was a contributing factor in a personnel action taken against her, the
agency is given an opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it
5
would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected
disclosure or activity. Id.
The appellant failed to prove that Disclosure (1) was protected.
¶10 As previously discussed, Disclosure (1) reportedly involved budget
irregularities or improprieties orchestrated by the PIRO RA. Supra ¶ 3. The
appellant described these improprieties in a number of different ways, with
varying degrees of specificity. IAF, Tab 1 at 19, Tab 6 at 6-9, Tab 26 at 7-8. She
appears to acknowledge that there is no documentary evidenc e of these
disclosures—the appellant alleges that they occurred during personal
conversations. E.g., IAF, Tab 6 at 6.
¶11 Although the appellant alleged that there were two recipients of
Disclosure (1), the DAAO and a CFO, only the DAAO testified at the hea ring.
See, e.g., IAF, Tab 21 at 9-10, Tab 26 at 7. The administrative judge found that
the DAAO provided specific and credible testimony contrary to the appellant’s
allegations. ID at 10-11 (citing HCD (testimony of the DAAO)). The DAAO
testified that the parties discussed budgetary issues, generally, as was customary
for their positions, but the appellant never disclosed any improprieties. Id. He
further testified that he heard of no budget irregularities secondhand, through the
other alleged recipient of Disclosure (1), the CFO. Id. The administrative judge
also found that, even when considering the appellant’s testimony on the matter,
she failed to show that she raised specific matters that a reasonable person in her
position would believe evidenced one of the categories of wrongdoing specified
in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). ID at 11-13 (citing HCD (testimony of the appellant)).
¶12 On review, the appellant argues that, based on her experience and training,
she had a reasonable and good faith belief regarding “concerns she was raising.”
PFR File, Tab 3 at 6. We find the argument unavailing. In concluding that
Disclosure (1) was not protected, the administrative judge made complete
credibility findings based, in part, on the demeanor of the witnesses. See Hillen
v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987) (identifying some of the
6
relevant credibility factors in assessing witness testimony). The appellant has not
identified any basis for us to disturb those well-reasoned findings.
The appellant failed to prove that Disclosure (2) was protected.
¶13 On appeal, the appellant described Disclosure (2) as involving an abuse of
authority in the form of “intimidation, threats, aggressive and violent behavior”
by the PIRO RA and one of the appellant’s subordinates. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 6
at 7-9. Her initial complaint to OSC used similar language. IAF, Tab 1 at 19, 25,
Tab 6 at 6-9, Tab 26 at 7-8.
¶14 The Board has recognized that an abuse of authority occurs when there is an
arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a Federal official or employee that
adversely affects the rights of any person or that results in personal gain or
advantage to himself or to preferred other persons. Mithen v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 489, ¶ 27 (2015), aff’d per curiam, 652 F. App’x
971 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Harassment or intimidation of employees may constitute an
abuse of authority. Herman v. Department of Justice, 115 M.S.P.R. 386, ¶ 11
(2011).
¶15 The appellant asserted that she disclosed “intimidation, threats, aggressive
and violent behavior.” E.g., IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 6 at 7-9. Specifically, she
alleged that the PIRO RA harassed and intimidated her, yelled and abused his
authority, engaged in unprofessional and disrespectful behavior, and made
inappropriate remarks about other employees “that violated [equal employment
opportunity law].” IAF, Tab 22 at 64-65. The appellant went on to provide
particular examples of this behavior. She alleged that the PIRO RA once
screamed and instructed her to tell some official partners to “f * off” during a
telephone call; he took home leftover food from an event—food that generally
would have been made available to office staff; he made inappropriate jokes and
comments, such as referring to certain individuals as “those kind of people” and
“little brown people”; he informed the appellant of a complaint lodged against her
and indicated that it reflected poorly on him; and he initially denied a reasonable
7
accommodation request she made, claiming she needed to be in the office due to
the “‘accusations’ circling around.” 2 Id.
¶16 In a prehearing conference summary, the administrative judge advised the
appellant that Disclosure (2) did not appear to be protected, but he did not
altogether dismiss it as nonfrivolous. IAF, Tab 26 at 8. Instead, he allowed the
appellant to further develop the matter at the hearing. IAF, Tab 41 at 5; HCD
(testimony of the appellant and the DAAO). Nevertheless, the initial decision
appears to conclude that the appellant failed to meet the nonfrivol ous standard for
Disclosure (2). 3 ID at 7. On review, the appellant argues that the administrative
judge failed to adequately consider witness testimony describing the PIRO RA’s
behavior as unprofessional. PFR File, Tab 3 at 6, 38-41. We are not persuaded.
¶17 The appellant has not identified any evidence that appears particularly
relevant to her burden concerning Disclosure (2). IAF, Tab 41 at 5; PFR File,
Tab 3 at 6. In fact, the appellant has referred to testimony from the alleged
recipient, the DAAO, but that individual characterized their discussions as
including allegations of rudeness, abruptness, and condescensio n—he did not
describe discussions of specific acts that might rise to the level of an abuse of
authority. See, e.g., PFR File, Tab 3 at 6, 27-28, HCD (testimony of the DAAO).
The appellant’s own testimony was similarly imprecise. HCD (testimony of
the appellant).
2
Concerning the reasonable accommodation request, the appellant alleged that the
PIRO RA’s initial response was to say “no” and suggest that she should come in to the
office via “the old people’s bus.” HCD (testimony of the appellant). However, she
further explained that the request was ultimately granted, after she submitted the
relevant paperwork to the agency’s reasonable accommodation office. Id.
3
We find that the more appropriate disposition is to conclude that the appellant failed
to meet her burden to prove that she made a protected disclosure by preponderant
evidence. See Bradley v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 6
(2016) (explaining that doubt or ambiguity as to whether the appellant made
nonfrivolous jurisdictional allegations should be resolved in favo r of finding
jurisdiction). We modify the initial decision accordingly.
8
¶18 Under the circumstances, we agree with the administrative judge’s
conclusion that the appellant failed to prove that Disclosure (2) was protected. ID
at 7. She failed to show that she disclosed specific actions that rose to the level
of an abuse of authority. Cf. Mithen v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
119 M.S.P.R. 215, ¶ 15 (2013) (finding that an employee had a reasonable belief
that he was disclosing an abuse of authority when he disclosed that a nonfederal
employee had veto power over the selection of an individual for a Federal
position); Herman, 115 M.S.P.R. 386, ¶ 11 (finding that a disinterested observer
could reasonably conclude that a supervisor’s specific threat to an employee’s
career constituted an abuse of authority).
The appellant failed to prove that Disclosure (3) was protected.
¶19 As relevant background to Disclosure (3), the record includes evidence that
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) petitioned t he agency to list the
false killer whale as “an endangered species and designate critical habitat to
ensure its recovery pursuant to . . . the Endangered Species Act.” IAF, Tab 22
at 33-38. Following a period of agency inaction, the NRDC warned that it
intended to bring legal action. Id. at 39-41. In May 2012, the NRDC followed
through, filing a complaint in Federal court. Id. at 46-48. According to the
appellant, the species was ultimately listed as endangered in November 2012. 4
IAF, Tab 6 at 10. She further asserts that, to attempt to follow the law and avoid
further conflict with the NRDC, she signed off on a Federal Register notice
pertaining to a recovery outline in September 2013. Id. at 10, 37-38. She did so
while serving as the acting PIRO RA. Id. at 10. When the actual PIRO RA
learned of this, in October 2013, he reportedly responded to her with hostility,
asserting that he had no intention of ever doing a recovery plan for the false killer
whale and that the appellant should not have signed off on the Federal Register
4
The record includes additional background information concerning false killer whales
and the agency’s role in protecting them. E.g., IAF, Tab 25 at 44-52.
9
notice. Id. at 11, 36. According to the appellant, she disclosed that response to
the DAAO, and that was Disclosure (3). E.g., id. at 6.
¶20 While testifying at the hearing, the PIRO RA explained his discussion with
the appellant by indicating that, while he would eventually need to, he had no
immediate plan to put forth the recovery plan due to limited resources. ID at 13;
HCD (testimony of the PIRO RA). The administrative judge found that, at best,
the appellant disclosed that the PIRO RA did not intend to comply with the
agency’s “Interim Endangered and Threatened Species Recovery Planning
Guidance” (Recovery Guidance) at some point in the future—she did not disclose
that he already had failed to comply with it or any law, rule, or regulation. ID
at 13-14; IAF, Tab 22 at 51, 53. The appellant has essentially conceded that
point, acknowledging that the relevant discussion she had with the PIRO RA
occurred in October 2013. IAF, Tab 6 at 9-11, Tab 22 at 67; PFR File, Tab 3
at 9-10. At that time, the deadline for putting forth a recovery plan was still
6 months away. IAF, Tab 22 at 53.
¶21 On review, the appellant alleges that 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) should be
interpreted to include not only violations of law, rule, or regulation, but also any
expressed intent to violate a law, rule, or regulation. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10.
However, she has failed to identify any persuasive reasoning for interpreting the
statute in that way, contrary to its plain language. See Pirkkala v. Department of
Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶ 7 (2016) (observing that the starting point for
statutory construction is the language of the statute itself, which, if clear, must
control absent plainly expressed legislative intent to the contrary). Alternatively,
the appellant alleges that her disclosure should qualify as a disclosure of an abuse
of authority. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10. For similar reasons, this argument is
unavailing. The appellant has not met her burden of proving that she reasonably
believed Disclosure (3) reflected an abuse of authority, which, by definition,
includes an actual exercise of power with an actual affect. See supra ¶ 14. In any
event, given that the deadline for submitting a recovery plan was still 6 months
10
away, we conclude that the appellant’s stated belief that wrongdoing would occur
is too speculative to warrant protection. See Schoenig v. Department of Justice,
120 M.S.P.R. 318, ¶ 10 (2013) (finding that disclosure of an imminent event may
constitute disclosure of a substantial and specific danger, but disclosure of a
speculative danger does not).
We vacate the administrative judge’s alternative finding.
¶22 The administrative judge found that, even if the appellant met her burden of
establishing a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, the agency met its
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
same personnel actions notwithstanding the disclosures . ID at 14-24. Because
we have found that the appellant failed to prove that she made a protected
disclosure, it is unnecessary to determine whether the agency proved by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have taken the actions at issue in the absence
of the disclosure. See Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R.
154, ¶ 19 n.10 (2014), aff’d per curiam, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, we vacate the administrative judge’s findings concerning whether
the agency met its clear and convincing burden. As a result, we will not address
the appellant’s arguments pertaining to this finding. 5 PFR File, Tab 3 at 11-25.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
5
We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
6
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
11
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriat e for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applica ble to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choice s of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
12
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
13
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regu lar U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your
7
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
14
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
15
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.