Opinion

Raymond Slayton v. Department of Agriculture

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Feb 23, 2023
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 22.7%

affirming a removal of a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department employee based on a charge of improper personal conduct involving an off-duty consensual affair with the spouse of a deployed military officer

How later courts described this case

affirming a removal of a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department employee based on a charge of improper personal conduct involving an off-duty consensual affair with the spouse of a deployed military officer

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

RAYMOND SLAYTON, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, SF-0752-17-0370-I-1

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DATE: February 23, 2023

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Jennifer Duke Isaacs, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

Julie Rook Gold, Esquire, and Kevin L. Owen, Esquire, Silver Spring,

Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

reversed the appellant’s removal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT

the agency’s petition for review, REVERSE the administrative judge’s finding

that the agency failed to establish a nexus between the sustained misconduct and

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

the efficiency of the service, FIND that the agency established nexus by

preponderant evidence and that the penalty of removal is within the tolerable

limits of reasonableness, and SUSTAIN the appellant’s removal.

¶2 The appellant was removed for conduct unbecoming a Federal employee

after intimately touching a female coworker without her consent while they were

both off-duty in the appellant’s apartment, which, due to the remote nature of the

worksite at the Tongass National Forest in Thorne Bay, Alaska, was leased from

the agency and which was located on property owned by the agency. Initial

Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 16, 24-25, 76, 100-04; Hearing Transcript Day 1

(HT-1) at 66; Hearing Transcript Day 2 (HT-2) at 43, 46. The appellant appealed

his removal to the Board. IAF, Tab 1. After holding a hearing, the administrative

judge issued a November 29, 2017 initial decision finding that, although the

agency proved its charge by preponderant evidence, it failed to p rove that a nexus

existed between the sustained misconduct and the efficiency of the service. IAF,

Tab 26, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-12, 20-24. Accordingly, she reversed the

appellant’s removal and ordered the agency to provide interim relief in

accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A) if either party filed a petition for

review. ID at 24-26.

¶3 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision arguing that

the administrative judge erred in finding that it failed to establish the required

nexus. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 7. It also argues that the removal

penalty was reasonable. Id. The appellant has filed a response to the agency’s

petition for review, to which the agency has replied. PFR File, Tabs 9-10.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The agency is in compliance with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.

¶4 With its request for an extension of time to file a petition for review, the

agency submitted a certification of its compliance with the interim relief order.

PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-21. The agency filed a December 20, 2017 letter

instructing the appellant to return to work on January 2, 2018, a Standard

Form 52 requesting the appellant’s interim appointment to his former GS-9

Biological Science Technician position with an effective date of November 29,

2017, and timesheets reflecting the appellant’s administrative leave pay status

from November 29, 2017, through the date of the agency’s submission. Id. The

agency asserts that, although the appellant was appointed to a different duty

location, a return to his prior duty station would be unduly disruptive because his

position at the prior location was abolished. Id. at 17.

¶5 In response to the agency’s petition for review, the appellant, among other

things, challenges the agency’s compliance with the interim relief order.

PFR File, Tab 9 at 6-8. Specifically, he argues that the agency’s contention that

his prior position at the prior location was abolished is “demonstrably false,” the

agency failed to restore his forest protection officer (FPO) status, it restricted his

ability to perform his job duties by limiting his access to a certain computer

network drive, and it only provided funding for his position for 20 days. 2 Id.

¶6 We find that the agency has proven that it complied with the administrative

judge’s interim relief order. The Board has held that an interim relief order

generally requires that an appellant be returned to the position from which he was

separated, effective as of the date of the initial decision, unless the agency

determines that this action would unduly disrupt the work environment. Chavies

v. Department of the Navy, 104 M.S.P.R. 81, ¶ 4, n.1 (2006). Here, it is

Following the agency’s reply to the appellant’s response to its petition for review, the

appellant filed a motion for leave to file a surreply. PFR File, Tab 12. Such a pleading

is generally not allowed absent approval by the Office of the Clerk of the Board based

upon a party’s motion describing the nature of and need for the pleading. See Martin v.

U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 8 n.1 (2016); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5).

Here, although the appellant argues that a surreply is necessary to address the agency’s

“mischaracterizations” of the interim relief order and to “clarify” his allegations

concerning the agency’s failure to provide interim relief, he has not contended that the

agency failed to reinstate him. PFR File, Tab 12 at 4. As explained below, the agency

provided proper certification that it reinstated the appellant and made an undue

disruption determination regarding his duty location consistent with the interim relief

order and 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A). Thus, we discern no need for this additional

pleading. Accordingly, the appellant’s motion for leave to file a surreply is denied.

undisputed that the agency returned the appellant to his GS-9 Biological Science

Technician position and that the agency made an undue disruption determination

with respect to his duty location. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17-19. Such relief is

consistent with 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A), (B). See Costin v. Department of

Health and Human Services, 72 M.S.P.R. 525, 533 (1996) (confirming that an

agency may, as part of an undue disruption determination, detail, assign, and

transfer an employee to a different duty location). Further, it is well settled that

the Board lacks the authority to review the merits of the agency’s undue

disruption determination. King v. Jerome, 42 F.3d 1371, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir.

1994); Parbs v. U.S. Postal Service, 107 M.S.P.R. 559, ¶ 6 (2007), aff’d, 301 F.

App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Byers v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

89 M.S.P.R. 655, ¶ 5 (2001). Thus, the Board may not consider the appellant’s

claim that the basis of the agency’s undue disruption determination is

“demonstrably false.”

¶7 The appellant’s remaining arguments amount to an assertion that the agency

has not provided status quo ante relief. PFR File, Tab 9 at 6 -8. Interim relief is

not intended as a status quo ante remedy. See Parbs, 107 M.S.P.R. 559, ¶ 6;

Moreno v. Department of the Air Force, 61 M.S.P.R. 396, 398 (1994) (explaining

that interim relief is intended to preserve only a limited aspect of the employment

relationship by prospectively returning the appellant to duty and pay status from

the date of the initial decision). Because the record reflects that the agency

returned the appellant to duty in a pay status in the same position he previously

held and made an undue disruption determination regarding his duty location, we

find that the agency complied with the interim relief order. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 7701(b)(2)(A),(B); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.111(c)(1).

The agency proved that a nexus exists between the sustained misconduct and the

efficiency of the service.

¶8 As explained above, the administrative judge reversed the appellant’s

removal based on her finding that the agency failed to establish a nexus between

the appellant’s off-duty misconduct and the efficiency of the service. ID

at 20-24. The nexus requirement, for purposes of whether an agency has shown

that its action promotes the efficiency of the service, means there must be a clear

and direct relationship between the articulated grounds fo r an adverse action and

either the employee’s ability to accomplish his duties satisfactorily or some other

legitimate government interest. Scheffler v. Department of the Army,

117 M.S.P.R. 499, ¶ 9 (2012), aff’d, 522 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2013). An

agency may show a nexus between off-duty misconduct and the efficiency of the

service by three means: (1) a rebuttable presumption in certain egregious

circumstances; (2) preponderant evidence that the misconduct adversely affects

the appellant’s or coworkers’ job performance or the agency’s trust and

confidence in the appellant’s job performance; or (3) preponderant evidence that

the misconduct interfered with or adversely affected the agency’s mission. Id.,

¶ 10; Kruger v. Department of Justice, 32 M.S.P.R. 71, 74 (1987).

¶9 Examples of misconduct so egregious as to create a rebuttable presumption

of nexus include drug trafficking and child molestation. See Brook v. Corrado,

999 F.2d 523, 527-28 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Allred v. Department of Health and

Human Services, 786 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The administrative

judge found that the appellant’s misconduct was not so egregious as to create a

presumption of nexus. ID at 20-21. The agency does not challenge this finding

on review, and we discern no reason to disturb it. PFR File, Tab 7.

¶10 Regarding the third means of establishing nexus—that the misconduct

interfered with or adversely affected the agency’s mission —the Board has held

that, absent a finding that the conduct was directly opposed to the agency’s

mission, a finding that the conduct was contrary to the agency’s culture and

values does not warrant a finding of nexus. See Scheffler, 117 M.S.P.R. 499,

¶ 12. In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the agency failed

to offer any evidence to establish that the appellant’s off -duty misconduct

interfered with or adversely affected the agency’s mission. ID at 21. The agency

similarly does not challenge this finding on review, and we discern no reason to

disturb it. PFR File, Tab 7.

¶11 Regarding the second means of establishing nexus—preponderant evidence

that the misconduct adversely affects the appellant’s or coworkers’ job

performance or the agency’s trust and confidence in the appellant’s job

performance—the administrative judge concluded that there was no evidence that

the appellant’s or the female coworker’s performance was adversely affected by

the off-duty misconduct and that the deciding official’s conclusion that he lost

confidence in being able to place the appellant in a remote setting was

undermined by the fact that the appellant was reassigned to another remote

setting. ID at 22-23. We disagree with the administrative judge’s analysis.

¶12 The female employee testified that she was uncomfortable around the

appellant, that she “didn’t even feel safe just being in the bunkhouse across the

street from him,” and that she was placed on administrative leave and effectively

paid for a week of work without having to perform any duties. HT-1 at 34-37.

She also testified that, although her appointment expired shortly after the

incident, she would not return to Alaska because she physically would not feel

comfortable there and that she “lost interest in working for the agency” as a result

of the incident. HT-1 at 45-46. Thus, the appellant’s misconduct had an adverse

impact on the female coworker’s job performance. Concerning the appellant’s

performance, following the incident, the agency placed him on administrative

leave and then reassigned him to a position 50 miles away. HT-1 at 86. This

reassignment had an impact on his job performance, as he took on a new position

at a new duty location. Additionally, this reassignment to a new location supports

the deciding official’s statement that he lost trust in the appellant’s ability to

perform his duties in the same remote location. IAF, Tab 8 at 32-33; HT-2 at 49,

70.

¶13 Moreover, because of the nature of their work, agency employees often

reside on its property in apartments leased from the agency in c lose proximity to

one another. IAF, Tab 8 at 31; HT-2 at 43, 46. We conclude that the appellant’s

off-duty misconduct, which involved inappropriate and unwanted sexual contact

with a coworker, could negatively impact how agency employees live and work in

this setting. See Doe v. National Security Agency, 6 M.S.P.R. 555, 562 (1981)

(stating that the deleterious effect of the misconduct at issue on the efficiency of

the service may be either presently existent or reasonably foreseeable) , aff’d sub

nom. Stalans v. National Security Agency, 678 F.2d 482 (4th Cir.1982). Based on

the foregoing, we find that the agency proved by preponderant evidence that the

misconduct at issue here adversely affected the appellant’s and his coworker’s

performance and that the agency legitimately lost trust and confidence in the

appellant’s ability to perform his duties. Accordingly, we reverse the

administrative judge’s finding in this regard and find that the agency proved by

preponderant evidence that a nexus exists between the appellant’s off -duty

misconduct and the efficiency of the service. 3

The agency proved by preponderant evidence that the penalty of removal is

within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.

¶14 In addition to proving its charge and nexus by preponderant evidence, the

agency must also establish that the penalty of removal is within the tolerable

limits of reasonable. 4 Shibuya v. Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537,

¶ 18 (2013); Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306-07 (1981).

Here, because of the administrative judge’s disposition of the appeal below, she

did not consider the penalty. Remand is not necessary to resolve this issue,

however, because the record is sufficiently developed on the penalty issue to fully

To not find nexus under the facts here would create a strange dichotomy in which

agencies are obligated to address sexual misconduct that occurred between coworkers

on duty but would not feel compelled to address sexual misconduct that occurred

between coworkers off duty.

As briefly stated above, the administrative judge found that the agency proved its

charge of conduct unbecoming a Federal employee by preponderant evidence. ID

at 3-12. Neither party challenges this finding on review, and we discern no reason to

disturb it.

consider it here. See Lednar v. Social Security Administration, 82 M.S.P.R. 364,

¶ 15 (1999).

¶15 When, as here, all of the charges are sustained, the Board will review the

agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all the

relevant factors and exercised management discretion within the tolerable limits

of reasonableness. Ellis v. Department of Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11

(2010). The Board’s function is not to displace management’s responsibility or to

decide what penalty it would impose, but to assure that management’s judgment

has been properly exercised and that the penalty selected by the agency does not

exceed the maximum limits of reasonableness. Stuhlmacher v. U.S. Postal

Service, 89 M.S.P.R. 272, ¶ 20 (2001); Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. Thus, the

Board will modify a penalty only when it finds that the agency failed to weigh the

relevant factors or that the penalty the agency imposed clearly exceeds the bo unds

of reasonableness. Stuhlmacher, 89 M.S.P.R. 272, ¶ 20.

¶16 Here, in making his decision regarding the disciplinary action ag ainst the

appellant, the deciding official prepared a document addressing the application of

the Douglas factors 5 to the appellant’s situation and also testified about the

penalty selection during the hearing. IAF, Tab 8 at 29-34; HT-2 at 42-54. He

stated that the agency has a duty to maintain a safe working environment at all of

its facilities and for all of its employees and that the appellant’s misconduct,

although off-duty, was disruptive to that safe environment. IAF, Tab 8 at 30 -31;

HT-2 at 46-47. The deciding official concluded that the appellant’s misconduct

was serious, particularly given the unwanted “skin-to-skin contact” underneath

the female coworker’s clothes. IAF, Tab 8 at 30; see HT-2 at 43. Of particular

importance to the deciding official was the remote nature of the work site and the

close proximity in which employees worked and lived and the misconduct’s

impact on agency operations. IAF, Tab 8 at 31; HT-2 at 45-46. As such, he

In Douglas, the Board set forth a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors that are relevant for

consideration in determining the appropriateness of a penalty. 5 M.S.P.R. at 305 -06.

stated that he lost trust and confidence that the appellant could live and work in

such a setting without engaging in the same conduct in the future, which would

affect agency operations. IAF, Tab 8 at 32-33; HT-2 at 45-46, 49, 70.

¶17 In considering the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation, the deciding

official explained that, although the appellant appeared remorseful in the

immediate aftermath of the incident, even calling the female coworker the

following day to apologize, the appellant appeared to “recant[]” that remorse,

assert that he had “implied consent,” and “blame” the female coworker during the

disciplinary proceedings. IAF, Tab 8 at 33. Thus, the deciding official stated in

his Douglas factors analysis that he had “little confidence” that the appellant

would refrain from similar misconduct in the future. Id.

¶18 The deciding official also considered relevant mitigating factors, such as

the appellant’s lack of a prior discipline, his 13.5 years of service with the

agency, and his superior performance ratings. 6 Id. at 31; HT-2 at 47-48. The

deciding official also considered the substantial support the appellant received

from coworkers who provided statements on the appellant’s behalf but noted that

none of the statements came from employees in supervisory or managerial

positions. IAF, Tab 8 at 32; HT-2 at 48, 70. Furthermore, the deciding official

explained that he considered alternative penalties, including a last-chance

agreement and an “extensive or substantial suspension,” but he concluded that the

The deciding official also considered the appellant’s assertions fro m his reply to the

notice of proposed removal. In his reply, the appellant offered as a mitigating factor

the fact that he was intoxicated prior to the incident. IAF, Tab 8 at 34. However, the

deciding official reasoned that, although the appellant was intoxicated, he nonetheless

was aware of his actions and knew they were inappropriate. Id.; HT-2 at 50. The

appellant also asserted in his reply that he was aware that the female coworker had

consensual sexual interactions with other members of the commun ity at other times, but

the deciding official concluded that these people were not agency employees, nor were

the female coworker’s actions in another circumstance relevant to the appellant’s

interaction with her in this appeal. IAF, Tab 8 at 34; HT-2 at 50-51. Accordingly, the

deciding official did not consider either of these arguments to be mitigating factors.

IAF, Tab 8 at 34; HT-2 at 49-51.

only way to ensure that such misconduct did not occur again was to remove the

appellant from Federal service. HT-2 at 52; see IAF, Tab 8 at 34.

¶19 Based on the foregoing, we find that the agency proved by preponderant

evidence that the deciding official considered all the relevant factors and

exercised managerial judgment and discretion in imposing the penalty of removal.

As such, the agency’s penalty determination is entitled to deference. See Jackson

v. Department of the Army, 99 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 4 (2005); Stuhlmacher,

89 M.S.P.R. 272, ¶ 20.

¶20 We further find, given the seriousness of the offense , which, again,

involved the unwanted skin-to-skin sexual touching of a coworker, the remote

nature of the appellant’s work, and the deciding official’s loss of trust and

confidence in the appellant’s ability to live and work in such a setting without

creating a disruptive and unsafe environment, that the penalty of removal is

within the tolerable limits of reasonableness. See Brown v. Department of the

Navy, 229 F.3d 1356, 1358, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming a removal of a

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Department employee based on a charge of

improper personal conduct involving an off-duty consensual affair with the

spouse of a deployed military officer); Martin v. Department of Transportation,

103 M.S.P.R. 153, ¶ 13 (2006) (explaining that the most important Douglas factor

is the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to the employee’s

duties, position, and responsibilities), aff’d, 224 F. App’x. 974 (Fed. Cir. 2007);

Stephens v. Department of the Air Force, 58 M.S.P.R. 502, 506 (1993) (stating

that even a single instance of indecent and disgraceful conduct involving sexual

contact toward a coworker can support a penalty of removal; there need not be a

pattern of such behavior before removal is reasonable). In reaching our

conclusion regarding the reasonableness of the removal, we have considered the

appellant’s length of service, his positive performance appraisals, and the support

of his coworkers, but find that those factors do not outweigh the factors

supporting removal.

¶21 Accordingly, we sustain the appellant’s removal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable t ime

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U .S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. I f so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fede ral