Claressa Ham v. Department of Veterans Affairs

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CLARESSA DELISHA HAM, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-0752-15-0518-B-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: May 18, 2022

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Claressa Delisha Ham, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, pro se.

Bradley Flippin, Nashville, Tennessee, for the agency.

BEFORE

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed her appeal of a purportedly involuntary resignation for lack of

jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision

were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,

and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material

evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the pe titioner’s due

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant resigned from her position as a GS-5 Human Resources

Assistant with the agency effective May 1, 2015. Ham v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-15-0518-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF)

Tab 12 at 19. She filed an appeal with the Board alleging that her resignation was

involuntary. 2 IAF, Tab 1. Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the

administrative judge issued an initial decision that dismissed the appeal for lack

of jurisdiction, focusing his analysis on the potential coercive impact of the

agency’s failure to select the appellant for numerous positions, its denial of

training opportunities for her, and its denial of her request to telework. IAF,

Tab 22, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge also found that, absent

2

The appellant applied for disability retirement benefits with the Office of Personnel

Management (OPM) on April 15, 2015, and when that application was denied she filed

a Board appeal. Ham v. Office of Personnel Management, MSPB Docket No. AT-844E-

16-0236-I-2. The administrative judge affirmed OPM’s reconsideration decision and

the appellant filed a petition for review. That matter is addressed in a separate

Board decision.

3

jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal, the Board also lacked jurisdiction over

her race discrimination claim. Id. The appellant filed a petition for review

challenging the administrative judge’s decision.

¶3 The Board granted the appellant’s petition for review, finding that, although

she alleged that the circumstances the administrative judge focused upon

contributed to a hostile working environment, the appellant also alleged below

that it was the agency’s denial of her reasonable accommodation request for her

numerous medical problems that precipitated her resignation. Ham v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-15-0518-I-1, Remand Order

(Feb. 19, 2016). The Board found that the appellant made a nonfrivolous

allegation of involuntariness, vacated the initial decision, and remanded the case

to the regional office for a hearing on the issue of whether “the appellant’s

resignation was the result of coercion based on intolerable working conditions

and therefore an involuntary act within the Board’s jurisdiction.” Id., ¶¶ 7-8.

¶4 After holding a hearing, the administrative judge again dismissed the appeal

for lack of jurisdiction. Ham v. Department of Veterans Affairs, AT-0752-15-

0518-B-1, Remand File (RF), Tab 29, Remand Initial Decision (RID). He found

that during the hearing, the appellant focused exclusively on her claim that her

resignation was involuntary because of the agency’s alleged failure to

accommodate her medical issues relating to digestion and her sleep disorders. 3

RID at 2. He then considered the appellant’s medical evidence and found that she

failed to support her request for an accommodation of her medical conditions.

RID at 5-14. He found that her request for a part-time schedule was not

supported by medical evidence showing how that accommodation would allow

her to perform the essential functions of her position. RID at 12. He also found

3

The administrative judge noted that, while the appellant did not expressly withdraw

her claims that she was forced to resign due to the agency’s failure to select her for

numerous positions, its denial of training opportunities for her, and race discrimination,

these matters were not supported or discussed at the hearing. RID at 2.

4

that the appellant failed to provide medical documentation to support her request

for telework and that, in any event, the appellant’s position was ineligible for

telework because it involved frequent face-to-face contact with applicants, new

employees, and members of the public. RID at 13. The administrative judge

noted that the Local Reasonable Accommodation Coordinator (LRAC) asked the

appellant about a possible reassignment to two positions that might allow for

part-time work and telework. RID at 9. However, the LRAC reported that the

appellant lacked the necessary certification for one of the positions, and declined

to accept the other position as it was lower graded. Id.

¶5 Finally, the administrative judge reiterated the findings that he made in the

vacated initial decision. RID at 15. He found that the appellant did not identify

any deceptive actions or objectively coercive behavior that individually or

collectively would have led a reasonable person to conclude that she had no

choice but to resign. Id. He found that, although the appellant felt aggrieved by

her repeated nonselection for promotions, her inability to telework, and her

perception that she was being discriminated against based on her race, she

identified no grounds for concluding that these circumstances left her with no

effective choice but to resign. Id.

¶6 The appellant has filed a petition for review contending, among other

things, that the administrative judge failed to consider certain evidence below.

Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has not responded to the

petition for review.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶7 A decision to resign is presumed to be a voluntary act outside the Board’s

jurisdiction, and the appellant bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of

the evidence that her resignation was involuntary and therefore tantamount to a

forced removal. Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 111 M.S.P.R. 586,

¶ 15 (2009). The presumption of voluntariness may be rebutted in a number of

5

ways, including if the employee can establish that the resignation was the product

of duress or coercion brought on by Government action, or of misleading or

deceptive information. 4 Heining v. General Services Administration, 68 M.S.P.R.

513, 519 (1995); see Scharf v. Department of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1574

(Fed. Cir. 1983). A resignation may be rendered involuntary by the agency’s

improper denial of an employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation. See

Hosozawa v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 5 (2010).

¶8 Here, the appellant indicated that she wished to continue working, but her

medical issues related to digestion and her sleep disorders required modifications

of her working conditions. Further, she identified reasonable accommodations of

a part-time schedule or telework that she contended would have enabled her to

continue working. At issue is whether the agency unjustifiably failed to offer

either accommodation.

The appellant failed to show that the agency improperly denied her request for

accommodation thus rendering her resignation involuntary.

¶9 On or about February 12, 2015, the appellant made her first request for

reasonable accommodation to the agency’s LRAC. RID at 6; RF, Tab 27, Exhibit

(Ex.) 5. In that request, the appellant sought a part-time schedule, but

subsequently proposed telework as an alternative. RF, Tab 27, Exs. 5, 7. The

LRAC met with the appellant and explained the process going forward,

particularly that the appellant’s medical providers would have to submit

information showing the appellant’s need for any requested accommodation. RID

at 6-7; RF, Tab 23 at 6-7.

4

The Board has jurisdiction over constructive actions, such as an involuntary

resignation, based on various fact patterns, but all constructive action cl aims have two

things in common: (1) the employee lacked a meaningful choice in the matter; and

(2) it was the agency’s wrongful actions that deprived the employee of that choice.

Bean v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8 (2013); see Brown v. U.S. Postal

Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 88, ¶ 8 (2010).

6

¶10 The record shows that the agency made a good faith effort to engage in the

interactive process in an attempt to understand the appellant’s medical

requirements and to accommodate them. It is well settled that both parties have

an obligation not only to assist in the search for an appropriate accommodation

but also to act in good faith in doing so. Tram v. U.S. Postal Service,

114 M.S.P.R. 413, ¶ 13 (2010); Collins v. U.S. Postal Service, 100 M.S.P.R. 332,

¶ 11 (2005). An employer can show its good faith efforts by requesting

information about the employee’s condition and what limitations the employee

has, asking the employee what she specifically wants, showing some sign of

having considered the employee’s request, and offering and discussing available

alternatives when the request is too burdensome. Conaway v. U.S. Postal Service,

93 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 37 (2002) (citing Taylor v. Phoenixville School District,

184 F.3d 296, 317 (3d Cir. 1999), superseded by statute on other grounds as

stated in Rocco v. Gordon Food Service, 998 F. Supp. 2d 422, 426 n.1 (W.D. Pa.

2014)).

¶11 We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to provide

the agency with clear and objective medical evidence of the need for her

requested accommodations. The physician treating the appellant’s issues related

to digestion stated in response to the agency’s request for medical documentation

that the appellant could perform her job duties if she were allowed frequent

restroom access. RF, Tab 13 at 29 of 54. As the administrative judge correctly

observed, this medical provider made no mention of a need for any other form of

accommodation. RID at 8. The administrative judge found that the LRAC

credibly testified that the agency provided the appellant ready access to a

restroom and the appellant did not contest that point. 5 RID at 9.

5

The appellant argues on review that the agency failed to provide documentation to

support the testimony that she was provided ready access to a restroom. PFR File,

Tab 1 at 5. According to the appellant, every step of the interactive process is supposed

to be documented, but the agency failed to do this. Id. The appellant has not

challenged the finding that she was provided access to a restroom and has not explained

7

¶12 Regarding the appellant’s contention that the agency failed to accommodate

her sleep disorders, the administrative judge first addressed a July 24, 2014 letter

from a physician at a sleep center who opined that he be lieved that the appellant

was disabled, but did not identify the disability or explain how he reached that

conclusion. 6 RID at 5; IAF, Tab 13 at 7 of 65. As the administrative judge

observed, the letter does not identify workplace restrictions or accommodations.

Id. The administrative judge also explained that it was doubtful that the agency’s

LRAC received this letter, but that, in any event, it provided little useful

information. RID at 5-6. Thereafter, in response to a request for information

about her sleep disorders, in a March 25, 2015 letter, her medical provider stated

that more time was needed to respond. RID at 9; RF, Tab 27, Ex. 8. This was the

last communication to the agency from the medical professionals treating the

appellant’s sleep disorders prior to the appellant’s resignation. 7

how the purported failure to document the interactive process caused her to resign. To

the extent that the appellant is contending that the agency had to provide her the

accommodation she requested, an agency must reasonably accommodate a disabled

employee but need not provide the accommodation of the employee’s choice. Miller v.

Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 15 (2014); Heidel v. U.S. Postal Service,

112 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶ 10 (2009).

6

On review, the appellant alleges that the administrative judge improperly considered

the July 24, 2014 letter as part of documentation supporting her reasonable

accommodation request. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. According to the appellant, she

submitted the letter to show her entitlement for selection under the Schedule A hiring

authority. Id. To the extent that the administrative judge may have erred in his

consideration of the letter, the appellant has not shown how she was prejudiced by the

error. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (stating that

an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no

basis for reversal of an initial decision).

7

The appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to consider an undated letter

from her sleep disorder physician apparently to the state Department of Motor Vehicles

explaining that the appellant had been involved in motor vehicle accidents due t o

excessive sleepiness related to her sleep disorder. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; RF, Tab 27,

Ex. 1. The fact that the administrative judge did not mention this letter, however,

does not mean that he did not consider it. See Marques v. Department of Health &

Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

(Table). In any event, the letter makes no mention of any accommodations necessary

8

¶13 Thus, the record shows that the agency provided the accommodation

identified by the appellant’s physician to address her medical issues related to

digestion. Regarding her sleep disorders, the appellant has not shown that the

agency failed to engage in the interactive process and it was the appellant who

resigned before her medical providers had an opportunity to respond to the

agency with information about any possible accommodations. See Clemens v.

Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶¶ 11, 14-15 (2014) (finding that the

appellant’s physicians’ “terse and unspecific answers” to the agency’s medical

documentation questionnaire did not constitute a valid reasonable accommodation

request). Therefore, we find that the appellant’s resignation was not rendered

involuntary by the agency’s improper denial of her request for a reasonable

accommodation. See Hosozawa, 113 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 5.

We discern no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s finding, made in the

first initial decision in this matter and reiterated in the remand initial decision,

that the agency did not coerce the appellant’s resignation.

¶14 As noted, in the first initial decision in this matter, the administrative judge

found that the appellant failed to show that the agency’s failure to select her for

numerous positions, its denial of training opportunities for her, and its denial of

her request to telework did not render her resignation involuntary. See ID. The

Board vacated that decision, but after affording the appellant a hearing, the

administrative judge restated his conclusions on this issue in the remand initial

decision. RID at 15. The appellant does not challenge those findings in her

petition for review and we discern no reason to disturb them. Crosby v. U.S.

Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the

administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,

for the appellant to perform the essential functions of her positon. Furthermore,

because the letter is undated, it is impossible to determine if it addresses the relevant

time frame.

9

drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v.

Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).

The appellant’s other arguments do not show that her resignation

was involuntary.

¶15 The appellant next contends that the administrative judge failed to consider

that she had an ad hoc telework agreement with the agency, that the agency

did not document how much of her time on the job was spent in face-to-face

interactions, and that a coworker could accomplish the face -to-face part of her

duties if she were teleworking. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-8. These arguments appear

to be related to the administrative judge’s finding that, notwithstanding the

appellant’s accommodation request, the agency was unable to accommodate the

appellant’s medical conditions by allowing her to telework because the

appellant’s duties required that she engage in frequent face-to-face contact with

applicants, new employees, and members of the public, and that such duties were

incompatible with teleworking. RID at 13.

¶16 The appellant’s assertion that she had a telework agreement is only partially

true. As the administrative judge found, at some point the agency approved “ad

hoc” telework agreements for almost all agency employees. RID at 6. However,

as the administrative judge also found, the agency effectively rescinded the “ad

hoc” telework agreement for the appellant and all similar secretarial -type

positions as they were deemed ineligible for telework based on the nature of the

positions. Id. Thus, the administrative judge properly considered that the

appellant at one time had a telework agreement. However, the appellant has

presented no evidence to show that, at the time that she requested

accommodation, the former ad hoc telework agreement remained in place.

¶17 The appellant also argues that the administrative judge erred by failing to

consider her testimony about her leave use, low leave balance, use of leave

without pay, denial of a leave request, statement by her supervisor on her

disability retirement application that if her leave use became long-term it would

10

be unacceptable, and fear that continued use of leave without pay could have

resulted in a disciplinary action. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. Again, the fact that the

administrative judge did not mention these matters does not mean that he did not

consider them in reaching his decision. Marques v. Department of Health &

Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir.

1985) (Table). Moreover, the appellant has not explained how these events either

individually or coupled with the other attendant circumstances compelled her to

resign. Regarding the appellant’s concern that she could have faced possible

future disciplinary action, as the administrative judge observed, at the time of her

resignation, there was not any discipline planned or pending against the appellant.

RID at 15. Thus, she could not have been coerced into resigning by a

hypothetical threat of discipline at some undefined future date. See, e.g.,

Staats v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (concluding

that the choice between two unattractive options does not render a decision to

retire or resign involuntary); Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Fed. Cir.

1987) (“[W]here an employee is faced merely with the unpleasant alternatives of

resigning or being subject to removal for cause, such limited choices do not make

the resulting resignation an involuntary act.”).

¶18 Finally, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to

acknowledge that agency witnesses made inconsistent statements about the

decision to accommodate the appellant by providing her ready access to a

restroom. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. The appellant does not argue, however, that she

was not granted this accommodation. She also argues that the administrative

judge erred by failing to acknowledge the witnesses’ inconsistencies in their

explanation of which agency officials signed the accommodation paperwork. Id.

The appellant, once more, has not explained how this alleged inconsistency in

who at the agency signed this paperwork contributed to her

involuntary resignation.

11

¶19 In sum, we find that the appellant has failed to show that it was the

agency’s wrongful actions that deprived her of a meaningful choice in the matter

of her decision to resign. Bean v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8

(2013).

¶20 Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

8

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

12

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before

13

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

14

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

9

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to Novemb er 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

15

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.