Adria Gharati v. Department of the Army

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

2022 MSPB 16

Docket No. AT-1221-13-4692-C-1

Adria Gharati,

Appellant,

v.

Department of the Army,

Agency.

June 22, 2022

Peter C. Lown, Esquire, Stockbridge, Georgia, for the appellant.

Randall W. Bentley, Esquire, Forest Park, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

granted in part the appellant’s petition for enforcement. For the reasons set forth

below, we GRANT the agency’s petition for review, find the agency in

compliance, and DISMISS the appellant’s petition for enforcement.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In January 2011, the agency’s Defense Forensic Science Center hired the

appellant as a Fingerprint Specialist for a term appointment not to exceed 4 years.

Gharati v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-13-4692-W-1,

Appeal File (W-1 AF), Tab 51, Initial Decision (ID) at 5. Shortly after being

hired, she deployed for 6 months to an agency laboratory in Kandahar,

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Afghanistan. Id. In May 2012, the agency selected the appellant from a referral

list for a GS-0072-12 Fingerprint Specialist position, effective May 20, 2012.

Gharati v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-13-4692-C-1,

Compliance File (CF), Tab 5 at 17-18. This appointment entitled the appellant to

a new 4-year term. Id.

¶3 In 2013, the appellant filed an individual right of action (IRA) appeal with

the Board, alleging that the agency reassigned her from Afgh anistan to Fort

Gillen, Georgia, and constructively removed her in reprisal for certain protected

disclosures she had made. W-1 AF, Tab 1. The administrative judge held a

hearing in that matter, and on April 21, 2016, issued an initial decision finding

that the appellant made a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal and tha t the

agency failed to meet its burden of proving that it would have taken the personnel

actions in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosures. ID at 4-35. The

administrative judge ordered corrective action, which, among other things,

included requiring the agency to “cancel the reassignment and removal and to

retroactively restore the appellant effective November 30, 2012.” Id. at 35-36.

Neither party petitioned for review of the initial decision, which became final on

May 26, 2016. Id. at 38.

¶4 On June 19, 2016, the appellant filed a petition for enforcement alleging

that the agency failed to return her to active employment in violation of the

corrective action ordered by the administrative judge. CF, Tab 1 at 8 -11. She

argued that, on the date on which the administrative judge ordered her to be

retroactively restored, she had 42 months remaining on her 4 -year term, and, that

to comply with the administrative judge’s order, the agency should have restored

her to that position to serve out the remaining months. Id.

¶5 In response, the agency asserted that the 4-year appointment became

effective on May 20, 2012, and expired on May 20, 2016. CF, Tab 5 at 6 -7.

Thus, the agency argued that it was not required to place her into an active

position because the term position that she held as of November 20, 2012, had

expired. Id. at 8. The agency also provided the appellant with back pay for the

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unserved remainder of her 4-year appointment that included a promotion from the

initial appointment grade, annual pay rate adjustments, and step increases to

which she was entitled. CF, Tab 20 at 5-9, 15, Tab 25 at 7. It also included

constructive credit for overtime and danger pay. CF, Tab 25 at 8.

¶6 In her petition for enforcement, the appellant also claimed that had she

continued in active employment status, she would have been selected for one of

several permanent positions that became available after her constructive removal.

CF, Tab 1 at 9. The agency argued that there were at least 10 vacancies for

permanent positions in the appellant’s line of work that were announced between

October 2014, and May 2016, but that she failed to apply for any of them. CF,

Tab 1 at 18, Tab 5 at 9. The appellant testified that she did not apply for the

positions because she felt her efforts would have been futile, given her ongoing

litigation with the agency concerning her whistleblowing activ ity. Hearing

Compact Disc (testimony of the appellant). She further asserted that, but for the

agency’s unlawful actions, she would have applied for the positions and likely

would have been selected. Id.

¶7 In an order to the agency to produce additional evidence of compliance, the

administrative judge stated that the purpose of the relief order in the now-final

initial decision was to place the appellant as nearly as possible in the position that

she would have been in but for the agency’s unlawful personnel actions. CF,

Tab 16 at 2. The administrative judge found plausible the appellant’s assertion

that the pending litigation caused her not to apply for any of the vacancies, but

also found merit in the agency’s argument that it would be speculative to assume

that the appellant would have been hired for any of the vacancies. Id. Thus, the

administrative judge ordered the agency to reconstruct the selection process for

the 10 vacancies. Id. The AJ also ordered the appellant to provide the agency

with an application for each position for which she would have applied. Id.

¶8 The agency informed the administrative judge that it would take a

significant period of time to reconstruct the selection process for the

10 vacancies, and that, regardless, it believed that it complied with the order. CF,

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Tab 17 at 4-7. The agency did not submit any evidence that it attempted to

reconstruct the selection process for any of the vacancies, but it did submit the

vacancy announcements. 1 CF, Tabs 40-45. The administrative judge imposed

sanctions on the agency in the form of an adverse infere nce that, had the agency

reconstituted the selection process for the first permanent Latent Patent Examiner

position that arose during the appellant’s constructive removal period and

considered the appellant’s application, it would have selected her. CF, Tab 28.

¶9 After holding a hearing at which the appellant was the only witness, 2 the

administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision finding that , although

the agency completed several of the corrective actions that she had ordered

previously, it failed to establish its compliance with the order in its entirety by

failing to reinstate the appellant to a permanent position, CF, Tab 49, Compliance

Initial Decision, (CID) at 3-12. Specifically, the administrative judge reasoned

that the appellant’s claim of entitlement to a permanent position was analogous to

a claim for a promotion as a part of a status quo ante order. CID at 10. She

relied on Dow v. General Services Administration, 117 M.S.P.R. 616 (2012), to

place the burden on the appellant to “clearly establish” that , but for the agency’s

improper actions, she would have applied for the vacancies and would have been

selected. CID at 10-12; see Dow, 117 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 18.

¶10 Based on the record evidence and the appellant’s testimony, the

administrative judge found the appellant’s belief that she did not have a

reasonable chance of being hired by the agency for any of the 10 vacancies to be

1

The agency filed a motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal on the question

of whether the administrative judge had the authority to order the reconstruction of the

10 vacancy announcements and selections. CF, Tabs 19-20. The administrative judge

denied the motion, CF, Tab 27, and it does not appear that the agency challenged that

ruling in its petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.

2

In her Summary of Telephonic Prehearing Conference, the administrative judge noted

that she informed the agency that she would not take evidence regarding the reason it

would not have hired the appellant because that issue was resolved by her prior

sanction. CF, Tab 39 at 1. The agency then withdrew its request to call any witnesses.

Id. at 2.

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a reasonable assumption, given her pending litigation with the agency. CID at 11.

Thus, she found that the appellant’s failure to apply for the vacancies was not

fatal to her claim. Id. Further, the administrative judge concluded that the

agency failed to reconstruct the selection process because it knew or suspected

that the appellant would have been selected for one of the vacancies. CID at 10.

Accordingly, as she had indicated she would do in her sanction order, the

administrative judge found it appropriate to draw an adverse inference that, had

the agency reconstructed the selection process for the first vacancy and

considered the appellant’s application, it would have determined that she would

have been selected. Id.; CF, Tab 28.

¶11 Based on the foregoing, the administrative judge concluded that the

appellant clearly established that she would have applied for a permanent position

with the agency but for its unlawful retaliation, and that , based on the adverse

inference drawn from the agency’s failure to reconstruct the selection process, the

evidence clearly established that the agency would have selected her for a

permanent position but for the unlawful personnel actions. CID at 11 -12. The

administrative judge granted the appellant’s petition for enforcement in part and

ordered the agency to place the appellant in a permanent Latent Print Examiner

position for which she qualifies at the GS-12 level or higher, retroactive to the

date of hire for the first vacancy announcement for a permanent Latent Print

Examiner position during the back pay period. CID at 12.

¶12 The agency has filed a petition for review arguing, among other things, that

the administrative judge’s order operates to place the appellant in a better

position than she was in at the time of the agency’s unlawful actions and that the

administrative judge abused her discretion when she attempted to require the

agency to reconstruct the selection process. Petition for Review (PFR) File,

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Tab 11, 19-21, 23. The appellant has filed a response to the agency’s petition.

PFR File, Tab 4. 3

ANALYSIS

The agency complied with the corrective action ordered by the administrative

judge following the adjudication of the IRA appeal.

¶13 The agency bears the burden of proving that it has complied with a Board

order. Mercado v. Office of Personnel Management, 115 M.S.P.R. 65, ¶ 4 (2010).

The agency is required to produce relevant, material, and credible evidence of

compliance in the form of documentation or affidavits. Spates v. U.S. Postal

Service, 70 M.S.P.R. 438, 443 (1996). Here, the corrective action ordered by the

administrative judge in the appellant’s IRA case includ ed the following:

cancelling the appellant’s reassignment and removal; retroactive restoration,

effective November 30, 2012; back pay with interest; and adjust ing benefits with

appropriate credits and deductions in accordance with the Office of Personnel

Management’s regulations. 4 ID at 35-37. In the administrative judge’s

compliance initial decision, she found that the agency was compliant with every

part of the order except for the restoration portion. CID at 4-6.

¶14 Below, we discuss the restoration-to-duty order, finding that the agency

complied with that order. Regarding the remainder of the corrective action order,

we note that the appellant has not filed a cross petition for review of the

administrative judge’s findings of the agency’s compliance. We have reviewed

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Prior to filing her response to the agency’s petition for review, the appellant filed a

motion to dismiss arguing that the agency failed to file any evidence of its compliance

with the interim relief order. PFR File, Tab 3. The compliance initial decision did not

contain an interim relief order. Although the initial decision ordering corrective action

ordered interim relief in the event either party filed a petition for review of the initial

decision, neither party so filed. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a). Accordingly, the agency

was not required to file evidence of compliance with any interim relief order in this

matter, and the appellant’s motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for review is denied.

4

The remainder of the administrative judge’s order related to interim relief and the

appropriate timelines and mechanisms to carry out the above -referenced order. ID

at 35-36.

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the record, and we find no reason to disturb those findings here. Further, the

record is clear that the agency provided the appellant with back pay for the

appropriate time period, taking into account annual pay rate adjustments, step

increases, constructive credit for overtime, and danger pay. CF, Tab 20 at 5-9,

15, Tab 25 at 7. The back pay award also considered the appellant’s interim

earnings and any lump sum payments for leave. CF, Tab 20 at 15. Accordingly,

we find the agency to be in compliance concerning these matters.

Placement in a permanent position for which the appellant has not applied

exceeds the relief ordered by the administrative judge.

¶15 When the Board finds reprisal based on whistleblowing, the Board is

statutorily authorized to order broad relief, that is, such corrective action “as [it]

considers appropriate . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); see Porter v. Department of

the Treasury, 80 M.S.P.R. 606, ¶ 11 (1999). If the Board orders corrective

action, such corrective action “may include” that the individual be placed, as

nearly as possible, in the position the individual would have been in had the

prohibited personnel practice not occurred, as well as such things as back pay and

related benefits, medical costs incurred, travel expenses, and other reasonable and

foreseeable consequential and compensatory damages. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(1)(A).

¶16 The administrative judge’s initial decision on the merits of the appeal

ordered the agency “to cancel the reassignment and removal and to retroactively

restore the appellant, effective November 30, 2012.” ID at 35. Through

compliance proceedings, the administrative judge found that the Board’s final

order required that the appellant be placed in a permanent Latent Print Examiner

position. CID at 12. Arriving at this conclusion, the administrative judge stated

that “an agency’s obligation under a status quo ante remedy is not necessarily

satisfied by merely rescinding the adverse or personnel action at issue,” but that it

also is required to fully address the appellant’s direct injuries and those that

flowed from the agency’s unlawful action. CID at 6-7 (citing Smith v.

Department of the Army, 458 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Although the

administrative judge acknowledged that a “status quo ante order” cannot operate

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to place the appellant in a better position than she would have otherwise been in

but for the agency’s unlawful actions, CID at 6, she nonetheless found that the

full extent of the appellant’s injuries included the loss of permanent employment

with the agency, CID at 7-12.

¶17 We disagree. The Board’s final order unambiguously sought to

retroactively restore the appellant to her position, or as close to her position as

possible, as of November 30, 2012. ID at 35. It is undisputed that, at that time,

the appellant was serving in a 4-year term appointment with the agency. The first

vacancy announcement for a permanent Latent Print Examiner position was not

issued until October 2014. CF, Tab 40 at 7-13. Thus, it would have been

impossible for the Board’s final order, with a retroactivity date of November 30,

2012, to properly encompass an appointment to a vacancy which did not arise

until nearly 2 years later and was unrelated to and independent from the

appellant’s position at the time relevant to the order. Therefore, we find the

administrative judge’s order in the compliance initial decision to appoint the

appellant to a permanent position, retroactive to the date of hire from the first

vacancy announcement in 2014, to be incongruent with the initial orde r, which

ordered retroactive restoration to November 30, 2012.

¶18 We also disagree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s

claim of entitlement to a permanent position is analogous to a claim for a

promotion as a part of a final order. CID at 10. To obtain a promotion as part of

an order granting final relief, an appellant must identify a law mandating the

promotion, or clearly establish that she would have been promoted during the

relevant period. Dow, 117 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 18. Promotion potential in the

compliance context presupposes continued employment with the agency. See

5 C.F.R. § 531.203 (stating that a promotion occurs while an employee is

“continuously employed”). Conversely, the very nature of a term appointment is

that it expires by a date certain as a basic condition of employment while the

appointment is made. Scull v. Department of Homeland Security, 113 M.S.P.R.

287, ¶ 7 (2010). Here, the appellant was serving in a term appointment, and she

9

has not pointed to any evidence showing that, in her capacity as a term appointee,

she was entitled to an opportunity to earn an appointment to a permanent position.

To the contrary, an agency is not obligated to offer an employee a permanent or

other term position when her term appointment expires; rather, the appointment

simply ends. See Murdock-Doughty v. Department of the Air Force, 74 M.S.P.R.

244, 252 (1997). In a similar situation to that presented here, the Board found

that when an appellant held a term appointment at the time of her removal, which

the Board mitigated to a 45-day suspension, the agency was in compliance with

the Board’s order to retroactively reinstate the appellant to the date of the

removal and impose the 45-day suspension, even though it separated her on the

date that her term appointment expired, which meant that no back pay was due.

Id. at 251-52. Thus, the agency in this matter did not act improperly in separating

the appellant on the date her term appointment was predeter mined to expire,

instead of appointing her to another position. Because we find that a promotion

and permanent appointment are not analogous under these circumstances, we

conclude that the administrative judge’s reliance on Dow was misplaced. CID

at 10-12. Accordingly, we need not determine whether the appellant “clearly

established” that she would have applied and been selected for one of the

permanent positions. Dow, 117 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 18.

¶19 Furthermore, we disagree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that

the appellant’s failure to apply for any of the 10 vacancies was not fatal to her

claim. CID at 11. Regardless of the likelihood that she would have been selected

for any of the vacancies had she chosen to apply, the appellant nonetheless had

the alternative recourse to apply for the positions, wait to learn whether she had

been selected, and if not, to include the agency’s failure to appoint her to the

position or positions as a personnel action in another whistleblower reprisal claim

before the Office of Special Counsel and, if necessary, before the Board. See

5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)(2)(A)(i), (b)(8)(A). The appellant chose not to embark on

this path, and she is left with the consequences of that inaction.

10

¶20 Ultimately, it is the speculative nature of the administrative judge’s findings

and order that leads us to conclude that the appellant is not entitled to a

permanent position as a part of status quo ante relief. We will not speculate or

presume that, had she chosen to apply for any of the vacancies, she would have

been selected. Accordingly, we agree with the agency that the administrative

judge should not have ordered it to reconstruct the hiring process for the

10 vacancies at issue, and we reverse the administrative judge’s order to place the

appellant in a permanent Latent Print Examiner position, retroactive to the date of

hire for the first vacancy announcement for a permanent Latent Print Examiner

position.

The appellant is not entitled to serve out her 4-year term appointment because it

has expired.

¶21 In her petition for enforcement, the appellant also asserted that she was

entitled to serve out the remaining 42 months on her 4-year term appointment.

CF, Tab 1 at 9. The administrative judge made no findings concerning this claim,

and we find it to be meritless. The Board has held that by the express nature of a

term appointment, an appellant has no right to continued employment with the

agency after the predetermined term has run. Berger v. Department of

Commerce, 3 M.S.P.R. 198, 199 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 316.303(b). Here, the initial

decision was issued on April 21, 2016, the appellant’s term appointment expired

on the predetermined date of May 20, 2016, and the initial decision became final

on May 26, 2016—6 days after her term appointment expired. CID at 1, 38; CF,

Tab 5 at 17-18. Under such circumstances, the appellant was not entitled to be

physically restored to her term position. See Murdock-Doughty, 74 M.S.P.R.

at 252 (finding that, in a compliance action concerning mitigating a removal to a

45-day suspension, because the appellant’s term appointment expired while she

was serving the 45-day suspension, she was not entitled to back pay).

¶22 Finally, there is no indication in the record that the appellant rejected the

agency’s calculation and issuance of back pay for the time period covering the

42 months that she did not serve. Thus, to accept the back pay award and be

11

reinstated to the term appointment for the 42 months at issue would be to allow

the appellant to benefit twice from the administrative judge’s order. To find

otherwise would allow the appellant to assume a better position than the one she

was in prior to the agency’s actions, a practice in which the Board does not

engage. See Sink v. Department of Energy, 110 M.S.P.R. 153, ¶ 19 (2008).

ORDER

¶23 Based on the foregoing, we GRANT the agency’s petition for review, find

the agency in compliance, and DISMISS the appellant’s petition for enforcement.

¶24 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this

appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1 201.113 (5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

5

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

12

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so , you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

13

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via com mercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

14

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

6

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,

132 Stat. 1510.

15

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.