Paul Bishop v. Department of Agriculture

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

2022 MSPB 28

Docket No. PH-1221-15-0535-W-1

Paul Bishop,

Appellant,

v.

Department of Agriculture,

Agency.

August 18, 2022

Paul Bishop, Hillsborough, New Jersey, pro se.

Bradly Siskind, Sarah S. Tuck and Zachary L. Wright,

Riverdale, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)

appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we VACATE the initial decision and

DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In August and September 2014, the appellant applied for a GS -9/11

Entomologist (Identifier) position and for two GS-9/11 Plant Protection and

Quarantine Officer (Plant Health Safeguarding Specialist) positions, but the

2

agency did not refer his applications to the selecting official. Initial Appeal File

(IAF), Tab 31 at 20-48, Tab 58 at 4, 14, 22. On December 1, 2014, the appellant

filed a formal equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging that the

agency failed to refer him to the selecting official in retaliation for his prior EEO

activity, including an April 26, 2013 formal EEO complaint against the agency

and EEO activity against his former employer, the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS). 1 IAF, Tab 12 at 6-7, 18-20, Tab 18 at 31-32, 46-48. In

September 2015, the agency issued a final agency decision (FAD) finding no

evidence of discrimination or retaliation based on his prior EEO activity. IAF,

Tab 18 at 30-44.

¶3 On May 1, 2015, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special

Counsel (OSC) alleging that the agency failed to appoint him on April 26, 2015, 2

1

From 2005 to 2007, the appellant held a term appointment under the Federal Career

Intern Program at DHS. In 2007, DHS terminated him from his position for alleged

misconduct, and he has since unsuccessfully challenged his termination in multiple

appeals before the Board. E.g., Bishop v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB

Docket No. NY-1221-17-0092-W-1, Initial Decision (Mar. 28, 2017); Bishop v.

Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. NY-1221-15-0186-W-1, Final

Order (Sept. 28, 2015); Bishop v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket

No. NY-1221-09-0209-W-1, Final Order (Feb. 24, 2010); Bishop v. Department of

Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-08-0001-I-1, Initial Decision (Oct. 4,

2007). He also has unsuccessfully challenged his termination in other fora. E.g.,

Bishop v. Department of Homeland Security, 648 F. App’x 180 (3d Cir. 2016)

(affirming the district court’s dismissal of the appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction

and its injunction enjoining him from filing further appeals related to his termination);

Bishop v. Office of Personnel Management, 514 F. App’x 104 (3d Cir. 2013)

(per curiam) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the appellant’s claims that DHS

and the Office of Personnel Management violated the Freedom of Information Act in

failing to produce documents that would show his termination was illegal and the

Privacy Act in failing to “correct” purportedly inaccurate records that led to his

termination); Bishop v. Department of Homeland Security, EEOC Appeal

No. 0120090628, 2009 WL 742266 (Mar. 12, 2009) (finding no evidence of

discrimination in connection with, among other things, the appellant’s termination).

2

It is unclear why the appellant indicated that the nonselections at issue occurred on

April 26, 2015. IAF, Tab 9 at 9. The record reflects that the appellant initiated contact

with an EEO Specialist on October 16, 2014, and filed a formal EEO complaint on

3

in retaliation for his “disclosures” to the agency’s EEO office in April 2013 , and

on December 1, 2014. IAF, Tab 9 at 6-13. On August 13, 2015, OSC notified the

appellant that it was terminating its inquiry into his allegation that the agency

failed to select him for employment in reprisal for making disclosures of

discrimination and informed him of his right to seek corrective action from the

Board. IAF, Tab 1 at 14-15.

¶4 The appellant then filed the instant Board appeal, alleging, among other

things, that the agency failed to select him in retaliation for his prior EEO activity

at DHS. 3 Id. at 10-13. In addition, he alleged that his nonselection was the result

of DHS’s efforts to “black list” him from Federal employment in retaliation for

his prior EEO activity by placing an unlawful promotion in his personnel folder,

which serves as a “black list mechanism” recognized by civil service em ployees,

including the agency hiring official who reviewed his application. Id. at 11-12.

¶5 In orders on jurisdiction, the administrative judge informed the appellant of

the applicable law and his burden of proof to establish Board jurisdiction over his

IRA appeal and specifically explained to him that disclosures of discrimination

and retaliation claims are excluded from coverage under the Whistleblower

Protection Act (WPA). IAF, Tabs 5, 13. In response, the appellant again alleged

that the agency failed to refer his applications to the selecting official in

retaliation for his prior EEO activity and because DHS had “black listed” him in

December 1, 2014, regarding the agency’s failure to refer his applications in the

identified nonselections to the selecting official. IAF, Tab 12 at 6-7, 18-20, Tab 18

at 31, 46-47. Thus, it is clear that the appellant was notified of his nonselection for the

three positions at issue in this appeal on or before October 16, 2014.

3

Before the agency issued the FAD finding no evidence of retaliation in connection

with the appellant’s nonselections, he filed an appeal with a Federal district court

arguing that the agency’s failure to select him was discriminatory and retaliatory. IAF,

Tab 25 at 7-14. The administrative judge issued an order finding that the IRA appeal

could proceed in parallel with the Federal district court appeal because an IRA action is

not cognizable before the Federal district court and an EEO complaint is not cognizable

before the Board. IAF, Tab 26.

4

retaliation for his EEO activity at DHS. 4 IAF, Tab 9 at 2-3, Tab 12 at 2-3, Tab 15

at 2. In an order and summary of a telephonic prehearing conference, the

administrative judge interpreted and summarized the appellant’s claims and again

provided the appellant notice of his jurisdictional burden . IAF, Tab 54.

¶6 After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge

issued an initial decision finding that the appellant made one protected disclosure

when he disclosed in an EEO complaint to the agency’s EEO office that DHS

improperly gave him a step increase and a promotion on the same day, but that he

failed to show that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s

decision not to select him for the three positions at issue. IAF, Tab 63, Initial

Decision (ID) at 13-19. Thus, the administrative judge denied the appellant’s

request for corrective action. ID at 20.

¶7 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, the

agency has responded in opposition, and the appellant has replied to the agency ’s

response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4.

ANALYSIS

The Board’s determinations regarding its jurisdiction over IRA appeals are

matters of civil service law, rule, or regulation.

¶8 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over whic h it has been

given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). As relevant here, the Board’s

jurisdiction over IRA appeals is derived from the WPA, Pub. L. No. 101-12,

103 Stat. 16, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of

2012 (WPEA), Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465. See Corthell v. Department

4

In support of his contention that DHS improperly promoted him, the appellant

submitted Standard Form 50s showing that he was awarded a within -grade increase

from GS-9, step 1, to GS-9, step 2, and a promotion from his GS-9 Agricultural

Specialist position to a GS-11 Agricultural Specialist position on September 3, 2006.

IAF, Tab 12 at 25, 27.

5

of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 7 (2016). Specifically, 5 U.S.C.

§ 1221(a) provides that “an employee, former employee, or applicant for

employment may, with respect to any personnel action taken, or proposed to be

taken, against such employee, former employee, or applicant for employment, as

a result of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b)(8) or

section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), seek corrective action from the Merit

Systems Protection Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a).

¶9 Before adjudicating an IRA appeal on the merits, however, the Board must

determine whether the appellant has established jurisdiction by demonstrating

exhaustion of his administrative remedy with OSC and by nonfrivolously alleging

that he satisfies the criteria of section 1221(a)—i.e., that he made a protected

disclosure or engaged in protected activity that was a contributing factor in a

personnel action taken, or proposed to be taken, against him. See Schmittling v.

Department of the Army, 219 F.3d 1332, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Salerno v.

Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016). The Board has

inherent authority to determine whether a matter is within its jurisdiction and to

make findings of fact and law necessary to such a determination. See Cruz v.

Department of the Navy, 934 F.2d 1240, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that,

although the Board does not have jurisdiction over voluntary resignations, the

Board has jurisdiction to determine whether a resignation was involuntary and,

therefore, a “constructive removal” within the Board’s jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C.

§ 7512 “because it has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction” ); Lloyd v. Small

Business Administration, 96 M.S.P.R. 518, ¶ 16 (2004).

¶10 In addition to judicial and Board precedent, the term “civil service law”

embodies statutory provisions that are within title 5 of the United States Code,

enacted as part of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L.

No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1111, and have a bearing on civil servants. See Horner v.

Merit Systems Protection Board, 815 F.2d 668, 671 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The WPA,

which amends title 5 and which Congress passed with the intent of strengthening

6

the protections for Federal whistleblowers contained in the CSRA, is a civil

service law because it meets these criteria. See WPA § 2, 103 Stat. 16; King v.

Jerome, 42 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding implicitly, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(d), that the interim relief provisions of the WPA and, by implication, all

other such provisions constituted civil service laws, rules, or regulations

appealable to the court by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management);

Marano v. Department of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Askew v.

Department of the Army, 88 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 22 (2001); White v. Department of

the Air Force, 71 M.S.P.R. 607, 617 n.5 (1996). The WPEA, which amends the

WPA to further strengthen protections for Federal whistleblowers, is similarly a

civil service law because it too meets these criteria. See WPEA, Pub. L.

No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465; S. Rep. No. 112-155, at 1-4 (2012), as reprinted in

2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 589-92 (noting that the CSRA first established statutory

whistleblower protections). By extension, determinations by the Board regarding

whether an appellant has exhausted his OSC remedy and made nonfrivolous

allegations of whistleblower reprisal under the WPA and the WPEA are matters

of civil service law. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a); see also Cruz, 934 F.2d at 1244.

Therefore, we find that a Board determination as to whether it possesses

jurisdiction under the WPA and the WPEA or, in the alternative, whether it

should (or should not) reach the merits of such a case, is a matter of civil service

law, rule, or regulation.

The Board lacks jurisdiction over this IRA appeal.

¶11 Before adjudicating an IRA appeal on the merits, the Board must make a

threshold finding of jurisdiction. King v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

105 M.S.P.R. 21, ¶ 8 (2007). The Board may not assume that the appellant has

established jurisdiction over his appeal and then proceed to reject his

whistleblower reprisal claim on the merits; rather, the Board first must address

the matter of jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal. Id.

(citing Schmittling, 219 F.3d at 1336-37). Absent jurisdiction, the Board is

7

without authority to decide the issues presented by the appellant. Id. If there is

no jurisdiction over this IRA appeal, the administrative judge’s findings on the

merits of the appeal are a nullity. Id.

¶12 Here, although the administrative judge denied the agency’s motion to

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, he did not make any explicit findings

regarding jurisdiction. IAF, Tabs 11, 26; ID. Rather, he appeared to assume that

the Board had jurisdiction over this appeal, held a hearing, and denied corrective

action on the merits. IAF, Tab 46; ID. Because the Board must address the

matter of jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal , we do so

now.

¶13 As noted above, to establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal based on

whistleblower reprisal, the appellant must exhaust his administrative remedies

before OSC and make nonfrivolous allegations of the following: (1) he engaged

in whistleblowing activity by making a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8), or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity

was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take, fail to take, or threaten

to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 5 Yunus v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Salerno,

123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). A nonfrivolous allegation is an

assertion that, if proven, could establish the mat ter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).

¶14 The appellant here filed a complaint with OSC alleging that the agency

failed to appoint him in retaliation for his disclosures to the agency’s EEO o ffice

in EEO complaints in April 2013, and on December 1, 2014. IAF, Tab 9 at 9. It

5

Effective December 27, 2012, the WPEA expanded the grounds on which an appellant

may file an IRA appeal with the Board. WPEA §§ 101(b)(1)(A), 202, 126 Stat. at 1476;

see Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 629, ¶ 9 (2014). Because

all of the material events in this appeal occurred after December 27, 2012, the WPEA

applies to this appeal.

8

appears that he submitted partial copies of his April 2013 and December 1, 2014

EEO complaints to OSC. Id. at 12-13. In relevant part, these documents both

allege that the agency failed to select him for employment in retaliation for his

prior EEO activity and because DHS had “black listed” him from Federal

employment. 6 Id. In support of his blacklisting claim, the appellant alleged that,

in retaliation for his prior EEO activity, DHS improperly promoted him and that

the improper promotion served as a “black list mechanism” recognized by other

civil service employees, including the agency hiring official who reviewed his

application. Id. In its close-out letter, OSC indicated that it was closing its

inquiry into the appellant’s allegations that the agency failed to select him for

employment in reprisal for making disclosures of discrimination. IAF, Tab 1

at 14-15. Accordingly, we find that the appellant exhausted the se claims before

OSC.

¶15 Next, we must determine whether the appellant made a nonfrivolous

allegation of a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in

protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5. Reprisal for exercising an EEO right is a

prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), not 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8). Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶¶ 7, 10 (2014);

Williams v. Department of Defense, 46 M.S.P.R. 549, 553 (1991). As relevant

here, protected activity under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) includes “the exercise of

6

The only evidence in the record regarding the appellant’s April 2013 EEO complaint

appears to be an unsigned, undated document titled “Supplemental Answers for

[agency] form 3090-1” alleging discrimination in connection with his nonselection for a

GS-9/11 Entomologist (Identifier) position, vacancy announcement number

24PQ-2013-0054, and a GS-9/11 Plant Protection and Quarantine Specialist position,

vacancy announcement number 24PQ-2013-0070. IAF, Tab 9 at 13. According to the

agency, it does not use a form 3090-1. IAF, Tab 32 at 6. Nonetheless, because the

agency acknowledged an April 2013 EEO complaint in its FAD, we assume for

purposes of our jurisdictional determination that the appellant filed an EEO complaint

in April 2013, including the “form 3090-1” in the record.

9

any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or

regulation . . . with regard to remedying a violation of [section 2302(b)(8)].”

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Section 2302(b)(8) provides, in

relevant part, that it is unlawful for an agency to take or fail to take a personnel

action with respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of any

disclosure of information that he reasonably believes evidences any violation of

any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an

abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety .

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). Thus, only complaints seeking to remedy

whistleblower reprisal are covered under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). See Mudd v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶¶ 6-7 (2013).

¶16 In the instant matter, the administrative judge found that the appellant

engaged in protected activity under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) when he filed an

EEO complaint in which he disclosed a reasonable belief that DHS violated the

regulatory “waiting period” for promotions by giving him a GS -9 step increase

and a promotion to GS-11 on the same day in 2006. ID at 13. However, the

appellant’s EEO complaint did not seek to remedy alleged whistleblower repris al

under section 2302(b)(8); rather, he repeatedly alleged that DHS unlawfully

promoted him and “black listed” him in retaliation for his prior EEO activity.

IAF, Tab 1 at 11, Tab 9 at 2. As discussed above, to constitute protected activity

under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), the substance of an appeal, complaint, or

grievance must concern remedying a violation of whistleblower reprisal under

section 2302(b)(8). Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7. A nonfrivolous allegation

regarding just one part of section 2302(b)(8)—such as, as here, a disclosure of

one of the categories of wrongdoing specified in section 2302(b)(8)(A) without

any allegation of whistleblower reprisal—is insufficient to constitute a

nonfrivolous allegation of protected activity under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). See

Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7. Therefore, we find that the appellant has failed to

nonfrivolously allege that he engaged in protected activity or made a protected

10

disclosure within the Board’s jurisdiction over IRA appeals. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 1221(a).

¶17 In light of the foregoing, we vacate the initial decision denying the

appellant’s request for corrective action and find that he failed to establish

jurisdiction over this IRA appeal.

ORDER

¶18 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this

appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113).

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

7

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

11

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

12

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

13

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 8 The court of appeals must receive your

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

8

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law b y the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of c ompetent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,

132 Stat. 1510.

14

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.