Opinion

Renate Gabel v. Department of Veterans Affairs

  • 2023 MSPB 4
Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Jan 11, 2023
Status
Published
Cited by
35 cases
Authority
More cited than 87.7%

stating that a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an allegation of facts that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable person in her position would believe evidenced one of the categories of wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8)

How later courts described this case

  • stating that a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an allegation of facts that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable person in her position would believe evidenced one of the categories of wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8)
  • recognizing the limited scope of IRA appeals, including the limitation that the Board only has IRA jurisdiction over EEO activity covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(9)(A)(i), meaning it seeks to remedy whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (b)(8)
  • stating that the Board has IRA jurisdiction over claims of reprisal for equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity seeking to remedy whistleblower reprisal
  • finding that an appellant’s vague and nonspecific allegations of disclosures of wrongdoing were insufficient to constitute nonfrivolous allegations

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

2023 MSPB 4

Docket No. PH-1221-16-0256-W-1

Renate M. Gabel,

Appellant,

v.

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

January 11, 2023

Chungsoo J. Lee, Feasterville, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

Alison M. Debes, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

Marcus S. Graham, Esquire, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

OPINION AND ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For

the reasons set forth in this Opinion and Order, we AFFIRM the initial decision

and DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant was a Licensed Practical Nurse in the agency’s Community

Based Outpatient Clinic in Gloucester, New Jersey. Initial Appeal File (IAF),

2

Tab 1 at 1, Tab 9 at 9. On or about August 27, 2015, she filed a complaint with

the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that the agency retaliated against

her for making protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and engaging in

protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A). IAF, Tab 1 at 8, Tab 8

at 10-31. On February 16, 2016, OSC issued the appellant a close-out letter

informing her that it was closing the file on her complaint and advising he r of her

right to file a Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 6-7. This appeal followed. Id. at 1.

¶3 The administrative judge issued an order explaining the appellant’s burden

to establish jurisdiction over an IRA appeal and ordering her to submit evidence

and argument supporting her claim. IAF, Tab 5. The appellant responded, IAF,

Tabs 8-10, and the administrative judge issued an initial decision without holding

the requested hearing, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, IAF, Tab 12,

Initial Decision (ID). She found that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous

allegation that she made a protected disclosure or otherwise engaged in protected

activity. ID at 6-12. She then found, in the alternative, that the appellant failed

to make a nonfrivolous allegation that any of her supposed protected disclosures

or her alleged protected activity was a contributing factor in any of the personnel

actions taken against her. ID at 12-15.

¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has responded

in opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-2, 5.

ANALYSIS 1

¶5 Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), the

Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has exhausted h er

1

We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal

and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.

3

administrative remedies before OSC, 2 and makes nonfrivolous allegations that

(1) she made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in

protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and (2) the

protected disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision

to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).

Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016). The

Board’s regulations define a nonfrivolous allegation as an assertion that, if

proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). 3 As the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently put it: “[T]he question of

whether the appellant has non-frivolously alleged protected disclosures [or

activities] that contributed to a personnel action must be determined based on

whether the employee alleged sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim that is plausible on its face.” Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board,

979 F.3d 1362, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 4

2

Here, the administrative judge found, and we agree, that the appellant met her burden

of establishing that she exhausted her administrative remedies before OSC. ID at 5;

IAF, Tab 8 at 10-31.

3

The regulation further provides that an allegation generally will be considered

nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation

that: (1) is more than conclusory; (2) is plausible on its face; and (3) is material to the

legal issues in the appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). Pro forma allegations are insufficient

to meet the nonfrivolous standard. Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 6

(2016), aff’d per curium, 679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017), overruled on other

grounds by Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20 n. 11.

4

Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to

the All Circuit Review Act (Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510), appellants may file

petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any

circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek

review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.

4

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure.

¶6 A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an

allegation of facts that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a

matter that a reasonable person in her position would believe evidenced one of

the categories of wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Mudd v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 8 (2013). The test to

determine whether a putative whistleblower has a reasonable belief in the

disclosure is an objective one: whether a disinterested observer with knowledge

of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainabl e by the employee could

reasonably conclude that the actions of the agency evidenced a violation of law,

rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of

authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safet y. Salerno,

123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 6. The disclosures must be specific and detailed, not vague

allegations of wrongdoing. Id.; see El v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R.

76, ¶ 6 (2015) (stating that vague, conclusory, unsupported, and pro forma

allegations of alleged wrongdoing do not meet the nonfrivolous pleading standard

needed to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal), aff’d, 663 F.

App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

¶7 Here, the appellant alleged in her OSC complaint that the agency

discriminated against her based on her disability and engaged in a pattern of

abuse concerning her requests for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act

of 1993 (FMLA) and requests for reasonable accommodation. IAF, Tab 8

at 27-31. She vaguely claimed that she attempted to bring this wrongdoing to her

supervisors’ attention from October 2014 through August 27, 2015, the date she

filed her OSC complaint. Id. at 29. As the administrative judge noted, however,

the appellant failed to provide with any specificity the content of her alleged

disclosures, to whom they were made, the dates they were made, or how they

were made. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 8 at 27-31. After considering the evidence and

argument in a light most favorable to the appellant, the administrative judge

5

concluded that the appellant failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation that she

disclosed a matter that a reasonable person in her position would believe

evidenced one of the categories of wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).

ID at 6-12. Specifically, she found that a disinterested observer with knowledge

of the essential facts known to and readily ascert ainable by the appellant

would not reasonably conclude that the agency’s actions evidenced gross

mismanagement or an abuse of authority. ID at 11. She further found that the

appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that the agency’s actions created a

substantial risk of significant adverse impact upon its ability to accomplish its

mission or reflected the arbitrary or capricious exercise of power . Id. We agree

that the appellant’s vague and nonspecific allegations of disclosures of

wrongdoing are insufficient to constitute nonfrivolous allegations of protected

disclosures. 5 See Mithen v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 122 M.S.P.R. 489,

¶ 27 (2015) (explaining that an “abuse of authority” occurs when there is an

arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a Federal official or employee that

adversely affects the rights of any person or that results in personal gain or

advantage to himself or to preferred other persons), aff’d, 652 F. App’x 971 (Fed.

Cir. 2016); Embree v. Department of the Treasury, 70 M.S.P.R. 79, 85 (1996)

(defining “gross management” as a management action or inaction that creates a

substantial risk of significant adverse impact on the agency’s ability to

accomplish its mission).

5

Subsequent to the issuance of the initial decision, the Federal Circuit held that the

Board “may not deny jurisdiction by crediting the agency’s interpretation of the

evidence as to whether the alleged disclosures fell within the protected categories or

whether the disclosures were a contributing factor to an adverse personnel action .”

Hessami, 979 F.3d at 1369. Although the administrative judge here discussed the

agency’s evidence and arguments regarding the appellant’s FMLA requests, ID at 7-10,

insofar as the appellant’s allegations regarding her purported disclosures related thereto

were vague and facially insufficient irrespective of the agency’s evidence and

argument, this discussion was harmless and a different outcome is not warranted, IAF,

Tab 8 at 27-31; see El, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6.

6

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she engaged in protected

activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A).

¶8 The Board only has IRA jurisdiction over equal employment opportunity

(EEO) activity covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), meaning it seeks to

remedy whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). Edwards v.

Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 24-25; Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶¶ 6-7

(explaining that filing a grievance, which does not itself seek to remedy

whistleblower reprisal, does not grant IRA jurisdiction under the WPEA). Here,

the appellant alleged that she filed an EEO complaint with the agency allegin g

discrimination and retaliation, and that the agency retaliated against her as a

result. IAF, Tab 8 at 6, Tab 9 at 19-40. However, the appellant did not allege

that the substance of her EEO complaint concerned remedying a violation of

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). IAF, Tab 9 at 19-40. Therefore, we agree with the

administrative judge that the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider her allegations

of reprisal for her EEO complaint in the context of this IRA appeal. ID at 12; see

Young v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 961 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2020)

(explaining that the Board lacks jurisdiction in an IRA appeal over claims of

reprisal for EEO activity protected under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii)). Because we

find that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected

disclosure or otherwise engaged in protected activity for which an IRA appeal is

authorized by the statute, she cannot meet her burden on jurisdiction and the

administrative judge properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See

Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 22 (2016)

(holding that the administrative judge correctly dismissed the IRA appeal for lack

of jurisdiction when the appellant failed to make nonfrivolous allegations that he

made protected disclosures or otherwise engaged in protected activity appealable

to the Board as an IRA appeal).

7

The appellant’s arguments and submissions on review fail to provide a reason to

disturb the initial decision.

¶9 On review, the appellant asserts that the agency engaged in discrimination,

retaliation, and “abuses of authority and gross mismanagement in connection with

requests for FMLA leave,” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, and she attaches alleged new

evidence in an effort to prove her assertions, PFR File, Tab 1 at 18-59, Tab 2.

Although the appellant’s argument and submissions outline in great detail the

alleged pattern of abuses she claims the agency took against her and her

coworkers, PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-17, she has not challenged the administrative

judge’s findings that she failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made protected

disclosures or otherwise engaged in protected activity appealable to the Board.

The appellant, therefore, has provided no basis to disturb the administrative

judge’s finding that she failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction.

See Graves, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 22; Russo v. Veterans Administration,

3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (holding that the Board will not grant a petition for

review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to

warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision). In the absence of

Board jurisdiction, we lack the authority to review the merits of the appellant’s

allegations concerning the agency actions taken against her and her coworkers.

Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.

ORDER

¶10 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this

appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.113).

8

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6

You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By

statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit

Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a

statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their

jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all

filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time

limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

6

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

9

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and

10

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other secur ity. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial deliver y or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protectio n

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

11

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in

section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial

review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

7

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

132 Stat. 1510.

12

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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