United States v. Rogelio Galvez

USCA11 Case: 22-10884 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 02/16/2023 Page: 1 of 7

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10884

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROGELIO GALVEZ,

a.k.a. Francoise Roger,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:96-cr-00075-JIC-27

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10884

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Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Rogelio Galvez, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se on ap-

peal, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for compas-

sionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by

§ 603(b) of the First Step Act.1 He asserts his “remarka-

ble” post-conviction rehabilitation, time-served, release plan,

health conditions, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors all support his

compassionate release.

The Government moves for summary affirmance of the dis-

trict court’s order and to stay the briefing schedule, contending

Galvez has failed to show the district court abused its discretion

when it found he did not establish an extraordinary and compelling

reason to reduce his sentence. The Government asserts the district

court independently determined the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did

not support Galvez’s compassionate release, and he continued to

be a danger to the community. After review, 2 we grant the Gov-

ernment’s motion for summary affirmance.

1 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21,

2018) (First Step Act).

2 We review de novo a district court’s determination about a defendant’s eli-

gibility for an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant,

996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). However, we review a district court’s

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22-10884 Opinion of the Court 3

District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term

of imprisonment but may do so within § 3582(c)’s provisions.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251

(11th Cir. 2021). As amended by § 603(b) of the First Step Act,

§ 3582(c) now provides, in relevant part, that:

[t]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bu-

reau of Prisons [(BOP)], or upon motion of the de-

fendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all ad-

ministrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to

bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse

of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the

warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is ear-

lier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after

considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.

§] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable if it

finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons

warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduc-

tion is consistent with applicable policy statements is-

sued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing

Guidelines provides the applicable policy statement for

§ 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The application notes to

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 list four categories of extraordinary and compel-

ling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical condition, (B) his age,

(C) his family circumstances, and (D) other reasons. Id., comment.

denial of a prisoner’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion under an abuse of dis-

cretion standard. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10884

n.1(A)–(D). The defendant’s medical condition qualifies as an ex-

traordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release if he

is “suffering from a serious physical or medical condition” that

“substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide

self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from

which he or she is not expected to recover.” Id., comment. n.1(A).

Additionally, § 3582(c)(1)(A) mandates the district court must con-

sider the § 3553(a) factors 3 before granting a motion for compas-

sionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The Government is entitled to summary affirmance of the

district court’s denial of Galvez’s motion for compassionate release

under § 3582(c)(1)(A) because its position is clearly correct as a mat-

ter of law. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,

1162 (5th Cir. 1969) 4 (stating summary disposition is appropriate,

in part, where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as

a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to

3 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the offense’s nature and circumstances and

the defendant’s history and characteristics; the need to (2) reflect the offense’s

seriousness; (3) afford adequate deterrence; (4) protect the public; (5) provide

the defendant with educational or vocational training or medical care; to re-

flect (6) the kinds of sentences that are available; (7) the advisory guideline

range; (8) the pertinent U.S. Sentencing Commission policy statements; and

the need to (9) avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and (10) provide vic-

tims with restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(a)(7).

4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-

cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.

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22-10884 Opinion of the Court 5

the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case,

the appeal is frivolous”).

First, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied Galvez’s motion for compassionate release because he

failed to demonstrate he possessed an extraordinary and compel-

ling reason for compassionate release under § 1B1.13. Although he

asserts his rehabilitation should be considered as an extraordinary

and compelling reason for compassionate release, his argument is

foreclosed by Bryant, where we held a defendant was only entitled

to compassionate release based on (A) the defendant’s medical con-

dition, (B) his age, or (C) his family circumstances. Bryant,

996 F.3d at 1248 (holding, following the enactment of the First Step

Act, § 1B1.13 continues to constrain a district court’s ability to eval-

uate whether extraordinary and compelling reasons were present

and that Application Note 1(D) did not grant discretion to courts

to develop other reasons that might justify a reduction in a defend-

ant’s sentence); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. n.1(A)–(C). Addition-

ally, aside from his general concerns about the risks of COVID-19,

Galvez has not demonstrated he suffers from a medical condition

that impairs his ability to provide self-care within the prison envi-

ronment. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. n.1(A). The district court

adequately considered Galvez’s claims his heart condition was an

extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release,

but ultimately concluded that, after he was vaccinated for

COVID-19, his heart condition no longer rose to the level of ex-

traordinary and compelling. Likewise, neither his rehabilitation

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10884

nor the length of his already-served time can substitute a finding of

extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant compassionate re-

lease.

Second, Galvez has failed to show the district court abused

its discretion when it weighed the § 3553(a) factors, as the court had

the discretion to determine how much weight to give to each of

the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Frazier, 823 F.3d 1329,

1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The district court has discretion to deter-

mine how much weight to grant to a specific § 3553(a) factor.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it explained the

§ 3553(a) factors weighed against his release, specifically, “his ex-

tensive criminal history, the violent nature of his crimes, and the

substantial time remaining on his sentence.” Because a court

“must find that all necessary conditions are satisfied before it grants

a reduction” under § 3582(c), the district court’s finding Galvez

failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason for

compassionate release was enough to preclude relief. See United

States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Un-

der § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must find that all necessary condi-

tions are satisfied before it grants a reduction,” and the absence of

any one of the necessary conditions—support in the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adher-

ence to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy statement—forecloses a sentence

reduction). Likewise, its finding the § 3553(a) factors did not sup-

port his early release was also sufficient to preclude relief. Accord-

ingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

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22-10884 Opinion of the Court 7

Galvez’s motion for compassionate release, the Government’s po-

sition is clearly correct as a matter of law, and it is entitled to sum-

mary affirmance of the district court’s denial of Galvez’s

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release.

Therefore, we GRANT the Government’s motion for sum-

mary affirmance of Galvez’s motion for compassionate release un-

der § 3582(c)(1)(A), and DENY as moot its motion to stay the brief-

ing schedule.

AFFIRMED.