The opinion
Case: 21-30625 Document: 00516645415 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/14/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 14, 2023
No. 21-30625 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Percy Taylor,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
James LeBlanc, Secretary,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:21-CV-72
Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV. § 1. So it should go without saying that the
government cannot hold a prisoner without the legal authority to do so, for
that would “deprive” a person of his “liberty . . . without due process of
law.” Id. Consistent with these principles, “[o]ur precedent establishes that
a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are timely released from prison.”
Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). “Detention of a prisoner
thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in the absence of a facially
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valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation of due process.”
Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Crittindon v.
LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 188 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[I]t is without question that
holding without legal notice a prisoner for a month beyond the expiration of
his sentence constitutes a denial of due process.”).
As our court has recently observed, however, the Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections has identified and exposed a
pattern of Louisiana inmates being detained past the expiration of their
sentences. See id. (describing study that “exposed widespread
overdetentions of DPSC prisoners”).
Percy Taylor was detained beyond the expiration of his sentence.
After his release, he sought redress for this violation of his rights by bringing
a lawsuit against various Louisiana officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Louisiana state law. The district court dismissed most of Taylor’s claims,
but allowed a supervisory liability claim against Department Secretary James
LeBlanc to proceed by denying qualified immunity. Now Secretary LeBlanc
appeals the denial of qualified immunity arguing, inter alia, that his conduct
wasn’t objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law.
The right to timely release is clearly established. But Taylor failed to
adequately brief—and has thus forfeited—any meritorious argument that
Secretary LeBlanc’s behavior was objectively unreasonable in light of that
right. Accordingly, we must reverse.
I.
For purposes of this appeal, we accept the factual allegations in
Plaintiff’s complaint as true. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009).
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Plaintiff Percy Taylor was sentenced in 1995 to 10 years imprisonment
for a drug felony offense in Louisiana, but he was later released on parole for
good behavior. While on parole, Taylor committed a new felony offense in
July 2001 but wasn’t arrested until February 20, 2002. Taylor was detained
pending trial, convicted on October 15, 2003, and subsequently sentenced as
a habitual offender. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and his parole
for the 1995 offense was revoked. Eventually, his life sentence for the 2003
felony conviction was amended to 20 years of imprisonment with “‘credit
for all time served.’”
In 2017, Taylor learned that his full-term release date was March 16,
2021, and that his good time adjusted date was May 5, 2020. But he believed
that his release date “should have been the last of October 2017 and no later
than January 1, 2018” had his good time credit been correctly calculated. So
he filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure grievance with the warden of
the facility where he was held. He contended that he should have received
credit toward the completion of his 10-year sentence for the 1995 drug
conviction based on the time he spent in jail between February 2002 and
October 2003 awaiting trial for his most recent felony offense. He contended
that he’d been wrongfully denied double credit for his period of pretrial
detention for his 1995 and 2003 sentences. The warden assigned the
grievance to a non-attorney employee of the Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections, who denied the grievance in July 2018. The denial
explained that Taylor wasn’t entitled to good time credit because the relevant
law didn’t go into effect until 2010, after both sentences were imposed.
The Administrative Remedy Procedure process allows for first and
second step review. See La. Admin. Code tit. 22, pt. I, § 325(J)(1)(a)–
(b). Taylor accordingly appealed to James LeBlanc, the Secretary of the
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. The appeal was
denied. The denial explained that, under a 2011 law, the 18 months of pretrial
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detention could apply only toward completion of the 20-year sentence
ultimately imposed for the 2003 felony conviction, and not also toward the
completion of the 10-year sentence imposed for the 1995 felony conviction.
See La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 880(E). It noted that overlapping credits
are prohibited when the sentences in question are consecutively, rather than
concurrently, imposed. See id. at 880(B).
Taylor sought review from the state district court. A commissioner of
the state district court issued a report recommending that the court grant the
petition for review. According to the report, Taylor’s parole had been
revoked no later than his arrest in February 2002, so he “should have been
shown as being in custody on both offenses” as of February 20, 2002, and
should have received credit toward the completion of his 1995 sentence as
well as his 2003 sentence for the time spent in custody between February 20,
2002 and October 15, 2003. The report noted that the version of the relevant
state law in effect when Taylor’s parole was revoked and he was convicted of
the 2003 felony offence didn’t expressly prohibit double counting of credit.
The state district court adopted the recommendation and ordered Taylor’s
master prison record be recalculated to give credit for time served as to both
sentences from February 20, 2002.
Taylor was released from prison on February 18, 2020—over two
years after the latest date he alleges he should have been released.
In late 2020, Taylor brought various claims against officials in state
court seeking damages for false imprisonment—including a § 1983
supervisory liability claim against LeBlanc. Defendants removed to federal
district court and moved to dismiss. Plaintiff amended the complaint and
responded to the motion to dismiss. The operative complaint alleged, inter
alia, that Secretary LeBlanc—a final policymaker—failed to initiate policies
ensuring inmates’ timely releases, that he failed to train or supervise
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employees carrying out the Administrative Remedy Procedure process, and
that he was aware that inmates were held for longer than their sentences due
to reports, public statements, and various cases documenting instances of
inmates being detained beyond their sentences. The district court granted in
part and denied in part the motion to dismiss.
Relevant here, the district court denied the motion as to the
supervisory liability claim against Secretary LeBlanc, finding that he wasn’t
entitled to qualified immunity. The district court found that Taylor
“sufficiently alleged that his unlawful detention and the patterns of unlawful
detention in [the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections]
stem from the same source—inadequate training and guidance,” noting that
the allegations included citations to various cases, reports, and statements
suggesting Secretary LeBlanc “was aware of similar constitutional violations
but failed to correct them.” In its discussion of whether Secretary LeBlanc’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable, the district court only addressed
whether Secretary LeBlanc acted with deliberate indifference to Taylor’s
constitutional rights. But deliberate indifference and objective
unreasonableness are separate inquiries. See, e.g., Hare v. City of Corinth,
Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Obviously, the analysis for
objective reasonableness is different from that for deliberate indifference (the
subjective test for addressing the merits).”).
Secretary LeBlanc appealed the denial of qualified immunity. 1
“Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review
orders denying qualified immunity.” Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 310
1
Taylor argues that the district court shouldn’t have dismissed the other claims,
but he did not file a notice of appeal, so only the district court’s denial of Secretary
LeBlanc’s assertion of qualified immunity is properly before us on this appeal.
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(5th Cir. 2022). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, accepting as true all well-pleaded
facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
II.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quotation omitted). “A public official is entitled to qualified immunity
unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. “Both steps in the qualified immunity
analysis are questions of law.” Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 503 (5th Cir.
2013). We are free to decide which prong of the qualified immunity analysis
to address first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242 (“[T]he judges of the district
courts and the courts of appeals are in the best position to determine the
order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient
disposition of each [qualified immunity] case.”).
We proceed to consider whether Secretary LeBlanc’s “actions were
objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the
violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. “The second prong of the qualified
immunity test is better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the
allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of
the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was
objectively unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.”
Hare, 135 F.3d at 326 (emphasis omitted).
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It is clearly established that inmates have the right to timely release
from prison consistent with the terms of their sentences. See Crittindon, 37
F.4th at 188; Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. Taylor’s claim against Secretary
LeBlanc nevertheless fails because he has forfeited any argument that the
Secretary’s conduct was objectively unreasonable.
The objectively unreasonable standard is not “that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has
previously been held unlawful; but it is . . . that in the light of pre-existing law
the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)
(citation omitted). The critical consideration is fair warning. See id. at 739–
41. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable official that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at
236.
Taylor does not present any meritorious argument that Secretary
LeBlanc acted in an objectively unreasonable manner in this case.
To begin with, he argues that whether Secretary LeBlanc acted
objectively unreasonably is a fact question not amenable to appellate review
at this stage in the proceedings. But we have long held precisely the opposite.
Whether “a given course of conduct would be objectively unreasonable in
light of clearly established law” is a “purely legal question” and plainly
within our jurisdiction on interlocutory review. Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d
337, 347 (5th Cir. 2004). See also Wyatt, 718 F.3d at 503 (noting both steps
of the qualified immunity analysis “are questions of law”).
To the extent that Taylor argues the merits, it’s inadequately briefed.
Taylor’s entire presentation on the issue of objective unreasonableness
amounts to just this single conclusory statement: “It is inherently
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unreasonable for the secretary . . . to fail to enact policies and procedures to
ensure the prompt release of inmates who have served their sentences in
accordance to law.” A single, unsupported sentence isn’t enough to
adequately brief the issue. See Melgar v. T.B. Butler Publ’g Co., Inc., 931 F.3d
375, 382 n.6 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that when an “issue [is] inadequately
briefed, it is forfeited”). To be sure, we have said that forfeiture principles
may apply “more leniently when the party who fails to brief an issue is the
appellee” rather than the appellant. Hernandez v. Garcia Pena, 820 F.3d 782,
786 n.3 (5th Cir. 2016). But Taylor bears the burden on the issue of objective
unreasonableness. See, e.g., Angulo v. Brown, 978 F.3d 942, 949 (5th Cir.
2020) (“The plaintiff has the burden to negate a properly raised defense of
qualified immunity.”). And he has not meaningfully briefed that issue. See,
e.g., Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 713 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir.
2013) (applying forfeiture to the appellee because an issue “has not been
meaningfully briefed”).
We reverse.
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