Scott Rigsby v. Godaddy Inc.

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT RIGSBY; SCOTT RIGSBY No. 21-16182

FOUNDATION, INC.,

D.C. No. 2:19-cv-

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 05710-MTL

v.

OPINION

GODADDY INC.; GODADDY.COM,

LLC; GODADDY OPERATING

COMPANY LLC; DESERT NEWCO

LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 9, 2022

Anchorage, Alaska

Filed February 3, 2023

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, M. Margaret McKeown, and

Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

2 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

SUMMARY *

Lanham Act

The panel (1) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an

action brought under the Lanham Act by Scott Rigsby and

the Scott Rigsby Foundation against GoDaddy Inc. et al.,

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief including return of

the domain name “scottrigsbyfoundation.org;” and (2)

dismissed Rigsby’s and the Foundation’s appeal of an order

transferring venue.

When Rigsby and the Foundation failed to pay

GoDaddy, a domain name registrar, the renewal fee for

scottrigsbyfoundation.org, a third party registered the then-

available domain name and used it for a gambling

information site.

The panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the

District Court for the Northern District of Georgia’s order

transferring the case to the District of Arizona because

transfer orders are reviewable only in the circuit of the

transferor district court.

The panel held that Rigsby could not satisfy the “use in

commerce” requirement of the Lanham Act vis-à-vis

GoDaddy because the “use” in question was being carried

out by a third-party gambling site, not GoDaddy, and Rigsby

therefore did not state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). As

to the Lanham Act claim, the panel further held that Rigsby

could not overcome GoDaddy’s immunity under the

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC. 3

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, which limits

the secondary liability of domain name registrars and

registries for the act of registering a domain name. The

panel concluded that Rigsby did not plausibly allege that

GoDaddy registered, used, or trafficked in his domain name

with a bad faith intent to profit, nor did he plausibly allege

that GoDaddy’s alleged wrongful conduct surpassed mere

registration activity.

The panel held that § 230 of the Communications

Decency Act, which immunizes providers of interactive

computer services against liability arising from content

created by third parties, shielded GoDaddy from liability for

Rigsby’s state-law claims for invasion of privacy, publicity,

trade libel, libel, and violations of Arizona’s Consumer

Fraud Act. The panel held that immunity under § 230

applies when the provider is an interactive computer

services, the plaintiff is treating the entity as the publisher or

speaker, and the information is provided by another

information content provider. Agreeing with other circuits,

the panel held that domain name registrars and website

hosting companies like GoDaddy fall under the definition of

an interactive computer service. In addition, GoDaddy was

not a publisher of scottrigsbyfoundation.org, and it was not

acting as an information content provider.

Finally, the panel held that Rigsby did not state a claim

for injunctive relief or declaratory relief.

4 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

COUNSEL

Charles M. Dalziel Jr. (argued), Dalziel Law Firm, Marietta,

Georgia, for Plaintiff-Appellants.

Harper S. Seldin (argued) and Jeffrey M. Monhait, Cozen

O’Connor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Paula L. Zecchini,

GoDaddy.com LLC, Kirkland, Washington; for Defendants-

Appellees.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

Scott Rigsby is a physically challenged athlete and

motivational speaker who started the Scott Rigsby

Foundation and registered the domain name

“scottrigsbyfoundation.org” with GoDaddy.com in 2007.

When Rigsby and the Foundation failed to pay the annual

renewal fee in 2018, allegedly a result of a glitch in

GoDaddy.com’s billing, a third party registered the then-

available domain name. To Rigsby’s dismay and his

customers’ confusion, scottrigsbyfoundation.org became a

gambling information site. Rigsby sued GoDaddy.com,

LLC and its corporate relatives (collectively, “GoDaddy”),

in the Northern District of Georgia for violations of the

Lanham Act and various state laws and sought declaratory

and injunctive relief including return of the domain name.

The Northern District of Georgia transferred the case to the

District of Arizona, which dismissed all claims.

Although Rigsby’s claims are sympathetic, relief is not

available against GoDaddy, which is a domain name

registrar. Rigsby cannot satisfy the “use in commerce”

RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC. 5

requirement of the Lanham Act vis-à-vis GoDaddy nor can

he overcome GoDaddy’s immunity under the

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) or

the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). Rigsby’s

problem lies with the entity that acquired the domain name;

his efforts to tag GoDaddy with liability miss the mark.

We affirm dismissal of the complaint against GoDaddy.

I. BACKGROUND

The Scott Rigsby Foundation, a nonprofit for wounded

veterans and other individuals with disabilities, and the

Foundation’s namesake, Scott Rigsby, a motivational

speaker and the first double-leg amputee to complete an Iron

Man Triathlon (collectively, “Rigsby”), promote an active

lifestyle for all physically challenged individuals. Rigsby

registered the domain name scottrigsbyfoundation.org with

GoDaddy.com in 2007, but in 2018 Rigsby failed to make a

payment to renew the registration due to GoDaddy’s billing

“glitch.” A third party, whom Rigsby refers to as a

“hijacker,” swooped in and registered the domain with

GoDaddy. The website scottrigsbyfoundation.org became

“a portal into an online gambling education site.” Neither

the website nor its new owner is a party to the underlying

suit or this appeal.

Rigsby sued GoDaddy in the Northern District of

Georgia to reclaim the domain scottrigsbyfoundation.org.

The district court transferred the case to the District of

Arizona on GoDaddy’s motion pursuant to the forum

selection clause in GoDaddy.com, LLC’s terms of service.

Rigsby’s Third Amended Complaint includes claims under

the Lanham Act and state-law claims for invasion of

privacy/publicity, trade libel, and libel. Rigsby also seeks a

declaratory judgment regarding ownership of the domain

6 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

name. Finally, Rigsby seeks an injunction under Arizona’s

Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1522, requiring

GoDaddy to reinstate Rigsby as the owner of

scottrigsbyfoundation.org.

The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice.

On appeal, Rigsby challenges the dismissal of his claims and

the transfer of venue.

II. ANALYSIS

A. VENUE CHALLENGE

We do not have jurisdiction to review the Northern

District of Georgia’s transfer order, as transfer orders “are

reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court.”

Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2005); see

also, e.g., In re U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 25 F.4th 692, 698 (9th

Cir. 2022) (“Our case law is clear that we do not have

jurisdiction to review the procedural or substantive propriety

of the Florida court’s transfer order.”). Rigsby’s remedy, if

any, lies in the Eleventh Circuit. See Posnanski, 421 F.3d at

980–81.

B. LANHAM ACT CLAIM

Moving to the claims over which we have jurisdiction,

Rigsby first invokes § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a), to claim that GoDaddy is “knowingly providing

the use of the domain name” in a deceptive way. This

approach is unsuccessful because the “use” in question is

being carried out by a third-party gambling site, not

GoDaddy. A claim aimed at the third party cannot be

repackaged to assert use by GoDaddy. Rigsby’s claim fails

for two reasons: Rigsby does not adequately plead that

GoDaddy used Rigsby’s mark “in commerce,” see 15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(a); and GoDaddy’s registrar activity is shielded from

RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC. 7

liability under the ACPA because Rigsby has not plausibly

alleged that GoDaddy was more than a registrar or that it

exhibited “bad faith or reckless disregard,” see 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1125(d)(2)(D)(ii); 1114(2)(D)(iii).

1. GoDaddy did not use Rigsby’s mark in

commerce.

We first consider Rigsby’s assertion that he did not have

to plead “use” of any “mark” in his Lanham Act claim.

Rigsby focuses on the lack of any trademark in his claim,

emphasizing that § 1125(a) allows suit completely apart

from “marks.” Rigsby is keying in on the wrong term.

Though Rigsby need not have a registered trademark to

bring claims under § 1125(a), the “use in commerce”

requirement still holds. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W.

Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“Such use requirement is firmly established in the case law

and, moreover, is embodied in the Lanham Act itself.”

(citation omitted)). To state a claim under § 1125(a), Rigsby

must plausibly allege that GoDaddy “use[d]” Rigsby’s

domain name “in commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).

His efforts fall short. When Rigsby stopped paying for

the scottrigsbyfoundation.org domain, a third party

purchased it. Rigsby contends that GoDaddy “active[ly]

push[ed] out” gambling content through the domain name,

but he does not plausibly allege that GoDaddy played a role

beyond registration. In “grant[ing] a particular domain name

to a registrant,” GoDaddy “simply grant[ed] it an address.”

Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 878 (6th Cir. 2002). “The

fact that the [third party] can then use its domain name to

infringe on the rights of a registered trademark owner does

not subject the registrar to liability for trademark

infringement or unfair competition.” Id.

8 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., we

dismissed claims of contributory infringement against the

domain name registrar Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”)

because registration of Lockheed Martin’s mark was not

“use in commerce” under § 1125(a). See 194 F.3d 980, 984–

85 (9th Cir. 1999). Although registrants had to pay NSI a

fee to use its routing service, we explained that “NSI does

not supply the domain-name combination any more than the

Postal Service supplies a street address by performing the

routine service of routing mail.” Id. We recognized that

“[w]here domain names are used to infringe, the

infringement does not result from [a registrar’s registration

activities], but from the registrant’s use of the name on a web

site . . . in connection with goods or services.” Id. at 985

(quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 985

F. Supp. 949, 958 (C.D. Cal 1997)). The registrar’s

“involvement with the use of domain names d[id] not extend

beyond registration.” Id. The same logic applies here.

While Lockheed Martin considered a claim for contributory

infringement, Rigsby’s suit under § 1125(a) is essentially a

repackaging of secondary liability claims, targeting the

domain registrar directly for the acts of the registrant.

Lockheed Martin’s reasoning still holds: “infringement does

not result from [the registrar’s services], but from the

registrant’s use” of the mark. See id. Rigsby has not

adequately alleged that GoDaddy “used” his mark, let alone

“in commerce,” sufficient to state a claim under § 1125(a).

2. Rigsby does not plausibly allege that GoDaddy

went beyond registration.

In 1999, Congress passed the ACPA, which amended the

RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC. 9

Lanham Act to protect against cybersquatting.1

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.

106–113, § 3001, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A–545 (1999). Under

the ACPA, a person may be civilly liable “if . . . that person

. . . has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark” and

“registers, traffics in, or uses a [protected] domain name.”

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). “Extending liability to registrars

or other third parties who are not cybersquatters, but whose

actions may have the effect of aiding such cybersquatting,

would expand the range of conduct prohibited by the

statute.” Petroliam Nasional Berhad, 737 F.3d at 550.

Prohibited conduct would expand “from a bad faith intent to

cybersquat on a trademark to the mere maintenance of a

domain name by a registrar, with or without a bad faith intent

to profit.” Id. at 550–51.

As a domain name registrar, GoDaddy is shielded from

liability under the ACPA, assuming that its activities do not

extend beyond registration. See id. at 548 (“GoDaddy.com,

Inc. (GoDaddy) is the world’s largest domain name registrar,

maintaining over 50 million domain names registered by

customers around the world.”). Congress explained that the

ACPA “codif[ies]” existing case law by “limiting the

secondary liability of domain name registrars and registries

for the act of registration of a domain name.” S. Rep. No.

106–140, at 11 (1999) (citing, inter alia, Lockheed Martin,

985 F. Supp. 949, aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999)); see

1

Cybersquatting entails “registering a domain name associated with a

protected trademark either to ransom the domain name to the mark

holder or to divert business from the mark holder.” Petroliam Nasional

Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 549 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013)

(citing Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.

2005)).

10 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

also Hawes v. Network Sols., Inc., 337 F.3d 377, 384 (4th

Cir. 2003) (“In creating these causes of action, Congress

intended expressly to limit the liability of domain name

registrars under the [Lanham] Act as long as the domain

name registrars comply with the conditions stated in [the

ACPA].”).

Rigsby has not plausibly alleged that GoDaddy

registered, used, or trafficked in his domain name with a bad

faith intent to profit, nor has he plausibly alleged that

GoDaddy’s allegedly wrongful conduct surpassed mere

registration activity. See § 1125(d)(1)(A); Rigsby is clearly

frustrated that GoDaddy “let some other person or entity

register the domain name,” but letting a third party purchase

an available domain name is standard practice for a domain

name registrar. See InvenTel Prods., LLC v. Li, 406 F. Supp.

3d 396, 402 (D.N.J. 2019) (“[W]ithout a warning that the

specific URL being registered would be used for an illicit

purpose, GoDaddy did not have a ‘bad faith intent to profit’

from the automatic registration of

‘www.hdmirrorcambuy.com.’”); Verizon Cal. Inc. v.

OnlineNIC, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1126 (N.D. Cal.

2009) (noting that the ACPA “exempts a domain name

registrar from liability resulting from its registration of

domain names for others where the registrar is acting in a

purely passive capacity”).

Rigsby equates GoDaddy’s lack of intervention with

active promotion, but GoDaddy “simply could not function

as a registrar, or as keeper of the registry, if it had to become

entangled in, and bear the expense of, disputes regarding the

right of a registrant to use a particular domain name.”

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 141 F. Supp.

2d 648, 655 (N.D. Tex. 2001). Rigsby has not alleged that

GoDaddy went beyond the registrar role by adding its own

RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC. 11

content or advertising to the site or “using” the domain name

for its own purposes. Instead, by merely allowing another

entity to register the domain name without bad faith intent to

profit from the registration, GoDaddy is shielded from

liability under the ACPA.

C. STATE-LAW CLAIMS

Rigsby’s state-law claims for invasion of privacy,

publicity, trade libel, libel, and violations of Arizona’s

Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1522, fare no

better, as the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.

§ 230, shields GoDaddy from liability. “Section 230 of the

CDA immunizes providers of interactive computer services

against liability arising from content created by third

parties.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.

Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)

(en banc) (footnotes omitted). In designing § 230,

“Congress ‘made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful

online speech through the separate route of imposing tort

liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other

parties’ potentially injurious messages.’” Gonzalez v.

Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2021) (alteration in

original) (citation omitted).

Section 230’s operative provision states “[n]o provider

or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as

the publisher or speaker of any information provided by

another information content provider.” § 230(c)(1). “No

cause of action may be brought and no liability may be

imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with

this section.” § 230(e)(3). Immunity applies when three

criteria are met: the provider is an interactive computer

service, the plaintiff is treating the entity as the publisher or

speaker, and the information is provided by another

12 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

information content provider. Dyroff v. Ultimate Software

Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019). GoDaddy

satisfies all three.

1. GoDaddy is a provider of an interactive

computer service.

Section 230 defines an “interactive computer service” as

“any information service, system, or access software

provider that provides or enables computer access by

multiple users to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).

“Courts typically have held that internet service providers,

website exchange systems, online message boards, and

search engines fall within this definition.” Fed. Trade

Comm’n v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d

Cir. 2016). Information content providers, in contrast, are

defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole

or in part, for the creation or development of information

provided through the Internet or any other interactive

computer service.” § 230(f)(3). “Under the statutory

scheme, an ‘interactive computer service’ qualifies for

immunity so long as it does not also function as an

‘information content provider’ for the portion of the

statement or publication at issue.” Carafano v.

Metrosplash.com., Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003);

see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,

591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Congress thus

established a general rule that providers of interactive

computer services are liable only for speech that is properly

attributable to them.”).

We have yet to consider whether domain name registrars

and website hosting companies like GoDaddy fall under the

“relatively expansive definition” of an “interactive computer

service.” See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123. It is a novel

RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC. 13

question for us, but one addressed by other courts. In Ricci

v. Teamsters Union Local 456, the Second Circuit

recognized that the term “has been construed broadly to

effectuate the statute’s speech-protective purpose” and

easily concluded that § 230 “shields GoDaddy from

publisher liability (with respect to web content provided by

others) in its capacity as a provider of an interactive

computer service.” 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing,

inter alia, Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found. Inc., No. CV

08–0054–PHX–SMM, 2008 WL 2705377, at *3 (D. Ariz.

July 9, 2008) (“GoDaddy, as a web host, qualifies as an

interactive computer service provider under the CDA.”));

see also Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d

398, 406 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014) (including “broadband

providers, hosting companies, and website operators” within

the term interactive computer service); Kathleen Ann Ruane,

Cong. Rsch. Serv. Legal Sidebar, LSB10082, How Broad a

Shield? A Brief Overview of Section 230 of the

Communications Decency Act 2 (2018),

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/LSB10082.pdf (last visited

January 26, 2023) (listing GoDaddy as an internet hosting

company shielded by Section 230 immunity).

We agree with this approach. Though Rigsby argues that

discovery is necessary to figure out which corporate relative

was the domain name registrar, he acknowledges that one of

the entities must be the registrar, claiming that GoDaddy

Operating Company, LLC “operates as a website hosting

provider” and “offers domain search, auctions, managed

hosting, site protection, website security, and other domain

registration services.” We can set aside which corporate

relative may be the actual registrar—Rigsby complains of

conduct related to the domain name registration, and we

accept a plausible claim against any of the named

14 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

defendants. As a domain name registrar and website hosting

provider, GoDaddy “provides or enables computer access by

multiple users to a computer server” and provides an

“interactive computer service” under § 230(f)(2).

2. GoDaddy is not a publisher.

We are not persuaded by Rigsby’s efforts to treat

GoDaddy as the “publisher” of scottrigsbyfoundation.org.

Rigsby’s state-law claims assert that he was harmed by the

gambling content on scottrigsbyfoundation.org, and he

alleges that “[s]ince the hijack of the site, daily, Defendants

have published false and defamatory statements concerning

the Foundation’s activities in the gambling world.” Rigsby

is mixing up GoDaddy’s registration of the domain name

with the creation and dissemination of a particular message.

The third-party registrant—arguably an information content

provider—is the one posting the content, not GoDaddy.

Section 230 shields GoDaddy from publisher liability when

another party is doing the speaking. See Ricci, 781 F.3d at

28 (holding that GoDaddy was shielded from publisher

liability where the complaint alleged only that it refused to

remove an allegedly defamatory newsletter).

3. GoDaddy was not acting as an information

content provider.

GoDaddy enjoys § 230 immunity because, contrary to

Rigsby’s assertion that GoDaddy made “the affirmative

decision to publish” the harmful gambling content,

GoDaddy was not an information content provider.

Websites may lose immunity if they make “a material

contribution” to a site’s content, see Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 892

(quoting Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir.

2016)), but Rigsby’s complaint is devoid of allegations that

GoDaddy contributed to the content of the gambling site.

RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC. 15

GoDaddy is offering only a domain name and a platform: a

“website does not create or develop content when it merely

provides a neutral means by which third parties can post

information of their own independent choosing online.”

Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1270 (quoting Klayman v. Zuckerberg,

753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).

We are similarly unpersuaded by Rigsby’s analogy to

our decision in Roommates.com. In Roommates.com, the

website created a series of questions and required

subscribers to answer them in order to register with the site.

See 521 F.3d at 1164. The site then displayed those answers

on the subscriber’s profile page. Id. at 1165. We held that

“Roommate’s own acts—posting the questionnaire and

requiring answers to it—are entirely its doing and thus

section 230 of the CDA does not apply to them.” Id. Rigsby

does not allege that GoDaddy required or otherwise induced

the third-party registrant to post the objected-to gambling

content on scottrigsbyfoundation.org. GoDaddy’s “act” was

limited to providing the third party a domain name, and

nothing in Rigsby’s complaint makes a plausible case for

GoDaddy acting as an information content provider on

scottrigsbyfoundation.org. Under these circumstances,

GoDaddy is entitled to § 230 immunity, and his state-law

claims are statutorily barred.

D. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

While Rigsby’s claim for injunctive relief is difficult to

decipher—as evidenced by the district court characterizing

it as a claim without a cause of action—his reference to

Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act leads us to construe his

claim as seeking relief under that statute. This generous

reading does not change the result; the claim is barred by

§ 230 of the CDA and it is inadequately pled.

16 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act prohibits deceptive or

unfair practices “in connection with the sale or

advertisement of any merchandise.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-

1522(A). Rigsby seeks an injunction forbidding GoDaddy

from, among other things, “passing off the merchandise and

the services of The Scott Rigsby Foundation as being the

merchandise and services of gambling interests.” Again,

Rigsby picks the wrong culprit. GoDaddy is not the one

“passing off the merchandise”—the third-party registrant is

the one allegedly promoting gambling services. Rigsby

seeks to hold GoDaddy liable as a “publisher or speaker” of

the third party’s message. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Because

GoDaddy is being sued in its capacity as a provider of an

interactive computer service, it is immune from consumer

fraud liability under § 230. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at

886.

To the extent that Rigsby is alleging that GoDaddy’s sale

of the domain name violated the Arizona Consumer Fraud

Act, Rigsby has still not adequately pleaded a claim. To

succeed, Rigsby must establish that GoDaddy (1) made a

misrepresentation in connection with the sale or

advertisement of merchandise, and (2) that conduct

proximately caused Rigsby to suffer damages. See

Cheatham v. ADT Corp., 161 F. Supp. 3d 815, 825 (D. Ariz.

2016); Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 666 P.2d 83,

87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). “The clear intent of this provision

is to protect unwary buyers from unscrupulous sellers.”

Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage Selections, Ltd., 971

F.2d 401, 407 (9th Cir. 1992). Because GoDaddy made no

representations regarding the domain or any advertising or

merchandise, this claim is a nonstarter.

RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC. 17

E. DECLARATORY RELIEF

Finally, we consider Rigsby’s requests for declaratory

relief. Under the Declaratory Judgement Act, “any court of

the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,

may declare the rights and other legal relations of any

interested party seeking such declaration . . . .” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201(a). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will

neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the

legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and

afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by

the parties.” United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353,

1357 (9th Cir. 1985). We review the district court’s denial

of declaratory relief for abuse of discretion. See Arizona v.

City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2014).

Rigsby seeks the following declarations:

1. GoDaddy’s UTSA is unenforceable against

Rigsby “given the failure to comply with the

electronic signature requirements of 15 U.S.C.

§ 7001 and A.R.S. 55-7001 et seq.”;

2. GoDaddy “cannot allow the hijacker to use the

domain name scottrigsbyfoundation.org”; and

3. “The Scott Rigsby Foundation Inc. is the proper

owner of the domain name

scottrigsbyfoundation.org, so that Defendants

must allow Plaintiffs to use that domain name.”

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining

to afford Rigsby a declaratory judgment that the UTSA is

unenforceable against him. Rigsby takes issue with the

forum selection clause of the UTSA, pursuant to which the

Northern District of Georgia transferred this case to the

District of Arizona. Because we lack jurisdiction to review

18 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

the Northern District of Georgia’s transfer order, Rigsby’s

effort to circumvent the jurisdictional barrier by reframing it

as a declaratory judgment request can’t fly. See Allstate Ins.

Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011)

(instructing courts to consider whether granting such relief

would “encourage the filing of declaratory actions as a

means of forum shopping”).

Moving to the second and third requested declarations,

Rigsby has pleaded no viable claims that would allow us to

provide the relief he seeks, namely blocking the third-party

registrant and reinstating Rigsby as the rightful registrant of

the domain name. See United States v. Washington, 759

F.2d at 1356 (recognizing that a court may “refuse to grant

declaratory relief because the state of the record is

inadequate to support the extent of relief sought”). But

Rigsby is not necessarily without potential recourse, though

we offer no view on his potential success. For example, the

ACPA provides for an action against a registrant directly,

requiring allegations that the registrant has a bad faith intent

to profit from the mark and “registers, traffics in, or uses

[the] domain name.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).

Although Rigsby presents a sympathetic ordeal, his ire,

and his claims, are misdirected. 2 We affirm the district

court’s dismissal of Rigsby’s claims, and we lack

jurisdiction to review the motion to transfer.

AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.

2

Given that Rigsby has had multiple opportunities to correct the

deficiencies in his complaint and has been unable to do so, the district

court acted within its discretion in denying him a fourth opportunity to

amend.