Dennis Ryno v. City of Waynesville

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-1046

___________________________

Dennis Ryno

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

City of Waynesville; Waynesville Police Department; Daniel Cordova; Kevin

Hillman; John Meir; Victor Weir

Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

Submitted: November 17, 2022

Filed: January 26, 2023

____________

Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

____________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

At the end of a week-long stalking and harassment investigation, police

arrested Dennis Ryno after he drove down a dead-end street and backed into a

driveway next to the one where the truck belonging to his ex-girlfriend—who had a

full order of protection against him—was parked. The officers later searched Ryno’s

home and electronics pursuant to warrants based on affidavits containing

inaccuracies. Prosecutors charged Ryno with felony stalking and harassment under

Missouri law, but eventually dismissed the charges. Following these events, Ryno

brought a variety of state and federal claims against the City of Waynesville (the

City), the Waynesville Police Department (WPD), WPD Chief Daniel Cordova,

WPD Officer John Meir, WPD Officer Victor Weir, and Pulaski County Prosecutor

Kevin Hillman (collectively, Appellees). The district court1 dismissed most of

Ryno’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and later

granted the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Ryno’s remaining claims.

Ryno now appeals the grant of summary judgment. Having jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I.

In August 2012, Ryno and Crystal Aynsley—Ryno’s romantic interest of over

four years—had an “out of control” argument at Aynsley’s apartment which

escalated to such a degree that the neighbors called the police. The next day,

Aynsley’s landlord caught Ryno lingering around the apartment complex, taking

pictures. She called the police. Officer Weir arrived on the scene to find Ryno

hiding behind some bushes near a dumpster. Officer Weir approached Ryno, who

told him that he was “keeping an eye on” Aynsley, as he feared that she was “making

a mistake” with a married soldier. Officer Weir proceeded to pat Ryno down,

discovering a digital voice recorder, binoculars, and a digital camera containing

pictures of Aynsley’s apartment and the soldier’s vehicle. Officer Weir then

informed Ryno that he was not permitted to return to the property.

From August 2012 through the middle of 2013, Ryno repeatedly drove by and

lingered around Aynsley’s apartment complex. He would drive around places where

Aynsley was and watch her. He sent people to talk to Aynsley on his behalf.

Aynsley started keeping a journal in October 2012 documenting all her run-ins with

Ryno, and by May 2013, she had “almost filled [two] spiral notebooks.” Based in

1

The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

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part on this journal, Aynsley received an ex parte order of protection against Ryno

in July 2013. Despite the order, Ryno persisted, and in November 2013, Pulaski

County prosecutors filed criminal charges against him for stalking and harassing

Aynsley.

On February 27, 2014, while Ryno’s criminal case was pending, Aynsley

received a full order of protection against him, to remain effective until February 26,

2015. The order provided that Ryno was not to communicate with Aynsley, nor was

he to “molest, stalk, or disturb [her] peace.” Around the same time, Ryno filed for

his own order of protection against Aynsley, alleging that she was setting him up

and following him around to make it look like he was stalking her. Shortly

thereafter, in March 2014, Ryno pled guilty to harassment of Aynsley and received

a suspended sentence with two years of probation. Importantly, the judgment of the

Pulaski County Circuit Court—signed by Ryno—provided that, as a condition of his

probation, he must “submit to searches of person, place [and] residence at [the]

request of [a probation officer] or [law enforcement officer].” At all times relevant

to this case, Ryno was on probation and subject to this search condition.

For approximately six months after Ryno’s guilty plea, all was quiet.

However, on September 29, 2014, Aynsley and a friend filed a report alleging that,

on September 25, 2014, they had seen Ryno in a nearby parking lot and that he had

then followed them to McDonald’s. On the same day, Aynsley’s landlord filed a

report alleging that, on both September 27th and 28th, she had seen “the gentleman

that my tenant, Crystal Aynsl[e]y had told me about” driving near and around

Aynsley’s apartment complex.

Based on these reports, on October 5, 2014, WPD Officer Kyle Prock

prepared a probable cause statement alleging that Ryno had violated Aynsley’s order

of protection. However, no further action was taken at that time. Then, on October

18, 2014, Aynsley’s landlord provided another statement to the WPD alleging that

she had seen a man matching Ryno’s description drive slowly through the apartment

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complex’s parking lot that same day. Aware that Aynsley had an order of protection

against Ryno, WPD began a weeklong investigation of Ryno on October 23, 2014.

All events occurred in Waynesville, Missouri. Waynesville is a small town,

consisting of a population of around 5,000 people. There are few purely

nonresidential streets, and one main road, Ichord Avenue, connects much of the

town. At the time of the investigation, Ryno lived in Plato, Missouri, approximately

34 miles away.2 Nonetheless, Ryno routinely traveled to Waynesville for innocuous

purposes. Often, he sat in his vehicle in the Price Cutter parking lot in the middle of

town, which allowed him to use public wi-fi. Indeed, during the investigation, the

officers knew this area to be Ryno’s usual parking spot. This parking lot sits along

Ichord Avenue.

On October 23, Chief Cordova and Officer Weir saw Ryno parked in his usual

spot near the Price Cutter between 4:30 PM and 4:45 PM. Later that day, Chief

Cordova saw what he believed to be Ryno’s car drive by Aynsley’s apartment

complex. The next day, October 24th, Chief Cordova and Officer Meir saw what

they believed to be Ryno’s car drive slowly past Aynsley’s apartment complex.

Later, they observed Ryno and Aynsley separately at a gas station. The officers

could not say who arrived first, but Chief Cordova thought that Ryno was staring in

Aynsley’s direction. Toward the end of surveillance that day, the officers saw a

vehicle that they believed to be Ryno’s drive slowly past Aynsley’s apartment

complex again.

The WPD paused surveillance for the weekend of October 25th and 26th.

Then on October 27th, Officer Weir surveilled Aynsley to see if Ryno would follow

her. He saw Ryno drive by on Ichord Avenue once while Aynsley was in the Price

Cutter and again while she was at a nearby restaurant. Officer Weir also saw Ryno

2

Although the distance is not in the record, we “may take judicial notice of a

fact for the first time on appeal,” Gustafson v. Cornelius Co., 724 F.2d 75, 79 (8th

Cir. 1983), including the distance between two places, Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v.

Robinson, 58 F. 723, 732 (8th Cir. 1893).

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drive near Aynsley’s apartment complex. On October 28th, Aynsley went to a

restaurant in the middle of town with her friend, Kevin Phillips. While they were

eating, Ryno drove by on Ichord Avenue at least four times. Finally, on October

30th, Aynsley told Chief Cordova that she had invited Phillips to join her for coffee.

Chief Cordova and Officer Meir then observed Aynsley as she drove to Phillips’s

house at 104 Summit Pass, parked her truck in the driveway, and headed to town

with Phillips in his car. Chief Cordova and Officer Meir waited in the parking lot

while Aynsley and Phillips went into the Price Cutter to get coffee. As they waited,

the Officers noted that Ryno was parked outside near his usual parking spot. After

a while, Ryno left.

Chief Cordova and Officer Meir then drove to the area of Summit Pass. While

they were there, Ryno drove past them headed in the direction of Phillips’s house,

so they turned around to follow him. Summit Pass is a dead-end street. Ryno drove

to 104 Summit Pass, then put his car in reverse and backed into the driveway of 102

Summit Pass, the residence next door to Phillips’s house. Officer Meir pulled up

and blocked Ryno’s car in the driveway.

Chief Cordova then approached Ryno and started asking him questions.

When Chief Cordova asked Ryno, “Do you have any friends down this street?”

Ryno stated, “I had a person who was following me earlier and I turned off and then

they went down this direction.” He further explained that his intention was merely

to use Summit Pass to turn around. Chief Cordova and Officer Meir then arrested

Ryno without a warrant for aggravated stalking and aggravated harassment. Officer

Weir had no personal involvement in the arrest.

An inventory search of Ryno’s car following his arrest revealed the following:

a wig, hats, gloves, a camcorder, recording devices, a pair of binoculars, a police

scanner programmed to the Waynesville frequencies, rope, coveralls, surgical

gloves, rolls of black trash bags, a hatchet, a pickaxe, a shovel, a crowbar, clothes,

and personal hygiene items. A subsequent search of Ryno’s car revealed a laptop

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computer, an external hard drive, papers, and cameras. These searches are

unchallenged on appeal.

The day after Ryno’s arrest, Pulaski County prosecutors charged him with

felony stalking and harassment. A few days later, Officer Weir spoke with Ryno’s

brother and sister, Terry Ryno and Pamela Hutsell. Hutsell told Officer Weir that

Ryno “types, ya know, he types everything. He, he just, ya know, he keeps notes on

everything . . . .” Following this interview, Officer Weir applied for and obtained

warrants to search, among other things, Ryno’s home and computer. The affidavit

for Ryno’s home provided that:

On 10/30/2014 Dennis Ryno was arrested for violation of an exparte

and stalking after he followed Crystal Aynsley to Summit Pass. There

is one way in and out of that area and he has no reason to be there

especially since she had an order of protection against him. This arrest

was the result of a three wing [sic] undercover operation wherein Mr.

Ryno was observed stalking the victim repeatedly. During the

inventory of his vehicle a computer, digital camera and notes were

among some items seized. In the trunk of Ryno’s vehicle the following

were located: rope, overalls, gloves (2 sizes), and shovel, hatchet, pick

and trash bags. . . . Mr. Ryno is on probation after pleading guilty to

Harassment of this same victim and a term and condition of his

probation is that he is subject to searches of his residence at the request

of law enforcement.

R. Doc. 67-1 at 7. The affidavit for Ryno’s computer states:

At the time of his arrest, Waynesville Police had been conducting a

surveillance operation of Mr. Ryno for multiple days. During the

course of that investigation, Mr. Ryno was seen driving by the victim’s

residence multiple times, following the victim multiple times, and

sitting outside of business[es] where the victim was located on multiple

times. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Ryno had multiple items with him

that were suspicious. The items included a police scanner set to the

Waynesville PD frequency, a camera, binoculars, recording devices,

garbage bags, a shovel, a pick ax, a hatchet, coveralls, a change of

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clothes, surgical gloves, rope, and soap. It should be noted that

Mr. Ryno is on probation after pleading guilty to harassment of the

same victim and a term and condition of his probation is that he is

subject to searches at the request of law enforcement. . . . On

11/02/2014 I spoke to Pamela Hutsell who is the sister of Dennis Ryno.

She told me that Ryno always writes everything down and then types

his information into the computer.

R. Doc. 67-1 at 23. Officer Meir and Chief Cordova reviewed and approved these

affidavits, the Circuit Court of Pulaski County issued the warrants, and the searches

were conducted. The searches yielded no additional incriminating evidence.

Prosecutors eventually dropped criminal charges against Ryno.

II.

In 2020, Ryno filed this action in Missouri state court, asserting a variety of

claims against the Appellees, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After

Appellees removed the suit to the district court, Ryno filed an amended complaint,

alleging claims of unreasonable seizure, conspiracy to cause false arrest,

unreasonable search, fabrication of evidence, excessive bail, abuse of process, and

negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss

Ryno’s claims for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in

part, holding that Ryno’s state-law claims were barred by Missouri’s statute of

limitations, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.130. It then dismissed Ryno’s claims against the

City, WPD, and Prosecutor Hillman. After this ruling, only three claims remained:

Ryno’s § 1983 claims against Chief Cordova, Officer Meir, and Officer Weir for

unreasonable seizure, conspiracy to cause false arrest, and unreasonable search. On

appeal, Ryno does not challenge the dismissal of any of his other claims.

Following discovery, the Appellees moved for summary judgment on Ryno’s

remaining claims. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity

because Ryno failed to show any Fourth Amendment violation, and even if he did,

it was not clearly established. The district court first addressed Ryno’s claim for

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unreasonable seizure. It held that the Appellees were entitled to summary judgment

on this claim because even though they arrested Ryno without a warrant, at the time

of his arrest, “the threshold of probable cause was met and exceeded due to the

allegations of multiple witnesses and the observations of [Officers] Cordova, Meir,

and Weir that Ryno’s conduct amounted to harassing, stalking, or disturbing

Aynsley’s peace.” Further, the district court reasoned, “Even if Ryno’s conduct did

not violate [Aynsley’s] Order of Protection, an arrest made pursuant to a mistaken

belief about applicability of such an order does not preclude a finding that the officer

had arguable probable cause to arrest.” Ultimately, the district court held that the

Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on this claim because “the totality of

the circumstances known to [them] on October 30, 2014, gave them sufficient

probable cause to believe that a crime had been or was being committed.”

Next, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees

on Ryno’s conspiracy-to-cause-false-arrest claim. It reasoned that such a claim

requires a plaintiff to “prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in

order to prevail,” and since Ryno could prove no underlying constitutional violation,

Appellees were entitled to summary judgment.

Finally, the district court reached Ryno’s claims for unreasonable search of

his home and electronics. Ryno argued that these searches violated the Fourth

Amendment because of various “false statements” in the warrant affidavits, without

which the warrants never would have issued. After considering this argument and

evaluating the affidavits in light of the whole record, the district court concluded that

“the search warrants in this case were supported by probable cause based on the

warrant affidavit, despite its inaccuracies. If the inaccuracies were removed from

the warrant affidavit, probable cause still exists for the search of Ryno’s home and

electronics.” Thus, the district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary

judgment on this final claim as well.

Ryno appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment. In his reply

brief, Ryno concedes that his unreasonable-seizure and conspiracy-to-cause-false-

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arrest claims do not involve Officer Weir. Additionally, Ryno clarified that his

appeal of the unreasonable search claim is limited to “the district court’s

determination about the computer and home searches.”

III.

“We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the record in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Wages v. Stuart Mgmt. Corp.,

798 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2015). “Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing

the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028,

1033 (8th Cir. 2007). Importantly, the “mere existence of a factual dispute is

insufficient alone to bar summary judgment; rather, the dispute must be outcome

determinative under prevailing law.” Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365, 366 (8th

Cir. 1989).

Initially, despite briefing from both parties on the issue of qualified immunity

below, the district court chose instead to address the merits of Ryno’s claims on

summary judgment. And although there is some equivocal language in the order, on

appeal the parties agree that the district court did not rule on qualified immunity.

Generally, “[w]hen the district court fails to rule on qualified immunity, we will

remand the case to the district court to decide the qualified-immunity question.”

Ferguson v. Short, 840 F.3d 508, 511 (8th Cir. 2016). However, we need not remand

the case where, as here, the issues presented on appeal are purely legal and the parties

briefed qualified immunity both before the district court and before us. See Hamner

v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1176 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that whether “allegations

show a violation of a clearly established right is a purely legal issue that is amenable

to consideration for the first time on appeal” especially where the parties “have been

given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue”). Further, evaluating

Ryno’s claims under the qualified-immunity framework now furthers the policies

behind the doctrine, which include “resolving immunity questions at the earliest

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possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). Therefore, we will

address Ryno’s claims under the qualified immunity framework.

To determine whether Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity, we

conduct a two-part inquiry: “(1) [whether] the facts, viewed in the light most

favorable to [Ryno], demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory

right; and (2) [whether] the right was clearly established at the time of the

deprivation.” Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2012) (first and third

alterations in original) (citation omitted). A right is “clearly established” when its

contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

As the Supreme Court has reiterated, “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” City of Tahlequah

v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting District of Columbia v.

Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)). “We have the ‘discretion to decide which of

the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.’” Lombardo v. City of

St. Louis, 38 F.4th 684, 690 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 735 (2011)). “If we conclude that the alleged facts do not violate a

constitutional right, then we need not address the second inquiry, and the

defendant[s] will be entitled to qualified immunity.” Groenewold v. Kelley, 888

F.3d 365, 371 (8th Cir. 2018).

A.

First, we address Ryno’s § 1983 claim for unreasonable seizure under the

Fourth Amendment. We begin by analyzing the first prong of the qualified-

immunity test: whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Ryno,

demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional right. Jones, 675 F.3d at 1161.

However, we must “simultaneously view[] the facts from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene” given the probable cause standard. Royster v.

Nichols, 698 F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Amendment protects the

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“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A warrantless arrest

violates the Fourth Amendment unless it is supported by probable cause.” Webster

v. Westlake, 41 F.4th 1004, 1010 (8th Cir. 2022). Officers have probable cause to

make a warrantless arrest “when the totality of the circumstances at the time of the

arrest ‘are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant has

committed or is committing an offense.’” Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523

(8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Here, at the time of Ryno’s arrest, at least Officers Weir and Meir were

partially familiar with the 2012-2013 background that culminated in Ryno’s

pleading guilty to a charge of harassing Aynsley. Further, all of the officers knew

about Aynsley’s order of protection against Ryno. Additionally, in late September

2014 and into the middle of October 2014, the WPD received several reports from

multiple witnesses about Ryno’s close proximity to Aynsley. During the weeklong

surveillance of Ryno, the officers saw him drive by Aynsley’s apartment complex

multiple times. They also saw Ryno sitting outside of businesses where Aynsley

was located multiple times.

Finally, on October 30, 2014, Chief Cordova and Officer Meir observed Ryno

drive down Summit Pass—the dead-end street where Phillips lived at 104 Summit

Pass, and then slowly reverse down the street and back into 102 Summit Pass, the

driveway next to Phillips’s.

The question that we must answer is whether, under these circumstances, a

reasonable officer would have believed Ryno had committed or was committing an

offense. Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010). The

2012-2013 background; the witness statements, see id. at 816-17 (“[O]fficers are

generally entitled to rely on the veracity of information supplied by the victim of a

crime . . . .”) (alterations in original) (citation omitted); the officers’ observations of

Ryno driving by Aynsley’s apartment complex and presence in the same places as

Aynsley throughout the week of October 23-30; Ryno’s presence in the driveway

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adjacent to the driveway in which Aynsley was parked; and Ryno’s inability to

adequately explain why he was on Summit Pass convince us that a reasonable officer

would have believed Ryno had committed or was committing a violation of Mo.

Rev. Stat. § 455.085.2 (violating an order of protection), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.090.1

(harassment), or Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.225.2-3 (stalking). Accordingly, there was no

Fourth Amendment violation, and the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

Even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Ryno, Ryno’s right

to be free from unreasonable seizure was not clearly established under these facts.

In other words, the officers had arguable probable cause. “Although this Court’s

opinions do not always expressly state as much, the terms ‘probable cause’ and

‘arguable probable cause’ are not interchangeable, and each term serves a different

purpose within the qualified immunity analysis.” Brown v. City of St. Louis, 40

F.4th 895, 901 (8th Cir. 2022). While the issue of probable cause addresses the first,

constitutional-violation prong, “the issue of arguable probable cause is properly part

of the resolution of qualified immunity’s second prong, the clearly established

prong.” Id. “Arguable probable cause exists even where an officer mistakenly

arrests a suspect believing it is based in probable cause if the mistake is ‘objectively

reasonable.’” Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523.

Here, at minimum, it was objectively reasonable for Chief Cordova and

Officer Meir to believe that Ryno had committed or was committing a violation of

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085.2 (violating an order of protection), Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 565.090.1 (harassment), or Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.225.2-3 (stalking). Accordingly,

arguable probable cause exists, meaning that it was not clearly established that

arresting Ryno on these facts would violate his right to be free from unlawful seizure.

Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Ryno’s

unreasonable-seizure claim because Chief Cordova and Officer Meir are entitled to

qualified immunity.

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B.

We now move to Ryno’s § 1983 claim against Chief Cordova and Officer

Meir for conspiracy to cause false arrest or unreasonable seizure. A § 1983

conspiracy claim requires a claimant to show: “(1) that the defendant conspired with

others to deprive him of constitutional rights; (2) that at least one of the alleged co-

conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that

the overt act injured the plaintiff.” White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir.

2008). But a claimant cannot succeed on such a claim without first proving the

“deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.” Id. Because we conclude that

no unreasonable seizure occurred, see supra Section III.A., Chief Cordova and

Office Meir are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well.

C.

Finally, we address Ryno’s § 1983 claim for the unreasonable search of his

home and computer under the Fourth Amendment. We begin again by asking

whether Ryno can prove a constitutional violation. Ryno is correct in arguing that,

in certain circumstances, one may succeed in proving a Fourth Amendment violation

where he shows an officer’s “probable cause statement contained a ‘deliberate

falsehood’” or that the officer “acted with ‘reckless disregard for the truth’ when he

prepared it.” Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

And as Ryno further asserts, a warrant containing material omissions may vitiate the

warrant in certain circumstances. See United States v. Ketzeback, 358 F.3d 987,

990 (8th Cir. 2004). However, we need not address these issues because, at the time

of the searches of Ryno’s home and computer, he was subject to a probation

condition that he “submit to searches of person, place [and] residence at [the] request

of [a probation officer] or [law enforcement officer].”

The Supreme Court has long held that a probationer has limited Fourth

Amendment rights because of a diminished expectation of privacy. See Griffin v.

Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987). Indeed, the “touchstone of the Fourth

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Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by

assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s

privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of

legitimate governmental interests.’” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19

(2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). Ryno’s “status

as a probationer subject to a search condition informs both sides of that balance.”

Id. at 119. After all, “[p]robation, like incarceration, is ‘a form of criminal sanction

imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.’”

Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (citations omitted). “Just as other punishments for criminal

convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation may impose

reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-

abiding citizens.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.

Here, the Missouri “judge who sentenced [Ryno] to probation determined that

it was necessary to condition the probation on [Ryno’s] acceptance of the search

provision.” Id. Further, “[t]he probation order clearly expressed the search

condition and [Ryno] was unambiguously informed of it.” Id. Indeed, Ryno signed

the judgment establishing the search condition. “The probation condition thus

significantly diminished [Ryno’s] reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 119-20.

In such a circumstance, the Fourth Amendment “requires no more than reasonable

suspicion to conduct a search of th[e] probationer’s house,” even without a warrant.

Id. at 121.

We conclude that reasonable suspicion supported the search of Ryno’s house.

“Reasonable suspicion exists when, considering the totality of the circumstances

known to the officer at the time, the officer has a particularized and objective basis

for suspecting wrongdoing.” United States v. Hamilton, 591 F.3d 1017, 1022 (8th

Cir. 2010). In the search-warrant affidavit for Ryno’s home, Officer Wier

misrepresented two facts. First, he averred that, “[Ryno] followed Crystal Aynsley

to Summit Pass.” This did not happen. Second, he averred that “Ryno was observed

stalking the victim repeatedly.” Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

Ryno, this is an overstatement as the officers only saw Ryno drive by Aynsley’s

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apartment complex multiple times and sit in public areas with her nearby. However,

the Constitution does not require “that every fact in the warrant affidavit is

necessarily correct,” but only “that the information put forth is believed or

appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,

165 (1978). Moreover, Officer Weir truthfully averred that the officers saw Ryno

on Summit Pass, a dead-end street. Further, Officer Weir described the many

suspicious items discovered in Ryno’s car. Finally, Officer Weir brought the search

condition of Ryno’s probation to the court’s attention. Despite inaccuracies in the

search-warrant affidavit for Ryno’s home, our analysis above, see supra Section

III.A., combined with what the officers found in Ryno’s car is sufficient for us to

determine that the officers had at least reasonable suspicion to search Ryno’s home,

as required by Knights.

Finally, we turn to the search of Ryno’s computer. Where a probationer is

unambiguously aware of a broad search condition like Ryno’s, we have held that

searches of personal property are permissible, even absent suspicion. See, e.g.,

United States v. Kuhnel, 25 F.4th 559, 564 (8th Cir. 2022) (holding that search of

probationer’s vehicle pursuant to probationary search condition was “reasonable and

permissible even in the absence of suspicion”); see also United States v. Jackson,

866 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 2017) (concluding that search of supervised

releasee’s cell phone was reasonable even absent suspicion when he was aware of

search condition and resided in residential reentry facility which prohibited cell

phones). However, we have never held that a probationary search condition

authorizes the search of a probationer’s personal property in any circumstances

absent suspicion. Given that the government may search a probationer’s home, an

area which lies “[a]t the very core” of the Fourth Amendment’s protections, Kyllo

v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001), based on nothing more than reasonable

suspicion—at least when he is subject to a search condition—the same standard is

more than sufficient to authorize the search of a lesser-protected area like a

computer. We thus assume without deciding that the reasonable suspicion standard

applies to the search of Ryno’s computer.

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In the search-warrant affidavit for Ryno’s computer, there is only one slight

inaccuracy. Officer Weir averred that, during the Ryno surveillance, “Ryno was

seen driving by the victim’s residence multiple times, following the victim multiple

times, and sitting outside of business[es] where the victim was located on multiple

times.” Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ryno, technically, the

officers did not witness him following Aynsley. Ryno also takes issue with Officer

Weir’s statement that “I spoke to Pamela Hutsell who is the sister of Dennis Ryno.

She told me that Ryno always writes everything down and then types his information

into the computer.” However, we conclude that it is at least an accurate paraphrasing

of her statement, which the recording demonstrates was, “I know he types, ya know,

he types everything. He, he just, ya know he keeps notes on everything . . . .”

Because there is only one minor inaccuracy in the otherwise thorough search-

warrant affidavit for Ryno’s computer, and the issuing judge found that there was

enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause, that judgment is entitled to

deference on appeal. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); see also

Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-65. Even if it were not, our analysis above, see supra Section

III.A., the items found in Ryno’s vehicle during the searches, and Hutsell’s statement

support a finding of at least reasonable suspicion. Thus, we affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment on Ryno’s unreasonable-search claim because the

Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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