Reynolds v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State University CA2/3

Filed 12/13/22 Reynolds v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State University CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

KATHERINE REYNOLDS, B315543

Plaintiff and Appellant,

(Los Angeles County

v. Super. Ct. No. 20STCV13567)

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE

CALIFORNIA STATE

UNIVERSITY,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of

Los Angeles County, Michael E. Whitaker, Judge. Affirmed.

Vaziri Law Group, Matthew M. Taylor and Karan S. Gill

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Danielle F. O’Bannon,

Assistant Attorney General, David Adida and Ezra D. Siegel,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Katherine Reynolds appeals the grant of a motion for

summary judgment on her complaint alleging a dangerous

condition of public property against the Board of Trustees of The

California State University 1 (CSU). Reynolds contends the trial

court erred because it based its decision upon an issue not raised

in CSU’s moving papers, and because there were triable issues of

material fact as to whether the area where Reynolds was injured

constituted a dangerous condition. We find no error and

therefore affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

I. Underlying facts

In April 2020, Reynolds filed a complaint against CSU

alleging general negligence and a dangerous condition of public

property (Gov. Code, § 835).2 Reynolds alleged that, on

October 12, 2019, she fell on a negligently owned, maintained,

and operated pedestrian walkway at CSU’s campus in Pomona,

California, sustaining severe and permanent injuries.

The incident occurred when Reynolds, accompanied by four

children, went to visit the annual Pumpkin Patch Festival on the

Cal Poly Pomona campus. The festival is a carnival-type event

with a 27-year history, hosted on a large field at the agricultural

school, surrounded by a white fence. Between 6,000 and 8,000

people visited the festival on the day of Reynolds’s accident, but

CSU planned for as many as 10,000 daily visitors.

1 TheBoard of Trustees of The California State University

was erroneously sued as The California State University.

2 All

undesignated statutory references that follow are to

the Government Code.

2

Reynolds drove to the festival in her husband’s car, which

had a handicap placard. Festival employees directed her to park

in the parking lot designated for persons with disabilities, which

was located on the opposite side of the field from the festival

entrance. A shuttle from that lot to the festival entrance was

available, but Reynolds declined to use it because she believed

the shuttle would not accommodate the wagon they had brought

to carry pumpkins, although she did not inquire specifically.

CSU’s plans and procedures required pedestrian traffic to

be directed toward the entrance. According to Reynolds, however,

she received no instruction from staff and, following 10 or 15

other pedestrians, decided to take a “ ‘short cut’ ”around the field

in the opposite direction, down a closed road and past a digital

message board indicating the road was closed and there was no

access to the festival that way. The signs did not specifically

state that pedestrians could not utilize the road.

The roadway had no sidewalk and was bordered only by a

strip of dirt and the white fence. Reynolds, wearing flip-flop

sandals, described that she followed other pedestrians along the

road—including a mother with a stroller and a woman carrying

her baby—until the white fence ended. She then turned down an

unpaved embankment, perpendicular to the road and separating

the crowd from the festival entrance, that was made up of loose

dirt and rocks. Nothing obstructed Reynolds’s view of the

embankment; her vision was “good” and the day was “bright and

sunny.” No signs designated the embankment as a pathway,

walkway, trail, or entrance to the festival or the adjacent farm

store.

Concerned that the children would lose control of the

wagon, Reynolds directed them to carry the wagon down the dirt

3

embankment. Because others were continuing down the

embankment, Reynolds did not think twice about doing so as

well. As she stepped down, she was not in a rush. She reached

toward the adjacent fence for balance but was unable to touch it

before her left foot slipped forward while her right leg bent under

her and she fell to the ground. She immediately laughed because

the children looked scared, but she had seriously injured her

ankle.3

Later, a CSU claims examiner searched a database

containing all bodily injury claims that occurred at Cal Poly

Pomona’s campus since July 1, 2010, and found no records of a

prior fall at that location. A campus police supervisor searched a

database of police reports dating to January 2012 and found no

records of a medical assist for a trip and fall incident within a

mile of the embankment area The festival’s director, who had

held that role since 2015, similarly had no record or recollection

of a fall or other accident in the area where Reynolds fell.

II. The summary judgment motion

In May 2021, CSU moved for summary judgment, arguing

that natural condition immunity and trail immunity rendered it

immune from suit, it had no notice of any dangerous condition,

and Reynolds’s failure to exercise due care prevented her from

showing the condition posed a substantial risk of injury.

Specifically, CSU argued that any person exercising due care

would have observed the steepness of the embankment and the

absence of a sign designating it as a path, and would have

declined to navigate it in flip-flops.

3 Although Reynolds told police that her sandal broke as

she was walking down the hillside, causing her to slip, Reynolds

insisted in her deposition that her sandal did not break.

4

Reynolds filed an opposition, specifically arguing, among

other things, that triable issues of fact existed as to whether she

“exercised due care and used the area in a foreseeable manner.”

Reynolds contended that it was foreseeable that pedestrians

would have attempted to take the shortest route to the entrance,4

that, as Californians in October, they would be wearing flip-flops,

that they would decline the free shuttle if they had wagons, and

that they would ignore a no-access sign because the sign did not

specifically mention pedestrians.

CSU filed a reply brief, arguing, among other things, that

pedestrians utilizing the embankment was not foreseeable

because: (1) Reynolds admitted to never having inquired into

whether she could carry her wagon on the free shuttle, and, even

if she could not do so, it was not foreseeable that the public would

walk down a closed road and onto an unimproved slope when the

designated entrance was within walking distance; (2) the

hypothetical existence of a shorter route did not mean its use was

foreseeable; and (3) the “road closed” sign could not reasonably be

interpreted as open to pedestrians. Further, even if using the

slope as a walking path was foreseeable, it was not consistent

with exercising due care, as required for dangerous condition

liability.

In August 2021, the trial court issued a tentative ruling

granting CSU’s motion, concluding that Reynolds had not met

her burden to show triable issues of material fact existed because

4 In support of this argument, Reynolds attached a

declaration from a forensic engineer who reviewed Google Earth

aerial view measurements and determined that the shortest path

of travel from the parking lot to the entrance of the festival was

through the “steeply sloped” embankment.

5

the alleged dangerous condition was “open and obvious to any

reasonable person exercising due care.” This was especially the

case where Reynolds admitted that there were no signs directing

her to the festival via the embankment, she was concerned about

the children accompanying her descending the embankment, she

could have used the wooden fence as a handrail, and she was

wearing flip-flops as she descended. The court also cited the

photographs of the slope and the testimony of Reynolds’s expert

that the embankment was “steeply sloped” as further evidence of

the obviousness of the purportedly dangerous condition. Given

the obvious nature of the alleged condition, the court reasoned,

any person “could reasonably be expected to see it” and therefore

there was no evidence of “foreseeability of harm.” The court

elaborated: “In other words . . . no reasonable person would

conclude that the subject property created a substantial risk of

harm to users who would use the subject property with the due

care that is expected.”

At oral argument, Reynolds reasserted the arguments in

her moving papers, arguing, among other things, that because

others were utilizing the embankment, there was a jury question

as to whether the embankment created a substantial risk of harm

to those utilizing the condition with due care. When Reynolds

argued that CSU’s position that the “condition was not so obvious

so as to trigger constructive notice” was inconsistent with the

court’s tentative ruling, the trial court pointed out that she was

“conflating . . . notice and what is open and obvious to a

reasonable person,” which were two separate issues.

Finally, Reynolds suggested that the trial court had based

its tentative ruling on an argument—that is, whether the

dangerous condition was “open and obvious”—that CSU had

6

never “specifically tendered” and requested further briefing. The

trial court responded that the issue had been “fully briefed,”

referencing specific pages of CSU’s moving papers and that its

tentative ruling had relied on the same cases. The trial court

adopted its tentative ruling, and Reynolds timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

The applicable standard of review of a ruling on a motion

for summary judgment is well established. “The purpose of the

law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism

to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine

whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to

resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25

Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).)

The moving party “bears the burden of persuasion that

there is no triable issue of material fact and that [it] is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at

p. 850; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant

moving for summary judgment must “ ‘show[ ] that one or more

elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established’ by the

plaintiff. [Citation.]” (Aguilar, at p. 853.) A defendant meets its

burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an

essential element of a plaintiff’s claim. (Guz v. Bechtel National,

Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) Alternatively, a defendant

meets its burden by submitting evidence “that the plaintiff does

not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence”

supporting an essential element of its claim (Aguilar, at p. 854),

or that “there is a complete defense to that cause of action.”

(Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 997).

7

On appeal from a summary judgment ruling, we review the

record de novo and independently determine whether triable

issues of material fact exist. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., supra,

24 Cal.4th at p. 334.) We resolve any evidentiary doubts or

ambiguities in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

(Saelzler, at p. 768.) Because a decision to permit a continuance

to present additional facts or law in opposition to a motion is

discretionary (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12

Cal.App.4th 59, 73), we review such a determination for an abuse

of discretion. (FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 35

Cal.App.4th 69, 72.)

“In performing an independent review of the granting of

summary judgment, we conduct the same procedure employed by

the trial court. We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the

elements of the claim, (2) the motion to determine if it establishes

facts justifying judgment in the moving party’s favor, and (3) the

opposition—assuming movant has met its initial burden—to

‘decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the

existence of a triable, material fact issue.’ ” (Oakland Raiders v.

National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) “We

need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons

in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial

court, not its rationale.” (Ibid.) Thus, a reviewing court “will

affirm a summary judgment if it is correct on any ground that the

parties had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court,

regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.” (Angelotti v. The

Walt Disney Co. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1402 (Angelotti).)

8

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

granting summary judgment without affording

Reynolds an opportunity to address issues not raised

in the moving papers

We begin with Reynolds’s contention that the trial court

improperly granted summary judgment on an issue not raised in

CSU’s moving papers. This contention is contrary to the record.

The theory upon which the trial court granted summary

judgment was the subject of extensive litigation both in the

written briefing and at oral argument. Therefore, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in granting CSU’s motion without

permitting further briefing or argument.

As described above, the trial court granted summary

judgment on the ground that the subject property was not a

“dangerous condition.” The court reasoned that because the

alleged dangerous condition was “open and obvious . . . . no

reasonable person would conclude that [it] created a substantial

risk of harm to users who would use [it] with the due care that is

expected.” In other words, “foreseeability of harm” was “absent”

under the facts presented.

Whether the embankment was a ”dangerous condition” was

an unmistakably central area of contention between the parties

throughout the summary judgment proceedings. In its holding,

the trial court cited the precise cases and language that CSU had

invoked in its moving papers. Reynolds’s opposition addressed

the issue specifically, alleging several specific reasons that triable

issues of fact existed as to whether she “exercised due care and

used the area in a foreseeable manner.” CSU’s reply brief further

elaborated on this theory, dissecting each of the reasons that

Reynolds’s opposition identified as a basis for trial on this issue.

9

The court then issued a tentative ruling indicating it would grant

the motion on this precise basis, pointing directly to the portion of

CSU’s moving papers raising this argument.

Although Reynolds’s counsel claimed at oral argument that

the trial court was ruling on an unbriefed issue and asked for a

continuance, he never indicated what points he would make that

he had not already addressed.5 That counsel’s oral argument

referenced cases and facts relevant to the precise issue upon

which the trial court ruled underscored that he was amply

prepared to address the issue. Therefore, as Reynolds’s appellate

briefs elsewhere acknowledge, she had ample notice and

opportunity to litigate the precise basis for the trial court’s

summary judgment ruling.6

5 Reynolds primarily takes issue with a single line in the

trial court’s decision declaring that CSU had argued that the

dangerous condition was “open and obvious.” Though Reynolds is

correct that CSU’s briefing did not deploy the precise phrasing

“open and obvious,” she also acknowledges that the trial court, in

the next sentence of its order, restated the contention as denying

liability for injuries resulting from dangers that were obvious or

“ ‘could have been observed had [Reynolds] exercised ordinary

care.’ ” The trial court was therefore at all times ruling on one

singular issue, which the parties had exhaustively briefed.

(Fredette v. City of Long Beach (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 132

(Fredette) [no dangerous condition because danger, if any, was

“obvious to anyone using” facility].) We therefore reject

Reynolds’s contentions regarding the trial court’s phrasing as

overly formalistic.

6We disagree with Reynolds’s assertion that this portion of

CSU’s motion was actually directed toward Reynolds’s

contributory negligence, a legally distinct defense to a section 835

10

Even accepting Reynolds’s assertion that the trial court

ruled on an unbriefed issue, Reynolds does not proffer what

additional argument she would have raised had she been afforded

the opportunity to do so. As we address in the section that

follows, her appellate attacks on the merits of the trial court’s

decision are no more persuasive than her arguments below.

Therefore, we are unconvinced that any additional argument

would have altered the outcome. (Angelotti, supra, 192

Cal.App.4th at p. 1402; see Red Mountain, LLC v. Fallbrook

Public Utility Dist. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 333, 347 [appellant’s

burden to demonstrate prejudicial error]; see also Cal. Const.,

art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475 [“No judgment, decision or

decree shall be reversed or affected by reason of any error

. . . unless it shall appear from the record that such error . . . was

prejudicial . . . and that a different result would have been

probable if such error . . . had not occurred or existed.”].)

Taking these circumstances together, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in ruling on the motion and denying counsel’s

request for a continuance.

III. Summary judgment was appropriate because no

trier of fact could reasonably conclude the

embankment created a substantial risk of injury

when used with due care in a foreseeable manner

A public entity is generally not liable for any injury,

whether arising out of an act or omission of the entity or

employee or any other person, except as provided by statute.

action that CSU did not raise. (See Mathews v. City of Cerritos

(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1384 (Mathews) [contributory

negligence is “defense” distinct from reasonably foreseeable use

with due care].)

11

(§ 815, subd. (a); Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 838.)7

Under section 835, a public entity is liable for injuries caused by

a dangerous condition of its property or its failure to warn of a

dangerous condition on or near its property, provided that a

plaintiff can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

injuries were “proximately caused by the dangerous condition,

[and] that the dangerous condition created a reasonably

foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred.”

(Harland v. State of California (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 475, 483.)8

Section 830, subdivision (a) defines “dangerous condition”

as “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as

distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury

7 Although the trial court did not separately analyze

whether summary judgment was appropriate as to Reynolds’s

general negligence cause of action, that claim unmistakably

failed because it did not allege a statutory basis. (Miklosy v.

Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899–

900.) As Reynolds raises no arguments with respect to it, we

need not address it further.

8 Government Code section 835 provides: “Except as

provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a

dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes

that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the

injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous

condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably

foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and

that either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an

employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment

created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had

actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under

Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken

measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”

12

when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in

the manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be

used.” “Any property can be dangerous if used in a sufficiently

abnormal manner; a public entity is required only to make its

property safe for reasonably foreseeable careful use.” (Mathews,

supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384.) “Whether property is in a

dangerous condition often presents a question of fact, but

summary judgment is appropriate if the trial or appellate court,

viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines

that no reasonable person would conclude the condition created a

substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due

care in a manner which is reasonably foreseeable that it would be

used.” (Id. at p. 1382; see Peterson v. San Francisco Community

College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 810 [summary judgment

inappropriate where reasonable minds can differ as to existence

of dangerous condition].) Assessing this question requires

consideration of a totality of the circumstances including, but not

limited to: the intrinsic nature and quality of the defect, any

circumstances surrounding the accident that might have caused

the defect to be more dangerous than usual (e.g., the time of day

and lighting), and whether there is evidence of any prior injuries

from the same defect. (Fielder v. City of Glendale (1977) 71

Cal.App.3d 719, 734.)

Here, no trier of fact could reasonably conclude the

embankment was a dangerous condition—that is, that it created

a substantial risk of injury when used with due care in a

foreseeable manner. The undisputed facts showed that the

embankment was a steep dirt slope, neither designed nor in any

way advertised as a walkway, that Reynolds reached by walking

down a road clearly marked as closed to festival-goers, instead of

13

utilizing the free shuttle available to her. Moreover, Reynolds

admitted to clearly observing the dangerous condition of the slope

and being “concerned” about it before choosing to take the risk of

navigating it in flip-flops and without utilizing the adjacent

wooden fence to brace herself.9

Thus, both the self-apparent nature of the alleged danger

and Reynolds’s choices in the face of that danger were, in their

totality, fatal to her dangerous condition claim. (See Fredette,

supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 132 [no “dangerous condition” where

“physical characteristics” made danger “apparent to all users”];

Mathews, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1384–1385 [reaching

similar conclusion, even as to child held to lower standard of care,

as to descending steep hill]; see also Davis v. City of Pasadena

(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 701 [plaintiff’s conscious choice to bypass

obviously safer route is not employing due care];10 Biscotti v.

Yuba City Unified School Dist. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 554, 559

[not “foreseeable” that plaintiff exercising due care would climb

fence to get to other side].)11 The lack of prior incidents at the

9 Reynolds’s argument that her statements only suggested

concern for the children accompanying her did not render the

condition any less obvious.

10 Reynolds’s attempt to distinguish Davis v. City of

Pasadena, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 70, as a case where plaintiff

declined to utilize an available alternative handrail, as opposed

to the fence at issue here is not convincing. In our view, the

substance of the safer alternative is of marginal relevance

compared to its availability in the first place.

11 Our reference to Reynolds’s circumstances is not

intended to suggest her particular lack of due care plays any role

in our analysis. After all, “the fact the particular plaintiff may

14

site, despite its long history of well-attended events, only

buttresses that conclusion. (Fielder v. City of Glendale, supra,

71 Cal.App.3d at p. 734.)

Reynolds’s further arguments suggesting otherwise are

unavailing. For example, she suggests that because other

pedestrians, including a mother with a stroller, were utilizing the

embankment to attend the festival without incident, and that the

embankment was the shortest path of travel, the dangerous

condition was “less obvious.” Even crediting that Reynolds took

the shortest possible “route” to the festival with the crowd she

described, this does not bear upon our conclusion that the users

of the route, however many there were, were not exercising due

care. The record is clear that the alleged group of 10 to 15 people

disregarded signs indicating the road, which had no apparent

pedestrian path, was closed, then proceeded down a steep dirt

embankment.

To the extent that Reynolds contends she was induced to

use the embankment as a walking path because the road closure

sign did not expressly prohibit pedestrians from doing so, we do

not share that view. In Morin v. County of Los Angeles (1989)

215 Cal.App.3d 184, another division of this court was faced with

a similar argument regarding a sign on a pier that warned

against “swimming within 200 feet thereof.” (Id. at p. 193.) The

court rejected the argument, reasoning that the sign’s placement

not have used due care is relevant only to his comparative fault

and not to the issue of the presence of a dangerous condition.”

(Huffman v. City of Poway (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 975, 992.)

Thus, we summarize her testimony only in connection with

assessing “the risk [the condition] posed to an ordinary

foreseeable user.” (Ibid.)

15

did not encourage a “reasonable person” to swim 300 feet from

the pier, as plaintiff had done when he encountered the alleged

dangerous condition. (Id. at p. 194.) Similarly, the closure signs

at issue here could not reasonably be construed as inviting

pedestrians to utilize the road to walk to the festival’s entrance,

especially where a free shuttle was available from the lot where

Reynolds parked. Certainly, able counsel with the benefit of

hindsight could readily devise a contrary reading of the signage,

but that is not the metric that section 830, subdivision (a)

requires us to apply.

In sum, given Reynolds’s choices despite the obvious risks

associated with the alleged condition, no reasonable factfinder

could have concluded that the embankment was a “dangerous

condition.” (Fredette, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 132.) That is,

no trier of fact could reasonably conclude the alleged condition

created a substantial risk of injury when used with due care in a

reasonably foreseeable manner. (Mathews, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1382.)12 The trial court properly granted summary

12 Despite Reynolds’s counterarguments, CSU’s assertion

that the embankment was not a dangerous condition because it

was “obvious” is not in tension with its contention that it did not

have actual or constructive notice of the alleged condition. The

argument that a condition was known or was otherwise so

“obvious” that the public entity should have discovered its

dangerousness—as required for actual or constructive notice

(§ 835.2)—is plainly distinct from the argument that a condition

is not “dangerous” because the alleged danger was so “obvious”

that no reasonable person can “ignore the notice which the

condition itself provides.” (Fredette, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at

p. 132.) As the trial court correctly noted, these are discrete

elements, one concerning the public entity’s awareness of the

16

judgment to CSU. In light of this disposition, we need not

address the alternative bases that CSU advances for upholding

the trial court’s summary judgment ruling. (Angelotti, supra, 192

Cal.App.4th at p. 1402.)

dangerous character of a latent condition, and the other involving

whether a foreseeable user exercising due care might fail to

anticipate the danger. (Id. at pp. 131–132 [constructive notice

has “no application” where condition is so obvious it is not

“dangerous”]; see Barone v. City of San Jose (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d

284, 289 [dangerous condition analysis “interwoven” with—but

distinct from—notice analysis].) The latter is a threshold

question to the former, but each inquiry serves a distinct purpose

in narrowing governmental liability. (See Fredette, at p. 132

[definition of “dangerous condition” recognizes that entity owes

no obligation to protect individuals failing to exercise public

property without care, even if such users are foreseeable];

Drummond v. Redondo Beach (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 715, 720

[municipality’s knowledge of not just condition, but of its

dangerousness, is essential to avoid “render[ing] [them] an

insurer against accidents”].)

17

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Board of Trustees of the

California State University is awarded its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

EGERTON, J.

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