holding that there is 1 no clearly established constitutional “right to privacy” for juvenile records even when 2 disclosed to third parties
How later courts described this case
- holding that there is 1 no clearly established constitutional “right to privacy” for juvenile records even when 2 disclosed to third parties
- holding that there is no clearly established constitutional “right to privacy” for 24 juvenile records even when disclosed to third parties
- holding social workers entitled to qualified 4 immunity because there was no clearly established constitutional “right to privacy” for juvenile 5 records even when disclosed to third parties
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUN 24 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ARMONIA RIGSBY; J.R., a minor No. 11-56473
Guardian Ad Litem Armonia Rigsby,
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-02766-SJO-PJW
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a
subdivision of the State of California;
DEBORAH DE LA PARRA, individually
and in capacities with the County of Los
Angeles Department of Childrens
Services; KARY IKEMOTO, individually
and in capacities with the County of Los
Angeles Department of Childrens
Services,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 7, 2013
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: PREGERSON and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and GWIN, District Judge.**
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Armonia Rigsby and her minor son J.R. (“Plaintiffs”),
appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim in favor of Defendants-Appellees, the County of Los Angeles and two
County social workers (“Defendants”). Plaintiffs contend that Defendants
accessed information from J.R.’s juvenile court record and included that
information in a report prepared for a separate juvenile proceeding. Plaintiffs
assert that under Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 2003),
Defendants’ use of information from J.R.’s juvenile court record violates their
federal right to privacy.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1998). We
affirm.
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs’ privacy rights were violated, Defendant
social workers are entitled to qualified immunity because the rights that Plaintiffs
seek to protect were not clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.
Gonzalez did not address the access of juvenile court records by social workers,
**
The Honorable James S. Gwin, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
2
nor did it address the disclosure of juvenile court records to third parties. See Kwai
Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 976 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
right was not clearly established because the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court had
never squarely addressed the alleged right).
Further, there is no triable issue of material fact concerning Plaintiffs’ claim
against the County under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). It is undisputed that Plaintiffs did not present any
evidence to demonstrate that the County is liable for constitutional deprivations
committed pursuant to a governmental policy or custom. Plaintiffs contend that
they did not have discovery on this issue, but they failed to request such discovery
to oppose Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
3