United States v. Muller Vedrine

USCA11 Case: 20-13259 Date Filed: 11/29/2022 Page: 1 of 20

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-13259

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MULLER VEDRINE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20512-BB-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-13259

____________________

No. 21-13624

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MULLER VEDRINE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20512-BB-1

____________________

Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and SANDS,∗ District

Judge.

PER CURIAM:

∗ Honorable W. Louis Sands, United States District Judge for the Middle

District of Georgia, sitting by designation.

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20-13259 Opinion of the Court 3

Muller Vedrine appeals his convictions for five fraud-related

crimes. 1 He first argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress because (A) the 14-day delay between his arrest

and the issuance of the search warrant for his cell phones was

unreasonable; (B) the evidence obtained as a result of the second

search warrant executed on his residence should have been

excluded as “fruit of the poisonous tree”; and (C) the delay in the

government’s review of the data extracted from his cell phone was

unreasonable. The government argues that neither delay was

unreasonable; and, therefore, the search warrant for Vedrine’s

apartment did not rely on illegally obtained evidence.

Second, Vedrine argues that the district court erred in

ordering restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act

(“MVRA”) to Capital One which did not qualify as a victim. The

government responds that we should dismiss the restitution claim

because Vedrine did not timely file his notice of appeal from the

amended judgment awarding restitution.

For the reasons below, we affirm the district court’s denial

of Vedrine’s motion to suppress and dismiss his restitution claim as

1 Following a bench trial, the district court convicted Vedrine of two counts

of possession of 15 or more unauthorized devices with intent to defraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), two counts of aggravated identity theft in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), and one count of possession of device-

making equipment with intent to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(4).

He was sentenced to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years’

supervised release.

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untimely. Finally, because the amended judgment contains a

clerical error, we vacate and remand for the limited purpose of

correcting the clerical error. 2

I. Background

A. Facts

Vedrine was arrested on June 4, 2019, for driving a stolen

vehicle. During an inventory search of the vehicle, officers

identified seven re-encoded credit cards, 3 two fake IDs with

Vedrine’s photo but the personal identifiable information of other

individuals, and two Target credit card applications. Officers also

seized three cell phones. His request for the return of his phones

was denied.

On the day of Vedrine’s arrest, the Miami-Dade Police

Department contacted Secret Service Special Agent Natalya

Kaczmarczyk and informed her of Vedrine’s fraudulent items.

2 Vedrine’s indictment listed counts three and four as aggravated identity theft

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The district court’s judgment and

amended judgment, however, listed count three as a violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) rather than 1028A(a)(1).

3 Secret Service Special Agent Natalya Kaczmarczyk explained what a re-

encoded credit card was during the motion to suppress hearing: “A re-encoded

card is a card that, on the front, the card number does not match what is on

the magnetic strip. So an individual can use a re-encoded card. It makes it

look like you’re using the credit card on the front of the card, but when you

actually use it it’s a different card number that you’re using.”

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Fourteen days after Vedrine’s arrest, Kaczmarczyk obtained a

search warrant for the seized cell phones and data extraction was

performed. However, after the extraction, the data was not

analyzed for 21 days. Before the data was fully analyzed, a second

search warrant was executed on Vedrine’s apartment and officers

obtained additional incriminating evidence of fraud.

A grand jury indicted Vedrine for five fraud-related crimes.

Vedrine moved to suppress evidence from the searches of his cell

phones and apartment. He advanced three arguments. First, he

argued that the 14-day delay between his arrest (June 4) and the

issuance of a search warrant for his three cell phones (June 18) was

unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Second, he

argued that the search warrant for his apartment lacked probable

cause because it relied on information gained from the

unreasonable search of his cell phones. Finally, he argued that the

warrant for his phones was executed unreasonably because the

data from his cell phones was not analyzed until 21 days after

extraction.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Agent

Kaczmarczyk testified on the progression and timing of her

investigation. She began by interviewing Vedrine on the day of his

arrest and requesting security footage from Target for the credit

card applications. She received the Target footage three days later,

but a security firewall initially blocked her access. Alongside her

investigation into Vedrine, Kaczmarczyk also engaged in

investigative duties in other cases that required her attention.

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Kaczmarczyk submitted a first draft of a search warrant for

Vedrine’s three cell phones to the Assistant United States Attorney

(“AUSA”) on June 11, 2019. On June 13, 2019, the AUSA sent

Kaczmarczyk requested revisions to the search warrant. After

revisions and additional investigation, Kaczmarczyk finalized a

search warrant that was signed by a magistrate judge on June 18,

2019.

The Miami-Dade Police Department released the cell

phones to Kaczmarczyk on June 27, 2019, and the data extraction

occurred the next day. Twenty-one days later, on July 19, 2019,

another agent conducted a forensic examination of the extracted

data. The agent completed his final report on August 5, 2019.

Kaczmarczyk was pursuing other leads in the case while she

waited on the final report from the cell phone extraction. Through

her investigation, she discovered an apartment that Vedrine

procured by supplying management with fraudulent information,

and she obtained a search warrant to search the residence.

Kaczmarczyk executed the search warrant on the residence with

eight other Secret Service agents and three other individuals on

August 1, 2019.

At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the district court

denied Vedrine’s motion to suppress. The district court reasoned

that, although Vedrine had a possessory interest in the cell phones,

given the government’s efforts, there was “not a significant

interference” with Vedrine’s possessory interest and the 14-day

delay between the lawful seizure of the phones and the search

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warrant was reasonable. Relatedly, the district court held that

evidence seized from Vedrine’s home was not due to be suppressed

because there was no constitutional violation. Finally, the district

court rejected Vedrine’s argument that the delay between the

extraction of the data from his phones and the examination of that

data affected a possessory interest.

Vedrine proceeded to a bench trial, and he was convicted as

charged. The district court imposed a total sentence of 84 months’

imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release. The

district court entered its judgment and sentence against Vedrine on

August 17, 2020, but because the parties did not agree on

restitution, it deferred “[t]he determination of restitution . . . until

October 2, 2020 . . . .” Vedrine filed a timely notice of appeal from

the judgment.

After a hearing, the district court entered an amended

judgment ordering restitution on November 13, 2020. Vedrine did

not file a notice of appeal from the amended judgment.

Nonetheless, Vedrine argued that the district court erred in

granting restitution as part of his briefing on appeal. In its response

brief, the government highlighted Vedrine’s procedural error and

sought dismissal of the restitution claim. Vedrine then filed in this

Court a “Motion for Leave to File a Belated Appeal” which

included a notice of appeal from the district court’s amended

judgment. We denied his motion as unnecessary and forwarded

his notice of appeal to the district court. And we allowed the

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-13259

government to file a sur-reply brief to address the belated appeal

from the amended judgment.

II. Standard of Review

“We review ‘a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress

evidence as a mixed question of law and fact, with rulings of law

reviewed de novo and findings of fact reviewed for clear error, in

the light most favorable to the prevailing party in district court.’”

United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 612 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting

United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2007)).

A defendant’s notice of appeal in a criminal case must be

filed no later than 14 days after the challenged order is entered. See

Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). In the criminal context, Rule 4(b) is not

jurisdictional because it is not grounded in a federal statute. United

States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless,

we must apply Rule 4(b)’s deadline if the government objects to a

defendant’s untimely notice of appeal. Id. at 1314.

III. Discussion

A. Denial of Motion to Suppress

Vedrine claims that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress. He claims suppression was merited for three

reasons. We address each in turn, but reach the same conclusion

for all: the district court did not err.

1. Issuance of Search Warrant for Cell Phones

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Vedrine argues that the 14-day delay between his arrest and

the issuance of the search warrant for his three seized cell phones

was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. We

disagree.

The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. “The touchstone of

the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . . .” United States v.

Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001). Even if a seizure is lawful at its

start, it may become unlawful if “the police act with unreasonable

delay in securing a warrant.” United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d

1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).

Reasonableness is not clear-cut. See Laist, 702 F.3d at 616

(noting that because there is no “per se rule of unreasonableness,”

the “devil . . . is in the details”). Rather, the reasonableness analysis

considers “all the facts and circumstances” on a “case-by-case basis”

and must balance “governmental and private interests.” Id. at 613.

Relevant factors include: (1) “the significance of the interference

with the person’s possessory interest,” (2) whether the individual

consented to the seizure, (3) “the duration of the delay,” (4) “the

government’s legitimate interest in holding the property as

evidence,” and (5) whether law enforcement “diligently pursue[d]

their investigation.” See id. at 613–14 (quotations omitted). To

determine whether law enforcement was diligent, we consider the

“nature and complexity” of the investigation, “the quality of the

warrant application and the amount of time we expect such a

warrant would take to prepare,” and “any other evidence proving

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or disproving law enforcement’s diligence in obtaining the

warrant.” Id. at 614.

Thus, we have held a 21-day delay between seizing a

computer hard drive and applying for a search warrant to be

unreasonable when the lead agent traveled out-of-state for training

and his only justification for the delay in obtaining the search

warrant was that he “didn’t see any urgency” because the

defendant had admitted there was evidence of criminal activity on

the hard drive. Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351–52. But we have held a

longer delay of 25 days to be reasonable when a case agent

immediately began preparing a warrant, exchanged edits with an

AUSA, and included a “very substantial amount of information

specifically as to the Defendant’s conduct” in the final warrant

affidavit. Laist, 702 F.3d at 617. Simply put, the factual particulars

of each case are decisive.

We now consider the facts of this case.

Vedrine’s cell phones were seized after his arrest. His

request for the return of his phones was denied. The search

warrant for those phones was issued 14 days after his arrest. Thus,

Vedrine clearly retained a possessory interest in the cell phones,

which was interfered with when the government kept his phones.

The government’s legitimate interest in holding the phones

as evidence is also indisputable. Police arrested Vedrine in a

reportedly stolen vehicle and found substantial evidence of

sophisticated fraud and identity theft. As such, the government

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had every reason to believe that one of Vedrine’s three phones

contained criminal evidence.

Additionally, Kaczmarczyk exhibited diligence throughout

her investigation. Despite reoccurring obligations that limited her

time and energy, she: (1) immediately began investigating Vedrine,

(2) started drafting a search warrant affidavit within two days, (3)

requested and examined pertinent surveillance video, (4) followed

leads, (5) exchanged edits with the AUSA on the search warrant

affidavit and application, (6) drafted and submitted a memorandum

to obtain the cell phones from the Miami-Dade Police Department,

and (7) completed a search warrant affidavit that included pertinent

information from the arrest of Vedrine as well as information from

the Target surveillance video.4 Kaczmarczyk took these steps

despite her necessary commitment to other important

4 The record establishes that Kaczmarczyk began investigating Vedrine the

day he was arrested. She interviewed Vedrine and requested surveillance

video from Target that same day. Within two days she began drafting her

search warrant affidavit. She stopped drafting, however, because she wanted

to include information from the Target video footage. Target sent the footage

on June 7, but it was blocked by a security firewall, and she had to wait for the

information technology department to unblock it. On June 11, Kaczmarczyk

submitted a draft warrant affidavit to the AUSA. The AUSA requested changes

and Kaczmarczyk edited the affidavit. All the while, Kaczmarczyk was

following up on leads in the case and conducting normal investigative duties.

On June 17—in anticipation of the search warrant—she drafted and submitted

a memo to the Miami-Dade Police Department to retrieve Vedrine’s phones.

On June 18, she submitted the final search warrant application and obtained

the warrant.

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investigations.5 This is a far cry from delaying the warrant process

because she “didn’t see any urgency.” Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351.

Rather, these facts resemble those of the 25-day delay we held

reasonable in Laist. 702 F.3d at 617.

Based on the facts in this record, we hold that the 14-day

period between the seizure of the phones and issuance of the

warrant was reasonable. Accordingly, the district court did not err

in denying the motion to suppress on this ground, and we affirm.

2. Search Warrant for Vedrine’s Apartment

Vedrine argues that because the 14-day delay between his

arrest and the issuance of the search warrant for his three cell

phones was “unreasonable,” evidence seized as a result of the

search warrant for his apartment—which relied, in part, on

evidence from his cell phones—must be excluded as “fruit of the

poisonous tree.” We disagree. Because we conclude that the 14-

5 During the 14-day interim between Vedrine’s arrest and the issuance of the

warrant, Kaczmarczyk also had significant investigatory responsibilities in

other cases. She was called to assist in an arrest on June 5. She was also

“heavily involved in” what “turned[ed] into a federal indictment out of [the

Secret Service’s] South Dakota office . . . with a big seizure of currency.” And

she was responsible for extensive surveillance operations in another large-

scale case. Ultimately, because of the “large-scale investigation[s] going on”

Kaczmarczyk’s schedule included working through weekends and on her

birthday such that she “might have had one day off” between June 4 and June

18. We include these facts for explanatory purposes, and expressly decline to

adopt a position as to what amount of “other duties” would allow an officer

to delay his or her other investigations.

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day delay in procuring the search warrant for the phones was

reasonable, there is no “poison” for Vedrine’s “fruit of the

poisonous tree” argument. This argument arrives dead on the

vine. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the

motion to suppress on this ground.6

3. Execution of Search Warrant for Cell Phones

Vedrine argues that the evidence from his cell phones

should have been suppressed because the search warrant for the

phones was “executed” improperly. Specifically, he argues that the

period from data extraction (June 28) to the forensic examination

of that data (July 19) was part of the execution of the warrant and

was an “unreasonable” delay. We disagree.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) governs warrant

execution. To start, Rule 41(e)(2)(A)(i) requires that the warrant

be executed “within a specified time no longer than 14 days.” Rule

41(e)(2)(B) controls warrant execution for electronically stored

information, and it provides that “[t]he time for executing the

warrant in Rule 41(e)(2)(A) . . . refers to the seizure or on-site

6 We note that the government also has a compelling argument under the

independent source doctrine. See United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252,

1260 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[E]vidence obtained from a lawful source that is

independent of any Fourth Amendment violation is admissible . . . .”

(emphasis added)). That is, even if we were to assume that the evidence from

Vedrine’s phone was “fruit of the poisonous tree,” the other evidence that

Kaczmarczyk independently obtained was sufficient to satisfy the “probable

cause” standard for a search warrant for Vedrine’s apartment.

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copying of the media or information, and not to any later off-site

copying or review.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

Finally, “[t]he general touchstone of reasonableness which governs

Fourth Amendment analysis . . . [also] governs [warrant

execution].” United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998).

The search warrant for Vedrine’s cell phones was issued on

June 18. The warrant had an execution deadline of July 1. After

navigating procedural hurdles with the Miami-Dade Police

Department, Kaczmarczyk received the cell phones on June 27,

and promptly delivered them to the forensics lab. On June 28, the

data extraction was completed. However, the data was not

reviewed or forensically analyzed until 21 days later.

Law enforcement complied with Rule 41(e) and completed

the data extraction within Rule 41(e)(2)(A)(i)’s 14-day timeline.

The rule clearly allows for the “later review” of timely-extracted

data—i.e., the July 19 forensic examination. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

41(e)(2)(B).

Based on the plain language of the rule, we agree with our

sister circuits that once the data is seized and extracted by law

enforcement, the warrant is considered executed for purposes of

Rule 41, and under Rule 41(e)(2)(B), law enforcement may analyze

that data at a later date. See United States v. Cleveland, 907 F.3d

423, 431 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[U]nder Rule 41, an execution period

specified in a warrant applies to the time to seize the device or to

conduct on-site copying of information from the device. This

deadline does not apply to the time to analyze and investigate the

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contents of the device off-site.”); United States v. Huart, 735 F.3d

972, 974 n.2 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[U]nder Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 41(e)(2)(B), a warrant for electronically stored

information is executed when the information is seized or

copied . . . . Law enforcement is permitted to decode or otherwise

analyze data on a seized device at a later time.”).

Despite the rule’s plain language, Vedrine argues that the

Fourth Amendment requires the government to review the

extracted data within a “reasonable” time period. In support, he

cites out-of-circuit, district court authority to argue that the “later

review” was “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.

Even assuming arguendo that the “later review” of the data

must be done within a “reasonable” time period, Vedrine’s first

problem is that he offers no convincing evidence of unreasonable

action in this case. Additionally, the authority he cites found law

enforcement acted unreasonably in reviewing the extracted data

only when the government had “no plans whatsoever to begin

review of that data” after 15 months. United States v. Metter, 860

F. Supp. 2d 205, 212, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). A months-long delay is

clearly different than the government actually undertaking a

forensic review of the data within a matter of weeks—as was done

in Vedrine’s case. This scenario is eminently reasonable

considering the “substantial amount of time” that data review can

require. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2), Advisory Committee Note, 2009

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16 Opinion of the Court 20-13259

Amendments. 7 Because Vedrine presents only a generalized time

grievance and puts forth no persuasive evidence of unreasonable

action, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to

suppress on this ground.

B. Restitution

Vedrine argues that the district court erred in awarding

restitution because Capital One does not qualify as a “victim”

under the MVRA. Because the government is correct that

Vedrine’s notice of appeal from the amended judgment imposing

restitution was untimely, we are compelled to dismiss this claim.

To appeal a lower court’s final decision to this court,

appellants in criminal cases must follow Federal Rule of Appellate

7 The advisory committee contemplated Vedrine’s factual scenario:

[T]he Rule limits the . . . execution period to the actual execution of

the warrant and the on-site activity. While consideration was given to

a presumptive national or uniform time period within which any

subsequent off-site copying or review of the media or electronically

stored information would take place, the practical reality is that there

is no basis for a ‘one size fits all’ presumptive period. A substantial

amount of time can be involved in the forensic imaging and review of

information.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2), Advisory Committee Note, 2009 Amendments

(emphasis added). While not binding, we recognize that advisory committee

notes are “accorded great weight” in interpreting federal rules. Horenkamp

v. Van Winkle and Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005).

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Procedure 4(b). See, e.g., Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct.

1266, 1271–74 (2017) (holding that Rule 4(b) requires an appellant

to file a separate notice of appeal from an amended judgment even

if a notice of appeal from an earlier judgment is already pending).

As noted previously, a defendant must file a notice of appeal within

14 days of “the entry of either the judgment or the order being

appealed.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1). See also id. Fed. R. App. P.

4(b)(4) (authorizing district court to extend Rule 4(b)(1)’s deadline

for an additional 30 days upon a “finding of excusable neglect or

good cause”). Rule 4(b)(2) provides that when a notice of appeal is

filed after the court announces its decision but before entry of the

formal judgment, it is treated as filed on the date of entry of the

judgment. Id. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(2). Importantly, however, the

Supreme Court has held that Rule 4(b)(2) does not “come into

play” if “the court has not yet decided the issue that the appellant

seeks to appeal.” Manrique, 137 S. Ct. at 1273. In fact, “[Rule

4(b)(2)] does not apply where a district court enters an initial

judgment deferring restitution and subsequently amends the

judgment to include the sentence of restitution.” Id.

Rule 4(b)’s filing deadline is not jurisdictional. Lopez, 562

F.3d at 1313. Rather, the deadline is treated as a claims-processing

rule and the government must seek to enforce the rule or else the

objection is waived. Id. at 1312. If the government raises the issue,

however, we must apply the rule’s time limits. Id. at 1313–14; see

also id. at 1313 (noting that “an appellee may object to the

timeliness of an appeal for the first time in its merit brief”).

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Here, following Vedrine’s convictions and imposition of

sentence, the district court entered a judgment of conviction, but

deferred the restitution issue. Vedrine appealed from the initial

judgment. Thereafter, the district court entered an amended

judgment ordering restitution. Almost a year later, Vedrine filed a

notice of appeal from the amended judgment.

We must dismiss Vedrine’s restitution claim. See Manrique,

137 S. Ct. at 1273; Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1313–14. While he timely

appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, that

notice of appeal could not encompass the district court’s later-

decided restitution order. See Manrique, 137 S. Ct. at 1273.

Because his notice of appeal from the amended judgment was

nearly one-year delinquent and the government affirmatively seeks

dismissal, we must dismiss Vedrine’s restitution claim. 8 See Lopez,

8 In a last-ditch effort, Vedrine argues—for the first time in his reply brief—

that his procedural error should be overlooked because it resulted from

ineffective assistance of counsel. Vedrine faces two insurmountable hurdles.

First, “[w]e will not generally consider claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel raised on direct appeal where the district court did not entertain the

claim nor develop a factual record.” United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324,

1328 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1284

(11th Cir. 2002)). Second, even if Vedrine were to overcome our first rule, he

abandoned the issue by raising it for the first time in his reply brief. See United

States v. Fiallo-Jacome, 874 F.2d 1479, 1481 (11th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, we

do not reach his ineffective assistance claim. Vedrine is free to bring this claim

in a properly filed motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

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562 F.3d at 1313–14 (dismissing appeal for missing Rule 4(b)

deadline by 6 days).

For these reasons, we dismiss Vedrine’s restitution claim.

C. Clerical Error in District Court Judgment

After a bench trial, Vedrine was found guilty of each crime

listed in his five-count indictment. The district court’s judgment

and amended judgment, however, listed count three as violating

18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) rather than the 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)—the

statute listed in the indictment and under which Vedrine was tried

and convicted. Therefore, we must sua sponte vacate the district

court’s judgment and remand for the limited purpose of correcting

this error in judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d

814, 822 (11th Cir. 2006) (vacating and remanding when the district

court’s judgment listed a crime as count two, but the indictment

listed the crime as count nine and defendant pleaded guilty to

count nine).

IV. Conclusion

We dismiss Vedrine’s restitution claim because his notice of

appeal from the amended judgment resolving the restitution issue

was untimely. We also hold that the district court did not err in

denying his motion to suppress evidence from the cell phone and

apartment searches. Finally, we vacate and remand for the limited

purpose of correcting the clerical error in count three of the district

court’s judgment and amended judgment.

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20 Opinion of the Court 20-13259

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.

JUDGMENT VACATED AND REMANDED FOR LIMITED

PURPOSE OF CORRECTING CLERICAL ERROR.