Angelo Clark v. Robert Coupe

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 21-2310

__________________________

*ANTOINE CLARK, as personal representative for Angelo

Clark,

Appellant

v.

ROBERT COUPE, DOC Commissioner; PERRY PHELPS;

DAVID PIERCE; MAJOR JEFFREY CARROTHERS;

CAPTAIN BURTON; CAPTAIN RISPOLI;

CAPTAIN WILLY; DR. WILLIAM RAY LYNCH; DR.

PAOLA MUNOZ; DR. DAVID YUNIS; RHONDA

MONTGOMERY; SUSAN MUMFORD; STEPHANIE D.

JOHNSON; CONNECTIONS COMMUNITY SUPPORT

PROGRAMS INC; STEFANIE STREETS; STEPHANIE

EVANS-MITCHELL; CAROL VODVARKA; CAROL

VANDRUNEN; LEZLEY SEXTON

*(Amended pursuant to Clerk's Order dated 2/1/22)

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. No. 1-17-cv-00066)

District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews

_____________

Argued: March 30, 2022

______________

Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: November 28, 2022)

Dwayne J. Bensing [ARGUED]

Susan L. Burke

American Civil Liberties Union

100 West 10th Street

Suite 706

Wilmington, DE 19801

Chad S.C. Stover

Barnes & Thornburg

222 Delaware Avenue

Suite 1200

Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for Appellant

Ryan T. Costa [ARGUED]

Kenneth L. Wan

Office of Attorney General of Delaware

Delaware Department of Justice

6th Floor

820 North French Street

Carvel Office Building

Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for Appellee

Peter M. Slocum

Lowenstein Sandler

One Lowenstein Drive

Roseland, NJ 07068

Counsel for Amicus Appellant National Disability Rights

Network

Daniel Greenfield

Northwestern Pritzker School of Law

MacArthur Justice Center

375 East Chicago Avenue

Chicago, IL 60611

Counsel for Amicus Appellant Roderick & Solange

MacArthur Justice Center

Laura L. Rovner

Tempest Cantrell (law student)

Chris Nafekh (law student)

Katie Scruggs (law student)

University of Denver

2

Civil Rights Clinic

2255 East Evans Avenue

Suite 335

Denver, CO 80208

Counsel for Amicus Appellants Richard Morgan and Dan

Pacholke

Brian Biggs

DLA Piper

1201 North Market Street

Suite 2100

Wilmington, DE 19801

Counsel for Amicus Appellant Professors and Practitioners of

Psychiatry Psychology and Medicine

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

______________

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

Angelo Clark, a prisoner diagnosed with manic

depression and paranoid schizophrenia, brought an as-applied

claim alleging his months-long placement in solitary

confinement violated his constitutional rights.1 The District

Court dismissed the claim on qualified immunity grounds,

finding Clark failed to allege the violation of a clearly

established right. We must disagree. Clark alleged prison

officials imposed conditions they knew carried a risk of

substantial harm and caused him to suffer debilitating pain that

served no penological purpose. Because these allegations

trigger established Eighth Amendment protection, we will

reverse the grant of qualified immunity and remand for further

proceedings.

I.

1

This Court received notice of Angelo Clark’s death on

January 21, 2022. His personal representative, Antoine

Clark, was named appellant that same day.

3

A. Factual Allegations

The District Court dismissed Clark’s conditions of

confinement claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). In reviewing the dismissal, we accept all sufficiently

pled allegations as true. Mammana v. Federal Bureau of

Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 2019). Clark’s allegations

are summarized as follows:

While an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional

Center (JTVCC) in Delaware, Clark was placed in solitary

confinement on or around January 22, 2016. Following an

incident at mealtime involving another inmate, prison officials

moved Clark to the Secure Housing Unit (SHU). App. 66, ¶

50. By 2016, Clark had been treated for schizophrenia and

bipolar disorder at the prison for at least ten years, a fact of

which the prison officials were aware. App. 59, ¶ 5. Despite

having few disciplinary “points” on his record and no security

classification meriting solitary confinement, Clark remained in

the SHU for seven months. App. 66, ¶ ¶ 50, 51.

Inside the SHU, Clark was alone in his cell except for

three one-hour intervals per week. The SHU cells are

approximately eleven by eight feet with solid doors and two

four-inch-wide windows, one of which faced the hallway.

App. 64, ¶ 39. The cell lights were on from approximately 6

a.m. to 11:30 p.m., which meant they were off for

approximately six hours a day. Meals were delivered without

human contact through a slot in the door. App. 59, ¶ 8.

Solitary confinement meant Clark was deprived of all

opportunities to engage in “normal” human interaction; he was

not allowed to work and prohibited from participating in

educational programs or religious services. Id., ¶ 7. He was

permitted only four phone calls and four visitors per month.

App. 64, ¶ 40.

The JTVCC’s policy regarding inmates in the SHU is

that they must “earn their way out” by exhibiting appropriate

behavior. App. 69, ¶ 68. While in isolation, Clark would “yell

and bang on the door to get the attention of the [Department of

Corrections] officials.” Id., ¶ 69. Prison officials considered

these outbursts and Clark’s inability to “calm[ ] down” to be

4

disciplinary incidents and would punish him by extending his

stay in the SHU. When Clark would question why he remained

in the SHU for “months and months,” prison officials would

put him in the “naked room,” an isolation cell where he was

given an open smock for clothing. App. 67, ¶ 57.

For the seven months, Clark was trapped in a “vicious

cycle” where his mental illness would cause behavior that was

punished by conditions that furthered his mental deterioration.

App. 61, ¶ 13. Clark’s extended stay in the SHU worsened his

mental illness and caused lasting harm. As a result of the

isolation, Clark experienced “increased hallucinations,

paranoia, self-mutilation, sleeplessness, and nightmares.”

App. 60, ¶ 12.

Commissioner of the Delaware Department of

Corrections (DOC) Richard Coupe authorized Clark’s

placement in the SHU. JTVCC Warden David Pierce, who had

the authority to veto and re-classify an inmate’s housing status,

kept Clark in the SHU for seven months despite knowing of his

mental illness. According to the complaint, the DOC Policy

Manual requires prison officials to “identify those prisoners

whose conditions would be contrary to confinement in

segregations, including prisoners with serious mental illness.”

App. 69-70, ¶ 72. Clark posits Commissioner Coupe and

Warden Pierce failed to abide by the Manual’s requirement to

consider his mental illness in determining the cause of “the

alleged rule violations” or the “appropriateness of sanction or

the conditions or duration of the sanctions.”2 App. 70, ¶ 73.

Clark further alleges defendants Commissioner Coupe

and Warden Pierce knew of the American Correctional

Association (ACA) study on the effects of solitary confinement

on seriously mentally ill inmates, the results of which were

published in March 2016— two months after Clark entered the

SHU and five months before he was released. The ACA

2

Clark also alleged the DOC defendants “deliberately

underbid [their] contract with [the] DOC with conscious

disregard for the severe impact its lack of funding has on the

health of Mr. Clark and other prisoners with [serious mental

illness].” App. 78, ¶ 107(g).

5

recommended prisons implement measures to ensure the

isolation would not exacerbate an inmate’s mental illness.3

App. 72, ¶ 84. Warden Pierce participated in the ACA study

in 2015. The study’s report singled out Warden Pierce, stating

that he is not “open to change in regards to restrictive housing

objective and classification regarding the mentally ill,” and

cited his authority “to over-ride decision[s] on classification

and/or mentally ill treatment decisions.” App. 75, ¶ 94.

The complaint avers the ACA study, the “other prior

lawsuits” against the JTVCC, and the prisons officials’

“familiarity with their own policy and practice” provided the

DOC defendants with direct notice of the “extreme adverse

effects” of holding seriously mentally ill inmates like Clark in

solitary confinement.4 App. 73, ¶ 86.

B. District Court Proceedings

Clark sued JTVCC prison officials, including

Commissioner Coupe and Warden Pierce, under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. He alleged numerous constitutional violations that

purportedly arose from his seven-month stay in the SHU. He

3

Clark claimed the DOC defendants were made aware of the

study because in 2015 Delaware State Representative J. J.

Johnson, head of Delaware’s House of Representatives

Corrections Committee, introduced legislation to reform the

DOC’s use of solitary confinement. To prevent having

Johnson advocate for such legislation, the DOC agreed to

allow the ACA to conduct the study in Delaware’s prisons. Id.

¶¶ 82, 83.

4

Clark’s other alleged sources of notice are the standards

published by the National Commission on Correctional Health

in 2008 that warned of the deterioration mentally ill inmates

can experience if confined to conditions of “extreme isolation.”

App. 65, ¶ 44. Also, the American Psychiatric Association’s

position statement on solitary confinement for prisoners with

mental illness opined that prolonged segregation should be

avoided in light of the potential for harm. Id. ¶ 45. In 2012,

the Association defined prolonged segregation as three to four

weeks. App. 73, ¶ 87.

6

accused the defendants of inflicting cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, providing

inadequate medical care also in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, conspiring to and engaging in retaliation against

his mental illness in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

rights, and placing him in solitary confinement in violation of

his due process rights. The prison officials moved to dismiss

Clark’s claims.5 App. 78–83.

Parsing the Eighth Amendment claims, the District

Court permitted Clark to proceed on allegations that the prison

officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs while he was in solitary confinement and that his

placement in the SHU was in retaliation for being mentally ill.

After discovery, these claims went to trial and the jury reached

a verdict in favor of the defendants. According to the verdict

form, Clark failed to prove he was deprived of adequate

medical care while in solitary confinement or that he was put

there “because of” his mental illness. App. 723.

The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to

dismiss the conditions of confinement claim that we address

now. In his initial complaint, Clark alleged that—as a mentally

ill inmate—the conditions of solitary confinement placed him

at risk for serious substantial harm, and the prison’s practice of

placing inmates with known mental illness in the SHU is done

with deliberate indifference to the “serious mental health

implications of long term confinement in isolation.” App. 79,

¶ 113. Given the enhanced risk of substantial harm, Clark

alleged this practice as applied to him constituted cruel and

unusual punishment.

Following the magistrate’s recommendation, the

District Court dismissed the conditions of confinement claim

on qualified immunity grounds. The court concluded the law

did not support Clark’s claim “that housing a mentally ill

inmate in solitary confinement for long periods of time violates

5 The State argues that claims regarding Clark’s stays in the

SHU prior to January 23, 2015—two years before he filed his

complaint in District Court—are barred by the statute of

limitations. We agree and will therefore only address the

seven-month SHU stay starting in 2016.

7

a clearly established Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel

and unusual punishment.” App. 4 (citing App. 108).

Accordingly, it ruled the prison officials were immune from

suit. This appeal addresses that ruling.

II.

Before addressing the propriety of the dismissal,

however, we must address whether Clark is legally barred from

raising this claim given the jury verdict deciding his other

Eighth Amendment claims.6 The State broadly argues the

instant appeal “is barred by the law of the case doctrine,

collateral estoppel, and res judicata.” Appellee Br., 26. We

disagree.7

First, we must determine which of these doctrines

provides the appropriate framework for addressing the

reviewability of the instant appeal. Here, the District Court

allowed two of Clark’s three Eighth Amendment claims to

proceed to trial; the third claim, the conditions of confinement

claim before us now, was dismissed. After the jury’s verdict

deciding the two claims, the District Court entered a single

judgment for the defendants on all claims.8 This appeal

followed that judgment.

6 The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have appellate

jurisdiction over District Courts’ final orders pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

7

Clark never addressed this issue of collateral estoppel in his

opening brief because he never disclosed that the two other

Eighth Amendment claims went to trial and were decided in

the defendants’ favor. The absolute omission regarding the

outcome of his other claims was at best unhelpful and at worse

obfuscation. We note Clark appealed the judgment but does

not challenge the adjudication of his other claims. App. 21.

The District Court’s judgment as to those claims is therefore

affirmed. App. 20.

8

After deciding defendants’ motion to dismiss the first

amended complaint, the District Court granted Clark’s motion

to reconsider and allowed him to proceed with his retaliation

8

Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion,

addresses the effect a prior adjudication in a different case has

on a current case; “it doesn’t often have much to say about the

preclusive effects of rulings within the framework of a

continuing action.” Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2154

(2018) (plurality decision) (internal citation and quotation

marks omitted). Therefore, collateral estoppel does not apply

when two rulings are made at different stages within the same

proceeding. United States v. Briseno, 843 F.3d 264, 270 (7th

Cir. 2016). Instead, the “[r]elitigation of issues previously

determined in the same litigation is controlled by principles of

the law of the case doctrine rather than collateral estoppel.”

Hull v. Freeman, 991 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation

omitted). See also United States v. Reyes-Romero, 959 F.3d

80, 93 (3d Cir. 2020). Here, Clark’s three Eighth Amendment

claims arose from the same complaint and were ultimately

resolved by the same judgment. Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b), the District Court could have revisited its

decision to dismiss Clark’s conditions of confinement claim

prior to issuing the final judgment. See Filebark v. U.S. Dept.

of Transp., 555 F.3d 1009, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2009); 18B Charles

Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4478.1, at 660, 667 (3d ed.

2019). Accordingly, the dismissal of the conditions claim

occurred at a different stage within the same proceeding. See

Brisneo, 843 F.3d at 270. As a result, any binding effect the

District Court’s dismissal has on this appeal is controlled by

the law of the case doctrine. See Reyes-Romero, 959 F.3d at

93.

claim, that he was placed in solitary confinement because of

his mental illness. App. 16. In so doing, the Court reiterated

its earlier ruling dismissing the instant conditions of

confinement claim because “no clearly established law

supports finding that housing a mentally ill inmate in solitary

confinement is per se a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”

Id. at 13, 16. Post-trial, on June 10, 2021, the District Court

entered a judgment dismissing the claims raised in the second

amended complaint. Clark’s notice of appeal, contesting the

dismissal of the conditions of confinement claim, was filed

July 9, 2021.

9

But the law of the case doctrine does not bar an

appellate court from reviewing the propriety of the District

Court’s ruling. Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 924 F.2d

689, 690 (7th Cir. 1991). Instead, it is this Court’s function to

review the decisions of the District Court. Reyes-Romero, 959

F.3d at 93 (citing Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709,

716 (2016)). We are not bound by the District Court’s decision

to dismiss Clark’s conditions of confinement claim and “owe

no deference” to its findings beyond what the standard of

review demands. Id. at 93.

Even if issue preclusion did apply, it would only bar the

re-litigation of findings “truly essential” to the jury’s verdict

deciding Clark’s other Eighth Amendment claims. See Caver

v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 259 (3d Cir. 2005). The jury’s

verdict was predicated on findings that Clark was not deprived

of adequate medical care while in solitary confinement and was

not placed in the SHU because of his mental illness. App. 723–

24. The conditions of confinement claim, or what the District

Court deemed the “per se” solitary confinement claim, exists

independently of those decided at trial. The State’s arguments

to the contrary are not persuasive. Citing Porter v.

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, it argues the

subjective element of a conditions of confinement claim, which

requires proof that prison officials were deliberately indifferent

“to inmate health or safety,” necessarily involves re-litigating

the issue of whether Clark received adequate mental health

treatment in solitary confinement. 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir.

2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

Under the State’s theory, adequate medical care is an essential

element of Clark’s conditions of confinement claim, which

means the jury’s finding that he received such care precludes

review of the conditions claim’s dismissal on appeal.

Such a finding would run contrary to this Court’s

precedent, which treats conditions of confinement claims as

separate and distinct from challenges addressing access to

medical care. In Porter, we recognized the viability of a claim

alleging the “substantial risk of serious psychological and

physical harm” posed by solitary confinement without

identifying the absence of mental health treatment as a

necessary element. 874 F.3d at 441-42 (citing Williams v.

Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs., 848 F.3d 549, 566–68 (3d

10

Cir. 2017)). In Palakovic v. Wetzel, we held allegations that

solitary confinement was “inhuman for [Palakovic] in light of

his mental illness” averred a viable conditions of confinement

claim without discussing his access to mental health treatment.

854 F.3d 209, 226 (3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, we conclude

that the jury’s verdict does not preclude our review of Clark’s

“per se” solitary confinement claim.9

Finally, “issue preclusion ‘cannot apply when the party

against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a full

and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.’” Reyes-Romero, 959

F.3d at 93 (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC,

923 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2019)). Clark’s conditions of

confinement claim was denied on qualified immunity grounds;

the District Court concluded there was no clearly established

right preventing the placement of a mentally ill inmate in

solitary confinement for an extended period of time. Clark

appealed this ruling at the first possible instance, after final

judgment was entered dismissing his case. Given that he has

not had a “full and fair adjudication” of this issue, he cannot be

estopped from pursuing the conditions of confinement claim

on appeal. Id. (quoting 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments

§ 28(5)).

For these reasons, we reject the State’s argument that

the jury’s verdict prevents this Court from reviewing the

dismissal of his conditions of confinement claim. We now

turn to whether that dismissal was proper as a matter of law.

9

Although not discussed by the State in its issue preclusion

argument, the jury also determined that Clark was not placed

in solitary confinement because he was mentally ill. As with

the finding that he was not denied mental health care, we

conclude this determination does not preclude this Court from

addressing Clark’s conditions of confinement claim. Why a

prisoner is placed in solitary confinement is not an element in

challenging that condition. This Court did not address the

reasons behind Palakovic’s thirty-day stints in solitary in

finding that there was a viable Eighth Amendment claim. See

Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 225–26. The jury’s findings regarding

why Clark was sent to the SHU does not preclude this Court

from addressing the constitutionality of the conditions and

length of his stay.

11

III.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a claim

based on the defense of qualified immunity because it involves

a pure question of law. Walker v. Coffey, 905 F.3d 138, 143

(3d Cir. 2018) (citing McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566,

570 (3d Cir. 2001)). Applying the same standard of a district

court, a claim should survive a motion to dismiss if it contains

sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a

claim of relief that is plausible on its face.” Mammana, 934

F.3d at 372 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). “A claim is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)). In assessing the claims, we must construe

the complaint liberally and assume the veracity of all “well-

pleaded factual allegations.” Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 679.

IV.

Clark alleges his prolonged stay in solitary

confinement, imposed by prison officials who knew he was

mentally ill, caused him to suffer mental deterioration for no

justifiable reason in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

The District Court dismissed Clark’s claim on the grounds of

qualified immunity, concluding that the prison officials were

shielded from liability because there was no clearly established

law prohibiting a months-long placement of a seriously

mentally ill inmate in solitary confinement. Viewing the

specific allegations through the proper lens, however, leads us

to a different conclusion. Established law at the time of Clark’s

SHU stay prohibited prison officials from imposing conditions

that threatened a substantial risk of serious harm and inflicted

such harm for no penological reason. Clark’s allegations,

liberally construed, give rise to a plausible claim that the

circumstances surrounding his months-long stay in the SHU

violated this established law. Accordingly, the District Court’s

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the conditions of confinement claim

was premature. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

12

A. Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials

from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Peroza-Benitez v.

Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11

(2015)) (per curiam). In assessing whether qualified immunity

was properly granted, we engage in a two-part analysis: (1)

whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a right had been

violated, and (2) whether that right was clearly established

when it was allegedly violated to the extent “that it would have

been clear to a reasonable person that his conduct was

unlawful.” Williams, 848 F.3d at 557.

The District Court dismissed Clark’s conditions of

confinement claim based on the second part, finding no clearly

established right, without addressing whether he sufficiently

alleged a constitutional violation. We will do so now. Clark

raised an as-applied challenge, alleging the particular

conditions of his confinement violated his right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment. In defining the right allegedly

violated, we assess whether Clark’s allegations show the

conditions he endured were cruel and unusual, rather than

determine if he succeeded in alleging a broader claim that

solitary confinement of a mentally ill inmate violates the

Eighth Amendment.

B. Constitutional Violation

“The Eighth Amendment ‘prohibits any punishment

which violates civilized standards and concepts of humanity

and decency.’” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir.

2020) (quoting Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir.

1992)). The Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition as

“impos[ing] affirmative duties on prison officials ‘to provide

humane conditions of confinement.’” Young v. Martin, 801

F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

832). To sufficiently allege prison officials violated his Eighth

Amendment rights by imposing inhumane conditions, Clark’s

13

complaint had to allege facts showing (1) the deprivation he

endured was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the prison officials

had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Thomas, 948 F.3d

at 138 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

The deprivation element is adequately pled when the

allegations depict conditions where the inmate is denied “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991). The benchmark for alleging

such deprivation is not that the inmate was merely

uncomfortable; he or she must show they are “incarcerated

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Showing a substantial risk of harm

is a less demanding standard than alleging conditions posing

“a probable risk of harm.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep’t

of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015).

The second element is subjective and requires an inmate

to sufficiently plead prison officials acted with deliberate

indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted).

Deliberate indifference is effectively alleged where an inmate

shows officials knew of, but disregarded, that the prison

conditions posed “an excessive risk to inmate health and

safety.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir.

2001).

As to the first element, this Court has previously held

that factual allegations comparable to Clark’s were sufficient

to allege conditions that pose a substantial risk of serious harm.

In Palakovic, a young man “diagnosed with a number of

serious mental disorders” was repeatedly placed in solitary

confinement for “30-day stints” during the thirteen months he

spent in a Pennsylvania prison. 854 F.3d at 217, 225. Like

Clark, Palakovic was severely isolated with limited

opportunity for any social interaction during these stays. Id. at

217. Palakovic’s parents, who brought the claim on their son’s

behalf, alleged prison officials knew the conditions of

confinement “were inhumane for him in light of his mental

illness” because the majority of the self-harm incidents

occurred in the prison’s solitary confinement cells. Id. at 225.

Palakovic ultimately committed suicide in one of these cells.

Id. at 217. This Court held Palakovic’s parents sufficiently

pled an Eighth Amendment claim by alleging prison officials

14

imposed conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious

harm to their mentally ill son. Id. at 225-26.

In so holding, the Palakovic Court acknowledged “the

robust body of legal and scientific authority recognizing the

devastating mental health consequences caused by long-term

isolation.” Id. at 225. Citing our decision in Williams, the

Palakovic Court recognized “a growing consensus” that

solitary confinement conditions can cause “severe and

traumatic psychological damage” that in turn leads to high

rates of self-harm or suicide in inmates who had spent time in

solitary confinement. Id. It is “[a]gainst this backdrop of

extremely serious and potentially dire consequences of lengthy

exposure to the conditions of solitary confinement” that this

Court assesses allegations of prison officials’ deliberate

indifference towards placing inmates with known mental

illnesses in conditions of extreme isolation for extended

periods of time. Id. at 226. Given this backdrop, Clark’s

allegations—that he was kept in conditions of almost complete

isolation for seven months by officials who knew him to be

seriously mentally ill—are sufficient to allege the requisite

deprivation.

This brings us to the second element of a conditions of

confinement claim, whether Clark sufficiently alleged the

prison officials possessed a culpable state of mind. We

conclude that he did. Clark claimed the DOC defendants were

“well aware” that he was seriously mentally ill, given that he

had been treated for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder at the

prison for over ten years. App. 59, ¶ 5. He alleged they knew

that placing him in solitary confinement would cause him to be

“severely and adversely affected.” Id. ¶ 6. According to

Clark’s complaint, the prison officials acted in complete

disregard for their own policies and procedures, which require

seriously mentally ill inmates to be closely assessed and

evaluated before being placed in solitary confinement. App.

69-70, ¶¶ 72, 73. Clark further alleged these particular officials

were made aware of the unjustifiable risk posed by their

conduct by the ACA’s investigation into the JTVCC’s use of

solitary confinement for mentally ill inmates. As noted, the

investigation’s results, published while Clark was in the SHU,

directly criticized defendant Warden Pierce’s practices and

recommended fundamental changes to the conditions of

15

solitary confinement to alleviate any potential harm. App. 72,

75, ¶¶ 84, 94. Despite this purported awareness of his mental

illness and the risk of serious harm, Clark alleged prison

officials disregarded his pleas to leave the SHU and

unnecessarily kept him there for seven months, causing his

mental health to deteriorate. Clark alleged the months in

isolation caused him to experience “increased hallucinations,

panic attacks, paranoia, nightmares and self-mutilation.” App.

75-76, ¶ 97.

Again, the Palakovic decision is illustrative. In both

cases, the plaintiffs alleged the prison officials knew the

inmates were mentally ill and that prolonged isolation posed a

substantial risk of harm. In Palakovic, officials were provided

notice by the prior incidents of self-harm that occurred in

segregated housing and their knowledge of a pending

investigation by the Department of Justice into the prison’s use

of solitary confinement. 854 F.3d at 217. Here, the alleged

notice to prison officials was far more direct: the DOC’s own

internal policies required they consider Clark’s mental illness

in determining both the appropriateness and length of time

spent in solitary confinement, and the results of a completed

investigation concluded that defendant Warden Pierce and the

JTVCC’s use of isolation threatened the health of mentally ill

inmates. Moreover, Clark alleged his symptoms were

noticeably exacerbated by the isolation and prison officials

responded by keeping him in the damaging conditions for

seven months. Following Palakovic, we hold these allegations

are sufficient to plead the DOC defendants possessed a

culpable state of mind.

This Court has recognized “the increasingly obvious

reality that extended stays in solitary confinement can cause

serious damage to mental health.” Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 226.

See also Porter, 974 F.3d at 441 (“It is well established in both

case law and scientific and medical research that prolonged

solitary confinement . . . poses a substantial risk of serious

psychological and physical harm.”); Williams, 848 F.3d at

567–68 (citations omitted) (citing studies of inmates in solitary

confinement documenting high rates of suicide and self-

mutilation, which are “believed to be maladaptive mechanisms

for dealing with the psychological suffering that comes with

isolation.”). Viewing Clark’s complaint with this reality in

16

mind, we conclude his allegations that he was kept in solitary

confinement by prison officials who were deliberately

indifferent to the effects of prolonged isolation on his already

severely compromised mental health are sufficient to raise a

viable Eighth Amendment claim.

V.

Having held Clark sufficiently alleged a violation of his

Eighth Amendment right due to the conditions of his

confinement, we must now determine whether qualified

immunity was properly awarded. This entails deciding if the

particular right outlined in Clark’s complaint was clearly

established at the time of his stint in the SHU. The District

Court ruled no established law was violated. We hold now that

ruling was premature given the nature of his allegations.

Because Clark sufficiently alleges the circumstances of his

time spent in solitary confinement violated rights long

protected by Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, we will

reverse the grant of immunity and remand for further

proceedings.

“A Government official’s conduct violates clearly

established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct,

the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is

doing violates that right.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d

235, 248 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 741 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The

ultimate question is whether the state of the law when the

offense occurred” gave the prison officials “fair warning” that

their conduct violated Clark’s Eighth Amendment right. Id. at

247 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).

To determine whether such “fair warning” existed, we

search first for “factually analogous” cases in the Supreme

Court, and then turn our inquiry to whether “binding opinions

from our own Court” were in existence. Peroza-Benitez, 994

F.3d at 165 (citing Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 361

(3d Cir. 2017)). If neither source provides relevant caselaw,

we consider whether “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive

authority in the Court of Appeals could clearly establish a right

for purposes of qualified immunity.” L. R., 836 F.3d at 248.

17

Finally, “[w]e may also take into account district court cases,

from within the Third Circuit or elsewhere.” Peroza-Benitez,

994 F.3d at 166 (citing L.R., 836 F.3d at 248).

Before searching for relevant caselaw, however, we

must first identify the specific right Clark alleged was violated.

Defining the contours of the right is critical to determining

whether it was clearly established; we must define the right “at

the appropriate level of specificity.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669

F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012). “This requires us to frame the

right ‘in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.’” Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). We

define the right with specificity because only then can we

determine whether “the violative nature of the [officials’]

particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix v. Luna,

136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curium). We turn then to the

complaint and the specific facts surrounding the alleged

violation.

The District Court defined Clark’s alleged right as

prohibiting prison officials from “housing a mentally ill inmate

in solitary confinement for long periods of time.” App., 4. As

so defined, the court held the complaint did not allege a

violation of a clearly established Eighth Amendment right and

dismissed the claim. But, given the facts averred in Clark’s

complaint, we find this characterization of the alleged right

insufficiently specific. In defining the alleged right, the

circumstances surrounding Clark’s confinement in the SHU

matters. The particularities of the prison officials’ alleged

conduct in imposing the seven-month stay must be considered

when deciding whether qualified immunity was appropriate.

Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (“The dispositive question is whether

the violative nature of the particular conduct is clearly

established.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Based on the allegations in the complaint, the particular

conduct at issue was prison officials keeping Clark in solitary

confinement for seven months despite knowing of his serious

mental illness. He alleged these DOC defendants had been

made aware of the devastating effects of the JTVCC’s solitary

confinement units and had direct notice that extended stays in

the SHU “exacerbate the symptoms of mental illness for

18

prisoners and result in further deterioration of their mental

health.” App. 69, ¶ 67. He claimed he was kept in the SHU

because the manifestations of his mental illness would be

treated as “prison rule infractions,” which resulted in increased

punishment and additional time in the SHU. App. 60, ¶ 12;

App. 69, ¶ 70. As noted earlier, Clark alleged complaining

about his prolonged stay in isolation would result in his being

sent to the “naked room,” an isolation cell where he received

only an open smock for clothing. App. 67, ¶ 57. His

allegations included the assertion that the DOC defendants had

the “authority and ability” to change their practices but

deliberately did not do so, choosing instead to intentionally

inflict “extreme emotional and mental distress” on him. App.

78, ¶¶ 108-09. Viewing these allegations in their totality, we

modify the District Court’s enunciation of the alleged right to:

the right of a prisoner known to be seriously mentally ill to not

be placed in solitary confinement for an extended period of

time by prison officials who were aware of, but disregarded,

the risk of lasting harm posed by such conditions.

In determining whether this articulated right was clearly

established at the time of Clark’s seven-month stay in the SHU,

we broaden the scope beyond determining whether “the very

action in question has been held unlawful.” Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The Supreme Court does

not require that earlier cases share the same or even similar

facts for a right to be deemed clearly established; it is enough

that the prior cases are “factually analogous.” Peroza-Benitez,

994 F.3d at 165 (citing Fields, 862 F.3d at 361). Further, we

must look at analogous cases with the understanding that this

Court takes a “broad view of what constitutes an established

right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at

166 (internal citations omitted). As a result, state officials can

still receive fair warning that their conduct is violative even in

“novel factual circumstances” never previously addressed in

caselaw. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. See also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at

741 (“We do not require a case directly on point, but existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.”).

Here, Clark alleged facts that put the officials’ conduct

squarely in the purview of established Eighth Amendment law.

By alleging prison officials imposed solitary confinement for

19

months, knowing the isolation carried a substantial risk of

exacerbating his mental illnesses but keeping him there until

he suffered serious harm, Clark alleged conduct that no

reasonable corrections officer could conclude was

constitutionally permissible. Two decades ago, this Court held

prison conditions “may not be so brutal or unhealthy as to be

in itself a punishment.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359

(3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as

stated in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000).

In assessing the conditions of segregated housing units, “[t]he

touchstone is the health of the inmate.” Id. at 364. While the

law recognizes that prison officials are authorized to punish for

disciplinary infractions, the Constitution forbids them to do so

“in a manner that threatens the physical and mental health of

the prisoners.” Id. In Young, this Court recognized that

determining the constitutionality of prison conditions is a

heavily fact-specific inquiry, where the particular

characteristics of the prisoner raising the challenge are taken

into consideration. Id. at 365 (noting fact that prisoner was

HIV-positive made unsanitary conditions “all the more

revolting” given that he is “more susceptible to infection and

disease”). Clark alleges months in the SHU were particularly

dangerous for him because his mental illnesses made the

extreme and prolonged isolation an inhumane condition, given

his susceptibility to serious psychological injury. App. 78-79,

¶¶ 108, 112. See also Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 225 (holding

conditions of solitary confinement were inhumane for

Palakovic “in light of his mental illness”).

Despite the threat of harm posed by isolation, we

recognize that solitary confinement does not per se violate the

Constitution “as long as the conditions of confinement are not

foul, inhuman or totally without penological justification.”

Young, 960 F.2d at 364 (citing Ford v. Bd. of Managers of New

Jersey State Prison, 407 F.2d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 1969)). But

Clark alleges conditions that contravene those requirements.

Even assuming Clark was initially placed in the SHU for a

justified penological purpose, the “pronounced worsening” of

his mental illness symptoms resulting from months in isolation

was wholly pointless and unjustified. App. 58, ¶ 1; App. 79, ¶

114. No penological purpose was served by irrevocably

damaging Clark’s already severely compromised mental

health; the increased incidents of hallucinations or self-

20

mutilation resulting from the exacerbation of his schizophrenia

and bi-polar disorder cannot be deemed a legitimate “part of

his penalty” for committing a disciplinary infraction. Rhodes

v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). We hold Clark’s

allegations give rise to the reasonable inference that prison

officials imposed conditions resulting in the “gratuitous

infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183

(1976). At the time of Clark’s stay in the SHU, imposing

conditions that cause the “wanton and unnecessary infliction

of pain” had long violated the Eighth Amendment prohibitions

against cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at

347.

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, however,

the wanton and unnecessary infliction pain must be done

knowingly. Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court

established that prison conditions do not violate the Eighth

Amendment unless officials act with deliberate indifference in

subjecting a prisoner to the risk of serious harm. See Wilson,

501 U.S. at 299 (holding violation of Eighth Amendment

requires “obduracy and wantonness” rather than “inadvertence

or error in good faith”) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312, 319 (1986)). Thus, to allege the violation of a clearly

established right, Clark had to have sufficiently alleged the

DOC defendants “recklessly disregard[ed]” the risk that his

months in solitary confinement were inhumane in light of his

serious mental illness. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. Clark alleged

the officials knew the risks the SHU posed to him as a mentally

ill inmate but did not respond reasonably to ensure his safety.

Such unexplained inaction in the face of a known risk has long

been held violative of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 845. See

also Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-321 (holding prison measures

that inflict unnecessary and wanton pain on prisoners, when no

plausible explanation for such measures is provided, violate

Eighth Amendment).

There is no indication in the complaint that prison

officials imposed the prolonged term of solitary confinement

for legitimate non-punishment reasons, such as for Clark’s own

protection or out of administrative necessity. See, e.g., Gibson

v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348, 354 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding no

constitutional violation where three-month stay in solitary

confinement was due to a “grave shortage of general

21

population cell space”) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 555 (1974)). Long before Clark’s stay in the SHU, Eighth

Amendment law prohibited officials from recklessly imposing

conditions carrying a known risk to a prisoner’s health for no

justifiable reason. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843-45. See United

States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (noting a “general

constitutional rule” prohibits the wanton and unnecessary

infliction of cruelty on prisoners).

Moreover, the subjective knowledge of a substantial

risk of harm can be inferred from the objective circumstances

of a prison’s conditions if such conditions pose an obvious

danger to the inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825. Here the risk

was obvious because the harm inherent in conditions of solitary

confinement has long been recognized. Indeed, the Supreme

Court recognized the threat to prisoners’ mental health over a

century ago:

A considerable number of prisoners fell, after

even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous

condition, from which it was next to impossible

to arouse them, and others became violently

insane; others still, committed suicide; while

those who stood the ordeal better were not

generally reformed, and in most cases did not

recover sufficient mental activity to be of any

subsequent service to the community.

In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). This Court has long

held that allegations of inflicting a serious mental injury are

sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. White

v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110–11 (3d Cir. 1990) (allegations

that prison doctor’s purposeful infliction of unnecessary

emotional harm on inmate patients raises Eighth Amendment

cause of action). Further, there was a general consensus among

the Courts of Appeals preceding Clark’s stay in the SHU that

a threat of serious psychological injury invokes Eighth

Amendment protection. See, e.g., Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d

162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (serious or significant emotional

injury resulting from conditions of confinement satisfies

Eighth Amendment claim); Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557,

559 (7th Cir. 1994) (the infliction of mental torture has been

the basis for viable cruel and unusual punishment claims in

22

prisoner cases); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1529 (9th

Cir. 1993) (en banc) (severe psychological pain can violate the

Eighth Amendment); Scher v. Engelke, 943 F.2d 921, 924 (8th

Cir. 1991) (“fear, mental anguish, and misery” can cause

sufficient pain to violate the Eighth Amendment). Clark

alleged his pre-existing condition of serious mental illness

heightened the impact of solitary confinement, rendering it

capable of inflicting severe mental trauma. By claiming the

prison officials knowingly imposed such conditions, Clark

sufficiently alleged the violation of a clearly established

right.10

In addition to violating the Eighth Amendment, Clark

alleges the prison officials violated the Delaware DOC’s own

policies regarding the imposition of solitary confinement.

Clark posits prison officials disregarded the policy by failing

to “consider sufficiently the role mental illness played in . . .

determining the appropriateness of sanctions or the conditions

or duration of the sanctions.” App. 70, ¶ 73. By alleging their

indifference to prison procedure, Clark inferred the officials

10

Clark’s allegations that he was punished for complaining

about the SHU by being sent to a “naked cell,” where he was

given an open smock for clothing and a mattress on the floor,

App. 67, ¶ 57, could raise a viable claim of cruel and unusual

punishment in and of itself based on a consensus of Courts of

Appeals decisions. See, e.g., Porth v. Farrier, 934 F.2d 154,

156 (8th Cir. 1991) (prima facie showing of Eighth

Amendment violation where prison officials denied prisoner

all clothing and bedding for twelve hours as a punitive

measure); Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir.

1981) (deprivation of clothing and bedding bear no

relationship to security measure and therefore amount to an

unnecessary infliction of pain in violation of Constitution);

McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 367 (although conditions

were intended to observe prisoner for self-harm, two days in

isolation cell without clothing or bedding unconstitutional);

Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 521 (2d Cir. 1967)

(complaint alleging solitary confinement cell where prisoner

was naked and denied bedding of any kind was cruel and

unusual punishment). See also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal

Standards for Prisons and Jails, §§ 11, 14 (1980) (prisoners in

disciplinary detention must be fully clothed).

23

knew but ignored the DOC’s prohibition against his seven-

month stay in segregation. Clearly established law dictated

that such internal governing policies are relevant in

determining whether the officials received fair warning of a

potential constitutional violation. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 743–

44 (recognizing Department of Corrections’ regulations are

relevant to determining whether prison officials had fair

warning of constitutional violation); Treats v. Morgan, 308

F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting prison regulations that

govern correctional officers’ conduct relevant in determining

whether inmate’s right was clearly established).

Allegations that the officials disregarded prison

regulations while inflicting wanton pain provided sufficient

grounds for the denial of qualified immunity at the complaint

stage. See Young, 801 F.3d at 182 (in deciding whether prison

officials were entitled to immunity on remand, district court

instructed to determine whether punishment violated prison

regulations). Indeed, the DOC policies become all the more

relevant in determining whether officials had fair warning that

their conduct “ran counter” to the Eighth Amendment given

that few cases addressed the constitutionality of solitary

confinement for seriously mentally ill prisoners at the time of

Clark’s stay in the SHU. See Williams, 848 F.3d at 571 (prison

policy relevant to qualified immunity analysis because limited

nature of case law in existence at time of term of segregation).

Clark alleges these officials received another warning

that their conduct was potentially unconstitutional when they

were sued in federal court. Two months after Clark entered

solitary confinement, the District Court of Delaware ruled

defendant Commissioner Coupe’s alleged conduct of placing

mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement, without adequate

mental health treatment and out-of-cell time, raised a viable

constitutional claim. Cmty. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc. v. Coupe, No.

15-688-GMS, 2016 WL 1055741, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 16,

2016) [hereinafter CLASI]. In that case, CLASI claimed

Commissioner Coupe, who remained Commissioner of the

DOC at the time of Clark’s stay in the SHU, knew the prison’s

practice of keeping mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement

would “exacerbate their symptoms of mental illness and cause

serious harm to their mental and physical health.” Id. at *1.

The district court denied Coupe’s motion to dismiss the claim,

24

ruling that CLASI’s allegations rendered it plausible that

Coupe “was aware that placing mentally ill patients in solitary

confinement could deprive inmates in a manner that is

‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ [so] that Coupe would draw

the inference that a ‘substantial risk of serious harm exists.’”

Id. at *4 (internal citation omitted). While this decision did not

create a clearly established right, Clark is correct that the

CLASI decision provided JTVCC prison officials with direct

notice that their conduct regarding solitary confinement

potentially violated the Eighth Amendment. And yet,

according to Clark, this targeted warning was disregarded, as

evidenced by the fact he remained in solitary confinement for

another five months.

The CLASI decision contains additional support for

concluding Clark alleged the violation of a clearly established

law. In this Court, decisions from district courts are relevant

in determining whether prison officials received fair warning

that their conduct was violative. See Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d

at 167 (in the absence of “actually analogous precedent” from

the Supreme Court or this Court, relevant and timely district

court decisions can help determine whether the law was clearly

established). See also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 321 n.10

(“[A]s our prior decisions have illustrated, district court

opinions do play a role in the qualified immunity analysis.”).

The district court cases cited in the CLASI opinion provide a

robust consensus of decisions specifically addressing the

constitutionality of assigning mentally ill prisoners to solitary

confinement: Ind. Protection & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v.

Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:05-cv-01317-TUP-MJD,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182974, at *60–61 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31,

2012) (Indiana Department of Correction’s practice of putting

seriously mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement threatens

permanent injury and violates the Eighth Amendment); Jones

“El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d. 1096, 1101–02 (W.D. Wis.

2001) (granting injunctive relief because conditions of solitary

confinement “can be devastating” to mentally ill prisoners

housed in supermax prison); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp.

1146, 1265-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (placement of mentally ill

inmates “in the SHU is the mental equivalent of putting an

asthmatic in a place with little air to breathe” and therefore

unconstitutional); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282,

1320-21 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that prison’s policies and

25

practices regarding segregating inmates with serious mental

disorders violates the class members’ Eighth Amendment

rights); Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1549-50 (D. Ariz.

1993) (holding that Arizona prison officials’ practice of

assigning seriously mentally ill inmates to segregated housing

“despite their knowledge of the harm” constitutes an

“appalling” Eighth Amendment violation); Langley v.

Coughlin, 715 F. Supp. 522, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding

viable claim that prison officials’ failure to “screen out” those

inmates that “by virtue of their mental condition, are likely to

be severely and adversely affected by placement there”). In

this Court, these cases—cited in a decision ruling against the

same Commissioner of the Delaware DOC that Clark named

as a defendant for engaging in the same conduct Clark is

challenging—are relevant in determining the state of the law.11

11 In addition to those cited in the CLASI opinion, multiple

district court decisions recognized the substantial risk of

serious harm that faces mentally ill prisoners in solitary

confinement and addressed the necessary changes to avoid

such harm. See Disability Advocs., Inc. v. New York State Off.

of Mental Health, No. 02 Civ. 4002 (GEL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,

2007) (settlement reached that all seriously mentally ill

inmates housed in isolation were entitled to, inter alia, two

hours per day of out-of-the cell programming given allegations

that solitary confinement gave rise to increased self-

mutilation); Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F. Supp. 2d 986, 1003

(W.D. Wis. 2005), aff’d, 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006) (placing

a mentally ill inmate in solitary confinement, marked by

“conditions so lacking in physical and social points of

reference,” might reasonably lead to “a kind of psychological

torture and future acts of self-harm”); Coleman v. Brown, 28 F.

Supp. 3d 1068, 1109 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (ordering prison officials

in California not to place any mentally ill prisoner in solitary

“unless that class member’s treating physician certifies that . .

. the inmate’s mental illness did not preclude the inmate from

conforming his or her conduct to the relevant institutional

requirements . . . [and] the inmate does not face a substantial

risk of exacerbation of his or her mental illness or

decompensation as a result of confinement in a SHU.”).

26

Notice of clearly established law also came from

Delaware’s own state legislature. Had Clark’s seven-month

term in solitary confinement been imposed by a Delaware state

court, it would have been illegal. Five years before Clark’s

stint in the SHU the Delaware legislature enacted a statute

prohibiting courts from imposing a term of solitary

confinement longer than three months. Section 3902 of the

Delaware Code read in relevant part:

In every case of sentence to imprisonment for a

term exceeding 3 months, the court may by the

sentence direct that a certain portion of the term

of imprisonment, not exceeding 3 months, shall

be in solitary confinement.

Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11 § 3902 (repealed 2021). This Court has

consistently considered relevant state statutes when

determining if the grant of qualified immunity is appropriate.

See Williams, 848 F.3d at 570-71 (finding a related state statute

“bear[s] on whether Plaintiff’s due process rights were clearly

established”). See also Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185, 195 (3d

Cir. 2018) (recognizing that officer’s conduct resembled the

statutory crime of indecent assault in denying qualified

immunity); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 211-12

(3d Cir. 2001) (denying qualified immunity for officer who

shot dog after acknowledging state statute defined dogs as the

owners’ personal property). Here, the defendant prison

officials were tasked with implementing the sentences imposed

by Delaware state courts. Familiarity with the state’s

sentencing structures was therefore an integral part of

Commissioner Coupe and Warden Pierce’s responsibilities.

The state of Delaware law at the time of Clark’s stay in the

SHU provided reasonable prison officials with fair warning

that seven months in isolation—which was four months past

the limit allowed by sentencing courts in the state of

Delaware—was unlawful.

While these sources of notice do not, in and of

themselves, clearly establish the law, they buttress the Eighth

Amendment jurisprudence invoked by Clark’s allegations.

Both Supreme Court and this Court’s precedents consider

district court cases, prison regulations, and state statutes in

determining whether officials received fair warning that their

27

conduct was unreasonable. Here, Clark alleged that the

JTVCC’s officials knew his prolonged stint in isolation posed

a substantial risk to his mental health but imposed the

conditions anyway, despite knowing serious pain resulted and

that such pain served no penological purpose. Established

Eighth Amendment law prohibited this alleged wanton and

gratuitous infliction of pain, and the law in conjunction with

other sources of notice warned prison officials that their

purported conduct was unlawful.

VI.

Given the specific conduct alleged and the warnings of

potential misconduct provided the defendants, we conclude

further proceedings are warranted. The District Court’s grant

of qualified immunity was premature in light of the possible

Eighth Amendment violation. In so holding we are mindful

that the allegations in Clark’s complaint may be disproven

during discovery, rendering the prison officials’ conduct

appropriate. In allowing Clark’s claim to proceed we do not

“assume that state legislatures and prison officials are

insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the

perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the

goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system.”

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352. To this end, we recognize it is

possible there were exigent circumstances and legitimate

penological justifications for Clark’s seven-month stint in

solitary confinement that would lead to the conclusion that no

clearly established right was violated. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at

301–02 (1991) (approving state-of-mind inquiry to allow

defense that prison officials lacked the subjective intent to

punish). Allowing the claim to proceed acknowledges that

Clark, by alleging his prolonged stay in solitary confinement

was the result of prison officials knowingly disregarding the

substantial risk of serious harm posed by the conditions and the

foreseeable harm inflicted was in no way penologically

justified, alleged the violation of a clearly established right.

Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the District

Court dismissing this claim and remand for further

proceedings.

28