State v. Hubble

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number 2009-NMSC-014

Filing Date: March 31, 2009

Docket No. 30,663

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RICH HUBBLE,

Defendant-Petitioner

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI

Sandra A. Price, District Judge

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender

Nancy M. Hewitt, Appellate Defender

Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Petitioner

Gary K. King, Attorney General

Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Respondent

Donna M. Bevacqua-Young

John Ward Wheeler, II

Santa Fe, NM

for Amici Curiae

New Mexico District Attorneys’ Association and

New Mexico Department of Public Safety

1

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} Defendant Rich Hubble was convicted in magistrate court of Driving Under The

Influence of Intoxicating Liquor, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102 (1953, as

amended through 2004), and Improper Turning at Intersection, contrary to NMSA 1978,

Section 66-7-325(A) (1978). Pursuant to Rule 6-703 NMRA, he appealed to the district

court. During the district court bench trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence that

was obtained from the traffic stop, which he claimed was conducted without reasonable

suspicion. The district court denied the motion and Defendant was once again convicted of

the same two offenses. Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment and the Court of

Appeals affirmed. We granted Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari on the issue of

whether the initial traffic stop was based upon reasonable suspicion that he violated a traffic

law. We hold that the traffic stop was based upon reasonable suspicion and we affirm the

denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} On the evening of February 15, 2005, Deputy Phillip Francisco was driving

southbound on County Road 6100 when he observed Defendant’s vehicle come to a stop at

a “T” intersection between County Road 6100 and an unnamed access road. Aside from the

vehicles belonging to Deputy Francisco and Defendant, there were no other vehicles on

either the county road or the access road. As Deputy Francisco passed through the

intersection, he observed that Defendant did not have his turn signal engaged. Deputy

Francisco continued to observe the vehicle through his rearview mirror as he proceeded

southbound and never saw the turn signal engaged. Deputy Francisco then observed

Defendant turn onto County Road 6100 without using his turn signal. Defendant and his

passenger both testified that Defendant did turn on his signal before turning right onto

Country Road 6100. Deputy Francisco pulled over to the side of the road about one hundred

feet past the intersection and waited for Defendant to pass him. Deputy Francisco then

proceeded to make the traffic stop on the basis that Defendant turned without using his

signal.

{3} Deputy Francisco approached the vehicle and detected the odor of alcohol on

Defendant’s breath and observed that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred

speech. Deputy Francisco also observed Defendant act in a slow, impaired, and disoriented

manner when he was retrieving his license and registration. Deputy Francisco ordered

Defendant to exit his vehicle and observed Defendant swaying and losing his balance when

standing. Deputy Francisco asked Defendant if he had been drinking and Defendant

responded by saying that he had consumed one beer. Deputy Francisco then had Defendant

undergo the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand tests.

Defendant failed all three tests and Deputy Francisco placed him under arrest. Defendant

consented to two breath tests and the results indicated that he had a blood alcohol content

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of 0.12 and 0.10, respectively. Deputy Francisco issued Defendant a citation for DWI and

for Improper Turning at Intersection.

{4} At trial, Deputy Francisco acknowledged that the turn signal statute dictates that a

driver use the turn signal in order to indicate to other traffic in which direction the driver

intends to travel. Deputy Francisco testified that he considered himself to be traffic that

night.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

{5} “In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we observe the

distinction between factual determinations which are subject to a substantial evidence

standard of review and application of law to the facts[,] which is subject to de novo review.”

State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). “We view the facts in the manner most favorable to the prevailing

party and defer to the district court’s findings of fact if substantial evidence exists to support

those findings.” State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964.

“Questions of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo by looking at the totality of the

circumstances to determine whether the detention was justified.” State v. Robbs, 2006-

NMCA-061, ¶ 9, 139 N.M. 569, 136 P.3d 570.

{6} Defendant did not assert that the New Mexico Constitution afforded him greater

protection than the federal Constitution, so we only address the issue of reasonable suspicion

under federal Fourth Amendment law. See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 22-23, 122

N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1.

{7} “Both the United State Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution protect a

citizen against unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026,

¶ 12, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922. Since an automobile stop is considered a “seizure” under

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, it must “be conducted in a reasonable manner to

satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 22, 138 N.M. 414, 120

P.3d 836. “Before a police officer makes a traffic stop, he must have a reasonable suspicion

of illegal activity.” State v. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-020, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 431, 176 P.3d 1163.

We analyze the reasonableness of a stop in accordance with the two-part test set forth in

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968): (1) whether the stop was justified at its inception

and (2) whether the officer’s action was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances

which justified the interference.” Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 13. Because there are

no allegations that Deputy Francisco exceeded the scope of the initial interference, we need

only examine the first part of the test—whether the stop was justified at its inception.

{8} “A reasonable suspicion is a particularized suspicion, based on all the circumstances

that a particular individual, the one detained, is breaking, or has broken, the law.” State v.

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Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. “The test is an objective one.

The subjective belief of the officer does not in itself affect the validity of the stop; it is the

evidence known to the officer that counts, not the officer’s view of the governing law.”

State v. Muñoz, 1998-NMCA-140, ¶ 9, 125 N.M. 765, 965 P.2d 349. We objectively

examine whether the facts available to the officer warrant the officer, as a person of

reasonable caution, to believe the action taken was appropriate. State v. Madsen, 2000-

NMCA-050, ¶ 9, 129 N.M. 251, 5 P.3d 573. We will find reasonable suspicion “if the

officer is aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those

facts, that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal

activity occurred or was occurring.” State v. Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 7, 126 N.M. 569,

973 P.2d 246 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Section 66-7-325(A) Requires Engagement of a Turn Signal When There is a

Reasonable Possibility That Other Traffic May Be Affected

{9} The determination of whether Deputy Francisco had reasonable suspicion to make

the traffic stop does not hinge on whether Defendant actually violated the underlying turn

signal statute. See State v. Brennan, 1998-NMCA-176, ¶ 12, 126 N.M. 389, 970 P.2d 161

(holding that, regardless of whether the defendant was ultimately convicted of careless

driving, the officer had reasonable suspicion that he was driving carelessly and the stop was

therefore justified). For clarity, we nonetheless take this opportunity to discuss Section 66-

7-325(A) and review Defendant’s Improper Turning at Intersection conviction.

{10} “The primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s

intent;” we first look at the words chosen by the Legislature and the plain meaning of those

words. State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. Under the plain

meaning rule, when a statute’s language is “clear and unambiguous,” we will give effect to

the language and refrain from further statutory interpretation. State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-

001, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. We will not read into a statute language which is not

there, especially when it makes sense as it is written. Burroughs v. Bd. of County Comm’rs

of Bernalillo County, 88 N.M. 303, 306, 540 P.2d 233, 236 (1975).

{11} Section 66-7-325(A) provides in pertinent part: “No person shall . . . turn any vehicle

without giving an appropriate signal . . . in the event any other traffic may be affected by

such movement.” Thus, there are two elements in the statute that must be satisfied in order

for its mandate to be triggered: (1) there must be other “traffic” (2) that “may be affected”

by the motorist’s turn.

{12} The “traffic” element is easily interpreted and any questions regarding its application

in this case are easily resolved given the factual scenario. In interpreting the “traffic”

element, we look to how the word is defined in our Motor Vehicle Code: “pedestrians,

ridden or herded animals, vehicles and other conveyances either singly or together using any

highway for purposes of travel.” NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.17(F) (1990, as amended through

2007). Thus, there is no doubt that Deputy Francisco, who was driving a vehicle on a

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highway, was “traffic” under Section 66-7-325(A). The more contentious question deals

with the “may be affected” element.

{13} We first look to the plain meaning of the words chosen by the Legislature and in

particular, the word “may.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “may” as “[t]o be a possibility.”

Black’s Law Dictionary 1000 (8th ed. 2004). Webster’s Dictionary defines it as “[u]sed to

indicate a certain measure of likelihood or possibility.” Webster’s II: New Riverside

University Dictionary 734 (1988). Thus, the concept of “possibility” is common to both

definitions. To this end, it is significant that the Legislature chose the phrase “may be

affected” as opposed to “is affected,” “will be affected,” or “most likely will be affected.”

We understand this to mean that the Legislature’s intent was to provide Section 66-7-325(A)

with a broad reach, requiring a signal even when there is only a reasonable possibility that

other traffic may be affected by the signaling driver’s movement. Thus, under the plain

meaning rule, we read the phrase “may be affected” to mean when there is a reasonable

possibility that other traffic may be affected.

{14} This interpretation of Section 66-7-325(A) aligns with the policy and concerns that

the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Division expressed in the New Mexico Driver Manual. See

Motor Vehicle Div., New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, New Mexico Driver Manual

19 (2004) [hereinafter New Mexico Driver Manual]. In the section titled “Letting Others

Know What You Are Doing,” the manual states: “Generally other drivers expect you to

keep doing what you are doing. You must warn them when you are going to change

direction or slow down. This will give them time to react if needed, or at least not be

surprised by what you do.” Id. The manual further instructs drivers to signal when they

change direction, turn right or left, merge into traffic, or park so that other drivers will have

time to react to such movements. Id. Thus, requiring motorists to signal before they turn

when there is a reasonable possibility that other traffic may be affected by such a turn not

only reduces the chance that other drivers would be surprised, but also increases the time that

other drivers have to react to such movements.

{15} Given this interpretation, we now turn to the application of Section 66-7-325(A) to

the facts of this case. In their arguments regarding whether Deputy Francisco was “other

traffic [that] may be affected” under the meaning of the statute, the parties advocated for

different snapshots of time from which this issue should be analyzed. Defendant argued that

the issue be determined by analyzing Deputy Francisco at the point in time when he had

already passed through the intersection and pulled over to the side of the road. Conversely,

the State argued for an extended period of time—the time from when Deputy Francisco was

approaching the intersection, including the time he passed through the intersection, until the

time he pulled over onto the side of the road.

{16} In holding that Deputy Francisco was not traffic that may have been affected by

Defendant’s turn, the Court of Appeals endorsed the Defendant’s proposed snapshot in time:

“[t]he State has not directed our attention to any evidence that Deputy Francisco believed

that Defendant’s right turn itself presented a potential hazard to him (the only traffic present)

5

as he observed the turn in his rearview mirror from 100 feet down the road . . . .” State v.

Hubble, No. 26,452, slip. op. at 3 (N.M. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2007) (emphasis added).

{17} Given our interpretation that Section 66-7-325(A) requires a motorist to give the

appropriate signal when there is a reasonable possibility that other traffic may be affected

by a turn, we believe that the time period during which there was such a possibility that

Deputy Francisco may have been affected by Defendant’s turn encompassed the time that

Deputy Francisco was approaching and passing through the intersection. The broad reach

and underlying policy of Section 66-7-325(A) dictate that the effect that one driver’s

movement may have on another driver is not confined to the point in time when the actual,

physical movement occurs. Rather, the effect also involves a driver’s decision-making

process in the time leading up to the movement. A driver, once given a visual cue that

indicates another driver’s intention, may decide to switch lanes, slow down, or prepare for

a change in direction. When a driver engages his or her turn signal, it also communicates

to other motorists that the driver is aware of their presence on the road. Thus, to consider

that other traffic may be affected only at the time of the actual, physical movement unduly

limits the broad reach of 66-7-325(A) and undermines our policy of giving drivers ample

time to react to the future movements of other drivers on the road. See New Mexico Driver

Manual at 19.

{18} Further, subsection (B) of the statute reinforces the notion that the time period before

the actual, physical movement of a driver is pertinent to the determination of Section 66-7-

325 violations. It provides: “[a] signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall

be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle

before turning.” Section 66-7-325(B). Thus, because we have determined that Deputy

Francisco was “other traffic [that] may [have been] affected,” Defendant should have

engaged his right turn signal at least one hundred feet before the intersection. Such

indication would have alerted Deputy Francisco as to Defendant’s intention before Deputy

Francisco reached the intersection.

{19} The Court of Appeals also unreasonably narrowed the reach of Section 66-7-325(A)

when it deviated from the language of the statute in its analysis. The first such deviation was

when the Court articulated the issue that it would discuss: “we must decide whether Deputy

Francisco could have been affected by Defendant’s turn within the meaning of Section 66-7-

325(A).” Hubble, No. 26,452, slip. op. at 2 (emphasis added). Later, the Court reasoned,

“[w]e do not understand how Deputy Francisco’s operation of his vehicle was affected in any

normal sense of this word by a right turn that occurred after he was well clear of the

intersection.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court stated, “[t]he State has not

directed our attention to any evidence that Deputy Francisco believed that Defendant’s right

turn itself presented a potential hazard to him . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).

{20} Given our interpretation of Section 66-7-325(A) and its underlying policy, it is clear

that the Court of Appeals required a greater show of effect than the statute contemplates.

6

The State was not required to prove that Deputy Francisco could have been affected, that he

was affected, or that Defendant’s turn presented a potential hazard; the statute only requires

that the surrounding facts establish that there was a reasonable possibility that he may have

been affected. To require an actual effect or a potential hazard would undermine the policy

behind driving safety by depriving non-signaling drivers of visual cues and ample decision-

making time in their interactions with drivers who intend to change directions. We therefore

conclude that Defendant violated Section 66-7-325(A) and affirm Defendant’s turn signal

violation conviction. We now turn our discussion to reasonable suspicion.

C. Mistakes of Fact and Law and Reasonable Suspicion

{21} Defendant argues that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion

because Deputy Francisco made a mistake of law when he concluded that Defendant violated

the traffic code. As we have already discussed, we agree with the district court that

Defendant violated Section 66-7-325(A) and therefore Deputy Francisco did not make a

mistake of any kind. However, in order to clarify the law regarding reasonable suspicion,

we take this opportunity to discuss mistakes of law and mistakes of fact and how they

interact with reasonable suspicion.

{22} A mistake of law is a “mistake about the legal effect of a known fact or situation,”

whereas a mistake of fact is a “mistake about a fact that is material to a transaction; any

mistake other than a mistake of law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1023. Although mistakes of

law and fact are more frequently encountered in the context of criminal defenses, some

jurisdictions have incorporated these concepts into their rules regarding reasonable

suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 2008)

(“[F]ailure to understand the plain and unambiguous law . . . is not objectively reasonable.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101

(1st Cir. 2006) (“Stops premised on a mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake,

are generally held to be unconstitutional.”); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271,

1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that, while an officer’s mistake of fact may provide the

objective grounds for reasonable suspicion, an officer’s mistake of law cannot); People v.

Ramirez, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“[A] suspicion founded on a

mistake of law cannot constitute the reasonable basis required for a lawful traffic stop.”)

1. State v. Anaya

{23} Reasonable suspicion in New Mexico is analyzed with the use of an objective test.

In State v. Anaya, our Court of Appeals held that “conduct premised totally on a mistake of

law cannot create the reasonable suspicion needed to make a traffic stop; but if the facts

articulated by the officer support reasonable suspicion on another basis, the stop can be

upheld.” Anaya, 2008-NMCA-020, ¶ 15.

{24} The facts in Anaya are similar to the instant case. The defendant in Anaya was

observed to be weaving within his lane of traffic and was later stopped by a police officer

7

after he failed to utilize his turn signal. Id. ¶ 2. After approaching the car and observing

signs of intoxication, the officer arrested the defendant for DWI. Id. The defendant moved

to suppress the DWI evidence on the basis that the initial stop was invalid because it was not

supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. ¶ 3. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified

that he did not observe any other cars in the area at the time of the stop and that he

understood that the turn signal statute required the use of a turn signal in all circumstances.

Id. Additionally, the officer did not testify that he was affected by the defendant’s right turn.

Id. The district court found that the defendant’s traffic stop was not supported by reasonable

suspicion and granted the motion to suppress the DWI evidence. Id. ¶ 4.

{25} In affirming the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence, the Anaya Court

found that, although “there could be cases in which the officer’s vehicle could be considered

affected traffic, depending on the evidence presented[,] . . . the facts as articulated by the

officer do not support violation of the turn signal law.” Id. ¶ 19. The Court also stated that

“[f]ailure to signal is not a per se traffic violation, despite [the] officer’s good-faith

understanding to the contrary,” and also classified the officer’s mistake as a mistake of law.

Id. ¶ 17. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, the Court agreed

with the district court’s finding that “the officer’s vehicle was not traffic that could be

affected by [the] [d]efendant’s failure to signal.” Id. ¶ 19.

2. Anaya Does Not Conflict With Our Objective Reasonable Suspicion Test

{26} The State argues that Anaya conflicts with our existing caselaw that has consistently

applied an objective approach to analyzing reasonable suspicion. We disagree.

{27} In its answer brief, the State asserted that “[t]he Anaya Court incorrectly states that

New Mexico caselaw holds that conduct premised totally on a mistake of law cannot create

the reasonable suspicion needed to make a traffic stop.” However, in making this assertion,

the State ignored the second part of Anaya’s holding: “but if the facts articulated by the

officer support reasonable suspicion on another basis, the stop can be upheld.” Id. ¶ 15.

This second part is critical because it establishes that a court’s analysis has not been

completed once an officer’s conduct has been categorized as a mistake of law—courts will

still analyze the facts surrounding the officer’s decision in order to determine whether the

officer had reasonable suspicion on another basis. In essence, the second part of the Anaya

proposition is our objective test for reasonable suspicion.

{28} Even with the “mistake of law” language of the first part of Anaya proposition, our

objective test set forth in Brennan and Muñoz remains unaffected because it does not hinge

on a court’s classification of an officer’s mistake as either a mistake of law or a mistake of

fact. See Brennan, 1998-NMCA-176, ¶ 10 (“[T]he question is whether there were facts

available to [the officer] that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the

stop was appropriate.”); Muñoz, 1998-NMCA-140, ¶ 9 (“The test [for reasonable suspicion]

is an objective one. The subjective belief of the officer does not in itself affect the validity

of the stop; it is the evidence known to the officer that counts . . . .”). In other words, it is

8

not fatal in terms of reasonable suspicion if an officer makes a mistake of law when he

conducts a traffic stop; courts will still look objectively to the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the officer’s decision to conduct the traffic stop in order to determine if he or

she had reasonable suspicion.

{29} This was the Court of Appeals’ process in Anaya. It determined that the officer in

that case made a mistake of law because he believed that the turn signal statute required

drivers to engage their turn signal at all times, no matter if there was other traffic that may

have been affected or not. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-020, ¶ 17. However, the inquiry did not end

with this determination. The Court of Appeals still had to determine, despite the officer’s

misunderstanding of the law, if there were other facts surrounding the officer’s decision to

conduct the traffic stop that could provide the objective grounds for reasonable suspicion.

Id. (“[T]here [were] no other facts or testimony . . . to support reasonable suspicion on other

grounds.”). The Court further held that “[i]t cannot be objectively reasonable to stop a

vehicle when there are no facts to support the inference that a law has been violated.” Id.

¶ 20 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court analyzed the facts surrounding the officer’s decision

and did not merely conclude that there was no reasonable suspicion upon its determination

that the officer had made a mistake of law.

3. This is Not a Mistake of Law Case

{30} In an attempt to apply the proposition set forth in Anaya, Defendant argues that

Deputy Francisco made a mistake of law when he conducted the traffic stop of Defendant

based on a perceived violation of the turn signal statute and that this mistake was the sole

basis for the stop. We disagree.

{31} Primarily, as discussed above, we hold that Defendant violated the turn signal statute

and thus, Deputy Francisco did not make a mistake either of fact or of law when he

conducted the traffic stop of Defendant. Thus, the mistake of law portion of the Anaya

proposition does not apply. Also, unlike the officer in Anaya, who testified that he

“understood Section 66-7-325 to require the use of a turn signal in all circumstances,” id. ¶

3, there is no evidence in the record before us that Deputy Francisco had any such

misunderstanding of the breadth of Section 66-7-325(A).

{32} Finally, even if Deputy Francisco was mistaken when he believed that Defendant had

violated the turn signal statute, such a mistake would be a mistake of fact, not a mistake of

law. Deputy Francisco’s determinations—that he, while driving his vehicle on the highway,

was “traffic,” and that he “may [have been] affected” by Defendant’s turn—concerned

“fact[s] that [were] material to [the] transaction.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 1023. Deputy

Francisco made no mistake about the applicable rules of law relating to the mandatory use

of turn signal. Instead, he had to determine whether certain facts—the relative positions of

the vehicles and their direction of travel—constituted a scenario where he may have been

affected by Defendant’s movement. Thus, any mistakes regarding these factual judgments

would be classified as mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law.

9

4. Reasonable Suspicion Analysis

{33} Given our interpretation of Section 66-7-325(A) and our holding that Defendant

violated the statute, we now address the reasonable suspicion inquiry to the facts of this case.

{34} Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that Deputy

Francisco had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant. Deputy Francisco testified that as he

passed through the intersection, he observed Defendant approach the same intersection

perpendicularly and come to a stop. Deputy Francisco observed that Defendant did not have

his turn signal engaged at that time. Deputy Francisco further testified that Defendant never,

at any time, had his turn signal engaged as Deputy Francisco drove through the intersection

and pulled over to the side of the road.

{35} Looking at the “totality of the circumstances” and through an objective lens, we hold

that Deputy Francisco had a “particularized suspicion . . . that [Defendant] [was] breaking,

or [had] broken[] the law.” See Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20. The “specific articulable”

facts that Deputy Francisco observed would lead a reasonable officer to believe that

Defendant had violated the turn signal statute and they created the objective basis for Deputy

Francisco’s reasonable suspicion. Thus, Deputy Francisco’s traffic stop of Defendant was

based upon reasonable suspicion.

III. CONCLUSION

{36} We hold that Defendant violated Section 66-7-325(A) and that Deputy Francisco had

reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop of Defendant. The district court’s denial of

Defendant’s motion to suppress and his convictions are hereby affirmed.

{37} IT IS SO ORDERED.

PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice

WE CONCUR:

EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Chief Justice

PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice

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RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice

CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice

Topic Index for State v. Hubble, No. 30,663

CT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CT-SU Suppression of Evidence

CA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CA-RS Reasonable Suspicion

CA-SZ Search and Seizure

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