Opinion

Brown v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.

  • 653 F.2d 1266
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jul 30, 1981
Status
Published
Cited by
9 cases
Authority
More cited than 77.5%

Ninth Circuit, on remand from Moitie, supra, disposed of the state law claims in Brown by saying that even if they were not merely artfully pleaded federal antitrust claims, they were barred by res judicata because they arose from the same transactions as the antitrust claims, and plaintiffs, under pendent jurisdiction, could have asserted those claims in the federal action

How later courts described this case

  • Ninth Circuit, on remand from Moitie, supra, disposed of the state law claims in Brown by saying that even if they were not merely artfully pleaded federal antitrust claims, they were barred by res judicata because they arose from the same transactions as the antitrust claims, and plaintiffs, under pendent jurisdiction, could have asserted those claims in the federal action
  • "Two claims are the same if they arise from the same transactions or events."
  • where it is not clear the district court would have declined jurisdiction over the supplemental state claims, they are barred by res judicata

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2424 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), the Supreme Court *1267 reversed our decision in Moitie v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 1267 (1980), and remanded for proceedings in conformity with its opinion. We now affirm the decision of the district court dismissing the action on the basis of res judicata.

The only issue unresolved by the Court’s opinion is whether Brown presented state law claims that are not barred by res judicata.

We held:

Appellants first contend that removal was improper because they stated a valid state claim. We disagree. The court below correctly held that the claims presented were federal in nature, arising solely from price fixing on defendants’ part.

611 F.2d at 1268 . Since this holding was not reversed, the law of the case is that Brown presented no valid state law claims.

Even if he did, they are barred. A judgment on the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties on the same claim. See IB Moore’s Federal Practice 10.410[2] at 1163; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 5, March 10, 1978). Two claims are the same if they arise from the same transactions or events. Id.

The federal antitrust claim in Brown I and the state law claims in Brown II arise from the same transactions. See 611 F.2d at 1268 . It is not clear that the district court in Brown I would have refused to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims. See - U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 2430 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The state law claims are barred by res judicata.

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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