Opinion

Doe v. Doe

  • 149 Idaho 564
  • 237 P.3d 661
  • 2010 Ida. App. LEXIS 62
Court
Idaho Court of Appeals
Filed
Jul 27, 2010
Status
Published
Author
Melanson
On the bench
Melanson, Lansing, Gratton
Cited by
5 cases
Authority
More cited than 55.8%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37466

IN THE MATTER OF JANE DOE, JOHN )

DOE, JOHN DOE I, JANE DOE I, )

CHILDREN UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS )

OF AGE. )

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & )

WELFARE, ) 2010 Opinion No. 51

)

Petitioner-Respondent, ) Filed: July 27, 2010

)

v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

)

JOHN DOE II and JANE DOE II, )

)

Respondents-Appellant. )

)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial

District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Bryan K. Murray, Magistrate.

Order terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Samuel C. James, Soda Springs, for appellants.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; James P. Price, Deputy Attorney

General, Boise, for respondent. James P. Price argued.

______________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge

John Doe II and Jane Doe II appeal from the magistrate’s order terminating their parental

rights to their children. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Jane is the mother of C.G., a female born in December 2000; D.G., a male born in

February 2003; N.G., a male born in September 2004; and K.G., a female born in February 2006.

John is the biological father of C.G., D.G., and N.G. John is listed as the father of K.G. on her

1

birth certificate, but he is not her biological father.1 The Department of Health and Welfare

initiated a child protection action in November 2007, after the Department had received several

referrals regarding the children. Approximately a year previous, a Department worker visiting a

neighbor’s house observed C.G., who was five years old at the time, wandering the

neighborhood unsupervised. C.G. appeared dirty and was not wearing shoes. In September

2007, police were contacted concerning an allegation that K.G., who was one year old at the

time, had ingested methamphetamine from Jane’s purse.

The impetus for the child protection action occurred in October 2007 when police found

D.G. and N.G. playing naked and unsupervised in the middle of the road. When police visited

the home, they observed dirty dishes piled in the sink and over the countertops, garbage spilling

over the cans, clothes and linen strewn over a filthy floor, a dirty refrigerator containing very

little food, and empty cupboards. K.G. was roaming naked in the house, and Jane explained that

it was because they could not afford diapers. The water had been turned off for failure to pay the

bill. Jane also indicated that they were behind on rent, and John was not helping support the

family. Jane reported that she had quit her job because it was too hard. Police questioned Jane

about K.G.’s alleged methamphetamine ingestion to which Jane responded that she would not

allow the Department to perform drug tests on the children because she had nothing to prove.

The police observed damage to Jane’s vehicle which Jane explained happened during an

altercation with John. In November 2007, authorities were alerted to C.G.’s poor attendance at

her elementary school.

In December 2007, the parties stipulated to a case plan that allowed the children to

remain with the Does under protective supervision. The case plan also provided, among other

things, that the Does cooperate with the Department’s home visits; not move outside of the

jurisdiction without written permission; notify the Department of address changes; maintain a

home free of drugs, alcohol, and other criminal activities; ensure that any child of age is

attending school; properly supervise the children and provide them with proper medical

treatment; submit to urinalysis testing; and complete various individual and family, as well as

drug and alcohol assessments. The case plan also required that Jane obtain a driver’s license as

1

K.G.’s biological father was a party to the termination proceedings below, had his

parental rights terminated with respect to K.G, and is the subject of a separate appeal which will

not be further addressed herein.

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soon as she was legally able and that John maintain employment and financially support the

children.

The condition of Jane and John’s home improved slightly after the Department became

involved. However, the situation remained unstable and, over the course of the next two years,

Jane and John moved at least five times. Several of those moves were motivated by eviction for

failure to pay rent. At least one such move, when Jane and John moved to Wyoming, was

without written permission from the court and the Department. Jane and John also had a rocky

relationship which resulted in periodic separation and at least one alleged incident of domestic

violence. Jane filed for divorce during this period, but the action was dismissed for inactivity.

Jane and John’s compliance with their case plan was inconsistent. The couple completed

individual and family assessments and held a meeting with extended family members to discuss

temporary placement for the children. However, Jane and John failed to follow through with

many of the recommendations to completion, including substance abuse evaluations and

treatment, couple’s counseling, and a parenting course. They also failed to live free of drugs and

alcohol, which was of great concern in the drafting of the case plan. Due to noncompliance with

their case plan, the magistrate ordered the children to be placed in the custody of the state during

the remainder of the proceedings.

Foster families and guardians who were responsible for the children reported various

disciplinary problems as a result of lack of proper supervision. Perhaps most troubling was the

highly-sexualized behavior of C.G., who was teaching her elementary school classmates how to

pole dance and be sensual. There were also reports that C.G. had been sexually abused and was

now subjecting her younger sister K.G. to abuse. Jane disputed the allegations, claiming that

they were not possible and that she had never witnessed such behavior. She admitted that an

acquaintance had taken sexually-inappropriate photographs of C.G., but denied that she had been

abused. Once placed within the care of the state, the children required extensive dental work and

surgery to correct years of neglect and lack of proper hygiene. Jane admitted difficulty in getting

the children to brush their teeth. N.G. was behind in his vaccinations. Employment for Jane and

John was also sporadic, and John failed to adequately provide for the children even when he had

work. Neither of them paid child support for the care of their children in the state’s custody nor

repaid temporary guardians for clothing and other necessities that were provided for the children.

They admitted receiving the child support orders, but claimed that they ignored them because

3

they did not understand them. Several home visits revealed evidence of alcohol consumption in

the home, which was also contrary to the requirements of the case plan. Neither parent

maintained regular phone contact with the children, despite the allowance of such contact.

During visits with the children, both Jane and John displayed poor, and at times unsafe, parenting

judgment with the children.

The Department sought termination of Jane and John’s parental rights to the children. A

hearing was held over several days in October 2009 and January 2010. Numerous witnesses

testified as to the instability in Jane and John’s lives and their lack of compliance with the case

plan. These witnesses were of the opinion that Jane and John could not adequately raise their

children. Some witnesses were presented on behalf of the parents. These witnesses testified that

Jane and John had made progress and were now capable of raising and nurturing the children in a

stable home environment. Jane and John offered assurances that all of their problems were

behind them. The magistrate terminated Jane and John’s parental rights to C.G., D.G., N.G., and

K.G. on the grounds of neglect and abandonment. The magistrate also held that John is the

presumptive father of K.G., but has been shown not to be her biological father. Jane and John

appeal.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an action to terminate parental rights, due process requires this Court to determine

whether the magistrate’s decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v.

Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 345, 144 P.3d 597, 599 (2006). Substantial and competent evidence is such

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 345-46,

144 P.3d at 599-600 This Court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial

court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. Doe v. Doe, 148

Idaho 243, 246-47, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). We conduct an independent review of the

record that was before the magistrate. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.

III.

ANALYSIS

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her

child. Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002). See also Quilloin v. Walcott,

434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

4

States Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). “Implicit in

[the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act] is the philosophy that wherever possible

family life should be strengthened and preserved . . . .” I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the

requisites of due process must be met when the Department intervenes to terminate the parent-

child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process

requires that the Department prove grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship by clear

and convincing evidence. Id. Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits the Department to petition

the court for termination of the parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interest and

any one of the following five factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a

biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to

discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period which will be injurious to the health,

morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated

for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination.

Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.

In this case, the magistrate concluded, among other things, that Jane and John’s parental

rights to their children should be terminated for neglect. Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3) defines

“neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(25),2 as well as situations where the

“parent(s) has failed to comply with the court’s orders in a child protective act case or the case

plan, and reunification of the child with his or her parent(s) has not occurred within the time

standards set forth in section 16-1629(9).” The time standard established by I.C. § 16-1629(9) is

defined as when “a child is placed in the custody of the Department and was also placed in out of

the home care for a period not less than fifteen (15) out of the last twenty-two (22) months from

the date the child entered shelter care.”

In support of its conclusion that Jane and John had neglected their children, the

magistrate held that they had “failed to provide proper parental care and control, or subsistence,

medical or other care or control necessary for the well being of the children.” The magistrate

2

Idaho Code Section 16-1602(25) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is “neglected”

when the child “is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care

or control necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or omission of his parents,

guardian or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them.”

5

also held that Jane and John were neglecting their children through failure to pay child support

and also were neglecting C.G.’s education. The magistrate concluded:

It is in the best interest of the children that [Jane and John’s] parental

rights should be terminated. Because of what the children have been through they

need capable, dedicated parents who can deal with existing and expected

behavior, health and development issues of the children. The children need a

permanent stable home as soon as possible. They can wait no longer for the

parents to prove themselves. Expecting the parents to do now what they could

and would not do in the past demonstrates how unlikely reunification is any time

soon. The [Department] is meeting the needs of the children far better than their

parents did. The parents have demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with

court orders.

Based on the totality of the evidence presented at the trial, we conclude that there was

substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s decision that termination was

proper. The facts of this case, as summarized above, were established by the testimony of

numerous witnesses at the three-day termination hearing. These witnesses included law

enforcement, social workers from Idaho and Wyoming, CASA representatives, foster parents,

and guardians--some of whom were related to Jane and John. All of these witnesses were in

agreement as to the unstable and inadequate living conditions and the lack of improvement

demonstrated by Jane and John. Additionally, the witnesses were in agreement that Jane and

John were either unwilling or unable to provide the extent of care and stability necessary for their

children’s well-being. Thus, there is substantial and competent evidence supporting the

magistrate’s decision.

Jane and John disputed some of the facts presented by the Department. They testified

that there was never any instance of domestic violence between them. They testified that they

were willing to have the children drug tested. They also provided testimony explaining or

rationalizing some of the troubling facts of this case, including the incidents of sexual abuse, lack

of school attendance, poor dental care, lack of discipline and adequate supervision, lack of

contact with the children, as well as failure to provide financial support and to comply with court

orders, drug testing, and other requirements of their case plan. Jane, John, and some immediate

family members also testified that conditions had improved and would remain stable for the

foreseeable future. Thus, there was evidence presented that Jane and John had made some

progress. However, Jane and John’s progress was not for any significant period of time,

6

especially in light of their turbulent history and tendency to relapse into destructive patterns of

parenting.

This child protection case progressed for over two years. During this time, Jane and John

enjoyed periods of progress that were repeatedly followed by desistence and relapse. Rather

than promoting stability, this ongoing pattern created even greater uncertainty in the lives of their

children. Therefore, there is little credibility to the testimony that all of their uncertainties had

been permanently addressed. Jane and John appeared to display genuine love and concern for

their children during the termination hearing. However, they had over two years to demonstrate

their love by making the necessary reforms in their lives in order to provide proper parental care

and control for the children and to abide by the simple strictures of their case plan. They failed

to make the necessary changes. Accordingly, the magistrate did not err by holding that

termination was in the children’s best interests and that Jane and John had neglected them by

failing to comply with their case plan and by failing to provide proper parental care and control.

Because neglect constitutes a sufficient, independent ground for termination of parental rights,

we do not address the magistrate’s additional reasons for termination.

Jane and John also contend that the Department did not make reasonable efforts at

reunification because it did not provide greater financial assistance for the couple to go to

counseling and complete the other requirements of their case plan. Their argument is without

merit. There was substantial and competent evidence presented at the termination hearing that

the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the parents with their children. The children

were allowed to stay in the custody of Jane and John until their own noncompliance forced the

Department to seek a custody order. The Department repeatedly tracked Jane and John down

after they moved without notice or permission. The Department then coordinated a cooperative

effort with officials in Wyoming after Jane and John relocated the children there. The testimony

presented at the termination hearing reveals numerous visits and encouragement to comply with

the case plan requirements. Jane and John were allowed frequent visitation with their children

and could speak to their children as often as they desired over the phone. However, Jane and

John failed to take advantage of those opportunities. The magistrate did not err by finding that

the Department had made reasonable reunification efforts.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

There is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s conclusion that

termination was in the children’s best interests. There is also substantial and competent evidence

to support the magistrate’s conclusion that Jane and John had neglected their children for failure

to comply with their case plan and provide proper parental care and control. Furthermore, there

is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s conclusion that the Department

made reasonable efforts to reunite Jane and John with their children. Accordingly, the

magistrate’s order terminating Jane and John’s parental rights to their children, C.G., D.G., N.G.,

and K.G. is affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.

Chief Judge LANSING and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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