In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation

*67 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RE: ATTORNEYS’ FEES — PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS and “MINORITY” STATES

McGLYNN, District Judge.

In Kramer v. Scientific Control Corporation, 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Kramer, 429 U.S. 830 , 97 S.Ct. 90 , 50 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976), our Court of Appeals, although acknowledging the benefits that accrue from class action law suits, noted that “critics have challenged the altruism of some class action lawyers and charged that the paramount motivation for such litigation was counsel’s desire to generate substantial fees.” Id. at 1090-91. Indeed, it is a “widely held notion” that in settled class actions, particularly in the securities and treble damage antitrust context, the great bulk of the money received from the defendants is not distributed to class members, but rather is “devoured by avaricious attorneys” who demand astronomical attorneys’ fees. See Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 664, 667 (1979). As the Second-Circuit has stated:

Class actions, termed by some as “lawyer’s lawsuits”, see Developments in the Law — Class Actions, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1318, 1605 (1976), have received a good deal of criticism; and much of this has been directed at the substantial fees awarded to class attorneys. See, e.g., Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1049-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092 , 94 S.Ct. 722 , 38 L.Ed.2d 549 (1973). Terms such as “golden harvest of fees”, Free World Foreign Cars, Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y.1972), “astronomical fees”, M. Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiff’s Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365 , 366 (1972), and “enormous fees”, Comment, 54 U.Det.J.Urb.L. 598, 611 (1977), are used to describe the allowances which often run into the millions of dollars. Critics point particularly to overgenerous application of the equitable fund doctrine, by means of which massive fees are awarded attorneys with too little regard for the interests of the class members. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir.1977). [Much of] [t]his criticism ... is justified. ...

Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735-36 (2d Cir.1978), aff’d, 444 U.S. 472 , 100 *68 S.Ct. 745 , 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980) (footnote omitted).

Presently before the court in this antitrust class action proceeding, are the fee petitions of forty-one private law firms and state attorneys general for approximately $21 million in counsel fees and expenses out of $50,650,000 (net of interest) in settlement proceeds. These requests approximate 40 percent of the class recovery. Twenty of the applications seek fees (not including expenses) in excess of a quarter of a million dollars. A dozen firms seek more than a half a million dollars; six seek approximately $1 million or more; two firms each seek some $2 million in fees and one firm, consisting of only four attorneys, requests nearly $4.3 million in fees. These fee petitions are grossly excessive on their face and, regrettably, lend substance to the widely-held and mostly unfavorable impressions of the plaintiffs’ class action bar, sometimes referred to as the class action industry.

This Memorandum of Decision reflects my judgment on the fee petitions in question. My task has not been an easy one. The fee petitions and supporting documentation are voluminous and reflect the time of more than 160 attorneys and scores of paralegals and legal assistants. In addition, the court has had to consider serious and detailed objections to the fee petitions, the petitioners’ responses to these objections, hundreds of pages of transcript from the 41 days of fee hearings and over a thousand exhibits which were admitted into evidence during those hearings.

Before proceeding to individual fee petitions, I will outline the pertinent history of this litigation, describe the organizing activities of plaintiffs’ counsel, review generally the evidence adduced at the fee petition hearings and outline the legal principles which control my rulings.

1. The History of the Litigation

The Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation (MDL 323) began nearly six years ago in mid-1977 with the filing of fifteen complaints in eight separate District Courts. On March 3, 1978, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 , the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the fifteen cases before it under common docket number 323, and transferred them to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where a federal grand jury was investigating possible antitrust violations in the fine paper industry. 1 See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 446 F.Supp. 759 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit.1978).

Within a year of the transfer, twenty-three additional cases had been filed, and a total of thirty-eight cases were consolidated. The named plaintiffs in the thirty-eight lawsuits were divided into two categories. One group of lawsuits became known as the Private Plaintiffs, which included certain “Minority State Plaintiffs”. These plaintiffs alleged a horizontal conspiracy among fifteen named defendants to fix and raise the prices at which fine paper was sold to their customers. These fifteen defendants, known as the “Mill-Defendants”, manufactured fine paper and sold it both to middlemen (“Merchants”) and other buyers, such as publishing houses, greeting card companies, printers and commercial and other industrial users.

The remaining fourteen plaintiffs were state governmental entities, known as the “Majority States”, which alleged a single horizontal and vertical conspiracy among the fifteen mill-defendants and the middlemen, “independent” merchants, to fix the prices of fine paper which was sold to governmental entities in the fourteen states. 2

The plaintiffs filed two separate motions for class certification. One, filed on behalf of the private plaintiffs, requested the court to certify private plaintiffs (and the “Mi *69 nority States”) who alleged a horizontal conspiracy, as representatives of a nationwide direct purchaser class. The other was filed by the Majority States, requesting the court to certify fourteen separate statewide governmental entity classes, each alleging horizontal and vertical conspiracies. After a hearing and argument, I entered an order on February 10, 1979, which denied the Majority States’ class certification motion and certified the private plaintiffs and Minority States as class representatives on behalf of the following classes:

Nationwide Direct Purchaser Class:

All persons, other than governmental entities, in the United States (excluding defendants and named co-conspirators in the MDL 323 actions, their respective subsidiaries and affiliates) which during the period January 1, 1965 to June 30, 1977, purchased from any defendant, or any subsidiary or affiliate thereof, any kind, type or grade of Fine Paper as hereinafter defined, or any paper product into which such papers were converted by any such defendant, subsidiary or affiliate.

Statewide Governmental Entity Classes: Separate classes, each consisting of the respective State and all of its cities, counties and political subdivisions, and all school'districts, governmental universities and community colleges within the State, which during the period January 1, 1965 to June 30, 1977, purchased from any defendant, or any subsidiary or affiliate thereof, any kind, type or grade of Fine Paper as hereinafter defined, or any paper product into which such papers were converted by any such defendant, subsidiary or affiliate.

See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 143 (E.D.Pa.1979).

At the time the defendants were contesting the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, plaintiffs and certain defendants initiated settlement discussions. These resulted in settlements as follows: with St. Regis Paper Company on July 25, 1978, four and a half months after the MDL transfer, in the amount of $2 million; with International Paper Company on August 18, 1978 in the amount of $5.2 million; and with Potlatch Corporation on September 8, 1978 for $2 million.

A few months later, three more settlements were negotiated as follows: on December 20, 1978, a settlement with Union Camp in the amount of $2 million; on January 15, 1979, with Weyerhaeuser Corporation in the amount of $5 million; and on January 16, 1979, with Boise Cascade Corporation in the amount of $13.8 million. Thus, within nine months after the MDL 323 cases had been transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a settlement fund in the amount of $30 million had been established.

Following this series of settlements a multitude of motions were filed by the plaintiffs and the non-settling defendants. The issues raised included the right to contribution among defendants in antitrust cases and the disqualification of several of plaintiffs’ counsel for conflict of interest. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 22 (3d Cir.1980).

In preparing for trial against the remaining defendants, the plaintiffs deposed approximately 250 witnesses and, along with the defendants, inspected and copied many thousands of documents and briefed and argued numerous discovery motions.

The imminence of the September 22,1980 trial date led to the resumption of settlement discussions. On September 15, 1980, the private plaintiffs and Minority States entered into a settlement with Champion International Corporation in the amount of $4 million. On the first day of trial, settlements with the remaining defendants were reached. The additional settlements, including Champion, amounted to $20,650,000 bringing a total settlement fund in the private cases to $50,650,000. With accrued interest the amount of the settlement fund as of February 1, 1983 was $74,830,000, after disbursement of $866,000 representing 75% of claimed expenses.

Immediately after the private plaintiff cases settled, the Majority State cases were consolidated and called for trial on October *70 6, 1980. At the close of the plaintiffs’ case the defendants rested without offering any evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on December 2, 1980. Subsequently the court adopted the findings of the jury, denied equitable relief, and entered judgments accordingly. The judgments were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 801 , 74 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983).

II. Organizational Structure of the Private Plaintiffs’ Case

The lawyers representing the private plaintiffs’ class created an organizational structure consisting of tiers of committees and subcommittees with numerous “Chairmen” and scores of “Co-Chairmen” for virtually every task in the case. This arrangement succeeded in utilizing the services of over three dozen law firms and state attorneys general and resulted in enormous charges against the fund by lawyers and numerous paralegals. This top-heavy structure was a model of inefficiency and worked to the detriment of thousands of unnamed class members on whose behalf counsel purported to act. For a three-year period, approximately 97,000 hours were billed to the class — 70,000 in lawyer hours and over 16,000 in paralegal hours. Most of this time, approximately 85,000 hours, was spent in the two-year period after the initial $30 million in settlements had been obtained. Such billing, most of which was at senior partner rates, resulted in an aggregate proposed lodestar of nearly $8 million and, with the application of the requested multipliers, a total fee request of over $20 million.

(A) Formation of the Organizational Structure

On July 18,1977 Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. filed a complaint in the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of Herst Litho, Inc., a New York based company. Specks’ co-counsel on this initial complaint was the New York firm of Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman. On October 11, 1977, Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. filed a second Fine Paper case in the District of Connecticut, this time on behalf of Phillip and Ruth Meroney of New Orleans. Specks’ co-counsel on this complaint was Fine, Waltzer & Bagneris, a New Orleans law firm. Each of these actions was brought on behalf of a national class of direct purchasers of fine paper similar to the class eventually certified by the court.

After filing these two complaints, Specks circulated copies of them to several lawyers with whom he had worked in prior class actions, including Jack Chestnut’s firm in Minneapolis, Leonard Barrack of Philadelphia, Lawrence Walner of Chicago, Gene Mesh of Cincinnati, David Berger of Philadelphia and Harold E. Kohn of Philadelphia. N.T., 2/1/82 at 40; Exhibits to Class Member Objectors’ Report in Support of Their Objections to Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses Filed by Class Counsel E 164, 584 (hereinafter referred to as “Class Objectors’ E [no.])”. These lawyers in turn filed actions in various United States District Courts. For example, Leonard Barrack filed a complaint for his Philadelphia-based client in the District of Connecticut. David Berger filed a complaint for his client in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, although Specks had asked Berger to file his complaint in the District of Connecticut. See Class Objectors’ E 164. Harold Kohn filed his complaint on behalf of his firm’s client in the Southern District of New York in November of 1977. Kohn testified that although his client was a member of the national class sought by Specks in his initial complaint, he decided to file his complaint because Specks “begged” him to “over a period of several months.” N.T., 4/21/82 at 2010. Lawrence Walner filed a complaint on behalf of Campbell Office Supply Company of Chicago in the Northern District of Illinois. Four other law firms were co-counsel with Walner on this complaint. Harold Kohn claims that one of these firms, Saveri & Saveri, was added by Walner to his complaint “as a favor” to Specks. Class Objectors’ E 586-87.

*71 At the time the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation entered its transfer order in March of 1978, there were fifteen actions filed in eight different federal districts. “All the actions were filed as purported class actions. While there .. . [were] some variations in the descriptions of the classes sought, most ... [were] national classes of all, or some group of fine paper purchasers.” Opinion of Panel, 446 F.Supp. at 759 . Within a year of the Panel’s transfer order, twenty-three additional cases had been filed by various lawyers, despite the fact that their clients’ interests were already protected by the previously-filed class actions. Indeed, many of these complaints were filed as late as 1979, after the first $30 million of settlements had been obtained and the class already had been certified. As noted by the class objectors, the only logical reason for these new filings was to permit counsel to participate in the case and thereby to obtain attorneys’ fees. Class Objectors’ Report at 22.

(B) Preorganization Meetings Among Counsel

As the complaints were being filed, Granvil I. Specks and others began planning for the distribution of patronage, that is, deciding to which firms the work assignments would be allocated. The planning appears to have begun in January 1978 in anticipation of the February 3,1978 “organizational meeting” in Chicago (discussed below) at which the structure of the case was formally proposed, voted upon and determined by various plaintiffs’ counsel. The time records of Michael Freed of the firm of Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg, Ament & Eiger, P.C. clearly demonstrate that there were several meetings and phone calls which took place on January 23, 24, 25, 27 and February 2, 1978 between James Sloan of the Chicago firm of Sloan & Connelly, P.C., Freed, Specks and other unspecified “Chicago counsel” regarding the organization of the case. As a direct result of these conferences, on January 25,1978, Sloan & Connelly was brought into the case by being added as co-counsel on the complaint filed by the Much, Shelist firm, see N.T., 4/6/82 at 1975, and on the next day the Chicago firm of Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd. was added as co-counsel on the Campbell Office Supply complaint filed by Lawrence Walner.

In addition to these conferences in Chicago, on January 29, 1978, there was a meeting of plaintiffs’ counsel in Atlanta, Georgia where many of the same lawyers were attending a hearing in the Armored Car Antitrust Litigation. This meeting was referred to by Aaron M. Fine of Philadelphia, an experienced antitrust lawyer, who wrote to Specks on March 8, 1978 to complain about not being invited to participate in the Atlanta session. See Class Objectors’ E-155-56. Certain documents, including Mr. Fine’s letter, are quoted at length because they provide some insight into the workings of the class action bar and help to demonstrate that the polestar of plaintiffs’ organizational structure in this case was patronage, not efficiency:

I called you on Thursday, February 2, 1978, after receiving your notice that there was to be an organizational meeting of all plaintiffs’ counsel to be held on the following day in Chicago, because I had heard disquieting reports from a number of sources. As I told you, I had heard that there had been a meeting of selected plaintiffs’ counsel in Atlanta at which an Executive Committee had been agreed upon, and that Harold [Kohn] had made disparaging remarks about our firm and stated that we could not serve on any such committee.

When I called you on February 2, you told me that there had indeed been a meeting in Atlanta; and that we could not be on the Executive Committee, because Harold had said so. You stated, however, that we would certainly not be barred from serving on other committees and, indeed, you said that you had the highest regard for the legal abilities of our firm. When I asked you who was going to be on the Executive Committee, you identified lawyers in five Philadelphia firms, including Dave Berger. While I have great respect and admira *72 tion for Dave’s legal abilities, I questioned you about his inclusion on the Executive Committee when we were to be excluded, in view of the fact that he had not yet to our knowledge filed a fine paper case and that we had not only filed a case, but taken an active part in obtaining the impoundment of the Grand Jury documents and in the transfer hearing before the Multidistrict Panel. You replied that Dave would certainly have to have a case on file to be on the committee and that he was selected to be on the committee because of his “position in the industry.” I asked whether you meant his position in the fine paper industry, and you replied that you meant his position in the plaintiffs’ antitrust industry, which may, in fact, be an apt description of what is going on. I later learned that Dave did file a case on February 2, 1978, but instead of putting Dave on the Executive Committee, you put Laddie Montague of his firm on it. Again, I have great respect for Laddie and his abilities, but question why he should be on to the exclusion of somebody from our firm.

As you know, Allen Black attended the meeting in Chicago on February 3, 1978, and was unsuccessful in seeking to expand the Executive Committee to include our firm and others. I question whether the Chicago proceedings should be conclusive on the subject, however, since your January 27, 1978 notice to all plaintiffs’ counsel that there was to be an organizational meeting did not give clear notice that an Executive Committee was to be voted upon. Moreover, the outcome of the meeting appears to have been prearranged so as to exclude several very capable law firms, including our own, for no apparently valid reason. A number of plaintiffs’ counsel did not attend the meeting.

We have now received your status report of March 3, 1978, addressed to all plaintiffs’ counsel, except counsel for the states of Arizona and Colorado. The status report disclosed that the members of the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee had approved the establishment of standing committees. A list of the members of those committees was annexed to the report. We are not represented on any of the committees. A number of plaintiffs’ counsel, on the other hand, have multiple assignments, including yourself and Messrs. Kohn, Montague, Walner, Barrack, Rubin and others.

I would appreciate it if you would let me know on what basis the committee assignments were made and on what basis our firm was excluded from any assignment. I hope that it was not done in response to Harold Kohn’s expressed feelings about us. Particularly now that the litigation has been transferred to Philadelphia as a result of the applications made by Sy Kurland and us, I suggest that you may want to reconsider our exclusion from the Executive and other meaningful committees.

(C) The February 3, 1978 Organizational Meeting

The formal organizational meeting was held in Chicago on February 3, 1978. The minutes of this meeting show that 21 private law firms representing 13 clients (5 law firms represented Campbell Office Supply) and 11 state attorneys general were in attendance. The minutes state that “it was the consensus, voting on both a case basis and a counsel basis, that for the purpose of this meeting each Attorney General and each private law firm should have one vote on any matter .... ” Class Objectors’ E 158.

Following the above procedure, the meeting elected a four-man lead counsel team: Granvil Specks, Harold Kohn, Joseph Cotchett and John Noel. Later Seymour Kurland was added to this group. The meeting then elected a dozen-member Executive Committee (later expanded to 14), with two Co-Chairmen, Specks and Kohn, which had the power to appoint standing committees. The minutes of the meeting concluded with a “Statement of Guiding Principles”:

The Chairman [Granvil I. Specks] stated that the members of the Executive Committee were of the opinion that the *73 Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation should be governed by two guiding principles:

(1) There will be a fair and equitable allocation of work so that all plaintiffs’ counsel can actively participate in the litigation.

(2) That plaintiffs’ counsel will be reasonably compensated for services actually and productively rendered. As a corollary of this principle, the litigation should be run as efficiently as possible and duplicative work should be avoided. Class Objectors’ E 161 3

Within a matter of a few weeks a host of committees and subcommittees had been formed by the Executive Committee. A plaintiffs’ Discovery Committee was formed with one chairman and three vice-chairmen. Fifteen individual defendants’ Discovery Subcommittees were formed with two chairmen for each subcommittee. Other committees included a Plaintiff’s Rule 37 Subcommittee, a Consolidated Amended Complaint Subcommittee, an Industrial Analysis Committee, and a Finance Committee, most with a chairman and a vice-chairman. See Specks’ Status Report dated March 3, 1978, Class Objectors’ E 588-93. 4

At this court’s first pretrial conference on April 19, 1978, certain states’ attorneys general objected to the makeup of the Executive Committee established at the February 3rd organizational meeting. In particular, Michael Spiegel, Deputy Attorney General of California complained at length about' the organization of the case and about the voting procedures used by the private law firms, N.T., 4/19/78 at 28-33:

“I think what we are coming down to in this case is what really is at stake here. In this litigation you have got a group of States who have filed cases. These States are claiming damages for purchases that they have made. They have got clients, that is, the attorneys general representing them have clients with purchases, they have something at stake in this litigation.

Hs * * * *

“On the other side we have a group of private attorneys here without substantial clients! 5 ! If you go down that list and look at the clients they represent you have three or four of the most prominent antitrust attorneys in this country representing a mom and pop greeting card store, a fishmonger from Fort Bragg, California who buys wrapping paper to wrap fish, and these people, just because they have had the ingenuity to allege a national class action representing the Fortune 500 corporations who also buy fine paper, it doesn’t seem to me that that ought to give them a position to walk into a courtroom and say we’re going to run this thing.

“What have they got at stake here? Their clients have nothing at stake. The defendants could buy all their clients for less than probably a month’s attorneys’ fees.

*74 “What is really at stake here is attorneys’ fees. These lawyers have filed these cases. They hope to proceed in this case so that at the end they can have an award of attorneys’ fees. That is their interest. From my point of view that is a conflict of interest.

“Your Honor can be very sure that the decisions that are made on the executive committees, on any committees between attorneys whose interest is down the line on what they are going to get out of this for their own pocket as opposed to what their client is going to get is very divergent.

“I think that is the real fight that is going on here in this courtroom."

“The interesting thing that occurred at the meeting in ... Chicago is that they decided to vote based on one attorney, one vote.

“I could have brought a 400-man staff out there and packed that meeting if I wanted to. They didn’t vote in terms of one client, one vote, you see, so that the mom and pop greeting card store with four attorneys got four votes, whereas at that meeting the State of Colorado would only get one vote.

“Now that is the way this thing was set up and, of course, this was set up before the cases were even transferred. So that whatever was done had no authority in terms of any court order, by any request of any court to have this committee set up.

“My experience in the past has simply been that this is the way that this is done, if somebody wants to make a run for it and grab the power and run the case you do it before anybody else has got together, before the panel has made any transfer, before anybody knows what happens.

“Then you walk into court and say now we have this executive committee and I am in charge of it and here are my four co-lead plaintiffs and we are going to run this thing and everybody else should sit down and be quiet.”

Mr. Kohn, who now complains about the voting and committee system, was a major proponent at that time. He stated, inter alia:

“We would ask that the arrangement which is provided for in our proposed pretrial order No. 2 be the one adopted by the Court. The Court, of course, has extremely wide discretion in this matter. The general procedure has been to follow the recommendations of counsel, particularly when they are arrived at in a democratic method, as we did arrive at them here. That is precisely what Judge Will and Judge Robinson did in the Folding Cartons case, which is the nearest analogy here. It is precisely what Judge Cahn did in the Eastern Sugar casé, where I think he went even further.... ” N.T., 4/19/78 at 15. 6

In retrospect, I can recognize the force of Mr. Spiegel’s argument but at the time the court was persuaded by the array of distinguished counsel for the private plaintiffs and had no reason to anticipate that the case would not be prosecuted in the best interests of the class.

(D) The Addition of New Law Firms and the Exclusion of Others

The number of law firms appearing as counsel for the class continued to grow even after the organizational structure was in place. For example, eight of the petitioning firms did not become involved in the case until well after the first $30 million in settlements were in the bank and the class had been certified. Kohn repeatedly objected to the entry of additional firms, Class Objectors’ E 754-61, but Specks and other members of the Executive Committee nonetheless assigned work to the newcomers. 7 *75 Incredibly, while tjew counsel were being invited to participate, other counsel, including some who had been involved from the outset were frozen out of the case. For example, Gene Mesh of Cincinnati failed in his bid for the Executive Committee; he then asked for the return of his assessment, and apparently dropped out of the case. Class Objectors’ E 169. Fine, Kaplan & Black was shut out of any committee assignments despite its protests. Class Objectors’ E 155-56, 601-02. Stewart Perry complained that he was being squeezed out of this case as well as future class action litigation and unsuccessfully asked Specks to include him in the work. Class Objectors’ E 546-49, 609. The Kohn firm’s request to Mr. Specks in May of 1979 that the Philadelphia firm of Greenfield & Schoen be given work assignments apparently went unheeded. See Class Objectors’ E 610, 168, 594, 595.

(E) The Operation of the Committee System

It was inevitable that this type of structure would generate wasted hours on useless tasks, propagate duplication and mask outright padding. The following are some examples:

1. Counsel have billed approximately one-half million dollars for 1,446 hours of preparation, travel and attendance at pretrial conferences. The class was ably represented at these conferences by lead counsel and except perhaps for their immediate assistants, the attendance of the other lawyers who merely sat and watched was superfluous.

2. Work on the pretrial memorandum was one of the major boondoggles of this case. Fifty-one plaintiffs’ lawyers, including twenty-one partners from nineteen different law firms, and deputy attorneys general devoted a total of over 4,500 hours to the preparation of this Memorandum — especially extravagant figures considering it was to be filed after the Majority States had already filed a similar document dealing with most of the same issues. Not only were these hours excessive, but many of the partner hours were poorly allocated because the same work could have been accomplished by associates and paralegals. Based on the fee petitions, the cost to the class for this one Memorandum is over $1 million.

3. In excess of 4,200 hours were charged to the development of a damage theory to be incorporated into the plaintiffs’ pretrial memorandum and for use at trial. Despite this enormous cost to the class, as of the date of trial, plaintiffs’ counsel had not developed a viable damage theory.

4. Sixteen law firms and attorneys general seek compensation from the class for some 460 hours devoted to researching and briefing motions pending before the Multidistrict Panel.

5. A total of 1,310.7 hours was billed to the class for discovery on the issue of class certification.

6. Approximately 1500 hours were billed to the class by nine law firms for preparing and taking the deposition of one third-party witness, James Nelson.

7. A dozen law firms and state attorneys general bill the class over 1800 hours for work on the Industrial Analysis Committee at a cost of approximately a quarter of a million dollars. The work of this committee, which was purportedly formed to gather information on various facets of the paper industry and the defendant corporations, resulted in little, if any, benefit to the class, largely because of grossly inefficient staffing. The time records disclose that most of the lawyer hours were devoted to researching and reviewing microfilm. Inexpensive retrieval systems, consultants or paralegals could have been utilized to provide the same information at much lower rates than those billed by the partners and associates on the committee.

8. Hundreds of hours were billed to the class by individual attorneys who spent time reading and reviewing a multitude of documents such as memoranda, correspondence, briefs, motions, and interrogatories, which crossed their desk during the course of this case, even though these attorneys were not closely involved with *76 or responsible for the subject matter of these documents.

9. Hundreds of hours were spent on coordination of brief writing. For example, fourteen firms list time for working on the moving brief for class certification. Most of these firms were billing simply for the time they spent reading and reviewing the work done by the Specks and Kohn firms. Eleven firms also bill time for the certification reply brief.

10. The work of the Rule 37 Committee, which was involved in obtaining and reviewing defendants’ discovery responses, was marked by overstaffing and by grossly excessive time changes. Useless mass meetings of plaintiffs’ attorneys, repetitive “read and review” time charged to the same defendants’ discovery responses, unproductive negotiating sessions by a gaggle of plaintiffs’ lawyers and approximately 1,271 hours devoted just to the briefing of motions are just some examples of these excesses.

11. Almost all 160 lawyers who participated in this case were involved in some phase of discovery, with a minimum of forty-five lawyers involved just in the taking of depositions. While time constraints imposed by the court may have contributed to the double tracking and triple tracking of depositions, the work of the fifteen discovery subcommittees seems to have been very poorly coordinated. This resulted in numerous meetings among counsel, reviewing and rereviewing thousands of discovery documents by dozens of partners, associates and paralegals, and tasks being performed by senior level personnel which more appropriately could be carried out by less expensive juniors.

III. Fee Negotiations

Immediately following the final round of settlements in September of 1980, the lawyers for the private plaintiffs turned their attention to the question of the total amount of fees that should be requested from the court. Beginning on October 3, 1980, the plaintiffs’ lawyers began a series of discussions in an attempt to arrive at a mutually agreed upon total fee request, hoping, with some justification, that in the absence of a fee dispute, the court would not feel compelled to subject the petitions to the type of scrutiny they are now undergoing.

On October 8, 1980, Specks sent a letter to all counsel asking that information concerning their time and expenses be sent to Messrs. Atkins, Cotchett, Kohn, Saveri and Specks so that the Executive Committee would “be in a position to make .. . estimates [of fees and expenses] and arrive at recommendations regarding reasonable guide lines [sic] with respect to multiples, etc.... ” Class Objectors’ E 618. On November 13, 1980, a meeting took place which was attended by Specks and other plaintiffs’ counsel for the purpose of reviewing the lodestar computations and out-of-pocket expenses of all plaintiffs’ counsel, this information having been obtained in response to the October 8th letter. According to Mr. Specks’ summary of the meeting, a “consensus” was reached “that counsel for the private plaintiffs and the certified states should seek fees aggregating approximately 25% of the settlement fund, including interest to the date of distribution.” Class Objectors’ E 619-22. This apparent “consensus” did not last long, for Harold Kohn would not agree, insisting that the total amount of fees awarded should not exceed 20% of the recovery or approximately $10 million.

In order to avoid a “blood bath over the fee applications”, see Sachnoff letter, 6/4/81, Class Objectors’ E 628, 8 negotiations were undertaken by Messrs. Specks, Barrack, Sachnoff, Cochett and others to persuade Kohn to change his position. Kohn proposed that the plaintiffs’ attorneys make recommendations to the court with respect to all of the fee petitions with the exception *77 of the Specks, Saveri and Sloan petitions. Specks rejected this proposal. According to Kohn, Specks “refused, as he has refused every suggestion which would not give him and Saveri patently and grossly excessive fees.” Letter from Kohn to Sachnoff, 4/28/81, Class Objectors’ E 625.

In the spring of 1981, as the date for filing the fee petitions drew near, Kohn let it be known that he would file formal objections with the court unless the proposed fees totaled under $10 million. Another round of negotiations ensued in an attempt to dissuade Kohn from this action. During these negotiations, Kohn claims that some plaintiffs’ lawyers privately attempted to have him raise his fee request while publically stating that Kohn’s request was too high. See Kohn’s Memo in Opposition to Subpoena, filed 5/20/81; N.T., 5/3/82, at 2215-16; Letter to Sachnoff, 4/28/81, Class Objectors’ E 625.

The negotiations collapsed primarily because Specks, Saveri and Sloan feared that if the plaintiffs’ lawyers reduced their fee to the level suggested by Kohn then the court would use the new, lower suggested level as a base from which to cut the fees even further. Sachnoff letter to all counsel, 6/4/81, Class Objectors’ E 628, N.T., 5/12/82 at 2297. Other plaintiffs’ counsel also refused to trim their fee requests because they feared they would be excluded from further antitrust cases by Specks, Saveri and Sloan. N.T., 5/3/82 at 2227; 5/12/82 at 2297-2314.

The negotiations having failed, the plaintiffs’ counsel filed their fee petitions on March 20, 1981, the deadline set by the court. The fee requests did not even conform to the originally agreed upon ceiling of 25%. Instead the requested fees totaled approximately 21 million dollars or 40% of the settlement fund (without interest). Efforts to persuade Kohn not to file objections continued. See Sachnoff’s 6/4/81 letter, Class Objectors’ E 628.

IV. The Fee Petitions

In anticipation of the fee requests, this court entered Pretrial Order No. 143, amended by Pretrial Order No. 147, detailing the information to be included in the fee petitions. A copy is appended to this memorandum. (Appendix). Many of the petitions filed did not comply with the requirements of Pretrial Order No. 143 as amended, making a difficult task more time consuming and burdensome.

The fees and expenses requested range from a low of $16,529, by Litman, Litman, Harris & Specter of Pittsburgh, to a high of $4,397,321 by Specks & Goldberg, Ltd. of Chicago. The petitions totaled $20,220,962 for attorneys’ fees and $1,197,151 for expenses.

Granvil I. Specks, co-lead counsel for the plaintiffs, along with several other plaintiffs’ lawyers asked the court to appoint a Fee Review Committee which would consist of seven of the plaintiffs’ counsel. As explained by Specks, this committee would review each petition filed and make recommendations to the court “as to the overall gross fees and expenses that should be awarded as well as the individual fees and expenses based upon that analysis.” N.T., 3/27/81 at 22.

Kohn objected to a fee review committee made up of plaintiffs’ counsel on conflict of interest grounds. Objections, filed 3/26/81, Docket Entry No. 3275. I agreed that it would be inappropriate under the circumstances and declined to appoint the committee. N.T., 3/27/81, at 21.

At the time the fee petitions were filed, Specks and other counsel recognized that some of the fee requests were outrageous. According to Kohn, Specks called the fee petition of Saveri & Saveri, which requested fees in excess of 2 million dollars, including $650 per hour for every hour Guido Saveri spent on the case “ridiculous” and thought that the petition should be “substantially reduced and cannot be allowed.” Kohn’s Objections to Petition of Saveri & Saveri at 6. Lowell E. Sachnoff, one of the petitioning attorneys here, told Specks that many of the firm’s fee petitions had “inflated lodestar time, rates, and multiples” (Letter to Specks, 4/27/81, Class Objectors’ E *78 521-524) and, accordingly, he urged co-lead counsel to make the “Herculean effort” to “sweep out the Aegean [sic] stables.” 9 N.T., 5/12/82 at 2298, 2308.

V. Objections to the Fee Petitions

Other interested parties also shared Specks’ and Sachnoff s sentiment that some of the fee petitions were outrageous. After the fee petitions were filed, detailed objections to them were filed by Harold Kohn and fifteen class member corporations. 10

(A) Kohn’s Objections

Kohn filed specific objections on behalf of his client to sixteen of the fee petitions. He also made general recommendations with respect to all of the petitions. An acknowledged leader of the class action bar with vast experience in the antitrust field, Kohn asserted that the 97,000 hours claimed by the plaintiffs’ lawyers were excessive, and that the same work could have been accomplished with an expenditure of 5,000 to 15,000 hours by one competent firm. Kohn alleged that much of the time claimed was unnecessary and duplicated the work of others, pointing particularly to time charged for travel and attendance at hearings at which attorneys did nothing but sit and listen to other counsel make presentations. He also complained about the many hours charged by lawyers who on their own undertook to “review” the work of others.

Kohn also was of the opinion that the hourly rates requested by many of the attorneys were excessive, as were the rates claimed for paralegals, who performed simple clerical and administrative tasks and yet for whom hourly rates were sought in many cases for amounts five times what paralegals are actually paid. Moreover, Kohn contended that the multipliers requested by many of the petitioning firms were excessive, especially in light of the fact that many of these firms made claims after the January, 1979 settlements when there was no longer any contingency to be considered.

Even more serious, Kohn claimed that five firms, Specks & Goldberg, Ltd., Saveri & Saveri, Sloan & Connelly, Lawrence Walner & Associates, Ltd. and Freeman, Atkins & Coleman, Ltd., gained control of the litigation through a voting block formed by lawyers who were importuned to file additional redundant class actions or who were simply added as co-counsel to complaints already filed. This coterie elected lead counsel and the Executive Committee who were responsible for handing out committee and other work assignments to themselves and to attorneys who voted for them. Such assignments were highly desirable because they enabled firms to increase their lodestar billing, frequently just for mere meetings and review tasks, and to claim multipliers for their leadership roles. Kohn alleged that these firms, in filing their fees petitions, had violated the good faith requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 by conspiring to produce overstaffing, overbilling, and needless “busy work.” 11

In his objections, Kohn concluded that the maximum proportion of fees to the overall settlement fund should have been no more than twenty percent, especially considering that in similar cases the recovery has been in the range of 6% to 20%. 12

*79 (B) Class Objectors

Among the members of the class were fifteen corporations 13 who engaged the New York City firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges (“Weil, Gotshal”) to challenge the fee requests of class counsel. On May 15, 1981, the deadline for filing objections to the fee petitions, Weil, Gotshal filed a “Notice of Intention to Appear and Object to Applications For Attorneys’ Fees and Costs”. Simultaneously, on behalf of the class objectors they filed a motion for an order (1) granting them permission to review all the attorneys’ fee applications and (2) for an extension of time to file additional written objections to the fee applications after they had had an adequate amount of time to review the fee petitions. Over the objections of plaintiffs’ counsel except Mr. Kohn, N.T. 6/10/81, I granted the class objectors’ motion.

The class objectors submitted a 525 page report with 1200 pages of exhibits and appendices reflecting a detailed analysis of many aspects of the fee petitions and which, to a great extent, supported the Kohn assertions of gross inefficiency, incompetence and overreaching on the part of plaintiffs’ counsel.

The report also made a number of recommendations including (1) denying fees to counsel who misstated facts underlying their fee application or who deliberately participated in the logging of unnecessary hours, and (2) fixing the number of compensable hours at 15,000, the number attested to by Kohn as being reasonable but adding, however, that even if the number were doubled with a rate of $100 per hour and a multiplier of 1.5, it would result in a generous award of 4.5 million dollars.

VI. The Response to the Objections

(A) Retaliation Against Kohn

Plaintiffs’ counsel returned the volley by filing numerous objections to the Kohn firm’s fee petition. 14

Although these same objectors did not challenge any other fee petitions, the objections to the Kohn petition apply equally to many other petitions. 15 For example, Specks & Goldberg attacked Kohn’s average hourly rates of $610 per hour as “scandalous”, Preliminary Statement of Objectors to Kohn Petition at 5, but have not challenged Saveri’s hourly rate of $650. Lowell Sachnoff in his objection to Kohn’s fee petition alleges that Kohn oftentimes used lawyers for ministerial work when he could have used paralegals; however, these same objections could be applied to nearly all the firms in this case, including Sachnoff. 16

*80 (B) Response to the Class Objectors’ Report

Not unexpectedly, the petitioners (except Kohn) defended the organizational structure and the hours charged claiming that the division of labor had been the most effective way of tackling the massive task confronting them and that only their long hours, hard work and sheer persistence produced the fund which benefited the class. 17

Kohn, in his response, agreed with Weil, Gotshal that there had been tremendous waste, particularly, in the deposition program. However, he noted that he had “steadfastly opposed the proliferation of work among additional firms which were engaged and were assigned by Mr. Specks over [my] objections.” Reply at 12, filed 11/12/81. Furthermore, he added, “There is a limit as to what any one lawyer, however dedicated and able, can do when so many lawyers, for reasons of their own, are united in opposing him.... ” Reply at 12. Finally, he claimed that he had been wary of displaying plaintiffs’ disputes before the watchful eyes of defendants’ counsel while settlement negotiations were going on.

VII. The Fee Hearings

The court notified all interested parties that an evidentiary hearing on the fee issue would be granted to any person desiring one. A total of eight firms took advantage of this opportunity. Inexplicably, Sloan & Connelly, P.C., having objected only to Kohn’s petition, filed a motion requesting an order compelling evidentiary hearings for all petitioning attorneys and seeking a denial of any fees to petitioners who did not present evidence at a hearing. This motion was denied. 18

The hearings commenced on February 1, 1982 and ended with a closing argument by the class objectors on June 7, 1982. 19

VIII. The Legal Principles

Although American courts generally require every litigant to pay his own attorneys’ fees and costs, the common fund doctrine represents a well-recognized exception to that rule. Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir.1982). This doctrine permits a court of equity to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a party who produces or preserves a common fund for the benefit of others. Id. The basis of this equitable award is to prevent the unjust enrichment of those who benefited from but did not participate in, the litigation. Id.

In Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973) (“Lindy I”), and 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.1976) (“Lindy II”), our Court of Appeals set forth the guidelines for the computation of fee awards. First, the court must determine the hours expended by counsel which created, protected or preserved the fund. Lindy II at 111. Second, the number of hours is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate for the attorney’s services. Hourly rates may vary according to the status of the attorney (i.e., his experience, reputation, practice, qualifications, etc.) who performed the work or the nature of the services provided. *81 Lindy I at 167. This multiplication of the number of compensable hours by the reasonable hourly rate constitutes the “lodestar” of the court’s fee determination. Id. at 168.

The lodestar can be increased or decreased based upon the contingent nature of the particular case involved and the quality of the attorney’s work. An increase or decrease of the lodestar amount is referred to as a “multiplier”. In determining whether to increase the lodestar to reflect the contingent nature of the case “the district court should consider any information that may help to establish the probability of success.” Id. at 168. However, “[t]he court may find that the contingency was so slight or the amount found to constitute reasonable compensation for the hours worked was so large a proportion of the total recovery that an increased allowance for the contingent nature of the fee would be minimal.” Id. A multiplier for quality should only be awarded for “an unusual degree of skill, superior or inferior, exhibited by counsel in the specific case before the court.” Siiberman, supra, at 64.

IX. Guidelines

When applying the Lindy analysis to the fee petitions in the instant case, I have had to make numerous rulings with respect to compensable hours, hourly rates and multipliers which are applicable to most — if not all — of the fee petitions. Before proceeding to a Lindy analysis of each individual fee petition, it would seem appropriate to outline in a general way the standards by which I measured the accuracy of the data submitted, the reasonableness of the hours charged and rates sought and the appropriateness of a multiplier for contingency and quality.

(A) Compensable Hours

(1) Disallowed Hours

I have disallowed or reduced time for the following tasks:

(a) Pretrial Memorandum

As mentioned earlier, this was one of the major examples of maladministration in this case. No less than 51 plaintiff lawyers devoted a total of over 4,500 hours to this task at a cost (based on the fees requested) of over one million dollars. This was a grossly excessive amount of time to expend on this one brief and accordingly, I have reduced each firm’s hours expended on this task by one-half.

(b) Read and Review Time

As mentioned previously, hundreds of hours have been billed to the class by attorneys for reading and reviewing documents for which the attorneys were not responsible. This time has been disallowed for all attorneys except members of the fourteen member Executive Committee. See In re Equity Funding Corporation Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. 1303, 1329 (C.D.Cal.1977)

(c) Fee Petition Time

In accordance with the rule of Lindy II, time involved in the preparation of fee petitions is not compensable as it does not enure to the benefit of the class, 540 F.2d at 111.

(d) Pretrial Conferences

As noted above, counsel billed a total of 1446 hours for the 31 conferences. This large number of hours was primarily due to the attendance of attorneys who contributed nothing to the conferences but were merely there as spectators. The hours billed by these attorneys will not be compensated by the class. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir.1974).

(e) Hours Without Adequate Supporting Data

Hundreds of hours which were described by vague or meaningless terms or insufficiently documented, will not be compensated. See In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. 1357, 1387 (N.D.Ga.1979), modified on other grounds, 645 F.2d *82 488 (5th Cir.1981). “The burden is clearly on counsel to file adequately-documented applications for fees and those who fail to meet that burden do so at their own risk.” In re Equity Funding Corporation Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. at 1327 .

(f) Industrial Analysis Committee

Approximately 1800 lawyer and paralegal hours have been billed to the class for work on the Industrial Analysis Committee (“IAC”). Approximately 150 of these hours were spent in the IAC meetings alone. The membership of this committee consisted of: one chairman, four co-chairmen and seven other private law firms, Also on the committee were five assistant attorneys general of the Minority States. The members of the IAC performed such clerical and ministerial tasks as gathering and microfilming defendants’ 1973-77 Form 10-Ks for sales volume, trying to determine defendants’ market shares and reviewing Lockwood’s Directory for the names of subsidiaries and affiliates of the defendants.

The work of this committee was basically useless. It duplicated the efforts of others and resulted in no appreciable benefit to the class. It therefore will not be compensated by the class.

My conclusion is supported by co-lead counsel’s repeated and well-documented objections to the work of this committee. Commencing with a letter dated August 23, 1978, to Joseph Cotchett, Chairman of the IAC, Harold Kohn, as a member of the IAC, continually took the position that the work of the IAC should cease as it was wasteful and of no benefit to the class. In the August 23, 1978 letter, Class Objectors’ E 278-79, Kohn complained of the fact that 15 persons attended a two-day meeting of the Industrial Analysis Committee regarding industry statistics — much of which came from publicly available publications of which most people were already aware. He also noted that the industry’s statistics were of limited use and that there had already been two settlements in the case based on market share information obtained without any input from the IAC.

Kohn’s letters to Cotchett criticizing the work of the IAC continued. On November 21, 1978, he again wrote to Cotchett stating that the work of the IAC had not ceased; that the committee’s work did not justify the amount of time devoted to it; and that his firm had been obtaining on its own industry information sufficient to conduct negotiations and to conclude settlements. See Class Objectors’ E 282-83; see also letter of 10/12/78, Class Objectors’ E 280. Kohn specifically noted that the information he obtained was the type of information he should have been, but was not, receiving from the committee, and that such information should not take very much time to obtain. Kohn concluded by directing that the activities of this committee be suspended until after the class was certified, when the situation could be reexamined. Kohn warned Cotchett that he would object to any attorney fees requested for any time expended after November 21,1978 on IAC matters. Kohn continued to write Cotchett repeating his objections, but his warnings went unheeded. See letters of 12/15/78, 1/19/79, Class Objectors’ E 284-85, 287.

Because of his intimate knowledge of the workings of this committee and his vast experience, Kohn’s assessment of the value of this committee is persuasive. I am in accord with Kohn’s view that the Industrial Analysis Committee work was of no benefit to the class.

(2) Allowed Hours

The class objectors have objected to the following hours, but for the reasons given below, I have determined that the time should be compensated.

(a) Proceedings before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”)

Class objectors urge that time spent before the Panel should be disallowed because they claim it was of no benefit to the class since the actions would inevitably be consolidated no matter what was argued by the plaintiffs’ lawyers to the Panel. Block affidavit, filed 6/8/81 at 36. I am not persuaded by this argument and I note *83 it was specifically rejected by the court in Equity Funding, supra, 438 F.Supp. at 1334 . Since the petitioning lawyers who argued before the JPML acted on behalf of their clients and the putative class and since counsels’ views and arguments are an essential part of the Panel’s decision-making process, the time will be compensated.

(b) Class Action Discovery

The class objectors object to the 1,310.7 hours devoted to class action discovery and they urge the court to disallow a substantial number of these hours because the class did not benefit from having 16 representatives certified.

Although this is an excessive number of hours to be spent on this one activity, all of it resulted from the action of the defendants, who requested the discovery of the 16 would-be class representatives. Since the responsibility for this inordinate number of hours lies with the defendants, not the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the petitioners should not be denied compensation for class discovery. On the other hand, to award the plaintiffs’ counsel fees for this time at their customary hourly rate would be an injustice to the class. I think a proper balance can be struck by compensating for class action discovery, but only at a rate of $50 per hour. 20

(B) Hourly Rate

Because of the duplication, waste and inefficiency which resulted from the participation of 41 sets of attorneys and the committee structure established by counsel, “it is only proper that the fee award be adjusted to reflect this.” In Re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 416 F.Supp. at 916. Because of these circumstances, attorneys cannot expect to receive the same hourly rates awarded to them by other courts in class action litigation. The abundance of attorneys representing the class substantially diluted each attorney’s role and, therefore, the rates should be reduced accordingly to reflect their diminished contribution. In many instances, adequate representation for the class may result in some degree of duplication but the proliferation of lawyers here cannot be justified on any rational basis.

In this litigation, it was not unusual for senior partners to devote a great deal of time to clerical, administrative and investigative tasks such as document review. Partners will not be compensated at partner-level rates for tasks which are customarily performed by junior associates or paralegals. Lindy I, supra at 167; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d at 717 . As my colleague Judge Cahn has aptly stated: “[A]n attorney who charges $150 per hour for work that could properly be completed by an attorney whose time is valued at only $75 per hour, should be paid only $75 per hour from the settlement funds.” In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation (East Coast) MDL 201(A), slip. op. at 11 (E.D.Pa., filed September 30, 1980).

In light of all the circumstances presented here, I am satisfied that the following rates are fair and reasonable for the private attorneys: 21

1. Hourly rate for partner-level work: $100.00.

2. Hourly rate for associate-level work performed by a partner or an associate: $50.00

3. Hourly rate for co-lead counsel (Specks and Kohn): $150.00.

These rates are in conformity with the regular hourly rates billed to noncontingent clients by private law firms in major metropolitan areas. Paralegals will be compensated at the rate of $25 per hour which I *84 find to be reasonable and which is the rate the majority of petitioners have requested. See Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 70 F.R.D. 366, 373-74 (E.D.Pa.1976); Entin v. Barg, 412 F.Supp. 508, 517 (E.D.Pa.1976) (In both cases paralegals were awarded $20 per hour).

(C) Multipliers

I will allow, for the contingency factor, a positive multiplier of 1.5 for all compensable time expended prior to the $30 million settlements consummated in January of 1979. 22 Once the initial settlements were approved, there was no risk of nonpayment for services or reimbursement of expenses. As Robert Atkins, Esq., one of the petitioners here, stated when he wrote to the New Hampshire Attorney General:

As you know, there have been previous settlements with certain defendants amounting to $30 million; approximately $6 million in interest has accrued since that date. As a result of these settlements, which have been approved, reimbursement of your State’s assessment payments is virtually assured.

Class Objectors’ E 205. I have not chosen a higher multiplier because prior to January 1979, the risk of an unsuccessful result in this case was spread among 25 law firms and 7 attorneys general. 23 Moreover, it appears that this was not a case of high risk because there was a “large number of attorneys who were willing to prosecute this case on a purely contingent basis. This was quite obviously not a case where counsel were reluctant to invest considerable time because of the fear that they would go unpaid.” In re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 416 F.Supp. at 919 n. 30.

No positive quality multiplier will be allowed. Under all the circumstances of the case, I am not persuaded that any counsel demonstrated such an unusually high degree of skill as would warrant compensation beyond that reflected in the hourly rates.

Specks & Goldberg, however, because of its dominant leadership role, must be charged with primary responsibility for all the wasted hours, duplication and gross inefficiency which marked this ease from its inception. While I recognize that in a case as large and complex as this, some duplication of effort is inevitable, nevertheless, the court cannot condone the needless proliferation of lawyers, wasted time and unnecessary expenses, all of which were orchestrated by Mr. Specks despite warnings and objections by his co-lead counsel.

Based on the record before me, a good case can be made for denying the Specks & Goldberg petition altogether. But weighing in the balance the positive aspects of the firm’s contribution such as the vital role Granvil Specks played in the settlement negotiations and the utilization of his broad experience in class action litigation, I am convinced that something less Draconian is in order.

Lindy I and its progeny authorize the application of a negative multiplier as a “penalty” based on “[a]n evaluation of the professional methods utilized in processing the case.” Lindy II at 118. This is the course I will follow and, accordingly, I will apply a negative multiplier of .5 to the Specks & Goldberg lodestar. This reflects my considered judgment that effective management could have produced the same results in less than half the time expended. The application of a negative multiplier is necessary in a case of this nature to remind counsel, particularly those in a leadership role, that a class action is something more than a fee-generating device. It is a cause *85 of action belonging to the members of the class to whom counsel owe a duty of fidelity. Their primary job is to create a fund for the class not the lawyers.

(D) Expenses

The petitioning attorneys here have asked the court for reimbursement of expenses totaling $1,197,151. The court has previously awarded counsel (except Messrs. Perry and Riordan) reimbursement for all but 25% of the expenses for which they have petitioned, with the understanding that if any of the requested expenses are disallowed, that amount will be subtracted from any fee awarded, or if necessary, repaid by counsel. Postjudgment Orders No. 5, filed 7/24/81, and No. 6, filed 8/13/80. My examination of the expense reimbursement requests prompts some general comments at this time with a more detailed analysis to follow.

First, where I have disallowed attorney time (e.g., for unnecessary attendance by an attorney at a pretrial conference), I have not permitted reimbursement for any expenses incurred' in connection with such time.

Second, I have assumed that the class members “have agreed to pay [only] modest to moderate travel and per diem costs when the trips served their beneficial interests.” In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. at 1389 . Accordingly, petitioners have not been reimbursed for “unnecessary or extravagant travel and related expenses.” Id.

Finally, I have scrutinized with particular care repeated charges for meals consumed at hometown restaurants and have disallowed those which appeared to have been arranged primarily for the benefit of the lawyer.

X. The Depth of the Review

In Lindy II, the Court of Appeals stated that it “did not ... intend that a district court, in setting an attorney’s fee, become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representation,” nor “that the inquiry into the adequacy of the fee assume massive proportions, perhaps even dwarfing the case in chief.” 540 F.2d at 116. Unfortunately, the expectations of Lindy II cannot be realized in this case. The internecine warfare which broke out among plaintiffs’ counsel resulted in charges of gross mismanagement, ethical misconduct, bad faith and overreaching. The eruption from within, in turn, generated an all out assault from without in the form of the class objectors’ investigations and report. 24 These circumstances made it imperative for the court to undertake a thorough examination of each of the fee petitions.

I regret to say that my inquiry has given substance to the worst fears of the critics of the class action device — that it is being manipulated by lawyers to generate fees. Some of the petitioners here were reminded on a prior occasion that

[t]he principal attacks on the [Rule 23] are largely the result of conduct by counsel for plaintiffs in some cases who have acted as though the rule was adopted for their benefit rather than for the multitude of individuals comprising the class or classes whose rights they were presumably vindicating.... It would be ironic indeed if class actions . .. were to be restricted or eliminated as a result of the conduct of a very small segment of the bar specializing in plaintiffs’ representation.

Liebman v. J.W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co., 63 F.R.D. 684, 701 (N.D.Ill.1974).

My rulings with respect to the fees may seem harsh to many, but as long as Rule 23 and Lindy and its progeny impose upon the court the duty to protect the class from overreaching by class counsel, I have no alternative. Moreover, the court must take a firm stand if Rule 23 is to retain *86 respectability as a legitimate and effective tool of judicial administration.

XI. The Individual Fee Petitions

In alphabetical order by firm (except for Stewart Perry, Esq., whose petition is reviewed in conjunction with that of Walter Riordan, Esq.) the results of my analysis of the fee petitions follow. In sum, I have allowed fees totaling $4,343,103 and expenses of $1,121,020.

ADLER, BARISH, LEVIN AND CRES-KOFF

Adler, Barish is located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The firm was co-counsel with Wolf, Block for plaintiff, Moses Jaroslawicz, t/a J & B Toy Stationery, on a complaint filed in August of 1977.

It seeks compensation for 965.5 partner hours, 1382.25 associate hours and 98.75 paralegal hours. Its total lodestar request is $219,925 and with the application of a requested multiplier of two, the total fee sought is $439,850. Adler, Barish’s major responsibility was discovery of Scott Paper Company in conjunction with co-counsel Wolf, Block. Both firms performed this task under the supervision of the discovery chairman (Specks) and co-chairmen (Saveri and Cotchett).

I. Arnold Levin

(A) Hours Expended

Levin is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 965.5 hours of work. After a careful review of the time records submitted, I find that only 622.75 of the total hours claimed by Levin have benefited the class. Specifically, in accordance with the Guidelines set forth above, I find the following hours did not benefit the class and accordingly will not be allowed:

1. .75 hours for status phone calls to Levin’s client. Such activity did not benefit the class.

2. 39.5 hours are claimed for the argument before the MultiDistrict Litigation Panel. This claim is clearly excessive. The court will allow 12 hours for this endeavor.

3. In the monthly time sheets, 51 hours are described only as “correspondence.” Such entries are too vague or inadequately documented to allow compensation since it cannot be determined whether the time benefited the class and what an appropriate hourly rate would be.

4. 6.5 hours devoted to attendance at pretrial conferences will not be compensated since such attendance did not benefit the class. In this litigation, Adler, Barish had no leadership role; its participation was limited to Scott Paper discovery. Therefore, it was neither necessary nor beneficial to the class for Levin to attend pretrial conferences.

5. 225 hours spent by Levin reviewing documents, correspondence and filings for which Adler, Barish was not responsible (i.e., those not pertaining to Scott Paper Company) will not be compensated. For example: (1) On May 7,1979, Levin spent .5 hours reviewing the Potlach cast of characters, .5 hours reviewing the joint memorandum of merchant house defendants in opposition to motion for reconsideration and an additional .5 hours reviewing the reply brief of Potlach in opposition to motion for reconsideration; (2) On January 4, 1980, two hours were spent reviewing the Majority States’ answer to the merchant house defendants’ interrogatories; and (3) On April 2, 1980, 1.5 hours were spent by Levin reviewing the Majority States’ petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. As discussed earlier, in a case such as this, where there are 160 attorneys participating, every attorney cannot possibly be compensated for reading every piece of paper over the course of three years of litigation, as Levin apparently did. 25

*87 6. 64 hours spent by Levin on the Trial Memorandum and Final Contentions (nearly 44 hours spent in meetings or conferences on the subject) appears excessive in light of the combined 4604.93 hours spent on these same tasks by all the lawyers in this case. Accordingly, I will reduce the 64 hours claimed by Levin by one-half. Only 32 of these hours will be compensated.

7. Finally, I have considered the class objectors’ challenge to the 19.4 hours Levin spent traveling and attending discovery-related meetings, most of them in Chicago, Illinois, and the general objection to his time spent in the discovery of Scott Paper Company. I have carefully considered these objections and especially share the objectors’ recommendation that meetings of plaintiff’s counsel, who are headquartered in various parts of the country, be kept to the bare minimum due to the expense of travel. I find, however, that since Levin played an appreciable role in the discovery of Scott Paper Company from the start to the finish of this litigation, the hours spent by him were reasonable and therefore compensable.

For all of the above reasons, then, Levin will be compensated for a total of 622.75 hours. The number of hours disallowed is 342.75.

(B) Hourly Rate

Levin asks for an hourly rate of $100 during the years 1977 through 1978 and $125 for 1979 through 1981. As was stated earlier, Levin’s compensable time in this litigation was devoted almost exclusively to Scott Paper discovery. He reviewed that defendant’s documents and took nine depositions. This task was performed in conjunction with members of the Wolf, Block office and under the supervision of Specks, Saveri & Cotchett. In short, it is of the type of work normally assigned to a junior partner or senior associate. On baianee, an average rate of $100 per hour for Levin’s time seems fair and appropriate.

(C) Total Lodestar

622.75 hours X $100/hour = $62,275

(D) Multiplier

A contingency multiplier of 1.5 will be applied to all compensable Adler, Barish time (171 hours) expended prior to the initial settlements. This includes 117.75 hours of Levin’s time and all of Michael Fishbein’s time. No adjustment to the lodestar is justified for the quality of Levin’s services. Adler, Barish did not have a leadership position in the case and the vast majority of Levin’s compensation is for routine discovery matters. A quality factor is inherent in Levin’s $100 hourly rate and an adjustment to that rate is not justified because Levin did not demonstrate an unusually high degree of skill.

II. Michael Fishbein

(A) Hours Expended

Fishbein, a 1977 law graduate, is an associate at Adler, Barish. He asks for compensation for 53.25 hours which were devoted to responding to the defendants’ discovery of the firm’s client and communications with or concerning that client.

The objectors challenge the award of compensation to Fishbein for class action discovery because the class did not benefit from having sixteen representatives certified. Nevertheless, the Adler, Barish client was a named party and a designated class representative. Certification was a necessary part of the proceedings and inured to the benefit of the class. Accordingly, I will allow compensation for the time Fishbein spent on this task.

(B) Hourly Rate

Adler, Barish has asked for $75 an hour for Fishbein’s time. However, since *88 Fishbein had only recently graduated from law school when he worked on this case, $50 an hour is a fair and appropriate hourly rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

53.25 hours X $50/hour = $2,662.50

(D) Multiplier

See I.D.

III. Arlene Lotman

(A) Hours Expended

Ms. Lotman is an associate of Adler, Barish. She spent a total of 1313.75 hours almost exclusively on discovery work, a substantial portion of which consisted of document review, microfilm review and deposition summarization pertaining to the Scott Paper discovery. After a review of the time records of Ms. Lotman, I find that the following hours of the total claimed by her are not compensable:

1. In the monthly time sheets submitted to the court 17.3 hours are merely described as “Telephone conversation with co-counsel.” Such entries are too vague or inadequately documented to allow compensation since it cannot be determined whether this time benefited the class or what an appropriate hourly rate would be for such time. 26

2. 6.5 hours of Lotman’s time devoted to attendance at pretrial conferences will be disallowed; it did not benefit the class.

3. 7 hours for one day of telephone calls to the Wolf, Block firm and James Sloan, Esquire (Entry of June 10, 1980) is excessive on its face. Only one hour of such time will be compensated.

4. 9.5 hours spent on July 7, 1980 reviewing the Majority States Pretrial Memorandum will be disallowed; it did not benefit the class.

5. 4.5 hours spent on September 3, 1980 reviewing correspondence and private plaintiffs’ pretrial memorandum is excessive; only one hour of this time will be compensated.

6. 3.25 hours spent on September 4, 1980 for “tel. call to co-counsel and complete review of trial memo” will be disallowed. This entry of 3.25 hours is contained in the monthly time summaries submitted to the court. It is at variance with Lotman’s contemporaneous time sheets, which list only .75 hours for this same activity. Accordingly, she will be compensated for only .75 hours.

7. Finally, it is my view that Ms. Lotman’s claim of 149.75 hours devoted to the preparation of depositions pertaining to Scott Paper is excessive in view of the fact that (1) Levin spent 117.5 hours in preparation for the same depositions and (2) Ms. Lot-man devoted over 680 hours to review of Scott documents and microfilm and an additional 100 hours preparing a discovery book and report and an undated cast of characters for Scott. Given these circumstances, it is my judgment that 149.75 hours for preparation of these depositions is unreasonable; only 50 hours of this time will be allowed.

Accordingly, I will disallow a total of 145.05 hours of Ms. Lotman’s time. The total amount of compensable time is therefore 1168.7.

(B) Hourly Rate

Adler, Barish is asking for $75 an hour for Ms. Lotman’s time. As in the case of Mr. Fishbein, Ms. Lotman began work on Fine Paper as a recent law school graduate. In the light of the level of the work she performed and her junior associate status, an award of $50 per hour for her time is fair and appropriate.

(C) Total Lodestar

1168.7 hours X $50 = $58,435

(D) Multiplier

See I. .(D) supra, at 57.

*89 IV. Barbara Sarkin and Claudia Tesoro

These two attorneys first appear in the Adler, Barish time records in late September 1980, less than a week before the final settlement agreements in this case were concluded. They reviewed pleadings and other general materials but performed no substantive work prior to settlement. Prior to this time, neither had any prior experience in Fine Paper and their addition to an already-crowded array of some 160 attorneys was of no benefit to the class. Accordingly, all of their 15.25 hours will be disallowed.

V. Paralegal

Adler, Barish asks for compensation of 98.75 paralegal hours at the rate of $25 per hour. A review of the time records indicate that their work did benefit the class and that time expended was reasonable. For the reasons stated in the Guidelines section, I believe that $25 an hour for paralegal time is fair and appropriate. However, for reasons already stated, no multiplier will be awarded for paralegal time. Accordingly, Adler, Barish will be awarded $2,468.75 for paralegal time.

VI. Expenses

Adler, Barish’s total expenses are $30,-269.12, which I find reasonable. As explained earlier, the firm has already received 75% of these expenses. Accordingly, I will award the firm the remainder of its expenses in the amount of $7,568.12.

VII. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which Adler, Barish is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Levin 622.75 $100.00 $ 62,275.00 $ 68,162.50 $227,575.00

Fishbein 53.25 $ 50.00 $ 2,662.50 $ 3,993.75 $ 7,987.50

Lotman 1168.7 $ 50.00 $ 58,435.00 $ 58,435.00 $197,062.50

Sarkin 0.0 0 0 0 $ 1,725.00

Tesoro 0.0 0 0 0 $ 562.50

Paralegals

TOTAL $125,841.25 $133,060.00 $439,850.00

98.75 $ 25.00 $ 2,468.75 $ 2,468.75 $ 4,937.50

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 30,269.12

Amount Previously Distributed $ 22,701.00

Amount Outstanding $ 7,568.12

Amount Awarded $ 7,568.12

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $133,060.00

Expenses $ 7,568.12

Final Award $140,628.12

AUSTIN, ROTH, SUNDE, McDONOUGH & TIERNEY, P.A. 27

This Minneapolis firm became counsel of record for National School Studios, Inc., Universal Publications, Inc. and Prestige Portraits, Inc. on April 1, 1979. As in the case of other Minneapolis firms, the Austin firm became involved in this case at the importuning of Walter Riordan, Esquire, long after the initial 30 million dollar settle *90 ments were obtained, after the class was certified, and after there was already an abundance of counsel representing the class.

The firm claims to have spent 117 partner hours, 55.75 associate hours and 169.25 paralegal hours (totalling 342 hours), on such tasks as reviewing and indexing microfilmed documents of Kimberly-Clark Corporation, Hammermill Paper Company and Gilbert Paper Company. The firm was apparently assisting other firms that were responsible for obtaining discovery from these defendants. 28 The firm seeks total fees of $29,584.38.

I. Robert M. Austin

(A) Hours Expended

This partner claims to have spent 117 hours on the litigation. After careful review of the time sheets submitted, I find that the 97 hours are not compensable:

1. 29 hours of work which did not benefit the class. These consist of 19 hours billed to work on the firm’s fee petition, 6 hours billed to conferences with Mr. Riordan in March and April, 1979 (apparently to obtain information about the case which the Austin firm was about to enter for the first time), and 4 hours devoted to the drafting of a complaint for the firm’s clients. Since the firm entered the case after the class was certified, these latter 10 hours were of no benefit to the class. The 19 hours spent on the firm’s fee petition are not compensable, since they conferred no benefit on the class.

2. 23 hours of Mr. Austin’s time were spent reading and reviewing materials for which the Austin firm did not have responsibility, such as Mead and Union Camp interrogatory answers. As discussed earlier, in a case such as this, where there are 160 attorneys participating, every attorney cannot possibly be compensated for reading or reviewing pleadings which do not directly pertain to their particular assignment.

3. 45 hours of Austin’s entries are so vague that, in view of his firm’s minimal role in the case, I am unable to discern what work was done, whether it benefited the class, whether it was duplicative or excessive, or at what rate the work should be compensated. Examples of such entries are “status conference,” “conference — Walter Riordan,” “general file review,” “background file — doc. procedure,” and “examining correspondence and pleadings.” Accordingly, the firm will not be compensated for this time.

The number of Austin’s disallowed hours amounts to 97. The remaining 20 hours spent by him on reviewing documents and document indices are compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Austin requests a rate of $100 to $125 per hour. This rate is not Austin’s non-contingent historical hourly rate, rather, as revealed in the petition, Austin’s historic hourly rate is $55 to $65 per hour. In view of these figures and the nature of the compensable tasks performed by Austin— document review — $50 per hour is a fair and appropriate rate for Austin’s time.

(C) Total Lodestar

20 hours X $50/hour = $1,000

(D) Multiplier

Austin requests a multiplier of 1.5 for the hours he expended in this case. This request, for obvious reasons, will be denied. At the time Austin’s firm entered the case, the risk of non-payment of attorney fees was virtually non-existent. The class already had been certified and $30 million dollars had already been obtained in settlements. As noted above, Robert Atkins, Chairman of plaintiffs’ finance committee, conceded the absence of a risk of *91 non-payment. 29 Furthermore, no multiplier is appropriate for the quality of the firm’s work. Austin’s compensable time was spent reviewing documents and supervising the indexing of documents. This type of routine work, performed in a case in which some 160 other attorneys were involved, does not warrant an increment for quality.

II. Donna Geek

(A) Hours Expended

This associate devoted 54.25 hours to this litigation. After careful review of the time sheets submitted, I have concluded that only 12 hours of her time should be compensated by the class. Specifically, the following time will be disallowed:

1. 10 hours will be disallowed because the work was of no benefit to the class and duplicative of the work of other counsel in the case. These hours are reflected by the following entries: 2 hours for “conference re: rep. of client, status of case, recent developments, pleadings,” 1.5 hours for “conference re: fine paper settlement, strategy,” 1.5 hours “legal research” and for 5 hours for “examine corres., pleadings, and orders to determine the status of litigation, legal research.”

2. 4.75 hours are reflected by vague entries such as “conference on legal research on strategy,” or “intra-office conferences” in which the other participants and the subject thereof are unspecified. I cannot tell from such entries whether this time benefited the class or whether it was duplicative of the efforts of other counsel.

3. 27.5 hours devoted to reading and reviewing documents for which this firm had no responsibility such as unspecified pleadings and correspondence relating to unidentified defendants. As in the ease of Mr. Austin, Geek will not be compensated for this “read and review” time.

Geek’s 12 compensable hours were spent meeting with and supervising paralegals who were reviewing documents and Kimberly-Clark and Hammermill answers to interrogatories.

(B) Hourly Rate

Geek requests $50 to $55 for her time. $50 an hour is a fair and appropriate rate for her time.

(C) Total Lodestar

12 hours X $50/hour = $600

(D) Multiplier

No multiplier is requested for Geek’s time, nor does one appear warranted.

III. Other Attorneys

Richard Sunde, a partner in the firm, seeks to be compensated for one hour he spent locating and leasing a microfilm reader. He will be compensated for this time, but only at the paralegal rate of $25 an hour. Michael Tierney, an associate, devoted one-half an hour to this litigation for attendance at an intra-office conference. Since Tierney did not become further involved in this- case, and there being no description of the purpose of his involvement, no compensation will be awarded for his time. Obviously, no multiplier will be awarded to either of these attorneys.

IV. Paralegals

169.25 hours were expended by the firm’s paralegals on document review, indexing and “file maintenance”. These hours appear to have benefited the class. However, of these hours, 43 are charged to “file maintenance”. In view of the firm’s minor role in this case, 43 hours on “file maintenance” is excessive. The firm will only be compensated for 10 hours spent by paralegals on this task. Thus, the firm will be compensated for 136.25 paralegal hours at the rate of $25 per hour, not the $35 per hour rate requested here. Thus, the total award for paralegal time is $3,406.25.

V. Expenses

The Austin firm’s total expenses are $5,719.81 of which $4,500 represents the *92 firm’s contribution to the plaintiff’s litigation fund. The expenses appear reasonable. Since the firm has already received 75% of these expenses or $4,290, I will allow the remaining $1,429.81 for expenses.

VI. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Austin firm is entitled:

Attorney Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Award Total Request

Austin 20 $50 $1,000.00 $1,000.00 $20,709.38

Geek 12 $50 $ 600.00 $ 600.00 $ 2,858.75

Tierney 0 0 0 $ 27.50

Sunde 1 $25 $ 25.00 $ 25.00 $ 65.00

Paralegals 136.25 $3,406.25 $3,406.25 $ 5,923.75

$5,031.25 $29,584.38

Expenses

Amount Requested $5,719.81

Amount Previously Distributed $4,290.00

Amount Outstanding $1,429.81

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $5,031.25

Expenses $1.429.81

Final Award $6,461.06

BARRACK, RODOS & McMAHON

Barrack, Rodos & McMahon, a Philadelphia law firm, represented plaintiff William Fels in a complaint filed in October of 1977. The firm’s major contribution to the class was discovery of the Hammermill Corporation. Barrack was appointed chairman of the Hammermill discovery subcommittee under the supervision of the discovery committee chairman and co-chairmen. In connection with the Hammermill discovery, the Barrack firm reviewed documents and took depositions of Hammermill employees. The firm also prepared a discovery book and drafted the Hammermill contentions section of the pre-trial memorandum. Barrack was one of the two co-chairmen of the Rule 37 committee. The firm also notes in its fee petition that Barrack was a member of the trial team appointed as “Liaison to and Chairman of the support teams preparing for trial”. Finally, throughout the course of this litigation, the firm was a member of the Executive Committee.

The firm seeks total compensation for its services in the amount of $998,276.25. This is based on requested hourly rates of $100-$145 per hour for Barrack, $85 — $115 per hour for Rodos, $80-$105 per hour for McMahon, $75-$85 per hour for Bacine, $65-$75 per hour for Keener, and $25 per hour for all law clerks and paralegals. The firm also requests a multiplier of 2.5 to be applied to their lodestar over the period of June to September 1980 and a multiplier of 2 for the remaining time. The firm also seeks reimbursement for $75,079.65 in expenses.

I. Leonard Barrack

(A) Hours Expended

Barrack is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 1278 hours of work. Upon analysis of the time sheets submitted, I find, however, that Barrack should only be compensated for 722.63 hours of work in this litigation. This is the *93 only time which can reasonably be said to have benefited the class.

1. 134.5 hours will not be compensated because the supporting entries are too vague. It was impossible to determine exactly what work was done and, therefore, the court is unable to make a determination of benefit to the class. These include: (a) time spent in telephone conferences and/or calls without an explanation of what was discussed; (b) time noted merely as “review” and/or “read correspondence”, without further explanation or documentation; (c) all efforts expended in “conference” or “meetings” without an explanation of the subject matter; (d) hours marked “amended complaint”; (e) time billed to “analyze filings”; and (f) letter writing time to various parties without explanation or documentation. In addition to these general classifications, there were numerous others. 30

2. 217.75 hours charged to discovery by Barrack are also disallowed because of vagueness. Disallowed time entries are those reflected by simple one or two word notations and include: (a) “general discovery review”, (b) “discovery”, (c) “documents”, (d) “document review”, (e) “examine documents”, (f) “review documents.” Such entries render impossible the court’s task of making a determination of benefit to the class. Fees are awarded on the basis of “whether the specific services benefited the fund ...” and such cursory explanations will not allow a general assumption of benefit to the class. Lindy II at 112 (emphasis added). It bears repeating that inadequately documented fee petitions are filed at the risk of the petitioning attorneys. In re Equity Funding Corporation of America Securities Litigation, 438 F.Supp. at 1327 .

3. 59 hours spent in preparing for and attendance at pretrial conferences are also disallowed. Barrack had no substantial leadership position, and the firm’s designated responsibility was limited to Hammer-mill discovery. Furthermore, Messrs. Kohn and Specks were appointed spokesmen for the private plaintiffs with Kohn later being solely designated as senior spokesman in the courtroom. See Class Objectors’ E 743-44 and N.T., 9/3/80 at 4-5. I am not persuaded by Barrack’s argument that his attendance at these conferences, particularly the last two, was warranted because of his appointment to the trial team. 31 Accordingly, Barrack’s preparation and attendance time is disallowed.

4. 41 hours spent in conferences concerning matters for which the firm was not responsible. This total reflects time spent in reading or review of documents of defendant companies other than Hammermill or on other matters for which the firm clearly was not responsible. 32 As co-chair *94 man of the Rule 37 committee Barrack will be compensated for time spent in ensuring compliance with discovery by companies other than Hammermill. Other efforts by Barrack were plainly duplicative, including time charged to settlement discussions, and class brief review.

5. I have disallowed 54.12 hours spent on pretrial memorandum and final contentions as well as 38.25 hours spent in trial preparation. 33 All of the attorneys involved in this litigation expended a combined total of 7874.52 hours on these tasks (4604.93 on pretrial memorandum and final contentions and 3269.59 on trial preparation). I find these hours to be excessive for such work and, accordingly, I have reduced Barrack’s requested compensable hours in these areas by one-half. 34

6. 5 hours spent on 12/13/79 watching Harold Kohn argue the Kimberly-Clark disqualification appeal before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. See N.T., 5/12/82 at 2336. Likewise, 2.5 hours spent in review of the Third Circuit decision on 2/22/80 is also disallowed. These efforts were of no benefit to the class and Barrack had no responsibility in these matters.

7. 3.25 hours for preparation and attendance at the Executive Committee meeting in Chicago on 3/6/81. I fail to see the benefit to the class from meetings held almost six months after the final settlements. I will allow time for one Executive Committee meeting for administrative purposes after final settlement.

The total hours for which Barrack is not compensated is 555.37. The remaining 722.-63 hours of compensation which Barrack seeks for his work I will allow. The hours of work for which Barrack is compensated include the document and discovery work specifically connected with Hammermill. Likewise Barrack is compensated for the time he spent in taking six depositions of Hammermill employees and in representing plaintiff Fels at his deposition. Since Barrack was a member of the Executive Committee, I have allowed reasonable “read & review” time. I have also allowed a reasonable number of hours for pretrial memorandum, final contentions, and trial preparation work. Finally, Barrack is compensated for reasonable Rule 37 and Executive Committee time.

(B) Hourly Rate

Barrack seeks an hourly rate of $100-$145 an hour for his work in this litigation, although the firm does not have historical, non-contingent hourly rates. Barrack’s compensable time is largely made up of Hammermill discovery work including the six depositions he took pursuant to this assignment. He was not one of the lead counsel or co-chairmen of the Executive Committee. His role in trial preparation was insignificant and his designation as “Liaison to and Chairman of the Support Teams” did not in any way confer a benefit on the class.

Accordingly, based on the rates received by partners in other firms for similar work, particularly the rates awarded for those involved with this litigation, I have determined a reasonable compensable hourly rate for Barrack to be $100. This rate reflects a reasonable remuneration for the type of work Barrack performed. However, Barrack cannot be compensated at this rate for all of his work. Of the 722.63 compensable hours, 114 hours will be corn *95 pensated at a rate of $50 an hour. This time includes 58.75 hours devoted to the Hammermill discovery book, 21.5 hours in review of Florida Grand Jury documents, and 33.75 hours of class discovery. These tasks are usually performed by juniors or associates and, therefore, any other rate of compensation would be excessive.

(C) Total Lodestar

608.63 hours X $100/hour = $60,863

114.00 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 5,700

(D) Multiplier

The Barrack, Rodos & McMahon firm requests a multiplier of 2 for their work throughout this litigation except for the period from June until September of 1980 when a multiplier of 2.5 is requested. I find that no quality multiplier is merited. Barrack was only appointed chairman of the Hammermill discovery subcommittee; a title which was doled out to many other attorneys who were given “charge” of discovery of a particular defendant. Likewise the leadership role played by Barrack as only co-chairman of the Rule 37 committee was dubious at best. I find equally unimpressive Barrack’s role as “Liaison to and Chairman of the Support Teams” in light of the fact that the case was settled before trial. Barrack followed the lead of Messrs. Kohn or Specks (particularly Specks, sometimes to the exclusion of Kohn). Accordingly, I find nothing in the work of Barrack which demonstrates the type of exceptional quality which warrants the award of a positive quality multiplier.

A contingency multiplier of 1.5 will be awarded for the 137 compensable hours expended prior to the initial settlements.

II. Gerald J. Rodos

(A) Hours Expended

Rodos is a partner. He asks to be compensated for 577.5 hours of work. My analysis of the time sheets leads me to conclude that Rodos can be compensated for only 352.25 hours of work in this litigation. The following hours are disallowed:

1. 58 hours for which the supporting entries were incomplete. It was not possible to determine from these entries exactly what work was done and, therefore, not possible to make a determination of benefit to the class. Entries disallowed as too vague included: (a) telephone calls and/or conferences without an explanation of what was discussed; (b) entries marked simply “review microfilm”; (c) time noted merely as “review of file” and/or “document review”; (d) an entry marked “review of pleading” and “review brief”; (e) time noted “review [and/or] read correspondence”; (f) all time charged to “conference” or “meeting” without an explanation of the subject matter; and (g) time writing letters to various parties without documentation or explanation as to their content.

2. 16.75 hours devoted to discovery by Rodos are also disallowed because of vagueness. Time designations charged to discovery and disallowed because of vagueness include: (a) “general review”; (b) “review discovery”; (c) “document discovery”; (d) “document work”; and (e) “general discovery review”.

3. 5 hours to review proceedings before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”). Numerous other attorneys, including Barrack, not only reviewed the same proceedings but were in attendance. In light of the 13 hours allowed Barrack for this work the efforts by Rodos were superfluous.

4. 39.25 hours spent in reading or reviewing documents of defendant companies other than Hammermill and on other matters for which the firm was clearly not responsible including settlement review time and class brief review and entries concerning defendants other than Hammermill that indicated duplicative review.

5. 15.25 hours spent in attendance at pretrial conferences. At the first pretrial conference on April 19, 1978 Messrs. Barrack, McMahon, and Rodos were all in attendance. It is plainly duplicative and wasteful of class funds for three partners to bill for this time. Moreover, Rodos did not have the type of leadership role in this litigation *96 which warranted his attendance at pretrial conferences. Accordingly, all of his pretrial conference time is disallowed.

6. 29 hours Rodos charged to preparation for and attendance at both Executive Committee meetings and discovery meetings with Barrack. 35 As Barrack also attended and prepared for each of these meetings, all of Rodos’ efforts were duplicative and of no benefit to the class.

7. 30.5 hours devoted to Hammermill deposition work by Rodos. These disallowed hours include all preparation, discussion, meeting, or review time in connection with any of these depositions. These efforts were of no benefit to the class since Rodos took no depositions of any Hammermill employees.

8. I have disallowed 22.87 hours spent on pretrial memorandum and final contentions as well as 8.63 hours spent in trial preparation. As previously noted, the total number of hours spent on these tasks by all the attorneys involved in this litigation is excessive. I have reduced Rodos’ requested compensable hours in these areas by one-half.

The total number of hours for which Rodos is not compensated is 225.25. The remaining 352.25 hours will be allowed. The hours of work for which Rodos is compensated include his document and discovery work specifically connected with Hammer-mill. Rodos also will be compensated for his briefing and contentions work.

(B) Hourly Rate

Rodos seeks an hourly rate of $85 — $115 an hour for his work in this litigation. However, Rodos’ compensable time is made up largely of Hammermill discovery, viz., document inspection, review, and microfilm analysis, tasks ordinarily performed by someone other than a senior partner. 36 Accordingly, I will allow a rate of $50 an hour for Rodos.

(C) Total Lodestar

352.25 hours X $50/hour = $17,612.50

(D) Multiplier

As noted above, the Barrack firm requests a multiplier of 2.5 for their work in this litigation from June until September of 1980 and a multiplier of 2 for their work during' the remaining period. On balance Rodos’ role in the Barrack firm’s contribution to this litigation was limited. Furthermore, unlike Barrack, Rodos does not even make a pretense of having played a leadership role in this litigation. His efforts were confined largely to routine discovery work. Accordingly, I find nothing in the work of Rodos which demonstrates the type of exceptional quality which suggests the award of a positive quality multiplier. As with Barrack a 1.5 contingency multiplier will be allowed for his 105.75 compensable pre-January 1979 hours.

III. Paul J. McMahon

(A) Hours Expended

McMahon is a partner with the firm. He asks to be compensated for 874.25 hours of work in this litigation. However, I find that only 577 hours of work reasonably can be said to have benefited the class. Compensation for the following time will be disallowed:

1. 201.75 hours cannot be compensated because the supporting entries are too vague. The cursory explanations accompanying these time charges are an insufficient basis for determining the benefit, if any, to the *97 class. These include: (a) entries marked simply “interrogatories”; (b) “research”; (c) “file review”; (d) numerous entries (99.-75 hours) from February until May of 1978 noted only as “motion to compel”; (e) “documents” or “document review”; (f) “conference” or “meeting” without an explanation of the subject matter; (g) time spent in telephone conference without an explanation of what was discussed; and (h) “microfilm” or “microfilm review” time.

2. 62.75 hours devoted to discovery by McMahon are also disallowed because of vagueness. 37 While some of the hours McMahon devoted to discovery were allowed because such work included an adequate explanation of exactly what was done, entries which are supported by one or two word notations such as “review discovery”, “discovery”, and “discovery review” are excluded.

3. 2 hours in preparation for the JPML proceedings. These hours are disallowed for the same reasons I have disallowed similar Rodos charges.

4. 5.5 hours in preparation and attendance at the pretrial conference on April 19,1978. As previously noted, three partners of the firm attended this conference. This wasteful and duplicative effort will not be compensated by the class.

5. 18.25 hours in review of the class brief. McMahon did not have any direct responsibilities concerning the class brief. This time merely duplicated the hours of many other attorneys involved in this litigation.

6. I have disallowed 2.5 hours spent on pretrial memorandum and final contentions as well as 4.5 hours spent in trial preparation. As previously noted, the total number of hours spent on these tasks is excessive. Accordingly, I have reduced McMahon’s compensable hours in these areas by one-half.

The total of disallowed hours is 297.25. The remaining 577 hours are compensable. The hours for which McMahon is compensated include his Hammermill discovery work and the three depositions he took pursuant to this activity. Likewise he is compensated for reasonable preparation of the Hammermill discovery book, plaintiffs’ contentions, and briefing activities.

(B) Hourly Rate

McMahon seeks an hourly rate of $80-$105 for his work in this litigation. However, McMahon’s compensable time consists almost exclusively of Hammermill discovery work. With the exception of the three depositions McMahon took, the type of tasks which McMahon performed in connection with this litigation were routine and of the type ordinarily assigned to junior associates. Accordingly, I will allow McMahon to be compensated at $85 an hour for 68.25 hours, the reasonable amount of time he spent in preparation for and deposing Hammermill employees. The remaining 508.75 hours of mostly general discovery work will be compensated at $50 an hour. In light of the rates awarded Barrack and Rodos as well as the rates requested for McMahon, this rate of compensation is reasonable.

(C) Total Lodestar

508.75 hours X $50/hour = $25,437.50

68.25 hours X $85/hour = $ 5,801.25

(D) Multiplier:

No positive quality multiplier will be applied to McMahon’s lodestar for the reasons I have not awarded one to Rodos. But, as with the others, a contingency multiplier will be applied to the compensable hours (57.5) expended prior to January 1979.

IV. Herbert B. Newberg

Newberg is a partner in the firm. According to the Barrack fee petition com *98 pensation for 10 hours of his time is requested. It is claimed that Newberg’s time involved reviewing briefs and memorandum. However, Newberg’s total requested hours, in light of the over 5200 hours requested by the entire Barrack firm, leads me to conclude that his services were insubstantial and of no benefit to the class. Furthermore, I am unable to find any documentation of Newberg’s 10 hours in the submitted time records of the Barrack firm. Only .5 hours are noted in the time sheets. Accordingly, compensation for Newberg’s time is denied. 38

V. Donald E. Keener

(A) Hours Expended

Keener is an associate with the firm. He asks to be compensated for 2165.-85 hours of work in this litigation. However, on the basis of my analysis Keener can only be compensated for 1840.64 hours of work. This is the only time I found to be beneficial to the class. The following hours are disallowed:

1. 6.45 hours cannot be compensated because they are too vague. It is impossible to determine from these entries whether the work performed was beneficial to the class. These include: (a) telephone calls and/or conferences without an explanation of what was discussed; (b) time noted merely as “review correspondence”; (c) entries marked simply “research”; (d) time noted merely as “review file [and/or] pleadings”; and (e) entries logged as “file and document organization.”

2. 32.6 hours of work in October of 1980. All the defendants in Fine Paper settled in September of 1980. At this time there was already a $50,000,000 fund created for the class. In light of this I find none of the “post settlement” work billed by Keener to be beneficial to the class. In addition, I find Keener’s efforts did nothing to “protect” or preserve the class fund as his work during this month involved only document search, review and organization.

3. 135 hours in preparation and attendance at meetings with other members of the firm. This time expenditure was unnecessary and of no benefit to the class. The hours include Keener’s attendance with Barrack at discovery, pretrial memorandum, and trial preparation meetings in Chicago during June, July and August of 1980. In all three of these areas there was an excessive amount of time billed by all the attorneys involved in this litigation. The attendance at meetings by several attorneys from the same firm only compounded an already wasteful situation.

4. I have disallowed 83.83 hours spent on pretrial memorandum and final contentions as well as 67.33 hours spent in trial preparation. As already noted, there was an excessive amount of time spent on these tasks. Accordingly, I have reduced Keener’s requested hours in these areas by one-half.

The total hours for which Keener is not compensated is 325.21. The remaining 1840.64 hours I will allow. The hours of work for which Keener is compensated include his Hammermill discovery, on-site document production and review, Hammer-mill microfilm review, discovery book preparation, and preparation of the cast of characters. Additionally, Keener is reasonably compensated for pretrial memorandum and trial preparation work.

(B) Hourly Rate

Keener asks for an hourly rate of $65 to $75 an hour depending on when he rendered his services in this litigation. I find this rate request too high. The overwhelming majority of Keener’s compensable hours are devoted to Hammermill discovery work. My examination of his efforts shows this discovery work to have been simple and routine. Furthermore, all of Keener’s work in this litigation was accomplished between *99 his first and second year out of law school. Accordingly, I will allow a rate of $50 an hour as compensation. This is a reasonable rate for the type of work Keener performed.

(C) Total Lodestar

1840.64 hours X $50/hour = $92,032

(D) Multiplier

Keener’s compensable hours consist mainly of routine Hammermill discovery work. An examination of his work reveals nothing of exceptional quality for which I should award a positive multiplier. Furthermore, Keener was under the direct supervision of Messrs. Barrack, Rodos, or McMahon. Accordingly, his work does not warrant the award of a quality multiplier. Moreover, since all his time was logged after the initial settlements, there will be no award of a contingency multiplier.

VI. Daniel E. Bacine

Bacine is an associate of the firm. The firm asks to be compensated for 102.05 hours of his work in this litigation. However, my analysis of his time records leads me to conclude that Bacine can be compensated for only 23 hours. The following hours are disapproved:

1. 25.8 hours because of the vagueness of the supporting entries. It was impossible to determine from those entries exactly what work was done and, therefore, it was not possible to make a determination of benefit to the class. Entries disallowed as too vague included: (a) time marked simply “analysis” or “analysis of responses”; (b) an entry marked simply “memo”; (c) time noted as “telephone call” without reference to what was discussed; (d) time noted simply as “review correspondence”; (e) an entry noted as “review complaint”; (f) all time entered merely as “documents” or “document review.”

2. 53.25 hours devoted to discovery are also disallowed because of vagueness. In light of the total number of hours devoted to discovery by the Barrack firm, simple one or two word entries .do not provide sufficient basis for this court to make a determination of benefit to the class. Discovery entries disallowed because of vagueness include: (a) “document discovery”; (b) “discovery analysis”; (c) “discovery”; and (d) “review discovery.”

The remaining 23 hours of Bacine’s time appear to have benefited the class and therefore will be compensated. This includes 15.5 hours devoted to “Rule 37 preparation”, 3.25 hours devoted to motion to compel work, and 4.25 hours devoted to Rule 37 discovery and analysis. However, in view of the fact that Bacine’s time was spent on routine tasks, Bacine will be awarded $50 an hour for his time, not the $75 to $85 an hour requested. Thus, Ba-cine’s lodestar is $1150. No quality multiplier is warranted, but I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 7.5 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

VII. Paralegals

The Barrack firm asks to be compensated for 225.2 paralegal hours. 39 I find the hours expended by the firm’s paralegals can reasonably be said to have benefited the class as an ancillary service to the work done by the attorneys of the firm. Furthermore, I have determined a reasonable hourly rate for the paralegal time to be $25 an hour.

VIII. Expenses

The Barrack firm seeks compensation for $75,079.65 in expenses. The firm has already been awarded 75% of these expenses or $56,310. After a careful review of the documentation supporting the firm’s claim for costs and expenses, I have concluded that the following expenses should not be paid for by the class. 40

*100 1. $4,416 in office equipment and office space rental will not be reimbursed. The Barrack firm incurred this expense pursuant to their responsibilities as “trial headquarters”. However, in light of the fact the Adler, Barish firm provided space for this purpose at no charge, and the Kohn firm also kept a complete set of documents necessary for trial at its office, it would be an imposition on the class to allow these expenses. Accordingly, they are disallowed, as unnecessary and duplicative.

2. $8,043.74 in office supply expenses will not be reimbursed. For the reasons noted above, any expenses incurred because of the trial headquarters designation will not be compensated.

3. $320.72 in archive expenses. These expenditures are disallowed because it is uncertain exactly what this cost represents. Assuming, arguendo, it involved document storage for trial, then it was unnecessary as the Adler, Barish firm and the Kohn firm were providing adequate space as a document depository.

4. $226.39 in “special secretarial services” also will be disallowed. This amount represents money paid to employees for whom the firm is being reimbursed at an hourly rate. 41

5. $5,604.32 in travel expenses will not be reimbursed because of a lack of adequate documentation. The only support provided was copies of checks made payable to the member of the firm requesting the reimbursement. 42 Often these intra-office expense vouchers did not even offer a description of how the expenditure was related to the class. Pretrial Order No. 143 required all expenses and costs incurred in connection with this litigation to be accompanied by copies of the original supporting documentation. The intra-office expense vouchers as submitted do not meet this requirement.

6. $175 in travel expenses must be disallowed. A check in this amount was made payable to Paul J. McMahon on 6/27/79. Again, there is no supporting explanation.

7. $3,884.09 in air fare and travel expenses must be disallowed as the hours for the work involving this travel were also disallowed or there were no entries in the time records which substantiated the expenses. Included in this total: $214 in air fare expense to Chicago incurred by Paul McMahon in a check disbursed to him on 6/26/78; $198 in air fare to Chicago for Gerald Rodos on a TWA bill paid by a check dated 7/24/79; $365 in expenses and $260 in air fare to Chicago incurred by Donald Keener on an intra-office expense voucher and a TWA bill dated 7/28/80; $205.41 in expenses and $496 in air fare to Los Angeles, California for Gerald Rodos in checks dated 9/12/79 and 8/23/79; 43 $298.94 in expenses

*101 and $620 in air fare to Los Angeles for Paul J. McMahon in a check dated 9/12/79; 44 $257 in air fare to Chicago for Paul J. McMahon on a TWA bill paid by check dated 1/24/80; $121 in air fare to Chicago for Donald E. Keener on a TWA bill paid by a check dated 6/16/80; $132.75 in expenses and $252 in air fare to Chicago for Leonard Barrack without documentation paid in checks dated 8/15/80 and 8/26/80; and $463.99 in air fare to Chicago for Donald Keener on a TWA bill dated 9/26/80.

8. The following miscellaneous expenses totaling $326.39 are also disallowed: (a) $34 in train fare to Washington, D.C. on 5/16/79 for Paul McMahon as I find nothing in the time records to indicate he was in Washington in connection with Fine Paper on this date; (b) $63.83 paid to Paul McMahon in a check dated 7/27/79 for “148” [Fine Paper ] expenses without documentation; (c) $51.63 for car rental expenses in Kansas City, Missouri by Paul McMahon on 10/26/79 as there was no indication in his time records that he was in Kansas City on this date; (d) $36.50 in train fare to Washington, D.C. for Paul McMahon on 10/26/79

as there was nothing in McMahon’s time records to indicate he was in Washington on this date; (e) $24.36 paid to the Locust Club for “148” [Fine Paper ] expenses in a check dated 7/28/80 without documentation; (f) $100 in travel expenses incurred by Leonard Barrack in Chicago in a check dated 8/8/80 without documentation; and (g) $16.07 billed to “148” [Fine Paper ] expenses paid to “petty cash” in a check dated 11/12/80 without documentation.

The total expenses for which the Barrack firm is not compensated is $22,996.65. This means that of the total claimed expenses of $75,079.65, the Barrack firm will only be awarded $52,083. In light of the previous disbursement of $56,310 for expenses there has been an overpayment of $4,227 to the firm. Accordingly, I will deduct this amount from the final award.

IX. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Barrack firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Barrack 722.63 $50/100 $ 66,563.00 $ 73,413.00 $351,894.63

Rodos 352.25 $50 $ 17,612.50 $ 20,256.25 $120,927.50

McMahon 577.00 $50/85 $ 31,238.75 $ 32,895.00 $156,765.00

Newberg 0 0 0 $ 3,100.00

Keener 1840.64 $50 $ 92,032.00 $ 92,032.00 $336,610.25

Bacine 23 $50 $ 1,150.00 $ 1,337.50 $ 16,513.50

Paralegals 225.2 $25_ $ 5.630.00 $ 5.630.00 $ 12.465.37

Total $214,226.25 $225,563.75 $998,276.25

$ 75,079.65 Amount Requested

$ 56,310,00 Amount Previously Distributed

$ 18,769.65 Amount Outstanding

$ 22,996.65 Amount Disallowed

$ 4,227.00 Amount to be Returned to the Class

Expenses:

*102 TOTAL AWARD: ■

Attorneys’ Fees $225,563.75

Less: Amount of Previously Awarded Expenses to be Returned to the Class $ 4,227.00

Final Award $221,336.75

BARTSH AND McINTOSH 45

Bartsh & McIntosh, a Minnesota law firm, became involved in this litigation as counsel for plaintiff Royal Stationery Co. in June of 1979. The firm participated in inspection of Hammermill, Kimberly-Clark, and Mead documents. The Bartsh firm also prepared for and took thirteen merchant depositions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6). Finally, the firm engaged in some trial preparation, viz., organization and coordination of merchant depositions and documents, and participated in obtaining immunity from prosecution for plaintiffs’ witness James Nelson.

The firm seeks total compensation for its services in the amount of $95,212.75. This is based on requested hourly rates of $90-$125 an hour for Bartsh, $95 an hour for McIntosh, $50-$60 an hour for Tripp, $55 an hour for Schwebach, and $20-$25 an hour for all paralegals. The Bartsh firm also requests a multiplier of between 1.5 and 2.5 to be applied to certain categories of work performed by its members in Fine Paper. Finally, the Bartsh firm seeks reimbursement for $8,274.87 in expenses.

Before proceeding to the Lindy analysis, it should be noted that although the Kohn firm did not file an objection to the Bartsh fee petition, it objected to the participation of the firm in the litigation. See Class Objectors’ E 755 and N.T., 4/5/82 at 1822-23.

I find it difficult to understand why the services of another firm were needed at this stage of the litigation, i.e., after a $30,000,-000 settlement had already been reached and given the number of lawyers already involved. As should have been expected, the Bartsh participation resulted in more duplication and unnecessary expenses. For example, work assigned this firm involved extensive travel to locations where other firms active in this litigation were based, clearly a most inefficient method of operation. In addition, many of the firms already involved in the litigation were looking for work and had written co-lead counsel requesting assignments 46 See Class Objectors’ E 167, 168, 169 & 170. The participation of the Bartsh firm in Fine Paper under these circumstances is further evidence of the grossly inefficient utilization of lawyers’ time.

I. Thomas C. Bartsh

(A) Hours Expended

Bartsh is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 186.3 hours of work. However, my analysis of the time sheets leads me to conclude that only 154 hours are compensable. I have disallowed the following:

*103 1. 14.1 hours cannot be compensated because the entries are too vague. All of this time indicated Bartsh was in conference. While these entries sometimes indicated the parties with whom Bartsh was meeting, there was no adequate explanation of what was discussed. 47 These hours are disallowed since I cannot make a determination of benefit to the class.

2. 18.2 hours devoted to “Protection of plaintiffs’ chief witness, James Nelson” must also be disallowed. I find this work to be of no benefit to the class. The work was performed solely for the benefit of Nelson and the Majority States and occurred after the final settlements.

The hours for which Bartsh will not be compensated total 32.3. The time for which Bartsh is compensated includes discovery work in connection with Mead, Hammermill and Kimberly-Clark. Bartsh will be allowed time charged to the preparation and depositions of paper merchants. Finally, Bartsh also will be compensated for trial preparation work, viz., analyzing and coordinating merchant depositions and documents for trial. All this compensable work was done at the specific direction of Granvil I. Specks. See N.T., 4/5/82 at 1832-35.

(B) Hourly Rate

Bartsh requests an hourly rate of $90 an hour for his work during 1979 and $125 an hour for his work during 1980. His compensable time consists primarily of the hours he expended in connection with the merchant deposition program. The thirteen depositions taken by Bartsh were not particularly long or complex. In addition, four of the depositions were of coarse paper, not fine paper, merchants. Another of the deponents was a mill representative who never dealt directly with the defendant mills.

Bartsh’s remaining efforts involved mostly document and microfilm inspection of defendant paper companies which were primarily the responsibility of other law firms participating in Fine Paper. 48

It is evident that the services rendered by Bartsh were simple and routine. He accomplished nothing which could not have been done just as well by a junior partner or associate. Accordingly, I will allow $50 for this work.

(C) Total Lodestar

154 hours X $50/hour = $7,700

(D) Multiplier

The Bartsh firm has broken down its requested compensable services into one of five categories. Depending on where in the five categories the services rendered fall, a multiplier request of between 1.0 and 2.5 is sought. I have determined that no positive multiplier should be awarded to Bartsh’s lodestar.

There was no contingency factor since a $30,000,000 settlement fund was in existence at the time the firm entered this litigation, thus eliminating the risk of nonpayment.

There will be no award of a positive multiplier for any quality factor. I find nothing in the work of Bartsh or any member of his firm which demonstrates the type of exceptional quality which warrants the award of a positive multiplier. On page 6 of their response to the Class Objectors’ Report, Bartsh argues that the firm assumed a de facto leadership role in document discovery, merchant deposition coordi *104 nation, and the Nelson discovery. There is no doubt the Bartsh firm carried out those assignments, but it was under the direct supervision of Specks.

The inspection by Bartsh and other members of his firm of the Hammermill, Kimberly-Clark and Mead documents and microfilm was done at the direction of Specks. The number of hours which the Bartsh firm devoted to inspection of these documents pales in light of the numerous hours which the firms of Barrack, Rodos & McMahon; Chestnut & Brooks; and Sachnoff, Schrager, Jones, Weaver & Rubenstein spent in discovery and document review of these same defendants.

I find insubstantial any contribution made by the Bartsh firm in coordinating and organizing in preparation for trial of any defendants’ documents produced in discovery. Likewise, I see little benefit from the preparation of merchant deposition summaries. As already noted in this memorandum, there was an excessive amount of time spent in trial preparation by all the attorneys involved in Fine Paper. In light of this, I see little benefit from these additional activities of the Bartsh firm.

By and large, the Bartsh firm’s limited involvement burdened the class with duplicative effort and the “fruits” of the firm’s labors were run-of-the mill. Accordingly, Bartsh’s work as well as the work of the other members of his firm do not warrant the award of a quality multiplier.

II. Andrew C. McIntosh

(A) Hours Expended

McIntosh is a partner in the firm. He asks to be compensated for 187.8 hours of work involved with Fine Paper. However, my analysis of his time records leads me to conclude that McIntosh can be compensated only for 168.55 hours. This is the only time which can reasonably be said to have at least marginally benefited the class. The hours of work which I have disallowed include:

1. 13.95 hours cannot be compensated because the entries are too vague. All of the time disallowed because of vagueness included hours devoted to correspondence, conference, and telephone conversation. Simply listing who attended the meeting, with whom one was speaking, or to whom a letter is written is insufficient without an adequate explanation of either what was discussed or the subject matter addressed. Accordingly, the time is disallowed since I cannot make a determination of benefit to the class.

2. 5.3 hours devoted to “Protection of plaintiffs’ Chief witness, James Nelson” must be disallowed. These hours are disallowed for the reasons I disallowed the same hours of work for Bartsh.

The total number of hours for which McIntosh is not compensated is 19.25. The remaining 168.55 hours of compensation which McIntosh seeks I will allow. McIntosh is compensated for his merchant deposition work and minor trial preparation work.

(B) Hourly Rate

McIntosh requests an hourly rate of $95 an hour for all of his work in this litigation. I find a reasonable rate of compensation for McIntosh’s work to be $50 an hour. McIntosh’s compensable time consists mostly of his merchant deposition work. As previously noted in both Bartsh’s hourly rate and multiplier analysis, I do not find this deposition work particularly complex. I also do not find the merchant deposition and discovery work to be especially beneficial to the class. Accordingly, I will allow this hourly rate for all but 10 of the total 168.55 hours of compensation I have awarded McIntosh. The remaining 10 hours, involving time spent locating missing deposition transcripts, will only be compensated at $25 an hour. A task such as this does not warrant compensation at an attorney’s rate; rather, this task could have been performed by a paralegal at the rate noted.

(C) Total Lodestar

158.55 hours X $50/hour = $7,927.50

10.00 hours X $25/hour = $ 250.00

*105 (D) Multiplier

An award of a positive multiplier to McIntosh’s lodestar is not warranted for the same reasons it was not awarded to Bartsh.

III. M. Joanne Schwebach

(A) Hours Expended

Schwebach is an associate with the firm. The firm seeks compensation for 27.5 hours of her work. I have concluded that Schwebach is not entitled to be compensated for any of her time charged to this litigation.

Schwebach’s time charges related to a document discovery and inspection of Hammermill, Kimberly-Clark, and Mead. Other law firms were primarily responsible for this work and I fail to see how Schwebach’s 26.1 hours of further “review” and 1.4 hours of travel aided these efforts.

IV. Samuel C. Tripp

(A) Hours Expended

Tripp is an associate for whom the firm seeks compensation for 59.2 hours of work. 31.8 hours will be approved. I have disallowed 27.4 hours because the entries are too vague. This total is made up of “conference” and “review” entries which do not permit the court to make a determination of benefit to the class. 49

The 31.8 hours of work for which Tripp is compensated includes his discovery services, merchant deposition work, and some minor trial preparation efforts.

(B) Hourly Rate

I will allow an hourly rate of compensation for Tripp’s services of $50. I find this rate to be reasonable for the reasons I awarded the same rate to Bartsh and McIntosh.

(C) Total Lodestar

31.8 hours X $50/hour = $1,590

(D) Multiplier

No multiplier will be awarded to Tripp’s lodestar' for the same reasons I did not award a multiplier to Bartsh or McIntosh.

V. Paralegals

The Bartsh firm seeks compensation for 15 hours of paralegal time. 50 I will allow the firm to be compensated for this time. I find the services rendered by the paralegals reasonably related to that work already accomplished and compensated by the attorneys of the firm. Furthermore, I will award the firm its requested hourly rates of $20 and $25 for 1979 and 1980 paralegal time. I find these rate requests reasonable.

VI. Expenses

The Bartsh firm seeks reimbursement for $8,274.87 in expenses. The firm has already been awarded 75% of these expenses or $6,206. After a careful review of the documentation supporting the firm’s claim for costs and expenses, I have concluded the following expenses should not be paid by the class:

1. $53.50 billed to “beverages” and $35.78 billed to “miscellaneous” on Bartsh’s bill at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel on May 12-13, 1980. Bartsh lodged here while taking a deposition in Los Angeles. I find these charges to be excessive given the insufficient headings under which they were billed. Accordingly, I fail to see the benefit to the class from these expenses and they will not be compensated.

2. $456.97 of the $913.94 which, in addition to the above expenses, was billed as travel expenses for the Los Angeles trip of Bartsh. *106 Considering the nature of the one deposition which Bartsh took on this trip, I find this sum, which principally resulted from Bartsh’s first class air fare and $125 a night accommodations, excessive. Accordingly, I have reduced the expenses for this trip by one-half as noted.

The total expenses for which the Bartsh firm is not compensated is $546.25. I will deduct this amount from the remaining $2,068.87 yet to be awarded to the firm. Accordingly, the final expenses to be awarded the Bartsh firm are $1,522.62.

VII. Conclusion

The following represents my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Bartsh firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Bartsh 154 $50 $ 7,700.00 $ 7,700.00 $48,755.75

McIntosh 168.55 $25/50 $ 8,177.50' $ 8,177.50 $38,118.75

Schwebach 0 0 0 0 $ 2,268.75

Tripp 31 $50 $ 1,590.00. $ 1,590.00 $ 5,687.00

Paralegals 15.6 $20/25 $ 382.50 $ 382.50 $ 382.50

Total $17,850.00 $17,850.00 $95,212.75

Expenses:

Amount Requested $ 8,274.87

Amount Previously Distributed $ 6,206.00

Amount Outstanding $ 2,068.87

Amount Disallowed $ 546.25

Pinal Expense Award Not Yet Disbursed $ 1,522.62

TOTAL AWARD:

Attorneys’ Fees $17,467.50

Paralegal Fees $ 382.50

Expenses $ 1.522.62

$17,850.00

$19,372.62

BERGER & MONTAGUE

The Berger firm, located in Philadelphia, entered this litigation early in 1978 as counsel of record for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia. 51 At the initial organizational meeting of plaintiffs’ counsel, H. Laddie Montague was elected to the Executive Committee. Montague was also made one of two co-chairmen (under Chairman Joseph Cotchett) of the Rule 37 Subcommittee. The firm was assigned joint responsibility with Litman, Litman, Harris & Specter for the discovery of defendant Union Camp. 52 According to its fee petition, the firm also assisted Barrack, Rodos & McMahon in ana *107 lyzing documents produced by defendant Hammermill Corp.

After the July 23, 1980 Executive Committee meeting in Chicago when it had become apparent that the pricing analysis done by the Sloan & Connelly firm could not be used to support a damage theory at trial, co-lead counsel Harold Kohn asked the Berger firm to assist Kohn’s firm in preparing the case on damages. 53 See letter from Berger to Kohn, August 18, 1980, Class Objectors’ E 448-454. Two economic experts and the accounting firm of Peat, Mar-wick were hired, and the Berger and Kohn firms set about doing what, as Berger saw it, the Chicago firms “were supposed, but failed to do.” Letter to Kohn, August 19, 1980, Class Objectors’ E 455. Pursuant to Pretrial Order No. 115, the Sloan firm sent Kohn a complete set of the pricing documents (some 18,000 sheets) it had collected from the discovery subcommittees. 54 For the two months before the scheduled September 22 trial, the Chicago and Philadelphia groups, each with their own economic experts, engaged in separate, uncooperative, and even hostile efforts to develop a damage theory. 55

I will defer my discussion of work by the other firms on the damage studies until I consider their respective fee petitions. I have determined that, unless otherwise disallowed, time spent by the Berger firm on developing a damage theory is compensable. When Kohn asked the Berger firm to take up the matter, the plaintiffs were two months from trial and had essentially no case to present on damages. As late as August 14, 1980, according to Berger, Perry Goldberg of the Chicago group had stated that “the case was in a settlement posture only and that the plaintiffs could not go to trial on [the] basis of the present damage case.” Letter from Berger to Kohn, August 18, 1980, Class Objectors’ E 453. I find that the work by the Berger firm to prepare the case on damages was done at the request of one of the co-lead counsel at a time when the interests of the class required that some action be taken to insure that this important element of plaintiffs’ case be adequately developed in time for trial. It may well be that the Berger firm’s involvement in this matter resulted, in part, from the battle between Kohn and Specks for control of the case, but I am *108 satisfied that the Berger firm acted in the best interests of the class.

I am, however, faced with another issue that must be addressed before I proceed with the Lindy analysis of the Berger firm’s fee petition. The firm has submitted computer print-outs of the daily time records of each attorney. Class objectors rightly point out that the descriptions contained in these computer records are extremely vague. 56 Class Objectors’ Report at 242-243. As Judge Freeman said in Armored Car:

Working hours identified in only vague and meaningless terms, such as “general,” “miscellaneous,” or “special services,” should not be charged to an involuntary class of claimants. In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, slip. op. at 28. Indefinite documentation might be acceptable in the understandings developed over years of extended lawyer-client relationships but may not be allowed under the equitable fund theory of this nationwide class action.

In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F.Supp. at 1387 . The use of standardized time categories may be sufficient for the purpose of preparing a bill for a client, but absent class members do not have contact with the lawyers representing their interests and cannot keep track of what the attorneys are doing or ask them to explain the “bill” (fee petition) when the work is completed. Attorneys with extensive experience in class actions should realize that these vague categories do not lend themselves to the Lindy analysis that the courts of this circuit are required to perform before granting attorneys’ fees.

I do, however, recognize the practical value of a computerized time system, and I am aware that Pretrial Order 143 (as modified by Pretrial Order 147) expressly permitted the submission of computer time records. Furthermore, I recognize the limitations of computer systems with their ever-present pressure for concise input and output. Nevertheless, I would not be justified, under Lindy, if I awarded fees based solely on such records. Standing alone they are inadequate.

The information that Pretrial Order 143 required to be included in the fee petitions as well as the opportunity each firm had to participate in the evidentiary hearings provided additional ways for firms to “explain their bill”. In my analysis of the fee petitions of firms who submitted computer records, 57 1 have been particularly careful not to disallow time if it could be supported by information contained elsewhere in the record (e.g. narrative summaries of work done which are attested to by affidavit, the firm’s response to the class objectors, monthly summaries, or other documents in the record). Nothing will save an entry of “miscellaneous” or “pretrial” or “telephone”, but I have only disallowed time for vagueness if there is no basis for a determination of any possible benefit to the class.

The Berger firm chose not to participate in the evidentiary hearings, but its fee petition contains a lengthy discussion of the *109 firm’s contributions to the litigation as well as what work was done by those attorneys with significant involvement in the case. With the aid of these narrative summaries and additional information gleaned from the firm’s response to the class objectors and from the exhibits to the Class Objectors’ Report itself, I have been able to perform the required analysis of the submitted time records.

The Berger firm requésts an award of $266,100.50 in attorneys’ fees (including a multiplier of 2 for each attorney, paralegal, and law clerk) and $43,402.18 in expénses. The firm devoted a total of 2446.75 hours to the litigation.

I. David Berger

(A) Hours Expended

This senior attorney devoted 47.5 hours to Fine Paper. Over 40 of these hours were expended after the firm began work on developing a damage theory. Berger participated in three Executive Committee meetings, but the fee petition has little to say about the nature of his other activities apart from the vague computer entries. A total of 26.75 hours (exclusive of compensable Executive Committee time) was expended between 7/23/80 and 9/22/80, the period in which the firm worked on the damage issue. Although there is little to suggest that Berger’s involvement in the damage study was more than supervisory, I will compensate him for this time. I can find no basis apart from the inadequate computer entries to compensate the remaining 11.25 hours. Examples of such entries are “PRE-TRIAL REVIEW”; and “CONFERENCE TELEPHONE REVIEW”. This time will be disallowed leaving Berger with 36.25 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

To be consistent with the hourly rate awarded other senior attorneys for similar work, I will compensate Berger at an hourly rate of $100.

(C) Total Lodestar

36.25 hours X $100/hour = $3625

(D) Multiplier

Berger’s efforts were not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. Moreover, since all of his compensable time was expended after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

II. H. Laddie Montague

(A) Hours Expended

Montague devoted 102.75 hours to the case. He represented the firm on the Executive Committee (although in the latter stages of the case, David Berger attended the meetings in his place) and the Rule 37 Subcommittee. Montague also directed the discovery of defendant Union Camp. I have determined that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 3.5 hours for attendance at the April 19, 1978 pretrial conference. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at this conference.

2. 12.5 hours for which I can find no basis for a determination of any benefit to the class apart from the inadequate computer entries.

3. .5 hours devoted to the fee petition. With the disallowance of the above 16.5

hours, Montague is left with 86.25 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

To be consistent with the hourly rate awarded other senior attorneys for similar work, I will compensate Montague at an hourly rate of $100 subject to modification in one area. As explained in the Guidelines, time spent on class certification discovery will be compensated at $50/hour. Montague spent 15 hours on matters relating to the deposition of the firm’s client.

(C) Total Lodestar

71.25 hours X $100/hour = $7125

15 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 750

*110 (D) Multiplier

Montague’s work was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 71 compensable hours expended prior to the end of the first wave of settlements.

III. Merrill Davidoff

(A) Hours Expended

Davidoff spent 71.25 hours on Fine Paper matters. The firm’s fee petition explains Davidoff’s contributions to the litigation only in connection with the damage study. I will, therefore, compensate him for the 26.5 hours expended between 7/28/80 and 9/22/80. For the remaining 44.75 hours, I have nowhere to look but the computer time sheets. Of this time I will compensate the 8 hours spent preparing and making arrangements for the depositions of Union Camp employees but I disallow3

1. 2 hours for attendance at the 3/7/79 pretrial conference. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at this conference.

2. The remaining 34.75 hours for which I can find no basis for making a determination of any benefit to the class apart from the inadequate computer entries. Examples of such entries include: “MEETING REVIEW FILE REVIEW”; “CONFERENCE FILE STRATEGY”; and “TELEPHONE CORRESPONDENCE.”

With the disallowance of the above 36.75 hours, Davidoff is left with 34.5 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Davidoff. As far as I can determine, it consisted primarily of associate-level tasks (preparing for depositions, attending in-house conferences on the damage study). There certainly is no basis for a higher hourly rate in the time sheets.

(C) Total Lodestar

34.5 hours X $50/hour = $1725

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Davidoff’s time because the work — to the extent I can determine its substance — was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. Moreover, since all the compensable time was expended after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

IV. Sherrie Savett

(A) Hours Expended

Savett devoted 57.5 hours to this litigation. The fee petition indicates that she spent most of her time working on the damage study. Savett and Daniel Berger worked with the economic experts hired by the firm to analyze the price sheets and to serve as possible expert witnesses at trial. I will compensate Savett for the 53 hours •spent on this matter, but I can find no basis apart from the inadequate computer records for determining whether the remaining 4.5 hours benefited the class. These hours will be disallowed.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Savett. As far as I can determine, it consisted primarily of associate-level tasks. There clearly is no basis for a higher hourly rate in the time sheets.

(C) Total Lodestar

53 hours X $50/hour = $2650

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Savett’s time for the reasons stated above in the discussion of Merrill Davidoff’s fee request.

V. Daniel Berger

(A) Hours Expended

Daniel Berger spent 156.75 hours working on Fine Paper. Nearly all of this time was devoted to the damage study. I will compensate him for the 143.5 hours logged between 7/23/80 and 9/22/80, but I can find *111 no basis apart from the inadequate computer records for a determination of whether the remaining 13.25 hours benefited the class. This time will be disallowed.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Daniel Berger. As far as I can determine, it consisted of associate-level tasks. There certainly is no basis for a higher hourly rate in the time sheets.

(C) Total Lodestar

143.5 hours X $50/hour = $7175

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Berger’s time for the reasons stated above in the discussion of Merrill Davidoff’s fee request.

VI. Roger Bernstein

(A) Hours Expended

This attorney devoted 205 hours to the case. He worked on drafting the complaint, Rule 37 Subcommittee matters, and the discovery of both the client and defendant Union Camp. Bernstein took the depositions of two Union Camp employees and attended the defendant’s document production sessions in New York and Virginia. I have determined that the following hours must be disallowed:

1. 57.5 hours for which I can find no basis for a determination of any possible benefit to the class apart from the inadequate computer entries. Examples of such entries are: “PRETRIAL REVIEW”; “DISCOVERY TELEPHONE”; and “CLASS ACTION DISCOVERY PREPARATION.”

2. 3.25 hours for attendance at the 4/19/78 and 6/14/78 pretrial conferences. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at these conferences.

3. 5 hours spent on matters related to attorneys’ fees and the fee petition.

With the disallowance of the above 65.75 hours, Bernstein is left with 139.25 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Bernstein. Most of his work consisted of discovery-related matters (class action interrogatories, taking depositions, reviewing documents) justifying compensation at an associate-level rate.

(C) Total Lodestar

139.25 hours X $50/hour = $6962.50

(D) Multiplier

Bernstein’s work was not of such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 86.75 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

VIL Joan Zubras

Zubras spent 470.25 hours on Fine Paper. She worked on the discovery of the client and defendant Union Camp as well as Rule 37 matters and the damage study.

Unfortunately, although the firm’s fee petition gives some indication of the nature of Zubras’ work, many of her computer entries are so vague that I cannot tell whether or not the work was of the type described in the fee petition. For example, a total of 85.25 hours are described only as “REVIEW”. Many others indicate only “PREPARATION” or “TELEPHONE”. A total of 214.5 hours are described in a manner that I find unnecessarily vague even for computer records. These entries are too numerous to justify full compensation. Accordingly, I will disallow half of the time (107.25 hours).

Zubras spent 8.25 hours working on the fee petition. This time must also be disallowed, leaving her with 354.75 compensable hours.

(B) Hourly Rate

I find that $50/hour is a reasonable rate for the work done by Zubras. As far as I can determine, it consisted of associate-level *112 tasks. There certainly is no basis for a higher rate in the time sheets.

(C) Total Lodestar

354.75 hours X $50/hour = $17,737.50

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Zubras’ time for the reasons stated above in the discussion of Merrill Davidoff’s fee request.

VIII. Other Attorneys and Law Clerk

The firm seeks compensation for the time of seven other attorneys and one summer law clerk, none of whom spent more than 5 hours on the case. 58 I have determined that only Russell Henkin’s time (3.75 hours) is compensable. The fee petition says nothing about what any of these individuals did. Only Henkin’s time entries (drafting requests for discovery) provide any basis for determining whether the work benefited the class. The other attorneys’ time is variously described as “PREPARATION CONFERENCE”; “REVIEW”; “PRE-TRIAL MEETING FILE REVIEW”; “TELEPHONE”; etc. In view of their minimal involvement in the litigation, I cannot justify charging the class for time that is not described more precisely. The law clerk’s time is disallowed because he merely attended the 6/14/78 pretrial conference.

I will compensate Henkin’s time at $50/hour. No multiplier will be applied since the work was not of the type to justify a quality multiplier and was done after the first wave of settlements.

IX. Paralegals

The firm employed 11 paralegals who devoted a total of 1318.25 hours to Fine Paper. Nearly all of this time was spent on document analysis in connection with class certification discovery, the discovery of Union Camp and Hammermill, the damage study, and preparation for expert testimony. I find that all of this time is compensable at $25/hour. No multiplier is applied to paralegal time.

X. Expenses

The firm seeks reimbursement of $43,-402.18 in expenses. It has already received 75% of this figure ($32,551). I find the requested expenses to be reasonable and will therefore allow reimbursement of the outstanding $10,851.18.

XI. Conclusion

The following is my determination of the fees and expenses to which the Berger firm is entitled under Lindy:

Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

David Berger 36.25 $100 $ 3,625.00 $ 3,625.00 $ 24,230.00

Montague 86.25 $50/100 $ 7,875.00 $11,050.00 $ 30,862.50

Davidoff 34.5 $50 $ 1,725.00 $ 1,725.00 $ 15,272.50

Savett 53 $50 $ 2,650.00 $ 2,650.00 $ 11,410.00

Daniel Berger 143.5 $50 $ 7,175.00 $ 7,175.00 $ 29,055.00

Bernstein 139.25 $50 $ 6,962.50 $ 9,131.25 $ 24,417.50

Zubras 354.75 $50 $17,737.50 $17,737.50 $ 56,142.50

Henkin 3.75 $50 $ 187.50 $ 187.50 $ 637.50

Paralegals 1318.25 $25 $32,956.25 $32,956,25 $ 72.092.00

Total $80,892.75 $86,237.50 $266,100,50 59

*113 Expenses:

Amount Requested $43,402.18

Amount Previously Distributed $32,551.00

Amount Outstanding $10,851.18

Amount Disallowed _0

Amount to be Distributed $10,851.18

TOTAL AWARD

Attorneys’ Fees $86,237.50

Expenses $10,851.18

Final Award $97,088.68

CHESTNUT & BROOKS

Chestnut & Brooks, a Minnesota law firm, entered the Fine Paper litigation on February 17, 1978 as counsel of record for plaintiffs Artcraft Press, Inc. and Prompt Printing, Inc. The firm was assigned joint responsibility with the Illinois Attorney General’s Office for discovery of defendant Kimberly-Clark Corporation. Chestnut & Brooks was also put in charge of the Rule 30(b)(6) Merchant Discovery Program and was lead counsel for ten merchant depositions. Other contributions to the litigation included Industrial Analysis Committee work, providing office space and supportive assistance for the James Nelson deposition, and arranging a settlement conference with defendant Wausau Paper Mills Co. The firm seeks an award of $262,268.75 in fees for 2447.7 hours of work and reimbursement of $36,434.21 in expenses.

I. Jack Chestnut

(A) Hours Expended

Jack Chestnut, the firm’s president, was co-chairman of the Kimberly-Clark discovery subcommittee and chairman of the Rule 30(b)(6) merchant discovery subcommittee. Many of his 177.7 hours were devoted to supervision and coordination of these programs. In addition, he argued against the Minneapolis merchants’ motion to quash the subpoena served on them and participated in settlement negotiations with Wausau Paper Mills Co.

After a careful review of Chestnut’s time records, I conclude that the following time must be disallowed:

1. 24.3 hours are supported by entries which are either illegible or too vague to provide any basis for determining if the time spent was of any benefit to the class. Many entries simply give the name of another plaintiffs’ counsel and indicate that a meeting or telephone call occurred.

2. 7 hours spent preparing for and attending the April 19,1978 pretrial conference in Philadelphia. The class was adequately represented by co-lead counsel at this conference.

3. 2.9 hours for Industrial Analysis Committee work. As stated in the Guidelines, I find that this work was of no benefit to the class.

4. 13.1 hours devoted to “read and review” of matters that were not Chestnut & Brooks’ responsibility. Since he was not a member of the Executive Committee, Chestnut will not be permitted to charge the class for time spent reading plaintiffs’ counsel status reports or reviewing settlement agreements between the states and the defendants.

5. 10.8 hours spent on the fee petition.

*114 (B) Hourly Rate

Chestnut & Brooks asks for a rate of $150-175/hour for Chestnut. However, to be consistent with the fees awarded to other attorneys of similar experience and ability for similar work, Chestnut’s time will be compensated at $100/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

119.6 hours X $100/hour = $11,960

(D) Multiplier

Although Chestnut headed two subcommittees, his role in the litigation was primarily ministerial. His substantive efforts (e.g. arguing against motion to quash), although quite capable, did not exhibit such an unusually high degree of skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, allow Chestnut a 1.5 contingency multiplier for the 21.6 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

II. Thomas Malone

(A) Hours Expended

Malone, an associate, devoted 533 hours to the litigation. He spent many hours reviewing Kimberly-Clark documents and was lead counsel at the two depositions of Kimberly-Clark employees. Malone also took several paper merchant depositions as part of the 30(b)(6) program. I find that all of Malone’s time is compensable except:

1. 31.8 hours which are supported by entries that are too vague to permit any determination of whether the time benefited the class.

2. 4.5 hours spent reading and reviewing material for which Chestnut & Brooks had no responsibility.

3. 5 hours spent attending the Nelson deposition. This time was duplicative and of no benefit to the class.

(B) Hourly Rate

Malone asks for $55-65/hour for his time. I find that $50/hour is a fair and reasonable compensation for this associate-level work.

(C) Total Lodestar

491.7 hours X $50/hour = $24,585

(D) Multiplier

Malone seeks a multiplier of 1.75. Because he was not in a position of leadership and spent most of his time on associate-level discovery work (e.g. reviewing documents, preparing for and taking depositions), he does not merit a quality multiplier. Furthermore, since all of Malone’s time was logged after the first wave of settlements, I will not apply any contingency multiplier.

III. Floyd Boline

(A) Hours Expended

Boline was a partner in the firm until March 1980. He spent 308.3 hours working on Fine Paper. The time records show that Boline prepared pleadings, answered defendants’ interrogatories, participated in. Kimberly-Clark discovery, attended Discovery Committee meetings, and did Industrial Analysis Committee work. I find that the following time is not compensable:

1. 16.1 hours supported by entries too vague to permit a determination of whether or not the time benefited the class. Most of this time was comprised of small fractions of an hour devoted to “review of new correspondence”.

2. 26.5 hours devoted to reviewing settlement agreements, reading new complaints, and reviewing the discovery of other defendants. Chestnut & Brooks was not responsible for these matters and Boline (not a member of the Executive Committee) may not charge the class for this time.

3. 37.8 hours spent on Industrial Analysis Committee work. As explained in the Guidelines, I find that this work did not benefit the class.

4. 3.5 hours spent on the fee petition.

(B) Hourly Rate

Boline requests $150/hour for his time. An examination of his records reveals that *115 he spent a good deal of time answering interrogatories, reviewing defendants’ answers to interrogatories and reviewing documents. Accordingly, I will award Boline $50/hour for the 90.3 hours he spent doing associate-level work. The remaining 134.1 compensable hours will be paid at $100/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

134.1 hours X $100/hour = $13,410

90.3 hours X $ 50/hour = $ 4,515

(D) Multiplier

I find that Boline’s work was not of such unusually high skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 105 compensable hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

IV. Michael Burns

(A) Hours Expended

Burns devoted 99.7 hours to this litigation. His efforts consisted primarily of reviewing and annotating Kimberly-Clark documents and participating in one of the merit depositions. I find that all of this time is compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Since nearly all of Burns’ time was spent reviewing documents, I find that an hourly rate of $50 is reasonable for his services.

(C) Total Lodestar

99.7 hours X $50/hour = $4,985

(D) Multiplier

I will not apply any multiplier to Burns’ lodestar since the nature of the work does not suggest that a quality adjustment is justified. Moreover, all of his time was logged after January 1979 so there is no contingency factor to be considered.

V. Karl Cambronne

(A) Hours Expended

Cambronne spent 46.1 hours on Fine Paper matters. He attended the deposition of Chestnut & Brooks’ client Prompt Printing, Inc., worked on the response to the merchants’ motion to quash the subpoena, and participated in the deposition of a Kimberly-Clark employee. I find that all of this time is compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Cambronne requests an hourly rate of $85. However, to be consistent with the rates awarded for similar associate-level work, I find that $50/hour is fair compensation.

(C) Total Lodestar

46.1 hours X $50/hour = $2,305

(D) Multiplier

Cambronne’s work was not of such unusually high skill to merit a quality multiplier. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to the 13 hours expended before the end of the first wave of settlements.

VI. Thomas Stringer

(A) Hours Expended

Stringer devoted 8.6 hours to conferences with clients and the drafting of pleadings. I find that all but .9 hours are compensable. The disallowed time is supported by entries that are too vague to permit a determination of any benefit to the class.

(B) Hourly Rate

The nature of these activities does not warrant the hourly rate of $100 that Stringer requests. A rate of $50/hour is fair and reasonable for such services.

(C) Total Lodestar

7.7 hours X $50/hours = $385

*116 (D) Multiplier

Stringer’s minimal role in the litigation does not merit a quality multiplier. Indeed, Chestnut & Brooks does not ask for one. I will, however, apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to Stringer’s lodestar since all of his time was expended before January 1979.

VII. Joseph Burkard

(A) Hours Expended

Burkard, a partner in the firm, spent 2.5 hours very early in the litigation. Most of this time was in a conference relating to the original pleadings filed by Chestnut & Brooks. I find that all of this time is compensable.

(B) Hourly Rate

Although he is a partner in the firm, Burkard’s involvement in this litigation was minimal. It does not merit the hourly rate of $150 he requests. Accordingly, Burkard will be compensated at a rate of $50/hour.

(C) Total Lodestar

2.5 hours X $50/hour = $125

(D) Multiplier

No quality multiplier is warranted here. To be consistent, however, I will apply a 1.5 contingency multiplier to Burkard’s time since it was expended before the end of the first wave of settlements in January 1979.

VIII. Paralegals

Two paralegals worked on Fine Paper matters. Gayle Wahl spent 1196.8 hours and Gary Peterson spent 62.7 hours on the case. I find that all of this time is compensable except the time devoted to the fee petition. Accordingly, I will disallow 84 hours of Wahl’s time and 28.1 hours of Peterson’s time. The remaining time will be compensated at an hourly rate of $25. No multiplier is applied to paralegal time.

IX. Bradley Johnson

Johnson, a college student at the time, worked a total of 12.3 hours. He obtained subpoenas, prepared notices of deposition for distribution to process servers, and filed the notices with the court. Chestnut & Brooks asks that he be compensated at a rate of $20/hour, but I find that an hourly rate of $10 is fair and reasonable for such services.

X. Expenses

Chestnut & Brooks requests reimbursement for $36,434.21 in expenses. Seventy-five percent of this figure ($27,325) has already been awarded. Of the remaining $9,109.21, I disallow:

1. $444.93 for transportation, meals and lodging for Jack Chestnut to attend the April 19, 1978 pretrial conference in Philadelphia. Attorney’s fees for this time have been disallowed as duplicative and unnecessary.

2. $155 for transportation, meals and lodging for Floyd Boline to attend the Industrial Analysis Committee meeting in Chicago in September 1978. The work of this committee did not benefit the class.

The remaining $8,509.28 in expenses may be recovered from the class fund. 60

XI. Conclusion

The following chart summarizes the compensable fees of Chestnut & Brooks:

*117 Attorney’s Name Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar Total Awarded Total Requested

Chestnut 119.6 $100 $11,960.00 $13,040.00 $ 61,037.50

Malone 491.7 $50 $24,585.00 $24,585.00 $ 58,210.25

Boline 224.4 $50/100 $17,925.00 $21,925.00 $ 92,490.00

Burns 99.7 $50 $ 4,985.00 $ 4,985.00 $ 11,216.25

Cambronne 46.1 $50 $ 2,305.00 $ 2,630.00 $ 5,877.75

Stringer 7.7 $50 $ 385.00 $ 577.50 $ 860.00

Burkard 2.5 $50 $ 125.00 $ 187.50 $ 375.00

Wahl 1112.8 $25 $27,820.00 $27,820.00 $ 30,287.50

Peterson 34.6 $25 $ 865.00 $ 865.00 $ 1,668.50

Johnson 12.3 $10 $ 123.00 $ 123.00 $ 246.00

Total $91,078.00 $96,738.00 $262,268.75

EXPENSES:

Amount Requested $ 36,434.21

Amount Previously Distributed $ 27,325.00

Amount Outstanding $ 9,109

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