State v. Gopher

No. 80-485

IN THE SUPRENE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1981

THE STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

VS .

MICHAEL GOPHER,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Cascade.

Honorable John McCarvel, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record:

For Appellant:

John C. Koch argued, Great Falls, Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Mark Murphy argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena,

Montana

J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

Randall Snyder argued,Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls,

Montana

Submitted: June 11, 1981

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: 9 - 1981

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- Clerk

Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of

the Court.

D e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h f e l o n y b u r g l a r y and f e l o n y

theft. A f t e r a h e a r i n g on May 9 , 1 9 8 0 , d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n

t o suppress i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d e v i d e n c e was d e n i e d . A jury

trial was held on August 18, 1980, and defendant was

convicted on both counts. Defendant appeals, submitting

t h a t t h e C a s c a d e County D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g h i s

motion t o s u p p r e s s .

A t about 5:00 a.m. on March 15, 1980, a silent

burglar a l a r m went o f f a t t h e Warehouse Pawn Shop i n G r e a t

F a l l s , Montana. Officer Stan Johnston arrived a t the scene

about a minute l a t e r . His i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l e d a broken

window, two large rocks on the floor, a number of empty

spaces in a r i f l e rack, and a f r e s h s e t o f t i r e tracks in

the parking l o t . While i n v e s t i g a t i n g he n o t i c e d a s i n g u l a r

v e h i c l e d r i v i n g s l o w l y p a s t t h e s c e n e and o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e

o c c u p a n t s e x h i b i t e d an un u s u a l c u r i o s i t y i n t h e c r i m e s i t e .

J o h n s t o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e knew from p a s t e x p e r i e n c e

t h a t i t was n o t uncommon f o r b u r g l a r s t o r e t u r n t o t h e s c e n e

of the crime after simply breeking a window. If the

break-in was u n d i s c o v e r e d , t h e y would then enter and take

t h e goods. On t h e b a s i s o f t h e s e f a c t s , J o h n s t o n c a l l e d an

assisting officer (Sharpe) and requested him to stop the

vehicle. O f f i c e r S h a r p e s t o p p e d and a p p r o a c h e d t h e v e h i c l e

shining h i s f l a s h 1i g h t i n t o t h e passenger compartment. He

noticed s e v e r a l r i f l e s on t h e f l o o r . While examining t h e

l i c e n s e of t h e d r i v e r , d e f e n d a n t Michael Gopher, t h e o f f i c e r

noticed the passenger's arm d r o p p i n g t o w a r d t h e g u n s . When

t h e o f f i c e r drew h i s weapon and o r d e r e d t h e o c c u p a n t s o f t h e

car t o g e t o u t of the vehicle, t h e d r i v e r a c c e l e r a t e d and

headed north. A subsequent pursuit by police terminated

w i t h t h e a r r e s t of b o t h p e r s o n s i n t h e c a r .

The s o l e i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t i s w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l

court erred when it refused defendant Gopher's motion to

s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e h e a l l e g e s was i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d .

The g i s t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s a r g u m e n t i s t h a t t h e o f f i c e r

who i n i t i a l l y " s t o p p e d " h i s c a r d i d n o t h a v e p r o b a b l e c a u s e

to do so. He maintains that the authorities must have

probable c a u s e t o b e l i e v e h e had committed a c r i m i n a l act

and s u f f i c i e n t c a u s e t o a r r e s t him t o j u s t i f y the search.

See s e c t i o n 4 6 - 5 - 1 0 1 ( 1 ) , MCA. Without probable c a u s e , t h e r e

c a n be no l a w f u l a r r e s t , and w i t h o u t t h e l a w f u l a r r e s t , a

search cannot be properly made as being incident to the

arrest. See section 46-6-401(4), MCA. Officer Sharpe,

defendant maintains, must h a v e had knowledge o f sufficient

facts to believe d e f e n d a n t had c o m m i t t e d the burglary and

that he must be immediately arrested. Gopher emphasizes

that the facts sufficient to properly arrest a defendant

must be known a t t h e moment o f t h e a r r e s t and n o t d i s c o v e r e d

during or after the arrest. S t a t e v. Rader ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177

Mont. 252, 5 8 1 P.2d 4 3 7 . C i t i n g Rader, defendant concludes

that t h i s Court h a s made a clear statement to the effect

t h a t s t o p and f r i s k p r i n c i p l e s do n o t a p p l y t o a d e f e n d a n t

in a vehicle. 581 P.2d a t 440.

A t t h e o u t s e t we r e c o g n i z e t h e Rader rule regarding

s t o p and f r i s k . A l t h o u g h d i c t u m , s u c h a c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n by

t h i s Court p r o h i b i t i n g a p p l i c a t i o n of s t o p and f r i s k r u l e s

t o a u t o m o b i l e s c a n n o t be i g n o r e d .

We also recognize that the facts known to Officer

Johnston at the time he directed Officer Sharpe to stop

defendant's automobile fall short of probable cause. We,

therefore, must determine whether Rader should continue to

be the law in this State and, if not, what standard should

be applied in circumstances such as exist before us here.

The State maintains that the "stop and frisk" doc-

trine should apply to vehicular stops, citing Terry v. Ohio

(1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. In

'Terry, the Supreme Court ruled that it can be constitu-

tionally permissible for an officer to stop and search a.

person, even in the absence of probable cause. 392 U.S. at

15. This type of encounter must be reviewed as to its

"reasonableness," and take into account the police interest

involved and existence of specific and articulable facts.

The most recent post-Terry decision regarding stop

and frisk is United States v. Cortez (1981), - U.S. I

101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. In Cortez, the Supreme Court

ruled that objective facts and circumstantial evidence

suggesting that a particular automobile is involved in some

sort of criminal activity is sufficient to warrant a limited

investigatory stop. Chief Justice Burger writes:

"The idea that an assessment of the whole

picture must yield a particularized suspicion

contains two elements, each of which must be

present before a stop is permissible. First,

the assessment must be based upon all the

circumstances. The analysis proceeds with

various objective observations, information

from police reports, if such are available,

and consideration of the modes or patterns of

operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.

From these data, a trained officer draws

inferences and makes deductions--inferences

and deductions that might well elude an

untrained person.

"The process does not deal with hard

certainties, but with probabilities. Long

before the law of probabilities was articu-

l a t e d a s such, p r a c t i c a l people formulated

c e r t a i n common s e n s e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t human

behavior; jurors a s f a c t f i n d e r s a r e permitted

t o do t h e same--and s o a r e law e n f o r c e m e n t

officers. Finally, the evidence thus col-

l e c t e d m u s t b e s e e n and weighed n o t i n t e r m s

o f l i b r a r y a n a l y s i s by s c h o l a r s , b u t a s

u n d e r s t o o d by t h o s e v e r s e d i n t h e f i e l d o f

law e n fo rc e m e n t . " 101 S.Ct. a t 6 9 5 , 66

L.Ed.2d a t 629.

I t s h o u l d be n o t e d h e r e t h a t O f f i c e r J o h n s t o n is an

experienced and knowledgeable member of the Great Falls

police department, having been with the force for over

twelve years. This is a n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f the Cortez

a n a l y s i s , which e m p h a s i z e s t h a t e x p e r i e n c e d l a w e n f o r c e m e n t

authorities are allowed t o draw c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s which

laymen c o u l d n o t p r o p e r l y d r a w i n d e t e r m i n i n g i f a s p e c i f i c

vehicular stop is legally valid. The -o r t e z

C-- court

concludes:

". . . Thus, t h e t e s t is n o t whether o f f i c e r s

Gray and Evans had p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o c o n c l u d e

t h a t t h e v e h i c l e t h e y s t o p p e d would c o n t a i n

'Chevron' and a g r o u p o f i l l e g a l a l i e n s .

R a t h e r t h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r , b a s e d upon

t h e whole p i c t u r e , t h e y , a s e x p e r i e n c e d

Border Patrol agents, could reasonably

surmise t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r vehicle they

s t o p p e d was engaged i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y . On

t h i s record, they could s o conclude." 101

S . C t . a t 6 9 7 , 66 L.Ed.2d a t 6 3 1 .

This Court is convinced that the facts at the

officer's disposal in this case are sufficient to affirm

under C o r t e z . F u r t h e r , our review of c a s e s from n e i g h b o r i n g

jurisdictions r e v e a l s t h a t t h e g r e a t t r e n d of a u t h o r i t y is

in accord. Citing State v. Ruiz ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 9 Ariz.App. 84,

504 P.2d 1 3 0 7 , t h e c o u r t i n S t a t e v . Dean ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 112 A r i z .

437, 543 P.2d 425, held t h a t "I . . . [ a ] founded s u s p i c i o n

is a l l t h a t is n e c e s s a r y , some b a s i s from which t h e c o u r t

can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or

harassing. '" 543 P.2d 425, 427 ( q u o t i n g Wilson v. Porter

( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) , 361 F.2d 4 1 2 , 4 1 5 ) .

In People v. Waits ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 196 Colo. 35, 580 P.2d

391, the Colorado Supreme C o u r t applied the standards of

Stone v. People (1971), 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495,

stating:

" ' I n order l a w f u l l y t o d e t a i n an i n d i v i d u a l

f o r q u e s t i o n i n g , ( 1 ) t h e o f f i c e r m u s t have a

reasonable suspicion t h a t the individual has

c o m m i t t e d , o r i s a b o u t t o commit, a c r i m e ;

( 2 ) t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e d e t e n t i o n must be

r e a s o n a b l e ; and ( 3 ) t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e

d e t e n t i o n m u s t be r e a s o n a b l e when c o n s i d e r e d

i n l i g h t of t h e purpose.' 174 Colo. a t 509,

485 P . 2 d a t 497.

"We have p r e v i o u s l y a p p l i e d t h e s e s t a n d a r d s

t o investigatory s t o p s involving automobiles.

People v. Mangum, Colo., 539 P . 2 d 120

( 1 9 7 5 ) . " 580 P.2d a t 393.

See a l s o S t a t e v. Bartosz ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 34 0 r . A p p . 1 2 3 , 578 P.2d

426; W a s h i n g t o n v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 94 Nev. 1 8 1 , 576 P.2d 1 1 2 6 .

Primarily applying the rules of Cortez, the State

submits t h a t s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i z e d suspicion existed t o

j u s t i f y t h e s t o p of d e f e n d a n t ' s c a r . The S t a t e ' s b u r d e n h a s

two e l e m e n t s : ( 1 ) o b j e c t i v e d a t a f r o m which a n e x p e r i e n c e d

officer c a n make certain inferences; and (2) a resulting

s u s p i c i o n t h a t t h e occupant of a c e r t a i n v e h i c l e is o r has

been engaged in wrongdoing or was a witness to criminal

activity. The f u n d a m e n t a l f a c t s p e r s u a d e u s t h a t t h e b u r d e n

was met i n t h i s c a s e .

The o f f i c e r s knew t h a t a c r i m e had b e e n committed--

probably theft, but certainly criminal mischief. They

b e l i e v e d s e v e r a l g u n s had b e e n t a k e n . They knew a v e h i c l e

was p r o b a b l y involved. They o b s e r v e d o n e v e h i c l e d r i v i n g

very slowly p a s t t h e crime scene. Although h i s p o l i c e c a r

was n o t on t h e f r o n t s t r e e t and d i d n o t h a v e i t s f l a s h i n g

lights on, the occupants of the vehicle expressed an

inordinate amount of interest in the scene. These known

f a c t s , combined w i t h t h e d e d u c t i o n s made i n l i g h t o f t w e l v e

years' experience in crime investigation, led Officer

Johnston to s u s p e c t d e f e n d a n t was involved in, or witness

t o , t h e crime.

W reaffirm the traditional

e r u l e of t h i s Court tha.t

dictum is not binding as controlling precedent, S t a t e v.

D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 139 Mont. 453, 471, 365 P.2d 512,

521, and feel compelled t o abandon the language of Rader

which a p p e a r s t o p r e c l u d e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e T e r r y s t o p

and f r i s k r u l e s t o v e h i c u l a r s t o p s . I n l i g h t of t h e C o r t e z

decision, and o t h e r p e r s u a s i v e a u t h o r i t y , we now h o l d t h a t

when a t r a i n e d p o l i c e o f f i c e r h a s a p a r t i c u l a r i z e d s u s p i c i o n

t h a t t h e o c c u p a n t of a vehicle is or has been engaged in

criminal activity, or witness thereto, a limited and

r e a s o n a b l e i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p and s e a r c h i s j u s t i f i e d .

The d e n i a l o f d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s and h i s

subsequent conviction a r e affirmed.

W concur:

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Chief J u s t i c e

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