The opinion
Mr. Justice DAVIS
delivered the opinion of the court.
The common-law form of the action of ejectment does not
*249
prevail in Illinois. There the action is without fictions, and is between the real parties in interest, and for the possession of a specific estate, and damages for its detention. On account of the fictitious character of the common-law action of ejectment, a judgment was not a complete bar, as in other actions. But in Illinois, by statute, it is declared, “ that every judgment in the action of ejectment, rendered upon a verdict, shall be conclusive as to the title established, in such action, upon the party against whom the same is rendered, and all persons claiming from, through, or under such pai’ty, by title accruing after the commencement of such action.” One verdict alone was not deemed satisfactory by the legislature. The ancient reverence for the tenure by which lands are h4d had its influence, and the unsuccessful party, of
right,
is entitled to
one
new trial, and the court can, if satisfied that justice will thereby be promoted, grant a
second.
After this the litigation is ended, and the verdict and judgment have the same conclusive effect as in other actions. In Missouri, a judgment in ejectment is also a bar to any othei action, between the same parties, on the same subject-matter; and this court, in the ease of
Miles
v.
Caldwell,
*
in construing a statute, no broader than the Illinois enactment,
h°M
that whatever is conclusive of the title to land in the courts of a State, is equally conclusive in the Federal cornts; that it is, in fact, a rule of property. ' A perfect solution is, therefore, given to this case when it is ascertained what was tried and determined in the ejectment suit. The evidence on this point is so full as to leave no room for doubt.
Blanchard did not resist Brown’s recoveiy in the action of ejectment on the sole question of paramount legal title, which he had the right to do, and then endeavor to get rid of it in chancery on the question of superior equities. He chose rather to risk his whole defence in the impeachment of B .-own’s title for fraud, and because the sale was vitiated by ii regularities and the property sacrificed. Having failed
*250
before the jury, he is estopped from investigating the same matters in another jurisdiction. He waived his right to have the question of fraud litigated in a court of chancery, when he presented it, as a defence to the action at law. And the defence was legitimate and proper, for such questions of fraud and irregularity as were raised could be disposed of as well at law as in chancery.
A grossly inadequate price is, under some circumstances, evidence of fraud, and a fit subject of inquiry by a jury, in determining the validity of a sale made under legal process. If the sale on the Hart execution was not made for the purpose of satisfying the judgment, but fraudulently to defeat subsequent encumbrancers, and Brown was not a
bond fide
purchaser for value, then his title was bad; and it was equally bad, if the irregularities were such as to render the sale void.
Evidence was given on all these matters, and was never withdrawn from the consideration of the jury. In fact the whole record shows that Blanchard claims equitable relief on substantially the same grounds, and sustained by the same evidence that he relied on to defeat the action of ejectment. The decision in
Miles
v.
Caldwell
is, therefore, applicable. In that case, as in this, the question of fraud had been submitted to the jury, and determined against the complainant; and this court held that he was barred by the proceedings in ejectment, and could not raise anew in chancery the same questions that were heard at law.
Decree affirmed with costs.
*
2 Wallace,
44.