noting that § 3582(c)(2) has a limited scope and purpose
How later courts described this case
- noting that § 3582(c)(2) has a limited scope and purpose
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 12-15608 Date Filed: 06/04/2013 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-15608
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:04-cr-00105-JA-DAB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAYMOND WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 4, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Raymond Williams, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of
his motion for a reduction of sentence, filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In
Case: 12-15608 Date Filed: 06/04/2013 Page: 2 of 5
response, the United States has moved for summary affirmance of the district
court’s decision based on its belief that our controlling precedent clearly
establishes that Mr. Williams is ineligible for a sentence reduction. After review,
we agree with the government and, therefore, affirm.
On July 29, 2004, Mr. Williams pled guilty to three counts of possessing
cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Both
parties agree that Mr. Williams qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. §
4B1.1, which subjected him to an enhanced sentencing guideline range of 188 to
235 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Mr. Williams as a career
offender to three concurrent terms of 188 months’ imprisonment.
On May 6, 2008, the district court sua sponte ordered both parties to address
whether Mr. Williams was eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2)
based on the retroactivity of Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The
district court determined that Mr. Williams was ineligible for a sentence reduction
because he was sentenced as a career offender, and, consequently, his applicable
guideline range was not affected by Amendment 706. We affirmed the district
court’s order. See D.E. 79.
On August 27, 2012, Mr. Williams filed a new § 3582(c)(2) motion arguing
that, even though he was a career offender, he was entitled to a sentence reduction
based on Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The United States filed a
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response in opposition, asserting that Mr. Williams is ineligible for a sentence
reduction because he was sentenced as a career offender and, therefore,
Amendment 750 does not impact his sentencing range. The district court denied
Mr. Williams’ motion, and this appeal followed.
“In a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, ‘we review de novo the district court's legal
conclusions regarding the scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines.’”
United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2008). Under § 3528(c)(2),
a district court may reduce the terms of a defendant’s imprisonment if the sentence
was based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
Sentencing Commission. If, however, “a retroactively applicable guideline
amendment reduces a defendant's base offense level, but does not alter the
sentencing range upon which his or her sentence was based, § 3582(c)(2) does not
authorize a reduction in sentence.” Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330.
In this case, Mr. Williams is not eligible for a reduced sentence under
Amendment 750 because he was sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1. His
sentencing guidelines remain unchanged because § 4B1.1 was not affected by
Amendment 750. See id. at 1327 (holding that defendants sentenced as career
offenders under § 4B1.1 are not entitled to sentence reductions based on
Amendment 706, which amended the base offense levels for crack cocaine
offenses in § 2D1.1); United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir.
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2012) (holding that Moore remains binding precedent and applies to Amendment
750).
Mr. Williams’ claim for relief under the Fair Sentencing Act is similarly
foreclosed by our binding precedent. In United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377
(11th Cir. 2012), we held that the Fair Sentencing Act is not a guidelines
amendment by the Sentencing Commission and, therefore, cannot be the basis for a
sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). In addition, Mr. Williams was sentenced
before the effective date of the FSA, and it is not retroactively applicable to him.
See id. (“We agree with every other circuit to address the issue that there is ‘no
evidence that Congress intended [the FSA] to apply to defendants who had been
sentenced prior to the August 3, 2010 date of the Act's enactment.’”) (citation
omitted). See also United States v. Hippolyte, No. 11-15933, ___ F.3d ___, ___,
2013 WL 978695, at *5 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) (same).
Finally, Mr. Williams’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge is
the type of “extraneous resentencing issue” that is not cognizable in a § 3582(c)(2)
motion. See United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781-82 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to address defendant’s
constitutional claim in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding). See also Dillon v. United States,
560 U.S. ___, ____, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2691-92 (2010) (noting that § 3582(c)(2) has
a limited scope and purpose). Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to
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address this constitutional issue, it could not have plainly erred by failing to
consider sua sponte Mr. Williams’ equal protection challenge. If Mr. Williams
desires to make a constitutional challenge to his sentence, § 3582(c)(2) is not the
proper vehicle.
For these reasons, we find that all of the arguments raised by Mr. Williams
are squarely foreclosed by our prior precedent, and “there can be no substantial
question as to the outcome of this case.” See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406
F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) (summary disposition is appropriate in cases
where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that
there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case”). Accordingly,
the United States’ motion for summary affirmance is granted, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed, and the United States’ alternative motion for extension of
time to file a brief is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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