Ridgley v. State

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 35823

LEE A. RIDGLEY, )

) Boise, December 2009 Term

Petitioner-Appellant, )

) 2010 Opinion No. 24

v. )

) Filed: March 17, 2010

STATE OF IDAHO, )

) Stephen Kenyon, Clerk

Respondent. )

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,

Boundary County. Hon. Charles W. Hosack, District Judge.

The district court order dismissing post-conviction relief petition is affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Justin M.

Curtis argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth

Jorgensen argued.

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HORTON, Justice

This is an appeal from the district court‟s summary dismissal of a petition for post-

conviction relief. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the district court‟s dismissal in part and

this Court granted the State‟s petition for review. We affirm the district court‟s order of

dismissal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2002, sixteen days after his wife died, Lee Ridgley pled guilty to lewd

and lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. Before sentencing, Ridgley moved

to withdraw his plea on the grounds that appointed counsel had not adequately represented and

advised him prior to entry of the guilty plea, but the district court denied his motion. In an

unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court‟s decision.

On April 4, 2005, Ridgley filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Ridgley‟s petition

alleged that his defense counsel‟s performance was deficient because counsel had met with him

for less than one hour before Ridgley pled guilty, failed to provide Ridgley with a copy of the

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police report, failed to contact potential witnesses, failed to watch or listen to tapes of interviews

of the victim, failed to advise Ridgley of potential defenses, and failed to take steps to determine

whether Ridgley‟s severe grief and depression rendered him incompetent or unable to make a

rational decision about pleading guilty.

The State answered the petition and, in its answer, moved for summary dismissal, arguing

that the issues presented in Ridgley‟s petition were “essentially identical” to the issues advanced

in support of Ridgley‟s earlier motion to withdraw his plea. After Ridgley requested a trial

setting on his petition, the State renewed its motion for summary dismissal, again asserting that

the bases for post-conviction relief advanced in the petition were identical to those that had been

decided previously. The district court then issued notice of its intention to summarily dismiss the

action pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906. In that notice, the district court observed that Ridgley had

included a transcript of the testimony produced at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. In light of the evidence produced at that hearing—that Ridgley had told his attorney

that he wished to plead guilty—the district court stated that there was an insufficient showing of

deficient performance by trial counsel. The district court further observed that there was “a total

lack of evidence that, but for counsel‟s alleged deficiencies, [Ridgley] would have insisted on

going to trial.”

Ridgley thereafter filed a response to the notice, supported by his affidavit and two other

affidavits. These responsive filings focused on the final claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, i.e., counsel‟s failure to take steps to evaluate Ridgley‟s mental condition prior to his

plea of guilty. In his affidavit, Ridgley averred that he informed his attorney that he was

suffering from severe depression and did not understand the proceedings. He further averred that

his attorney did not discuss with him the possibility of obtaining an evaluation to determine his

competence. He also asserted that, if successful in obtaining post-conviction relief, he intended

to go to trial. Ridgley‟s attorney‟s first affidavit advanced his opinion that trial counsel‟s

performance was objectively unreasonable and appended a report prepared by a psychologist, Dr.

Jonelle Timlin. Dr. Timlin prepared this report approximately nine months after Ridgley pled

guilty. After reviewing Ridgley‟s response, the district court summarily dismissed Ridgley‟s

petition.

Ridgley appealed the district court‟s decision. The court of appeals affirmed the district

court‟s dismissal of the first five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the court

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of appeals reversed the grant of summary dismissal regarding counsel‟s failure to request a

competency evaluation prior to Ridgley‟s plea. This Court granted the State‟s petition for

review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

While this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the court of appeals when

considering a case on review from that court, this Court reviews the district court‟s decision

directly. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 226, 91 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2004).

Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure

Act, I.C. § 19-4901 et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed

by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646

(2008). However, “[t]he „application must contain much more than a short and plain statement

of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).‟” State v. Payne, 146

Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61

P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). The application must be supported by a statement that

“specifically set[s] forth the grounds upon which the application is based.” Rhoades v. State, 148

Idaho 247, 249-51, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068-69 (2009). “The application must present or be

accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject

to dismissal.” Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136 (citing I.C. § 19-4903).

“Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-

conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court‟s own initiative.

Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under

I.R.C.P. 56.” State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). “When

reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard

used by the district court in ruling on the motion.” Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Carroll, 148

Idaho 254, 257, 220 P.3d 1073, 1076 (2009) (citing Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,

556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009)). Likewise, when reviewing a district court‟s order of summary

dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding, we apply the same standard as that applied by

the district court. Thus, when reviewing such a dismissal, this Court must determine whether a

genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any

affidavits on file. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483.

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“[I]f the petitioner‟s alleged facts are uncontroverted by the State . . . [they] must be

regarded as true.” Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405, 407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985).

However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even where the State does not

controvert the applicant‟s evidence because the court is not required to accept

either the applicant‟s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible

evidence, or the applicant‟s conclusions of law.

Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483.

“[W]here the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a

jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the

possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible

for resolving the conflict between those inferences.” Riverside Dev. Co. v.

Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). “When an action is to be

tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw

inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but

rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn

from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.” Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,

437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).

Id.

III. ANALYSIS

As previously noted, Ridgley‟s petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in the

following aspects: (1) that his attorney met with Ridgley for less than one hour before Ridgley

pled guilty; (2) that his attorney failed to provide Ridgley with a copy of the police report; (3)

that his attorney failed to contact potential witnesses; (4) that his attorney failed to watch or

listen to tapes of interviews of the victim; (5) that his attorney failed to advise Ridgley of

potential defenses; and (6) that his attorney failed to take steps to determine whether Ridgley‟s

severe grief and depression rendered him incompetent or unable to make a rational decision

about pleading guilty.

A petitioner‟s claim that counsel‟s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a

conviction has two components. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In

addition to showing that his counsel‟s performance was deficient, “the defendant must show that

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id.

The district court‟s order of dismissal concluded a ten-page memorandum opinion. The

first four pages of the order were largely devoted to a recitation of the procedural history of the

case. The district court devoted approximately one page of analysis to the first five claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel and observed that these “were virtual mirror images” of the

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claims advanced in support of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Relying heavily on the

earlier findings of a different district judge in connection with the earlier proceedings and the

court of appeals‟ affirmance, the district court then concluded that Ridgley had failed to

demonstrate that trial counsel‟s performance was deficient.

The district court observed that the only “„new‟ evidence” presented in response to the

proposed dismissal of the petition related to trial counsel‟s failure to request an evaluation of

Ridgley‟s mental health condition. The district court then devoted approximately five pages of

discussion to that claim, concluding that Ridgley had failed to demonstrate that trial counsel‟s

performance was deficient in this regard and that Ridgley had failed to demonstrate resultant

prejudice. In light of the differing treatment of the first five issues by the district court, we

consider them collectively before turning to the sixth claim.

A. Although the district court improperly failed to provide Ridgley with notice of the

grounds upon which Ridgley’s first five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

were dismissed, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal.

As to the first five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel presented in his petition for

post-conviction relief, Ridgley asserts that the district court erred by dismissing his petition on a

ground that was not identified by the court in its notice of intent to dismiss. The district court‟s

notice stated its intent to dismiss on the grounds that Ridgley had presented no evidence

supporting his claims of deficient performance nor evidence establishing an objective basis from

which to conclude that, but for counsel‟s alleged deficiencies, Ridgley would not have pled

guilty. However, the degree to which the final order referenced and evidently relied on the

earlier factual findings by a different judge can only be reasonably interpreted as reflecting the

district court‟s view that the issues previously presented by Ridgley in support of his motion to

withdraw his plea of guilty could not be relitigated in this post-conviction action. This ground

for dismissal was not stated in the district court‟s notice of intent to dismiss.

A petitioner is entitled to notice of the trial court‟s contemplated grounds for dismissal

and an opportunity to respond before a petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed. I.C. § 19-

4906(b). Failure to provide such notice and opportunity to be heard may result in reversal of a

summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho

319, 321, 900 P.2d 795, 797 (1995). We are unable to conclude that the district court gave

Ridgley appropriate notice of its intention to dismiss the first five claims on the basis of res

judicata.

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This conclusion does not automatically require reversal, however. Where the lower court

reaches the correct result, albeit by reliance on an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the

order on the correct theory. Boise Tower Assoc.s, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 782, 215 P.3d

494, 502 (2009) (citing Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33, 72 P.3d 868,

873 (2003)). Because this Court employs the same standards on appellate review that the trial

court applies in considering summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, if Ridgley

failed to provide admissible evidence supporting these claims, they were properly dismissed.

We address only the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified how the Strickland prejudice prong is to be

applied when the defendant entered a plea of guilty. In order to demonstrate prejudice, a

petitioner is required to show that as a result of counsel‟s deficient performance “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. Since its pronouncement, this Court has

regularly reiterated that the Hill prejudice standard is applicable to claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel in connection with guilty pleas. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106

P.3d 376, 385 (2004); Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82, 57 P.3d 787, 793 (2002);

McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 851, 103 P.3d 460, 464 (2004); Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96,

101, 983 P.2d 931, 936 (1999).

In his affidavit filed in response to the district court‟s notice of intent to dismiss, Ridgley

asserted that if post-conviction relief were granted, he would not again plead guilty but would

insist on going to trial because he is innocent. This assertion is insufficient to withstand

summary dismissal. Nowhere in his petition or his affidavit does Ridgley attempt to draw a

causal connection between the alleged deficiencies of his attorney‟s performance and his

decision to plead guilty. In Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court focused on a similar failure to allege a

causal connection. 474 U.S. at 60 (“Petitioner did not allege in his habeas petition that, had

counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not

guilty.”)

In the present case, Ridgley did not attempt to show that the relatively brief contact with

his trial attorney contributed to his decision to plead guilty or that greater contact may have

dissuaded him from pleading guilty. He did not show that information contained within the

police reports may have given him some reason to go to trial. Similarly, he did not identify any

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evidence from potential witnesses or that was contained in the tape recording of the victim‟s

interview that may have led him to decide against pleading guilty. He did not identify any

potential defense to the charge that may have resulted in a different decision. In short, Ridgley

simply made no effort to link his claims of deficient performance with his plea of guilty.

Therefore, we affirm the district court‟s summary dismissal of these claims.

B. The district court properly dismissed Ridgley’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel for failure to determine Ridgley’s competence to enter a plea of guilty.

The district court found that Ridgley failed to establish necessary facts to support a

finding that his counsel was deficient by failing to seek a competency evaluation before Ridgley

entered his guilty plea or that Ridgley was prejudiced by any deficient performance.

In his petition for post-conviction relief, Ridgley alleged that

[m]y attorney did not advise me of the potential of having an evaluation to

determine my mental status, whether or not I would appreciate the proceedings

that were filed against me or be able to assist in my defense. In fact, I was not

able to assist in my defense. I had no basis of knowledge.

In other words, Ridgley alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that he

was incompetent at the time he entered his plea. See I.C. § 18-210 (“No person who as a result

of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist

in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an

offense so long as such incapacity endures.”). This Court has determined that the I.C. § 18-210

standard is consistent with that applied by the federal courts. State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 842,

537 P.2d 1369, 1378 (1975) (citing Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). The standard to

determine competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has “the capacity to understand the

proceedings against him and (2) assist in his defense.” Id.

Once again, we find that Ridgley has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material

fact as to prejudice. “With respect to the prejudice prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel [for failing to order a competency evaluation], [a petitioner] need only demonstrate a

„reasonable probability‟ that he was incompetent, „sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome‟” at the time he entered his plea. Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 594 (5th Cir.

1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

A claim of incompetence does not lend itself very well to the “outcome”

test in Strickland because it does not turn on the validity of the result vis a vis

guilt or innocence. Since to convict an incompetent person is a per se due process

violation, guilt or innocence of the offense charged is irrelevant.

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Id. at 595 n.20. The South Carolina Supreme Court states the rule this way:

Due process prohibits the conviction of an incompetent defendant, and this

right may not be waived by a guilty plea. Jeter v. State, [417 S.E.2d 594, 595-

596] (1992) (citations omitted).

In a [post-conviction relief] action, the petitioner must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent when he entered his guilty

plea. Id. at [417 S.E.2d at 596]; Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP.

In order to find that petitioner‟s trial counsel was ineffective for refusing

to request a . . . hearing on petitioner‟s competency to stand trial, petitioner must

show that counsel was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of

petitioner‟s proceedings. In [Jeter, 417 S.E. 2d at 596], this Court proclaimed that

in proving Strickland prejudice within the context of counsel‟s failure to fully

investigate the petitioner‟s mental capacity, “the [petitioner] need only show a

„reasonable probability‟ that he was . . . incompetent at the time of the plea.”

Matthews v. State, 596 S.E.2d 49, 50-51 (S.C. 2004). Thus, we must decide whether Ridgley has

presented admissible evidence showing that there is a reasonable probability that he was

incompetent at the time he entered his plea. We conclude that he has not.

In discussing whether Ridgley‟s trial counsel should have ordered an evaluation, the

district court stated that

[t]he only evidence offered in this case that Ridgley was emotionally distraught,

in a state of shock, and incompetent are the allegations of Ridgley‟s own affidavit.

Ridgley‟s own conclusory and bare assertions, alone, are not sufficient to survive

summary dismissal . . . . While Ridgley‟s affidavit does raise the fact issue that

he was emotionally distraught when he entered the guilty plea, the affidavit offers

no more than a mere conclusion that he was not competent to understand the

nature of the proceedings and knowingly enter into a guilty plea, and is

unsupported by any facts as to the alleged mental incompetency.

The court further stated that

without something in the record suggesting that an examination in February 2002

would have shown [that Ridgley was incompetent] to proceed, there is nothing to

satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.

We note that the district court was not entirely accurate in saying that Ridgley offered

nothing more on the issue of his incompetency than his own statements. Ridgley also offered the

psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Timlin for sentencing purposes nine months after

Ridgley‟s plea in support of his claim that he was not competent to plead guilty. Despite noting

that Ridgley suffers from some indications of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and

anxiety disorder, the report also states that Ridgley is “„oriented to person, place and time.‟”

More importantly, the report addressed only Ridgley‟s mental state at the time it was prepared;

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the report says nothing about Ridgley‟s mental state at the time he entered his plea—nine months

earlier. By contrast, in Bouchillon, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in holding that a

defense attorney‟s failure to investigate the defendant‟s competency to stand trial constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel, recognized that

the psychologist who examined Bouchillon . . . testified that, in his opinion,

Bouchillon was incompetent at the time of his pleading. While that opinion was

not offered based on a contemporaneous examination of Bouchillon it was

rendered in the context of his diagnosis of Bouchillon‟s condition. That diagnosis

is consistent with Bouchillon‟s record of treatment in prison and his previous

history of mental problems.

Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d at 594.

In the present case, Ridgley did not present an expert‟s opinion that he was not

competent, as defined by I.C. § 18-210, at the time he pled guilty. Although Ridgley stated in

his petition that he was not able to assist in his defense, to the extent that this statement may be

interpreted as an opinion regarding his competence for purposes of I.C. § 18-210, it was not

admissible evidence. This Court has recognized that in order to render admissible opinions

regarding mental condition, the witness must be qualified as an expert under the Idaho Rules of

Evidence. State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 855, 828 P.2d 879, 884 (1992).1 In the absence of

admissible evidence showing a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time of his

plea of guilty, we conclude that Ridgley failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as

to his claim that his attorney‟s deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Accordingly, we

affirm the decision of the district court.

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that Ridgley did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact supporting his claim that his attorney‟s allegedly deficient performance resulted in

prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‟s order granting summary dismissal of

Ridgley‟s petition for post-conviction relief.

Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and W. JONES CONCUR.

1

Although admissibility of evidence is governed by the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the standard that we have

required is consistent with legislative requirements. Court-ordered competency evaluations are to be performed by a

“qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist.” I.C. § 18-211.

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