State v. Urrabazo

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 33459/33460

STATE OF IDAHO, )

)

Boise, December 2010 Term

Plaintiff-Respondent, )

)

2010 Opinion No. 137

v. )

)

Filed: December 23, 2010

FRANCISCO AUGUSTIN URRABAZO, )

)

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Defendant-Appellant. )

______________________________________ )

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho,

Canyon County. Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick, District Judge.

The appeal is dismissed.

Molly Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sarah E.

Tompkins argued.

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Jessica M. Lorello argued.

_______________

J. JONES, Justice.

Francisco Augustin Urrabazo appeals the sentence imposed by the district court. Because

Urrabazo’s appeal is untimely, we dismiss.

I.

Factual and Procedural History

On August 8, 2005, Francisco Urrabazo pleaded guilty to statutory rape, felony battery on

a police officer, and misdemeanor battery. The statutory rape charge was filed in a different case

than the battery charges, but the two cases were considered together for the purposes of

sentencing. On November 7, 2005, the district court sentenced Urrabazo to a unified sentence of

ten years with three years fixed for statutory rape and a concurrent unified sentence of five years

with three fixed for the felony battery charge. However, the court retained jurisdiction in both

cases for a period of 180 days.

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The district court held a hearing on May 1, 2005, to review Urrabazo’s progress. At the

hearing, the State acknowledged that Urrabazo “had a good six months,” but indicated it was still

concerned about Urrabazo’s use of alcohol, that he failed to recognize the severity of the

situation, and “that it was unclear if the level to re-offend [had] gone down.” The court continued

the hearing until May 5, 2006, because “it was a close question on whether or not the court

should place [Urrabazo] on probation or relinquish jurisdiction.” The court also recognized that

its jurisdiction expired the following day, on May 6, 2006.

At the May 5 hearing, the district court initially determined it would relinquish

jurisdiction and impose the original sentence. The court “advised counsel that the defendant was

not ready for probation at this time, however, the Court felt that a Rule 35 motion would be

appropriate” if defense counsel wished to argue for a reduction in Urrabazo’s sentence.

Urrabazo’s counsel also suggested that the “State had floated the possibility of a second rider.”

After a recess, Urrabazo’s counsel moved, pursuant to Rule 35, for a reduction in Urrabazo’s

sentence in the form of a second period of retained jurisdiction. In making its determination on

the issue, the court acknowledged Urrabazo’s progress during the first rider, and noted that his

failure to complete a sexual offender treatment program was not for lack of cooperation but,

rather, was due to an inability to complete the assignments in the time provided. However, the

court remained concerned about placing Urrabazo on probation in the same city where the rape

victim resided, and recognized a continued need for anger management and substance abuse

treatment. The court therefore concluded Urrabazo was not ready for probation at that time. The

court ordered relinquishment of its retained jurisdiction, but then granted Urrabazo’s Rule 35

motion by ordering a second 180-day period of retained jurisdiction.

Two months into the second rider, the district court received an updated report regarding

Urrabazo’s progress. After reviewing the updated report, the court relinquished its jurisdiction

pursuant to the second rider in an order filed on July 28, 2006. The order stated: “The Court’s

paramount concern for public safety, together with a lack of confidence in Defendant Urrabazo’s

ability to control his conduct for an extended [period] of time, and to accomplish rehabilitation in

the less-structured setting of a community-based probation, support a decision to relinquish

jurisdiction.”

Urrabazo filed an appeal on September 8, 2006, 42 days after the July 28 order, alleging

that the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction, and that the sentences

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imposed were excessive. Urrabazo argues that consecutive riders, without an intervening period

of probation, is consistent with the provisions and intent of I.C. § 19-2601(4). The State contends

this Court should not consider the merits of Urrabazo’s claims on appeal, arguing that the district

court lacked jurisdiction to order a successive period of retained jurisdiction, that Urrabazo’s 42

days for filing an appeal commenced running at the end of the first period of retained

jurisdiction, that the district court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for filing an appeal, and

that Urrabazo’s late appeal should therefore be dismissed.

II.

Issues on Appeal

1. Does I.C. § 19-2601(4) require a period of probation prior to ordering a second period of

retained jurisdiction?

2. If the statute does require an intervening period of probation, was the district court

without subject matter jurisdiction to order the second rider?

III.

Discussion

The district court in this case relinquished jurisdiction on the first rider on May 5, 2006.

However, the court then ordered a second consecutive period of retained jurisdiction on that

same day, without an intervening period of probation. On July 28, 2006, the court relinquished

jurisdiction on the second rider. Urrabazo viewed this order as beginning the 42-day period in

which to file his appeal. Thus, we must first determine whether I.C. § 19-2601(4), which permits

an additional period of retained jurisdiction “after a defendant has been placed on probation,” is

ambiguous. Because we determine the provision is not ambiguous and clearly requires an

intervening period of probation, we must also determine whether the district court acted without

subject matter jurisdiction when ordering the second rider. We hold I.C. § 19-2601(4) requires

that a defendant be placed on probation and subsequently be found to have violated the probation

before a district court may order a second period of retained jurisdiction and that the district

court in this case did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order the second rider. Therefore, the

orders granting and revoking the second rider are void, rendering Urrabazo’s appeal untimely.

A. An Intervening Period of Probation Is Required Under I.C. § 19-2601(4) Before

a Court May Order a Second Period of Retained Jurisdiction.

The State contends the plain language of I.C. § 19-2601(4) requires an intervening period

of probation prior to ordering a second period of retained jurisdiction. However, Urrabazo argues

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that the provision is ambiguous because district courts regularly order consecutive periods of

retained jurisdiction without an intervening period of probation, which indicates the statute is not

plain on its face. Additionally, Urrabazo contends that the probation provision merely delineates

an example for a court to consider when making its sentencing decision. Urrabazo further asserts

that the legislative history of the amendment supports this interpretation because the goal of the

statute is to give district courts substantial flexibility in sentencing decisions.

This Court exercises free review over questions of law, which include issues of statutory

interpretation. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 327, 208 P.3d 730, 731 (2009). The purpose of

statutory interpretation is to “give effect to legislative intent,” which starts with the “literal words

of the statute.” Id. at 328, 208 P.3d at 732. The words of the statute are given their plain, usual,

and ordinary meaning, unless such meaning leads to absurd results. Id. However, “[t]his Court

will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the

purpose and intent of the Legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending

substance and meaning to the provisions.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 199 P.3d 123,

150 (2008). Where a statute is capable of more than one reasonable construction, it is ambiguous

and must be interpreted to achieve the Legislature’s intent. Doe, 147 Idaho at 328, 208 P.3d at

732. To do so, the Court goes beyond the words of the statute, and also considers “the

reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative

history.” Id.

After a person is convicted of a crime, a district court is empowered with several

sentencing options. Among these options is imposing a sentence and retaining jurisdiction for a

statutory period. I.C. § 19-2601(4). The purpose of this period of retained jurisdiction is to

provide an evaluation “of the offender’s potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation.”

State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (2004). However, pursuant to I.C. § 19-

2601(4), a court may only retain jurisdiction for up to 180 days,1 except in special circumstances

when a court may take up to 30 additional days to make its ultimate sentencing decision.2

According to the statute, courts may also impose more than one period of retained jurisdiction

“after a defendant has been placed on probation in a case.” I.C. § 19-2601(4). At the time of this

1

A 2010 amendment to I.C. § 19-2601(4) extended the retained jurisdiction period from 180 days to 365 days;

however, the probation requirement at issue in this case remains the same. See I.C. § 19-2601(4) (2010).

2

This 30-day extension was added in a 2005 amendment to I.C. § 19-2601(4). See S.L. 2005, ch. 186, § 1.

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appeal, I.C. § 19-2601(4) provided, in part, as follows:

Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty . . . the

court in its discretion, may:

....

(4) Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first one

hundred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of

correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for the first one

hundred eighty (180) days or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile

reaches twenty-one (21) years of age. The prisoner will remain committed to the

board of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by the court. In

extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes that it is unable to obtain

and evaluate the relevant information within the one hundred eighty (180) day

period of retained jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a hearing is

required and is unable to obtain the defendant’s presence for such a hearing

within such period, the court may decide whether to place the defendant on

probation or release jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30)

days, after the one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction has

expired. . . . The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one

(1) period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on probation

in a case. . . . Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court. . . .

I.C. § 19-2601 (2005) (emphasis added).

The issue for this Court to determine is whether a district court must sentence a defendant

to probation before retaining jurisdiction for an additional period. The plain language of section

19-2601(4) unconditionally requires an intervening period of probation prior to ordering an

additional period of retained jurisdiction. The provision only permits a court to sentence a

defendant to a second rider “after a defendant has been placed on probation in a case.” In other

words, a court may retain jurisdiction for a second time only after sentencing the defendant to a

period of probation. This limiting language is not written in terms of an example, as suggested by

Urrabazo, because there is no “such as,” or similar exemplary language, that would support such

an interpretation. Indeed, to treat the provision merely as an example essentially reads the words

“after a defendant has been placed on probation” out of the statute. Such an interpretation would

violate the rule of statutory construction requiring every word in a statute to be given its plain

meaning.

Urrabazo contends that such a literal interpretation leads to an absurd result because

courts may grant “probation for a brief period of time with a condition of probation that will

necessarily be violated, and then revoke probation, simply to order a second period of retained

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jurisdiction in order to get all of the necessary information for an informed sentencing decision.”

However, this argument is without merit because when a district court is not satisfied, after an

initial period of retained jurisdiction, that a defendant is ready to integrate back into society

under the less supervised conditions of probation, the statute, by its own terms, affirmatively

places the defendant under the control of the Department of Correction. See I.C. § 19-2601(4)

(“The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on

probation by the court.”). If probation is granted, the district court may not revoke the same on

its own. The defendant may challenge unreasonable conditions of probation. The Department of

Correction must allege and show a violation of the terms of probation at a hearing before the

court. It is highly unlikely that a sham probation would be granted merely to allow a second

rider. It is not absurd for the Legislature to have concluded that a prisoner should commence

serving his sentence if the court does not feel certain enough to order probation. The plain

language of I.C. § 19-2601(4) requires a period of probation prior to an additional period of

retained jurisdiction. The provision is not ambiguous in this regard and, therefore, the Court has

no need to consider the legislative history of this provision.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Is Implicated Under I.C. § 19-2601(4).

The district court in this case ordered two consecutive periods of retained jurisdiction,

without an intervening period of probation, in violation of I.C. § 19-2601(4). Thus, the Court

must determine whether the district court’s orders, granting the second rider, are void for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, or merely voidable as acts outside its statutory authority. The State

suggests that a district court only possesses subject matter jurisdiction over sentencing matters to

the extent outlined by the statute. Thus, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction

to order an additional 180-day period of retained jurisdiction without an intervening period of

probation. The State argues that because the district court’s May 5 order granting the second

rider is void, so is the court’s July 28 order relinquishing jurisdiction on the second rider. Since

Urrabazo used the date of the latter order to calculate the commencement of the 42 days for

filing his appeal, the State argues the September 8 appeal is untimely and should be dismissed.

“Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general type or class

of dispute.” Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007). The source of this

power comes from Article V, Section 20, of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that district

courts “shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate

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jurisdiction as may be conferred by law.” IDAHO CONST., art. V, § 20. This issue is so

fundamental to the propriety of a court’s actions, that subject matter jurisdiction can never be

waived or consented to, and a court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subject matter

jurisdiction over a case. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4). Furthermore, judgments and orders made

without subject matter jurisdiction are void and “are subject to collateral attack, and are not

entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and credit clause of the United States

Constitution.” Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-

71 (1978). This Court exercises free review over questions of jurisdiction. Doe, 147 Idaho at

327, 208 P.3d at 731.

As a general matter, the “control of persons convicted of crimes and sentenced to

imprisonment is given to the executive branch of the Idaho state government . . . .” Diggie, 140

Idaho at 240, 91 P.3d at 1144 (quoting IDAHO CONST., art. X, § 5; I.C. § 19-2503 et seq.).

However, “[t]his power is subject to legislative law-making authority,” and the Legislature

carved out an exception to the exclusive control vested with the executive branch over convicted

and sentenced persons when it created the retained jurisdiction program. Id. Thus, “[s]ection 19-

2601(4) allows the court and the [executive branch] to exercise concurrent authority over an

offender for a limited period of time.” Id. At the time of this appeal, a court had 180 days to

place a defendant on probation, after which the court’s jurisdiction ceased to exist and an

offender automatically came under the control of the Department of Correction. State v. Taylor,

142 Idaho 30, 31, 121 P.3d 961, 962 (2005). This “jurisdiction” confines a court’s “power to

determine cases over a general type or class of dispute,” specifically, cases involving periods of

retained jurisdiction. Therefore, the provisions of I.C. § 19-2601(4) limit a court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would usurp the powers vested in the executive branch by the

Idaho Constitution and by the Legislature—specifically, the exclusive control over convicted and

sentenced persons, which is vested in the executive branch by the Constitution, and the control

over defendants not placed on probation during a period of retained jurisdiction, which is vested

in the Department of Correction by the Legislature.

Because the district court in this case failed to place Urrabazo on probation at the end of

the first period of retained jurisdiction, Urrabazo was automatically under the affirmative control

of the Department of Correction upon filing of the order relinquishing jurisdiction on May 5,

2006. Thus, the court’s orders, granting a second rider and relinquishing jurisdiction on the same,

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are void for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and Urrabazo’s appeal is untimely. Idaho

Appellate Rule 14(a) states that an appeal in a criminal matter must be filed with the district

court “within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court on any

judgment or order of the district court appealable as a matter of right . . . .” I.A.R. 14(a).

Additionally, this rule provides that “the time to file an appeal is enlarged by the length of time

the district court actually retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code. When the court releases its

retained jurisdiction . . . the time within which to file a notice of appeal shall commence to run.”

Id. As such, the time for filing an appeal in this case commenced with the district court’s

relinquishing jurisdiction over Urrabazo and Urrabazo had to file his appeal within 42 days of

that time in order for the appeal to be timely. Because Urrabazo’s appeal was not filed until

September 8, 2006, it is untimely, and this Court will not consider the merits of the appeal.3

IV.

Conclusion

Idaho Code section 19-2601(4) requires an intervening period of probation prior to

ordering an additional period of retained jurisdiction. Additionally, the provisions of this section

limit a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction to order a second period of retained jurisdiction.

Therefore, the orders purporting to grant and then revoke a second rider are void, and Urrabazo’s

appeal is untimely.

Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.

3

It is unfortunate that the district court misread the statute and possibly mislead Urrabazo about its application.

However, Urrabazo provides no authority for the proposition that the filing deadline should be extended under

circumstances where the statute in question clearly discloses the orders he relies upon on to be void for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

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