Ronny M. v. Nanette H.

Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC R EPORTER .

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email

corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

RONNY M., )

) Supreme Court No. S-14558

Appellant, )

) Superior Court No. 3AN-10-11884 CI

v. )

) OPINION

NANETTE H., )

) No. 6783 – May 31, 2013

Appellee. )

)

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third

Judicial District, Anchorage, Eric A. Aarseth, Judge.

Appearances: Ronny M., pro se, Lake Placid, Florida,

Appellant. Nanette H., pro se, Palmer, Appellee.

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Stowers and Maassen, Justices.

[Carpeneti and Winfree, Justices, not participating.]

STOWERS, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal concerns the custody and child support arrangement between

Ronny M. and Nanette H.1 with respect to their two minor children, Ronny Jr. and Lavar,

both of whom were born in Florida. Ronny and Nanette dated for several years after the

births of their children but broke up in 2002 following a significant history of domestic

1

To protect the family’s privacy, we use initials instead of full last names.

violence by Ronny against Nanette, including at least three domestic violence

convictions. In 2002 the Florida Department of Children and Families became involved

in the matter and set up a case plan that significantly limited Ronny’s visitation rights.

Ronny complied with the case plan and eventually worked his way up to unsupervised

visitation with the children, but in 2007 he stopped seeing or contacting them altogether.

In 2009 Nanette married and moved to Alaska with the children without informing

Ronny.

In 2010 Nanette filed a complaint in which she sought sole legal and

primary physical custody of the children. Nanette also requested child support. Ronny

opposed, requesting that the parties share joint legal custody and that he be awarded

primary physical custody. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing over the course

of two days in May and August 2011. At the conclusion of the hearing the superior court

awarded primary physical custody to Nanette and a modified form of joint legal custody

to Nanette and Ronny, with Nanette having final decision-making authority should the

parties fail to agree on major decisions affecting the children’s welfare. The superior

court also granted Ronny summer visitation rights, provided that he pay for the travel

expenses, and ordered Ronny to pay child support. Ronny appeals.

For the reasons explained below, we affirm the superior court’s child

custody award. We affirm the child support award but reverse and remand regarding the

allocation of visitation expenses. We affirm the superior court in all other respects.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Facts

Ronny M. and Nanette H. began dating in Florida in 1998 when they were

both 16. They are the parents of two minor children: Ronny Deion Jr., born in October

1999 in Lake Placid, Florida, and Lavar Eugene, born in November 2000, also in Lake

Placid. Ronny and Nanette dated intermittently for five years; they never married.

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Nanette testified that Ronny was abusive toward her throughout the

duration of their relationship.2 In June 2002 Ronny was arrested for assaulting Nanette.

That same month Nanette obtained a temporary injunction for protection against

domestic violence that prohibited Nanette and Ronny from contacting one another and

that granted Nanette temporary custody of the children. Nanette subsequently reconciled

with Ronny and sought to have the injunction dismissed, but it appears her efforts were

unsuccessful. Later that year Ronny was twice arrested for committing two separate acts

of domestic violence against Nanette. Ronny was convicted in all three instances.

The Florida Department of Children and Families (Department) intervened

following Ronny’s third arrest in September 2002 and petitioned a Florida court for an

emergency shelter hearing. The court allowed Nanette to retain custody of the children,

provided that she did not contact Ronny or allow him to see the children. Nanette and

the boys moved into a shelter per court order and remained there for a few months.

The Department set up a case plan with which both Ronny and Nanette

substantially complied. Ronny completed a batterer’s intervention program, a parenting

program, and a psychological evaluation as required by the case plan. In 2003 Ronny

was awarded supervised visitation with the children, and he soon worked his way up to

unsupervised visitation every other weekend.

Ronny remained involved in the boys’ lives until April 2007, at which point

he stopped seeing them altogether. Nanette obtained her nursing degree in 2008, and in

2009 she married her husband, Robert H. Nanette, Robert, and the boys moved to

2

Nanette testified that Ronny was first arrested for assaulting her when she

was pregnant with Lavar and spent ten months incarcerated for the incident, but she was

unable to obtain certified copies of the records because Ronny was a juvenile at the time

of his arrest and incarceration.

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Alaska later in 2009, and Robert and Nanette had their own child in Alaska in 2010.3

Nanette did not inform Ronny of their move. Ronny continues to live in Florida.

B. Proceedings

In November 2010 Nanette filed a complaint with the superior court in

Anchorage seeking primary physical and sole legal custody. She also requested child

support. Ronny filed an answer and asked that he be awarded primary physical custody

and that the parties share joint legal custody.

In January 2011 Ronny moved for interim relief asking for “weekly or open

phone communication” and shared physical custody. Ronny asserted that Nanette had

made it impossible for him to communicate with his children, but he wanted to

reestablish involvement in their lives. Nanette opposed Ronny’s motion and argued that

the children should stay in her custody, citing Ronny’s multiple domestic violence

convictions. Nanette also expressed fear that if the boys were sent to Florida to visit

Ronny, he might never send them back to Alaska. In addition to the motion for interim

custody, Ronny filed a motion to show cause and a motion to transfer the case to Collier

County, Florida; Nanette moved for appointment of a guardian ad litem.

In April 2011 Superior Court Judge Eric A. Aarseth granted Ronny’s

motion in part. Noting the history of domestic violence and the geographic separation,

the superior court awarded Nanette interim sole legal and primary physical custody. The

court awarded Ronny telephonic visitation with the boys two times per week between

6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. The court denied the other three motions.

The superior court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in May and August

2011 at which Nanette appeared with limited representation and Ronny appeared pro se.

At the first hearing Nanette reiterated her request for sole legal and primary physical

3

Nanette also has a son from another relationship.

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custody, with either no visitation or supervised visitation for Ronny. Nanette testified

that it was in the boys’ best interests to remain in her custody because they had been in

her care for their entire lives and were very bonded with her. Nanette also testified that

it was in the children’s best interests to relocate to Alaska. Nanette stated that her

husband, Robert, worked on the North Slope, and moving to Alaska enabled them to stop

paying for plane tickets between Alaska and Florida. Nanette also stated she was able

to earn a higher wage as a nurse in Alaska, though in the past few years she had only

been working six days a month in order to spend more time with her family. Nanette

testified that both of the boys had been falling behind in school in Florida and had to be

held back, but that their grades had significantly improved since moving to Alaska.

Nanette stated that the boys were involved in Boy Scouts, basketball, track, and football,

and were doing “wonderful.”

Nanette also testified that Ronny voluntarily chose not to exercise his

visitation rights during the last two years she and the boys were living in Florida.

Nanette stated that Ronny initially complied with the visitation schedule set up by the

Florida case plan, but after the case closed Ronny stopped picking up the boys at the

specified times. Nanette testified that she did not tell Ronny she and the children were

leaving Florida or immediately inform him of their whereabouts because he had not

exercised his visitation rights for the two previous years and because she was afraid of

him.

At the conclusion of her testimony Nanette reconsidered her initial

statements regarding visitation. Nanette stated that the reason she did not want Ronny

to have regular visitation with the boys was because he had often disappointed them in

the past and she was concerned they would be hurt again. Nanette explained that when

the interim visitation was first ordered the boys did not want to talk to their father, but

they had recently become increasingly interested in reestablishing a bond with him.

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Nanette testified that if she and the boys were to travel to Florida to visit her family, she

would agree to allow the boys to see their father.

Ronny testified telephonically from Florida. He requested shared physical

custody, with the children spending six months in Florida and six months in Alaska.

When pressed as to what the children would do for school under his proposed custody

schedule, Ronny requested that the boys spend every other year and alternate holidays

with each parent.

Ronny testified that he was involved in his children’s lives to the extent that

Nanette and the court would allow him. Ronny stated that he had tried to communicate

with Nanette as soon as the no-contact order was lifted, but he did not know her contact

information. Ronny explained that Nanette’s father informed him in August 2010 that

Nanette and the boys had moved to Alaska, but her father would not give him their

address. Ronny testified that he had tried to file a custody action in Florida, but he had

no address at which to serve Nanette. Ronny asserted that he was doing everything he

could to reach out to his boys and to be a part of their lives, but Nanette was making it

impossible.

The parties also disputed the extent to which Ronny was exercising his

interim visitation rights. Nanette submitted her phone records in support of her

testimony that Ronny often waited until the end of the designated hour to call or failed

to call altogether. Nanette acknowledged that she typically did not answer her phone if

Ronny called outside of the designated times. Ronny accused Nanette of violating the

interim order and asserted that Nanette would often interrupt his phone calls with the

boys by telling them to do things while he was on the phone. Ronny also explained that

he did not call right at the time specified by the order because he wanted to give

Nanette’s family a chance to eat dinner and because he sometimes had to get his other

children to bed in Florida.

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The parties also discussed child support. Nanette testified that Ronny only

paid $274 per child in 2010, all of which came from his social security payments. Ronny

testified that he was completely unable to work because of renal failure and he relied

entirely on social security and disability payments for his income.

Ronny also attempted to submit into evidence a tape of a December 1, 2010

phone conversation he had with Nanette’s father, Donald P., which was recorded without

Donald’s permission. Ronny alleged that Donald stated on the recording that he would

not give Nanette’s address in Alaska to Ronny because Nanette did not want him to have

it, and that Donald acknowledged on the recording that he did not condone Nanette’s

actions. The superior court elected to call Donald to testify rather than to play the tape.

Donald testified that Nanette had a very good relationship with her sons,

and he described her as a loving parent. When asked if he thought the move to Alaska

was in the children’s best interests, Donald stated that he knew the boys were in a good

environment and happy there. Donald testified that he thought, given the job

opportunities, Nanette made the right choice for her family by moving to Alaska.

Donald asserted that Ronny was not providing for the boys and had not “stepped up to

the plate” insofar as they were concerned.

Ronny’s girlfriend, Nichole S., also testified telephonically from Florida.

She stated that she and Ronny started dating in 2001 and had three children together.

Nichole testified that Ronny Jr. and Lavar had very good relationships with their father,

with their half-brothers, and with her.

Nichole testified that Ronny and Nanette initially did not have any

problems sharing custody of the boys in Florida, with Ronny and Nichole taking the boys

every other weekend, and that she would often communicate with Nanette since Ronny

and Nanette were prohibited from contacting one another. But, Nichole testified, in

April 2007 Nanette and Ronny had a miscommunication about picking the boys up from

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school. According to Nichole, Nanette got frustrated with the situation and sent Nichole

a text message stating that Ronny would not see his boys again. Nichole asserted that

she and Ronny called, texted, and left messages with Nanette to see if they could

reestablish visitation, but their efforts proved unsuccessful. Nichole testified that Ronny

had consulted various attorneys in order to try to reestablish contact with the boys, but

they “never got anywhere.”

At the conclusion of the May hearing Judge Aarseth stated he had more

questions for Nanette and Ronny and scheduled another evidentiary hearing for

August 4, 2011.

Two days before the continued evidentiary hearing was scheduled to take

place, Ronny filed a motion to compel compliance with the visitation order in which he

argued that Nanette “has unilaterally abrogated [his] parental rights without cause” by

disconnecting her phone and blocking his Skype calls. Ronny accused Nanette of “using

the children as pawns for her own selfish interests”; he further alleged that Nanette had

“set[] the stage for the onset of Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) to develop in the

children’s minds.” Nanette denied Ronny’s allegations and countered that she had

allowed the boys to have unlimited contact with their father rather than follow the rigid

court-ordered schedule. Nanette explained:

I thought that allowing the boys to have as much contact with

their dad as they want was good for the boys. But when

Ronny uses it against me, and tries to make me look bad in

court when I am trying to do what’s right and what is best for

my boys, then I have to reconsider what I am doing. I am

willing to restrict the boys’ contact with their dad to what the

court ordered, up to 1 hour, twice a week, during the week,

and one hour of Skype on the weekend. I am willing to stick

strictly and exactly to the court order. Whether that is best for

the boys, I don’t know.

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Nanette argued that Ronny’s motion was made in bad faith and requested he pay her

attorney’s fees incurred in defending against his motion.

Nanette missed the August 4, 2011 evidentiary hearing, so the superior

court rescheduled the hearing for later that month. After hearing the parties’ closing

arguments, the superior court awarded primary physical custody of the children to

Nanette and “a form of joint legal custody” to Nanette and Ronny, under which the

parties were ordered to communicate and attempt to agree on major decisions affecting

the children’s welfare, but Nanette would have ultimate decision-making authority

should they fail to agree. The court further ordered that: (1) Ronny was awarded

telephonic or electronic visitation two days per week during the school week for one

hour each day, and one hour on weekends; (2) Ronny could see the children when

Nanette visited Florida later that year, should she choose to make them available for a

visit; (3) Ronny could have the boys in Florida for two to three weeks during the summer

in 2012 and up to six weeks in subsequent summers on the condition that he pay all of

their airfare and travel expenses; (4) Ronnie was to file a DR-250 Financial Declaration

so that his child support obligation could be determined; (5) Nanette was entitled to

claim both boys as dependents on her tax return; (6) Nanette was authorized to use the

boys’ Alaska Permanent Fund Dividends (PFDs) at her discretion; and (7) Ronny was

to be listed as a parent and an emergency contact on the boys’ school and other activity

contact cards.

The superior court also addressed Ronny’s motion to compel compliance

with visitation. It found that the motion was made without good faith and described it

as a “blow[] below the belt.” The court also noted that, but for Ronny’s financial

situation and inability to work, Ronny would have been ordered to pay Nanette’s

attorney’s fees for the time necessary to respond to his frivolous motion.

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On November 17, 2011, the superior court issued a child support order.

Ronny appeals both the final custody order and the child support order. Both parties

proceed pro se.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a superior court has jurisdiction is a question of law that we review

de novo.4

“The trial court has broad discretion in child custody decisions.”5 We will

set aside a superior court’s resolution of child custody issues “only if the entire record

demonstrates that the controlling findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that the trial

court abused its discretion.”6 An abuse of discretion exists where the superior court

“considered improper factors in making its custody determination, failed to consider

statutorily mandated factors, or assigned disproportionate weight to particular factors

while ignoring others.”7 “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when a review of the

record leaves the court with a definite and firm conviction that the superior court has

made a mistake.”8 “We give ‘particular deference’ to the trial court’s factual findings

when they are based primarily on oral testimony,” because it is the function of the trial

4

Barlow v. Thompson, 221 P.3d 998, 1001 (Alaska 2009) (citing Atkins v.

Vigil, 59 P.3d 255, 256 (Alaska 2002)).

5

Hamilton v. Hamilton, 42 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Alaska 2002).

6

Id.

7

Siekawitch v. Siekawitch, 956 P.2d 447, 449 (Alaska 1998).

8

Fardig v. Fardig, 56 P.3d 9, 11 (Alaska 2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

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court, not of this court, to judge the credibility of witnesses and to weigh conflicting

evidence.9

“Child support awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion and ‘will not

be set aside unless a review of the record as a whole leaves us with a definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ”10 Allocation of travel expenses are also

reviewed for abuse of discretion.11

Additionally, an abuse of discretion exists if the superior court’s decision

denied a substantial right to or substantially prejudiced a party.12

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Superior Court Had Jurisdiction To Hear The Case.

In his appellate reply brief,13 Ronny argues: “Under the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act . . . children must reside in a state for six consecutive

months before that state can become their legal domicile. Alaska and Florida are

signatories to this act. During the initial six month period, the children were under

9

Ebertz v. Ebertz, 113 P.3d 643, 646 (Alaska 2005) (quoting In re Adoption

of A.F.M., 15 P.3d 258, 262 (Alaska 2001)).

10

Harvey v. Cook, 172 P.3d 794, 797 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Moore v.

Moore, 893 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Alaska 1995)).

11

Skinner v. Hagberg, 183 P.3d 486, 489 (Alaska 2008).

12

House v. House, 779 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Alaska 1989).

13

Although Ronny did not raise this issue in his opening appellate brief, we

have consistently held that subject matter jurisdiction “may be raised at any stage of the

litigation and if noticed must be raised by the court if not raised by the parties.”

Robertson v. Riplett, 194 P.3d 382, 386 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Stone v. Stone, 647 P.2d

582, 584 n.1 (Alaska 1982)).

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Florida jurisdiction. This is the reason why [Nanette’s] stealthful crossing of state lines

was unlawful.”

Ronny’s assertion appears to be a continuation of the argument he made to

the superior court that Alaska lacked jurisdiction over the proceedings. In the superior

court Ronny argued that he did not consent to the State of Alaska exercising jurisdiction

because “Alaska is an inconvenient forum for him and more importantly, his children

were kidnapped by their mother who moved them to Alaska without his knowledge or

consent.” Ronny also filed a motion to transfer the case to Florida.

1. The superior court had jurisdiction over the child custody

proceedings.

The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act14 (PKPA) and Alaska’s

version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act15 (UCCJEA)

govern jurisdiction over child custody proceedings in Alaska when a parent alleges a

state other than Alaska has jurisdiction over the children.16 “These statutes were

promulgated in an effort to encourage courts considering child custody matters to

cooperate in order to arrive at a fully informed judgment transcending state lines and

considering all claimants, residents and nonresidents, on an equal basis and from the

standpoint of the welfare of the child.”17 The UCCJEA assigns children “home states”

14

28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006).

15

Ch. 133, § 2, SLA 1998. Alaska’s UCCJEA is codified in title 25, chapter

30 of the Alaska Statutes, AS 25.30.300-25.30.910.

16

Atkins v. Vigil, 59 P.3d 255, 257 (Alaska 2002) (citing Rogers v. Rogers,

907 P.2d 469, 471 (Alaska 1995)). If these statutes conflict, the PKPA preempts the

UCCJEA. Id. at 258.

17

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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in order to determine which state has principal jurisdiction.18 “Home state” is defined

in part as “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for

at least six consecutive months” immediately before the commencement of a child

custody proceeding.19

The record shows that Nanette and the boys moved to Alaska on

May 21, 2009, over 17 months before the child custody proceedings commenced in

Alaska. Ronny does not dispute these facts. Thus, Alaska was the children’s home state,

and the superior court had jurisdiction to make the initial custody determination.

Ronny argues, however, that Alaska lacked jurisdiction because Florida had

already assumed jurisdiction over the matter. The PKPA requires a state to recognize

and enforce a child custody determination made by a court of another state,20 and the

UCCJEA “severely limit[s]” a state’s ability to modify another state’s child custody

determination.21 Alaska Statute 25.30.909(3) defines “child custody determination” as

“a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical

custody, or visitation with respect to a child, including a permanent, temporary, initial,

and modification order, except that the term does not include an order relating to child

18

AS 25.30.300(a).

19

AS 25.30.909(7).

20

28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006).

21

S.B. v. State, Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs.,

61 P.3d 6, 10 (Alaska 2002). “Modification” is defined as “a child custody

determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous

determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that

made the previous determination.” AS 25.30.909(11).

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support or other monetary obligation of an individual.”22

Here, there was no Florida child custody determination that the superior

court was required to enforce. The parties submitted three Florida court orders that could

arguably be considered Florida child custody determinations: a June 2002 temporary

injunction for protection against domestic violence; a September 2002 shelter order; and

a June 2003 judicial review order. All three orders were no longer effective or

enforceable at the time of the superior court proceedings in Alaska. It is undisputed that

the Florida no-contact order and the shelter order expired years ago, and it appears that

Florida has not exercised jurisdiction over the parties’ child custody or child support

matters in any respect since 2004. Thus, there was no Florida “existing, ongoing child

custody determination,” and the superior court properly assumed jurisdiction.

2. The superior court had jurisdiction over the child

support matter.

Ronny also asserted throughout the proceedings that the superior court

lacked jurisdiction over child support. In his initial answer Ronny argued that a Florida

court “reserve[d] juris[d]iction on child support which [Nanette] receives.” Ronny

additionally filed a motion to transfer the case to Florida, arguing there was a standing

child support order in place in Florida.

The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act23 (UIFSA) and the Full Faith

22

The PKPA similarly defines the term as “a judgment, decree, or other order

of a court providing for the custody of a child” and expressly includes “permanent and

temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications” within the statutory definition.

28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(3).

23

Unif. Interstate Family Support Act § 603(c), 9 U.L.A. 245 (2001)

(providing that a state asked to enforce another state’s child support order “shall

recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing tribunal had

jurisdiction”). 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (2006) requires states to adopt the UIFSA. See also

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and Credit for Child Support Orders Act24 (FFCCSOA) govern jurisdiction over child

support matters and require states to enforce other states’ child support judgments in

order to create uniformity in interstate judgments.25 But here, there was no Florida child

support judgment that the superior court could have enforced. The 2004 Florida

“standing order” to which Ronny refers did not relieve Ronny of his obligation to pay

child support; the order expressly stated that Ronny is the boys’ natural biological father

“and as such owes a duty of support . . . .” However, the order did not set any dollar

amount to be paid. Thus, no valid final judgment or child support order existed to which

the superior court was obligated to give full faith and credit, and the superior court

properly exercised jurisdiction over the child support issues.

B. Custody Issues

1. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding

primary physical custody to Nanette and joint legal custody to

Ronny and Nanette.

The superior court must determine custody in accordance with the best

interests of the children and must consider the list of statutory factors set forth in

AS 25.24.150(c).26 The superior court “need not make express findings on all statutory

23

(...continued)

AS 25.25.101-25.25.903.

24

28 U.S.C. § 1738B(a) (2006).

25

Bartlett v. State, Dep’t. of Revenue ex rel. Bartlett, 125 P.3d 328, 330-31

(Alaska 2005).

26

AS 25.24.150(c) provides nine factors to be considered in determining the

best interests of the child:

(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social

needs of the child;

(continued...)

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factors; instead, its findings ‘must either give us a clear indication of the factors which

the superior court considered important in exercising its discretion or allow us to glean

from the record what considerations were involved.’ ”27

The superior court granted primary physical custody to Nanette and “a form

26

(...continued)

(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these

needs;

(3) the child’s preference if the child is of sufficient age and

capacity to form a preference;

(4) the love and affection existing between the child and each

parent;

(5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable,

satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining

continuity;

(6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and

encourage a close and continuing relationship between the

other parent and the child, except that the court may not

consider this willingness and ability if one parent shows that

the other parent has sexually assaulted or engaged in

domestic violence against the parent or a child, and that a

continuing relationship with the other parent will endanger

the health or safety of either the parent or the child;

(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child

neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history of

violence between the parents;

(8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other

members of the household directly affects the emotional or

physical well-being of the child;

(9) other factors that the court considers pertinent.

27

Chesser v. Chesser-Witmer, 178 P.3d 1154, 1158 (Alaska 2008) (quoting

Smith v. Weekley, 73 P.3d 1219, 1225 (Alaska 2003)).

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of joint legal custody” to Nanette and Ronny after finding that: (1) there was no

evidence that the boys had special needs; (2) Nanette had been the primary custodian of

the boys and had done “a good job” of meeting their needs; (3) there was love and

affection between the boys and both parents; (4) Nanette had provided “a stable home

with a positive environment for the boys”; (5) Nanette had gone “above and beyond” in

fostering a relationship between the boys and their father, but Ronny had not done the

same; (6) there had been a significant history of domestic violence by Ronny against

Nanette, but Ronny had overcome the statutory presumption against awarding custody

to the perpetrator of domestic violence; and (7) there was no evidence of substance

abuse.

Ronny contends that the superior court abused its discretion in awarding

primary physical custody to Nanette and a modified form of joint legal custody to

Nanette and Ronny. His argument is threefold: (1) it was not in the boys’ best interests

to move to Alaska with Nanette; (2) the superior court erred in finding that Nanette was

more willing and able than Ronny to facilitate and encourage the relationship between

the children and the other parent; and (3) it was an abuse of discretion for the superior

court to give Nanette ultimate decision-making authority in its award of joint legal

custody.

a. Relocation to Alaska

Ronny argues that Nanette’s relocation to Alaska was not in the children’s

best interests and was instead intended to subvert Ronny’s relationship with his children.

Ronny argues that the children “were unnecessarily ‘uprooted’ from a warm and familiar

environment to a cold and unfamiliar one.” Ronny further contends that Nanette’s

“relocation to Alaska was by design with the intent to put as much distance as she could

between Ronny . . . and his children.”

Nanette responds that she “moved to Alaska for a better opportunity for

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[her] family.” Nanette argues that the move made sense financially because her husband

was employed on the North Slope and had to fly back and forth between Alaska and

Florida every two weeks, and because she could earn more money as a nurse in Alaska.

Nanette also argues that she and the boys lived less than two miles from Ronny in

Florida but he chose “not to see the boys for 2 years prior to us moving.”

We have previously considered the related standards that govern a custody

determination when one parent chooses to move out of Alaska.28 We have held that “a

court must consider the best interests of the children by applying the criteria in

AS 25.24.150(c), and in doing so should consider whether there is a legitimate reason

for the move.”29 “[A] proposed move is legitimate if it ‘was not primarily motivated by

a desire to make visitation . . . more difficult.’ ”30 We have emphasized that the best

interests of the child remain paramount, such that child custody determinations “are

based upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”31 This analysis applies

to the circumstances of this case.

Nanette testified that she had a legitimate reason for moving to Alaska: She

wanted to live closer to her husband’s place of employment, and she was able to secure

a higher-paying job for herself in Alaska. Nanette also testified that the move was in the

boys’ best interests: Their grades have improved since moving to Alaska, they are

involved in Boy Scouts, football, basketball, and track, and they live in a nice home with

28

Vachon v. Pugliese, 931 P.2d 371, 379 (Alaska 1996); McQuade v.

McQuade, 901 P.2d 421, 423 (Alaska 1995).

29

Vachon, 931 P.2d at 379 (quoting McQuade, 901 P.2d at 424) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

30

Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch, 27 P.3d 314, 316 (Alaska 2001) (quoting

House v. House, 779 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Alaska 1989)).

31

McQuade, 901 P.2d at 424.

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a big yard. Nanette’s testimony that Ronny voluntarily stopped exercising his visitation

rights two years before she and the boys relocated to Alaska also suggests that the move

was not primarily motivated by a desire to hinder Ronny’s visitation rights.

The superior court did not expressly find that the relocation to Alaska was

in the children’s best interests, but it credited Nanette’s testimony as outlined above in

making its custodial best interest findings. These findings are supported by the record

and are sufficient to conclude that Nanette’s reasons for relocating to Alaska were

legitimate and not primarily motivated by a desire to hinder Ronny’s visitation with the

children.32

b. The superior court’s finding as to each parent’s

willingness to encourage a relationship with the other

parent was not clearly erroneous.

The superior court must consider “the willingness and ability of each parent

to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent

and the child” in determining the child’s best interests.33 Here, the court found that this

factor “overwhelmingly favors” Nanette. The court explained that “[t]here has been one

parent supporting the relationship between the other parent and the children, and that is

[Nanette].” The court further found that “[d]espite the fact that she is the victim of

32

Ronny does more than impute an improper motive for Nanette’s relocation

to Alaska: He alleges that Nanette “kidnapped the minor children for her own selfish

interests.” On appeal Ronny asserts that (contrary to his testimony) he only found out

that Nanette moved to Alaska when he hired an attorney “to serve Nanette Florida court

papers” because he thought she and the children were still living in Florida. The issue

of kidnapping is not properly on review before this court. Moreover, there was no court

order prohibiting Nanette from relocating to another state. Nanette was the custodial

parent with legal custody of the children, so she could not have kidnapped the children

as a matter of law.

33

AS 25.24.150(c)(6).

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multiple acts of domestic violence from [Ronny], she clearly let that part of her past stay

in the past,” and “is going above and beyond that required by the court to maintain the

relationship between the children and their father.”

Ronny argues that the superior court improperly found that

AS 25.24.150(c)(6) weighs in Nanette’s favor. Ronny’s argument is twofold: He argues

that Nanette moved to Alaska to subvert his relationship with the boys, discussed above,

and that Nanette failed to follow the interim visitation schedule, as alleged in his motion

to compel visitation, which was denied by the superior court.

Ronny argues that Nanette violated the interim order and that he was unable

to contact his children for a five-week period between the two evidentiary hearings.

Ronny argues that Nanette informed the court that she was in the process of obtaining

additional phone records to disprove Ronny’s accusations, but “these records were never

submitted to the court . . . .” According to Ronny, these records “coincide and cover the

five week period that [Ronny] had no contact with his children.” Ronny further alleges

that Nanette disconnected her phone and subsequently failed to attend the evidentiary

hearing, such that “[a]ny reasonable person in [Ronny’s] position would clearly think

that Nanette . . . took off with his children . . . .”

Nanette submitted her home phone records to the superior court and

testified that, although she and Ronny were no longer adhering to the rigid interim

visitation schedule between May and August 2011, she was allowing the boys to have

frequent and unlimited contact with Ronny via Xbox Live and Skype. Nanette explained

that the boys enjoyed having open communication with their father, and she gave them

total freedom with the phone because “that is what the boys are wanting, they want to

have a relationship with their dad.” Nanette stated that the children often called their

father on his home phone number, records which Ronny did not submit. Nanette

testified that she was unable to obtain a month’s worth of records for her old cellular

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phone, but she submitted records for her new cellular phone to show that she had texted

her new number to Ronny. Nanette further testified that there was a period for which she

did not have records because Ronny and the boys were talking via Xbox Live and Skype,

and she could not obtain records for these methods of communication. With regard to

the missed evidentiary hearing, Nanette testified that she did not appear because she “had

November second in her head,” and apologized for her mistake.

The superior court found unpersuasive Ronny’s allegations that Nanette

was trying to alienate the children and “accept[ed] [Nanette’s] testimony regarding her

efforts to maintain the connection between the children and their father.” The superior

court’s findings were not based on phone records that Nanette stated she would submit

in the future, but rather on Nanette’s testimony, which the superior court found credible,

and on the admitted exhibits. The court’s finding that Ronny’s motion lacked a good

faith basis is also supported by the record and further supports its finding that Nanette

was more willing than Ronny to foster the relationship between the other parent and the

children. As discussed above, the court’s findings regarding Nanette’s relocation were

not clearly erroneous, and Nanette’s relocation does not establish her present

unwillingness to facilitate and encourage Ronny’s relationship with his children. Thus,

the superior court’s finding that Nanette was more willing than Ronny to facilitate and

encourage a close and continuing relationship between the children and the other parent

is supported by ample evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

c. It was not an abuse of discretion to order a modified form

of joint legal custody.

Ronny argues that the superior court abused its discretion by awarding the

parties a modified form of joint legal custody, under which they must communicate with

each other and attempt to agree on major decisions affecting the boys’ welfare, but

Nanette is given final decision-making authority should they fail to agree. Ronny further

-21- 6783

argues that because the visitation schedule may be modified in writing by the parties,

Nanette “will always have the last say concerning modifying visitation.”

An award of joint legal custody means that the parents share responsibility

in the making of major decisions affecting the children’s welfare.34 These major

decisions include choices regarding the children’s education, non-emergency health care,

morals, and religion.35 “The legislature has expressed a preference for joint legal

custody, and a court may award joint custody if it is in the best interests of the child.”36

However, “joint legal custody is only appropriate when the parents can cooperate and

communicate in the child’s best interest.”37

The superior court found that the case had generally moved in a positive

direction and that Ronny and Nanette had “made enormous strides in terms of where they

are in relationship to each other as parents.” But it also expressed concern over Ronny’s

desire to adhere to a rigid visitation schedule rather than accept a more flexible approach,

and it found that Ronny had made unfounded and frivolous allegations against Nanette.

These findings are supported by the record and show that, while Ronny and Nanette’s

relationship has improved, Ronny has at times failed to take reasonable steps to

communicate and cooperate with Nanette.

The superior court has broad discretion in making a legal custody

34

Farrell v. Farrell, 819 P.2d 896, 899 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Bell v. Bell,

794 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1990)).

35

Elton H. v. Naomi R., 119 P.3d 969, 975 (Alaska 2005) (citing 3 A RNOLD

H. RUTKIN , FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 32.08[2] (2004)).

36

Jaymot v. Skillings-Donat, 216 P.3d 534, 540 (Alaska 2009).

37

Farrell, 819 P.2d at 899.

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determination.38 It is a permissible exercise of that discretion to order the kind of

modified shared legal custody the court ordered here. We commend the court for trying

to involve both parents in major decisions affecting the children’s welfare, even where

the parties have some difficulty communicating with one another. The court’s approach

is reasonably intended to encourage both parents to communicate and attempt to make

decisions about their children, but it also practically recognizes that if they cannot make

a decision, then one of them must be given that responsibility and authority. The

superior court did not abuse its discretion by ordering this modified form of joint legal

custody.

Ronny is incorrect that the custody order gives Nanette the right to

unilaterally modify visitation. The custody order gives Nanette ultimate authority with

regard to major decisions affecting the children’s welfare, but it does not give her the

authority to abrogate the court’s custody order or to change the terms of Ronny’s

visitation. Nanette is required to allow Ronny his court-ordered visitation, and if Ronny

feels that Nanette is denying him his visitation rights, he is free to file a motion with the

superior court.

C. Child Support Issues

1. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by ordering

Ronny to pay child support.

Ronny argues that the superior court should not have awarded child support

to Nanette. Ronny contends that he is not “attempting to skirt his child support

obligation,” but “[h]e simply doesn’t have the dollars” and the boys do not need his

support. Ronny further argues that he “has made a proper showing for a good cause

38

Hamilton v. Hamilton, 42 P.3d 1107, 1111 (Alaska 2002).

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variance to the child support requirements as listed in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure

90.3.”

Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 states that where one parent is awarded primary

physical custody, a child support award will be calculated “as an amount equal to the

adjusted annual income of the non-custodial parent multiplied by a percentage specified

in sub-paragraph (a)(2).”39 Civil Rule 90.3(c)(1) also provides that “[t]he court may vary

the child support award as calculated under the other provisions of this rule for good

cause upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice would result

if the support award were not varied.” What constitutes “good cause” will depend on the

circumstances of each case,40 with emphasis on the needs of the children.41 The statute

lists examples of exceptional circumstances that might amount to good cause, but this list

is not exhaustive.42

As the parent who has been awarded primary physical custody, Nanette is

entitled to child support from Ronny, the non-custodial parent.43 Both parties submitted

updated Child Support Guidelines Affidavits, as required by Civil Rule 90.3. Nanette

reported an adjusted annual income of $26,870 on her affidavit. Ronny reported an

adjusted annual income of $9,444 on his affidavit. The superior court correctly applied

39

Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(a). Rule 90.3(a)(2) provides that for two children,

the non-custodial parent’s adjusted income must be multiplied by 27% in order to

calculate the child support award.

40

Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. VI.A.

41

Doyle v. Doyle, 815 P.2d 366, 373 (Alaska 1991).

42

See Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(c)(1).

43

Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(a); see Matthews v. Matthews, 739 P.2d 1298, 1299

(Alaska 1987) (“A parent is obligated both by statute and at common law to support his

or her children.”).

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the formula provided by Rule 90.3 to calculate that Ronny owes Nanette $215 per month

to support their two children.

Ronny did not argue to the superior court that he was entitled to a Civil

Rule 90.3(c)(1) good cause exception; thus, this argument is waived.44 Moreover,

Ronny did not present any evidence that would warrant a good cause finding. Ronny

repeatedly argued to the superior court that he was indigent and disabled, but Civil Rule

90.3 expressly defines “income” to include social security and disability benefits.45 And

Civil Rule 90.3 already takes into account Ronny’s low income in its calculation of child

support payments. The fact that Nanette earns more money than Ronny does not amount

to the type of “manifest injustice” required for a good cause finding.

2. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

impute income to Nanette.

Ronny argues that the superior court should have imputed income to

Nanette because, as a nurse, Nanette should be working more than six days a month.

Ronny argues that Nanette is voluntarily underemployed, whereas he cannot work

because he is disabled. Ronny asserts that if Nanette was “gainfully employed at the

standard 40 hour work week, her adjusted annual income would be significantly higher

than $26,870.16; instead she has forever quashed her nursing career in the pursuit of

extracting child support dollars from the disabled and the disadvantaged.”

As discussed above, where one party is awarded primary physical custody,

Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(a) requires the superior court to base its child support order

exclusively on the non-custodial parent’s income. In such circumstances, the statute

does not contemplate that the custodial parent’s income will factor into the court’s

44

See Harvey v. Cook, 172 P.3d 794, 802 (Alaska 2007) (“[I]ssues not

properly raised in the trial court will not ordinarily be considered on appeal.”).

45

Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. III.A.

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calculation. It is true that Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(a)(4) gives the superior court the

discretion to “calculate child support based on a determination of the potential income

of a parent who voluntarily and unreasonably is unemployed or underemployed,” but this

provision does not apply where the obligee is awarded primary physical custody.46

Here, because Nanette was awarded primary physical custody, the superior

court could not permissibly impute potential income to her pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule

90.3(a)(4). Thus, Nanette’s employment situation was irrelevant and properly did not

factor into the superior court’s child support award.

3. It was an abuse of discretion to order Ronny to pay 100% of the

children’s visitation expenses.

Ronny argues that the superior court erred when it ordered him to pay for

the boys’ visitation expenses. Ronny argues that, although the custody order grants him

yearly visitation with his sons in Florida, he will never see them unless they travel to

Florida with their mother because “he can’t afford their round trip air fare to Florida.”

Ronny asserts that it would cost him $2,200 to fly his boys to Florida for two weeks, and

the court “knew ahead of time that Ronny . . . could not afford ‘in person’ visitation.”

The superior court noted that Nanette and the boys were planning to travel

to Florida the following summer and left it to Nanette’s discretion to allow Ronny to see

the boys during their trip. With regard to in-person visitation in subsequent years, the

superior court ordered that Ronny be allowed to have the boys for two to three weeks

during the summer of 2012 and up to six weeks in the summer of 2013 if the other trips

went well. But the superior court conditioned Ronny’s in-person visitation on his

payment of one-hundred percent of airfare and other travel expenses, stating:

46

The superior court may consider the custodial parent’s income where a

good cause variance is warranted. Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. VI. As discussed above,

Ronny is not entitled to a good cause variance.

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I’m just not going to put [Nanette] in a position where it’s her

job to finance the visitation. That’s not appropriate under the

circumstances. First of all, she’s not making that much

money. Secondly, she’s not getting much in terms of child

support, so it’s not as if that money exists to really do

that. . . . I’d like to see if [Ronny] can foot the bill to be able

to have the boys for a couple weeks in the summertime.

Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(g) provides: “After determining an award of child

support under this rule, the court shall allocate reasonable travel expenses which are

necessary to exercise visitation between the parties as may be just and proper for them

to contribute.”

It does not appear that the superior court considered the mandate of Alaska

Civil Rule 90.3(g) to allocate reasonable visitation expenses. The superior court

implicitly found that it was in the children’s best interests to visit Ronny by awarding

him two to three weeks of visitation in 2012 and up to six weeks in 2013, and Nanette

agreed that the boys benefitted from increased contact with their father. But the record

before the superior court clearly indicates that an order granting Ronny in-person

visitation rights would potentially be rendered meaningless if Ronny were required to

pay all the visitation expenses. The record shows that Ronny has an adjusted annual

income of $9,444, twenty-seven percent of which was awarded to Nanette as child

support. After payment of child support, Ronny’s adjusted annual income will be

approximately $6,894. The record also shows that Nanette earns significantly more

money than Ronny, and that she has the potential to earn additional income.47 Nanette

also has access to the boys’ PFDs, to be used at her discretion. Given these facts, it was

47

Although Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(a) precludes the superior court from

considering the obligee’s income in awarding child support where one parent is awarded

primary physical custody, nothing in the rule prohibits a court from considering potential

income in allocating visitation expenses.

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neither “reasonable” nor “just and proper” for the superior court to require Ronny to pay

for all the visitation expenses, and it was an abuse of discretion to condition his visitation

on his ability to pay.

We reverse the visitation expense order and remand for the court to

reconsider what constitutes a reasonable, just, and proper allocation of visitation

expenses. On remand the superior court may, in its discretion, take additional evidence

regarding the parties’ finances. And as we discuss next, the court may require Nanette

to use some or all of the boys’ PFDs to contribute toward visitation expenses.

4. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by authorizing

Nanette to use the boys’ PFDs as needed.

As part of its final custody order, the superior court authorized Nanette “to

apply for and receive the boys’ Alaska Permanent Fund Dividends, and to use them as

needed, in her discretion, because she is receiving so little child support.” Ronny asserts

that, rather than giving Nanette discretion to use the boys’ PFDs, “the trial court could

have ordered that 50% of those annual dividends would be used for airfare to Florida

toward the children’s summer visitation with their father with the remainder of the airfare

to be paid by Ronny . . . .” Ronny asserts that this “type of a visitation order would be

affordable and within [his] reach.”

Alaska Statute 43.23.005(c) authorizes a parent to claim a PFD on behalf

of an unemancipated minor, but the law is silent as to a parent’s responsibilities once

those funds are distributed.48 We have previously recognized the superior court’s broad

discretion to decide which parent would better serve the children’s best interests in being

responsible for management of their PFDs.49 The superior court did not abuse its

48

Hayes v. Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 900-01 (Alaska 1996).

49

Helen S.K. v. Samuel M.K., 288 P.3d 463, 477 (Alaska 2012).

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discretion in declining to order Nanette to use their PFDs in a particular manner. On

remand, however, the superior court may in its discretion order the boys’ PFDs to be

applied in whole or in part to their travel expenses.

D. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Declining To

Admit The Tape Recording Of Ronny’s Conversation With Nanette’s

Father.

During the evidentiary hearing Ronny attempted to enter into evidence a

tape recording of a telephone conversation he had with Nanette’s father, Donald, that

was made without Donald’s knowledge. The superior court declined to play the tape,

stating that it had no way of doing so, and instead found that the appropriate approach

was to call Donald to testify live. Ronny did not object, and both Nanette and Ronny

were given the opportunity to examine Donald.

On appeal Ronny argues that the superior court had a duty to play the

tape.50 Ronny argues that “[h]ad the tape been played, [Donald] may have recalled some

things he said that were not recorded.” Ronny contends that the recording would show

that Ronny “was solely concerned about the welfare of his boys and that [Nanette] may

be intentionally alienating the boys from him.” Ronny further argues that “[h]ad the tape

been admitted, the outcome of Judge Aarseth’s ruling could have been different . . . .”

In his offer of proof to the superior court, Ronny stated that the tape

recording was important to his case in several ways. Ronny argued that the tape would

show Nanette never intended for him to have her address or to regain contact with the

children and that Nanette’s allegations of domestic violence were false. Ronny also

claimed that Donald stated that Nanette did not want Ronny to have her address, and that

50

Ronny argues numerous grounds as to why the tape recording was legal

even though it was made without Donald’s permission. The superior court never found

that the tape was illegally recorded; it declined to play the tape without making any

findings as to its admissibility.

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Donald acknowledged that he did not condone Nanette’s behavior.

Nanette admitted that she did not want Ronny to have her physical address

because of the history of domestic violence, so the tape was not necessary to show that

Nanette instructed Donald not to give Ronny her address. Also, Ronny was convicted

of domestic violence and is thus collaterally estopped from relitigating these

convictions,51 so the tape could not be used to show that Ronny did not commit domestic

violence against Nanette. The tape could therefore only be used, if at all, to show that

Donald had previously stated that he did not condone Nanette’s behavior and to

potentially impeach Donald.

Alaska Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) allows prior statements of a witness to

be admitted if the declarant testifies at the hearing and the statement is inconsistent with

the declarant’s testimony. “ ‘Inconsistency’ does not necessarily require textual conflict;

other circumstances, including lack of memory at trial, may suffice.”52

Theoretically, Donald’s statement on the recording was potentially

admissible as a prior inconsistent statement. The superior court did not make any

evidentiary findings in declining to play the tape, and the record only indicates that the

superior court declined to play the recording because it was unable to do so. It is unclear

whether this indicates a logistical or technical inability, or some other inability.

Assuming without deciding that it was error not to admit the tape, Alaska Civil Rule 61

provides that errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be judged under the

51

See Lamb v. Anderson, 147 P.3d 736, 742 (Alaska 2006) (holding that “a

conviction based on a no contest plea will collaterally estop the criminal defendant from

denying any element in a subsequent civil action against him that was necessarily

established by the conviction, as long as the prior conviction was for a serious criminal

offense and the defendant in fact had the opportunity for a full and fair hearing”).

52

Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1015 (Alaska 2006).

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harmless error rule: “A party appealing the exclusion of evidence must show not only

that such exclusion was improper, but also that it resulted in prejudice to that party.”53

Here, Ronny has not shown that he was in any way prejudiced by the exclusion of the

tape recording. Ronny’s offer of proof indicated that the tape was only relevant to

impeach Donald’s statement that Nanette did the right thing by moving to Alaska. But

the court’s findings did not rely on Donald’s opinion regarding Nanette’s move, and it

is highly improbable that Donald’s opinion would even be a relevant factor for the court

to consider on this issue. Ronny was not prejudiced by his inability to impeach Donald.

E. The Superior Court Exhibited No Bias Against Ronny.

Ronny alleges that the superior court displayed “a pervasive pattern of

prejudice” against him. Ronny points to the allocation of visitation expenses, the award

of child support, the superior court’s failure to sanction Nanette for missing the

evidentiary hearing, and the superior court’s denial of Ronny’s motion to compel

visitation as “prime examples of how Judge Aarseth sided with Nanette . . . in a

compassionate manner but much to the detriment of Ronny . . . .” Ronny also takes issue

with some of the language used by the superior court. Specifically, Ronny argues that

the superior court should not have praised Nanette for going “above and beyond” in

allowing Ronny telephonic visitation while simultaneously telling Ronny “he better start

showing some appreciation for what [Nanette] is doing.” Ronny argues: “Apparently,

the Trial Court has one standard for [Nanette] and another standard for Ronny . . . . This

is called impropriety . . . . Judge Aarseth has repeatedly shown favoritism to [Nanette]

while treating Ronny . . . as an outcast[].”

“To prove a claim of judicial bias, the claimant must show that the judge

formed an opinion of [him] from extrajudicial sources, resulting in an opinion other than

53

Estate of Arrowwood v. State, 894 P.2d 642, 648 (Alaska 1995).

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on the merits.”54 No bias is shown if a judge derives an opinion based on the record, and

the opinion is supported by the record.55 We have also held that a court’s ruling

adversely against a party does not establish evidence of bias.56

Ronny has not made a showing of judicial bias. As discussed above, the

superior court’s findings and rulings are supported by the record.57

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the superior court’s child custody

order. We REVERSE and REMAND the court’s visitation expense order, but AFFIRM

the superior court’s child support order in all other respects. We AFFIRM the remainder

of the superior court’s rulings.

54

Williams v. Williams, 252 P.3d 998, 1010 (Alaska 2011).

55

Id.; Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458, 467 (Alaska 2004).

56

Labrenz v. Burnett, 218 P.3d 993, 1002 (Alaska 2009) (citing Tillmon v.

Tillmon, 189 P.3d 1022, 1027 n.13 (Alaska 2008)).

57

Ronny alleges that Nanette is currently in violation of the final custody

order. If Ronny believes Nanette has interfered with his telephonic visitation rights, he

may file a motion to enforce the final custody order with the superior court.

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