Jesse Engebretson v. Mike Mahoney

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSE K. ENGEBRETSON; No. 10-35626

CATHERINE T. ENGEBRETSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.

9:09-cv-00098-

v. DWM

MIKE MAHONEY, Warden,

Montana State Prison; STATE OPINION

OF MONTANA; WILLIAM

SLAUGHTER, Director of the

Department of Corrections

for the State of Montana,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 8, 2013—Seattle, Washington

Filed May 30, 2013

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, A. Wallace Tashima, and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Callahan

2 ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

Affirming the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

dismissal of a complaint, the panel held that prison officials

enjoy absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for conduct prescribed by facially valid court orders.

Plaintiffs sought money damages for an alleged illegal

term of probation. The panel held that prison officials who

simply enforce facially valid court orders are performing

functions necessary to the judicial process and they must not

be required to second-guess the courts if that process is to

work fairly and efficiently.

COUNSEL

Kayla Liatti (argued) and Claudia Menjivar (argued), Ninth

Circuit Clinical Externship, Loyola Law School, Los

Angeles, California; Erica L. Reilley, Jones Day, Los

Angeles, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Brenda K. Elias (argued) and Ira Eakin, Special Assistant

Attorneys General, Montana Department of Corrections,

Helena, Montana, for Defendants-Appellees.

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY 3

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we are asked to decide whether prison

officials enjoy absolute immunity from liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for conduct prescribed by facially valid court

orders. We conclude that they do.

BACKGROUND

In 1993, Plaintiff-Appellant Jesse Engebretson pleaded

guilty to four counts of sexual assault. The state trial court

sentenced him to four concurrent 20-year prison terms. The

court also found that because Engebretson had been convicted

of burglary (a felony) within five years of committing the

sexual assaults, he was a persistent felony offender under

Montana law. See Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-501. The court

accordingly sentenced Engebretson to serve an additional 30

years in prison, to run consecutively to the assault sentences.

However, the trial court suspended Engebretson’s entire 30-

year sentence and imposed probation instead, even though

Montana’s persistent felony offender law provides that “the

imposition or execution of the first 5 years of a sentence

imposed under” the law “may not be deferred or suspended.”

Id. § 46-18-502(3).

Engebretson did not appeal, and he began serving his 20-

year prison sentence in November 1993. He was discharged

for good behavior about ten years later, in September 2003.

Engebretson then began serving his probationary term under

the supervision of a probation officer.

4 ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY

Three years later, while he was on probation, Engebretson

filed a habeas petition with the Montana Supreme Court. He

argued that the state trial court’s sentencing order was illegal

because his entire 30-year persistent felony offender sentence

was suspended, in violation of § 46-18-502(3). In other

words, the law required Engebretson to serve at least five

years of his 30-year sentence in prison. The Montana

Supreme Court granted Engebretson’s petition, concluding

that the “sentencing court lacked authority to suspend

Engebretson’s entire sentence as a persistent felony

offender.”

On remand, the state trial court (through a different judge)

adjudged Engebretson guilty of the four counts of sexual

assault for which he previously had been charged, sentenced

him to four concurrent 20-year terms (with credit for time

served), and prescribed “terms and condition[s] of probation

of any remaining time.” However, the court proceeded to

amend the judgment to state that Engebretson’s “sentence has

been discharged,” and to delete all the terms and conditions

of his probation. The court’s orders did not mention

Engebretson’s status as a persistent felony offender, and they

did not impose a five-year prison term under § 46-18-502(3).

The State did not appeal.

Nearly two years later, Engebretson and his wife,

Catherine Engebretson, filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 in federal district court against Defendants-Appellees

Mike Mahoney, the warden of the prison where Engebretson

had served his sentence, and William Slaughter, the director

of the Montana Department of Corrections. In an amended

complaint, which added the State of Montana as a defendant,

the Engebretsons alleged that Mahoney and Slaughter “would

only release me [Jesse Engebretson] to a probationary

ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY 5

sentence, even though I had informed them that such was an

illegal sentence.” In other words, the Engebretsons sought

damages because Jesse Engebretson was released from prison

earlier than he should have been.1 The Engebretsons more

specifically alleged that: (1) Mahoney and Slaughter “had a

duty to ascertain that I [Jesse Engebretson] had a legal

sentence prior to accepting me into their custody;” (2)

Engebretson “was stopped from filing in the court by the lack

of legal reference materials” during his imprisonment; and (3)

Engebretson was “stopped from gaining the assistance” of

another inmate in his legal filings during his imprisonment,

after that inmate “was moved to another facility after the

Department of Corrections found out that he was assisting

inmates in their legal research.” The complaint also alleged

that Mahoney, Slaughter, and Jesse Engebretson’s probation

officer (who was not named as a defendant)

unconstitutionally restrained Engebretson’s liberty during his

“illegal” term of probation. The Engebretsons sought $10

million in damages.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Upon a

magistrate’s recommendation, the district court dismissed the

claims against Mahoney and Slaughter because they

subjected Jesse Engebretson to restrictions on

his liberty based on a facially valid court

order. Even though the order was later

invalidated by the Montana Supreme Court,

1

Engebretson apparently thought he should not have been sentenced to

probation, either, as the state trial court did not identify him as a persistent

felony offender, and therefore did not impose a five-year prison term or

probation, on remand from the Montana Supreme Court.

6 ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY

they cannot be held liable for complying with

the order while it was in place.

The district court also dismissed the Engebretsons’ claims

against the State of Montana on Eleventh Amendment

grounds, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over a state-law loss-of-consortium claim that Catherine

Engebretson appeared to assert in the amended complaint.

The Engebretsons appeal only the district court’s conclusion

that Mahoney and Slaughter are entitled to absolute

immunity.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.

2005). We must “take as true all factual allegations in the

complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s

favor.” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir.

2011). “[W]e construe pro se complaints liberally and may

only dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim if

it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, we

review de novo whether a public official is entitled to

absolute or qualified immunity. Slater v. Clarke, 700 F.3d

1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012); Botello, 413 F.3d at 975.

DISCUSSION

Although the parties and the district court do not discuss

it, the first question we must address is whether the

Engebretsons have standing to bring this action. Jesse

ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY 7

Engebretson did not suffer any actual injury from the

defendants’ enforcement of the state court’s unlawful

sentencing order; indeed, that order saved him five years’

mandatory prison time. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.

Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (explaining that the

“basic purpose of § 1983 damages is to compensate persons

for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of

constitutional rights” (quotation marks omitted)).

However, Jesse Engebretson alleges that the term of

probation prescribed by the state court’s sentencing order,

and enforced by the defendants, was unlawful because, after

the Montana Supreme Court vacated and remanded the state

trial court’s initial sentencing order, a different trial judge did

not identify him as a persistent felony offender and

accordingly relieved him of any further prison or probation

time. In other words, in Engebretson’s view, he never should

have served any probation time. Engebretson also alleges

that the defendants had a duty to investigate whether the

initial sentencing order was lawful before enforcing it. While

we think these allegations lack merit, because we are

reviewing this case at the dismissal stage, and because the

Engebretsons proceeded pro se below, the allegations are

sufficient for purposes of standing to assert a § 1983 claim.

See Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 872 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“We are doubtful that Bernhardt’s damages

claims are plausible . . . . But we accept her allegations

because we examine only the face of her complaint and

therefore conclude that she has standing to pursue her claim

for damages.”). Finally, even without any actual injury for

which they may seek compensatory damages, the

Engebretsons would be entitled to nominal damages under

§ 1983 if they can establish a violation of a constitutional

8 ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY

right. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist., 477 U.S. at 308 n.11;

Bernhardt, 279 F.3d at 872.

The next question is whether prison officials who, like

Mahoney and Slaughter, simply enforce facially valid court

orders are absolutely immune from any liability under § 1983.

We have not yet had occasion to address this question. See

Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006)

(Gould, J., concurring). However, several of our cases point

in the direction of absolute immunity. In Hoffman v. Halden,

268 F.2d 280, 301 (9th Cir. 1959), overruled on other

grounds by Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962) (en

banc), we held that a hospital superintendent who prevented

the prisoner from leaving a mental hospital pursuant to a

court order “enjoyed the immunity of a jailor.” We

explained:

We think the failure of a jailor or keeper to

release a prisoner held on a warrant or

commitment cannot be the basis for a civil

rights action regardless of allegations of

malice, motive or intent. His act is required

by law. Even if the statute were later held

void or the conviction later set aside, so long

as he acted under authority of the writ or

warrant, he was performing a duty which the

law at that time required him to perform.

Id. at 300. In Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health

Services, 834 F.2d 758, 762–65 (9th Cir. 1987), we held that

a child services worker who faithfully executed a court order

to apprehend a child from her mother enjoyed absolute quasi-

judicial immunity. See id. at 765 (“The fearless and

unhesitating execution of court orders is essential if the

ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY 9

court’s authority and ability to function are to remain

uncompromised.”). And in Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,

895–96 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), we explained that “when

Congress enacted § 1983, it was aware of a well-established

and well-understood common-law tradition that extended

absolute immunity to individuals performing functions

necessary to the judicial process.”

The Supreme Court also has not decided whether prison

officials are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983

liability for enforcing facially valid court orders. However,

the Court has long expressed the general idea that public

officials who ministerially enforce facially valid court orders

are entitled to absolute immunity. See, e.g., Matthews v.

Densmore, 109 U.S. 216, 218–19 (1883); Erskine v.

Hohnbach, 81 U.S. 613, 616–17 (1872). More directly

relevant here, the Court has extended absolute immunity in

§ 1983 cases where doing so would “free the judicial process

from the harassment and intimidation associated with

litigation.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494 (1991).2

In recent years, the Supreme Court has emphasized this

functional approach for determining when public officials

may claim absolute immunity under § 1983. An official must

2

For example, the Court has extended absolute immunity to prosecutors

and judges for their roles in judicial proceedings. See Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 427–28 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55

(1967). In contrast, the Court has declined to extend absolute immunity

to judges and prison, school, and executive officials acting in their non-

judicial capacities. See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229–30

(1988); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982); Cleavinger v.

Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203–06 (1985); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.

555, 561 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); Scheuer

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974).

10 ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY

be “performing a duty functionally comparable to one for

which officials were rendered immune at common law,” and

“it is only the specific function performed, and not the role or

title of the official, that is the touchstone of absolute

immunity.” Miller, 335 F.3d at 897 (citing Antoine v. Byers

& Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1993); Kalina v.

Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997)).

Consistent with this functional approach, the courts of

appeals that have addressed whether prison officials are

absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for enforcing

facially valid court orders have uniformly concluded that they

are. Absolute immunity applies even where a prisoner claims

that the order at issue is invalid or the order is later

overturned. See, e.g., Figg v. Russell, 433 F.3d 593, 599 (8th

Cir. 2006) (absolute immunity for prison officials who

confined the prisoner pursuant to “facially valid orders”

before a habeas writ was issued); Hamilton v. Leavy, 322

F.3d 776, 782–83 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that, in a case

against prison officials, an “action taken pursuant to a facially

valid court order receives absolute immunity from § 1983

lawsuits for damages”); Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d

1235, 1239–41 (8th Cir. 1993) (prison wardens enjoyed

absolute immunity for continuing to incarcerate prisoner

pursuant to a valid court order, even though the prisoner

claimed he was wrongfully convicted and his conviction was

later overturned); Valdez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 878 F.2d

1285, 1287–89 (10th Cir. 1989) (law enforcement officials

entitled to absolute immunity for imprisoning plaintiff at

direction of county judge, even though plaintiff was later

released on a habeas writ); Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583,

585 (1st Cir. 1954) (same with respect to state judge order);

Ravenscroft v. Casey, 139 F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1944)

(“Whether [the judge’s] orders were correct or erroneous he

ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY 11

had jurisdiction to make them and they provide immunity to

the jail authorities who did nothing other than perform

them.”).3

We now join our sister circuits and hold that prison

officials charged with executing facially valid court orders

enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for conduct

prescribed by those orders. Our reasons are straightforward.

First, such immunity is grounded in the common law. See

Patterson, 999 F.2d at 1240; Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1287;

Francis, 216 F.2d at 588–89; cf. Miller, 335 F.3d at 895–96

(recognizing the “common-law tradition that extended

absolute immunity to individuals performing functions

necessary to the judicial process”). Second, such immunity

is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent case law,

because it is beyond dispute that prison officials enforcing

court orders are “performing functions necessary to the

3

The courts have similarly extended absolute immunity to law

enforcement and other public officials who simply enforce facially valid

sentencing orders. See, e.g., Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1163–68 (10th

Cir. 2009) (absolute immunity for sheriff’s deputies enforcing court search

orders); Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 112–13 (5th Cir. 1996) (absolute

immunity for sheriff’s attachment of prisoner pursuant to a court order,

even though sheriff allegedly knew the order was invalid); Bush v. Rauch,

38 F.3d 842, 847–48 (6th Cir. 1994) (absolute immunity for probate

official who enforced court order requiring that juvenile be placed in

detention home, even though subsequent investigation revealed that the

court order was based on incomplete information); Roland v. Phillips, 19

F.3d 552, 556 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that county law enforcement

officials had absolute immunity in § 1983 action arising from their actions

in enforcing facially valid judicial orders).

12 ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY

judicial process.” Miller, 335 F.3d at 895–96.4 It is no

accident that most courts refer to absolute immunity for

prison officials enforcing court orders as “quasi-judicial

immunity.”5 Third, absolute immunity is necessary to free

prison officials from the fear of litigation and “insure that

such officials can perform their function without the need to

secure permanent legal counsel.” Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1288;

see also id. at 1289 (“Officials such as the defendants must

not be required to act as pseudo-appellate courts scrutinizing

the orders of judges.”). Finally, absolute immunity ensures

“the public’s trust and confidence in courts’ ability to

completely, effectively and finally adjudicate the

controversies before them.” Id. at 1289.

The Engebretsons nonetheless argue against absolute

immunity on two grounds. First, they contend that we are

bound by two prior Ninth Circuit cases which held that the

defendant prison officials were entitled to qualified

immunity. See Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094, 1098–1100

(9th Cir. 2011); Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114, 1119–20 (9th

Cir. 2011). However, only Stein was concerned with liability

4

See also Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 435 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The

absolute immunity afforded to judges has been extended to apply to

‘quasi-judicial conduct’ of ‘[n]on-judicial officials whose official duties

have an integral relationship with the judicial process.’” (citation

omitted)); Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding

that “‘quasi-judicial’ agency officials whose duties are comparable to

those of judges or prosecutors” are likewise entitled to absolute

immunity).

5

The exception is the Third Circuit, which reserves “quasi-judicial

immunity” for circumstances in which a defendant is “acting in a role that

is functionally comparable to that of a judge, rather than under the

authority of a court order.” Hamilton, 322 F.3d at 783 n.5.

ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY 13

for the officials’ enforcement of a facially valid court order,6

and in both cases, the parties did not brief, and we did not

address, whether the prison officials were entitled to absolute

immunity. Alston and Stein accordingly do not dictate our

answer to that question. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 631 (1993) (prior rulings do not serve as binding

precedent on issues “never squarely addressed”); Morales-

Garcia v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009)

(explaining that while three-judge panels are bound by prior

decisions, “the term ‘decision’ . . . encompasses only those

issues that are raised or discussed”).

Second, the Engebretsons argue that qualified immunity

is sufficient to protect prison officials enforcing court orders.

It is true that there is a presumption in favor of qualified

immunity, and that a defendant public official bears the

burden of showing a need for absolute immunity. Antoine,

508 U.S. at 433 n.4; Miller, 335 F.3d at 897. That burden is

met here. “[I]t is simply unfair to spare the judges who give

orders while punishing the officers who obey them,” and

prison officials would be subject to harassing litigation even

with qualified immunity. Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289.

Moreover, the judicial process itself would suffer without

absolute immunity. “[N]ot only may the threat of litigation

impede an official’s compliance with judicial orders, but ‘fear

of bringing down litigation on the [official] might color a

court’s judgment in some cases.’” Mays, 97 F.3d at 112

6

Alston was concerned with whether the prison officials were liable for

incorrectly calculating the defendant’s sentencing date pursuant to an

internal policy, not with their mere enforcement of a court order. See 663

F.3d at 1096–97. We have consistently analyzed such claims under a

qualified immunity rubric. See, e.g., Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392,

1393–94 (9th Cir. 1990); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1356–59

(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

14 ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY

(quoting Coverdell, 834 F.2d at 765) (alteration in Mays). In

addition, the expense of litigation, “the diversion of

[officials’] attention from more socially productive

obligations,” and the “deterrence of qualified individuals

from accepting public employment” all weigh against

granting only qualified immunity. Valdez, 878 F.2d at

1288–89. Finally, absolute immunity does not leave

prisoners who are incarcerated pursuant to illegal court orders

without a remedy; they may directly appeal their convictions

and/or seek habeas relief. Id. at 1289–90. We are cognizant

that “absolute immunity always comes at a price.” Id. at

1289. But “the public interest in the enforcement of court

orders that is essential to the effective functioning of our

judicial process far outweighs the benefits” of providing only

qualified immunity. Id.

Our sister circuits have been careful to extend absolute

immunity only to the fact of a prisoner’s incarceration

pursuant to a facially valid court order—i.e., the prison

official in question must act within his or her authority and

strictly comply with the order. See, e.g., Patterson, 999 F.2d

at 1241 (“We note the limits of our holding. We simply

conclude that a warden is absolutely immune from damages

flowing from the fact of a prisoner’s incarceration, when that

incarceration occurs pursuant to a facially valid order of

confinement.” (emphasis omitted)); Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1286

(“[W]e hold that an official charged with the duty of

executing a facially valid court order enjoys absolute

immunity from liability for damages in a suit challenging

conduct prescribed by that order.” (emphasis added)); see

also Moss, 559 F.3d at 1163, 1167–68 (“[T]he judge issuing

the disputed order must be immune from liability in his or her

own right, the officials executing the order must act within

the scope of their own jurisdiction, and the officials must only

ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY 15

act as prescribed by the order in question.”); Hamilton, 322

F.3d at 778, 783–86 (holding that questions of fact about the

manner in which prison officials executed court orders may

defeat absolute immunity).

This case fits within these limitations. There can be no

question that the state court had the authority to issue

Engebretson’s sentencing order, that the defendants had the

authority to enforce the order, or that the order was facially

valid. See Mont. Code Ann. § 3-5-302(1)(a) (providing for

original jurisdiction in the state trial courts over felony cases);

id. § 46-19-101(1) (providing for authorization to imprison or

confine a defendant); Sadoski, 435 F.3d at 1079 (only a

“judge who acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction is not

entitled to absolute immunity” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Francis, 216 F.2d at 585 (“facially valid” means

that an order is “fair and regular on [its] face”). Moreover,

the Engebretsons seek to hold Mahoney and Slaughter liable

only for the conduct prescribed the state court’s sentencing

order (to subject Engebretson to probation following his

release from prison); they do not make any allegations about

how the defendants enforced the order.7 Thus, we need not

7

The Engebretsons’ amended complaint alleges that Mahoney and

Slaughter had an independent duty to investigate the legality of the court’s

sentencing order before enforcing it. They did not. See, e.g., Stein, 662

F.3d at 1119 (“[There is] no authority requiring prison officials to review

sentencing orders independently to make sure the court got it right.”);

Valdez, 878 F.2d at 1289 (prison officials have no duty “to act as pseudo-

appellate courts scrutinizing the orders of judges”).

The complaint also alleges that Mahoney and Slaughter

impermissibly restricted Jesse Engebretson’s access to adequate legal

reference materials and an inmate who might have helped him prepare his

habeas petition. But those allegations concern how the defendants

allegedly ran the prison system, not whether they could enforce, or how

16 ENGEBRETSON V. MAHONEY

decide whether allegations regarding a lack of authority to

issue or enforce a facially valid court order, or a prison

official’s engaging in conduct not prescribed in such an order,

might defeat that official’s absolute immunity.

CONCLUSION

Prison officials who simply enforce facially valid court

orders “are performing functions necessary to the judicial

process.” Miller, 335 F.3d at 895–96. They must not be

required to second-guess the courts if that process is to work

fairly and efficiently. For this and the other reasons discussed

above, we hold that prison officials, like the defendants in this

case, who are charged with executing facially valid court

orders enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for

conduct prescribed by those orders.

AFFIRMED.

they enforced, the state trial court’s sentencing order. As such, the

allegations do not undermine Mahoney and Slaughter’s absolute immunity

from liability for simply and strictly enforcing that order. Because the

Engebretsons do not appeal the district court’s failure to separately address

these allegations, we do not address them further.