Rodriguez v. Harris County

ORDER

VANESSA D. GILMORE, District Judge.

In this case, Plaintiffs Edward Gonzalez, Orlando Ybarra, Patricia Gonzales, Reynaldo Guerra, Sandra Puente, Thomas Berg, and James Rodriguez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) challenge the legality of the redistricting plan adopted by the Harris County Commissioner’s Court on August 9, 2011, known as Revised Plan A-l, which reapportions voters among Harris County’s four commissioner precincts (the “County’s Plan”). Plaintiffs claim that the County’s Plan dilutes the voting strength of politically cohesive Latinos in Harris County Commissioner’s Precinct 2 (“Precinct 2”), such that this population has less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice, resulting in a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. Plaintiffs further contend that the County’s Plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of ■ the United States Constitution, because it allegedly was drawn (i) with the motive of intentional discrimination against Hispanics and (ii) with excessive and unjustified use of race and racial data. Defendants Harris County, Texas, and Ed Emmett, in his capacity as Harris County Judge (collectively, “Defendants”), contend that the County’s Plan neither violates the Voting Rights Act nor does it offend the Constitution.

This matter was tried without a jury beginning on November 13, 2012. The Court, having heard the arguments, read the submissions of counsel, reviewed the governing legal principles, and considered the testimonial evidence and exhibits, submits the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK: SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the ‘Voting Rights Act”), as amended in 1982, provides that:

*698 (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ....

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 . The Voting Rights Act was enacted to “give those who had been disenfranchised on account of their race the opportunity to participate in the political process.” White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058 , 1069 (11th Cir.1996). Section 2 proscribes practices that, while permitting a mechanical exercise of the right to vote, “operate[] to cancel out or minimize [i.e. dilute] the voting strength of racial groups,” such that members of the racial minority have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 87 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 , 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Rodriguez v. Bexar Cnty., 385 F.3d 853 , 859 (5th Cir.2004); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 , 93 S.Ct. 2332 , 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973).

Ultimately, the right to undiluted voting strength, provided by Section 2, is a guarantee of equal opportunity in voting, ensuring that a minority group is not denied, on account of race, color, or language minority status, the opportunity to exercise an electoral power that is commensurate with its population in the relevant jurisdiction. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 , 1014 n. 11, 114 S.Ct. 2647 , 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994) (“the ultimate right of Section 2 is equality of opportunity”); Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421 , 429 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Campos v. City of Houston, 113 F.3d 544, 546 (5th Cir.1997). That said, the goal of Section 2 is not to guarantee success at the polls for minority-preferred candidates but to provide assurances of fairness in the electoral process. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1014 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 . The promise of Section 2 is the removal of all barriers to truly equal participation, but a necessary part of equal participation is the possibility of a loss. United States v. Euclid City Sch. Board, 632 F.Supp.2d 740, 752 (N.D.Ohio 2009). After all, Section 2 protects the right to meaningful participation, “not the right to vote for the winning candidate.” Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 236 (5th Cir.1978).

A state or political subdivision thereof violates Section 2 whenever it adopts a practice that dilutes the voting strength of a minority group, such that members of the minority group have less opportunity for meaningful participation and franchise. 1 Voinovich v. Quitter, 507 *699 U.S. 146, 157 , 113 S.Ct. 1149 , 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 . Proof of vote dilution is assembled using the two-part framework set forth in the seminal case of Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 , 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 , 113 S.Ct. 1075 , 122 L.Ed.2d 388 (1993) (vote dilution challenge to a single-member districting scheme is analyzed using the framework set forth in Gingles); Fairley v. Hattiesburg, 584 F.3d 660, 667 (5th Cir.2009).

Under Gingles , a plaintiff must first demonstrate that: (1) the affected minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in an additional single-member district; (2) the affected minority group is politically cohesive; and (3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it — in the absence of special circumstances — usually to defeat the minority group’s preferred candidates. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 , 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 ; Fairley, 584 F.3d at 667 . “[The Fifth Circuit] has interpreted the Gingles factors as a bright line test.” Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 848 , 852 (5th Cir.1999). Each factor must be proved. Growe, 507 U.S. at 40-41 , 113 S.Ct. 1075 ; Fairley, 584 F.3d at 667 (quoting Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir.2004)). Failure to establish any one of the three Gingles factors precludes a finding of vote dilution, because if these three preconditions are not present then the plaintiffs cannot show that the challenged electoral practice or device impairs minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice. League of United Latin Am. Citizens No. U552 v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist., 123 F.3d 843, 847 (5th Cir.1997); League of United Latin Am. Citizens No. v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728 , 743 (5th Cir.1993) (“LULAC III”); Benavidez v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.Supp.2d 451, 455 (ND.Tex. 2010).

The satisfaction of these three preconditions is necessary but not sufficient to establish a Section 2 claim. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1012-13 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 ; see also Perry, 548 U.S. at 425-26 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 . If these three preconditions are met, the district court must then examine a variety of other factors to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged practice impairs the ability of the minority voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect a representative of their choice. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 ; Fairley, 584 F.3d at 667 (citing Sensley, 385 F.3d at 595 ); see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 11-12 , 129 S.Ct. 1231 , 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009). This requires a “searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 (quoting S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess., (1982) (“Senate Report”) at 30, reprinted in' 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News (“U.S.C.C.A.N.”) 177 at 208).

In conducting this broader inquiry, the court should consider the objective factors set forth in the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, including: (1) the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; (2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially po *700 larized; (3) the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; (4) the degree to which members of the minority group have been denied access to the candidate slating process; (5) the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; (6) the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; (7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction; (8) whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group; and (9) whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure is tenuous. Senate Report at 28-29, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07; Perry, 548 U.S. at 426 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 ).

Although the totality of the circumstance analysis is guided by the Senate factors, these factors are neither “comprehensive nor exclusive.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 ; Teague v. Attala Cnty., Miss., 92 F.3d 283, 292 (5th Cir.1996) (noting that the district court must be “flexible in its totality inquiry and guided by factors drawn from the Senate Judiciary Committee report on the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.”). The Court must also consider “whether the number of districts in which the minority group forms an effective majority is roughly proportional to its share of the population in the relevant area,” Perry, 548 U.S. at 426, 436 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 ; De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1000 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 , as well as any other fact which may bear on the question of dilution. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 . Ultimately, the totality of the circumstances inquiry presents very complex political and legal issues whose resolution requires a comprehensive canvassing of the relevant facts, De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 , and “an intensely local appraisal of the design and- impact of the contested electoral mechanisms.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 .

Given that the plaintiffs ability to establish the three Gingles factors does not end the court’s inquiry, proof of the Gingles factors does-not always portend liability. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1012-13 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 . That said, “it will only be the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of the three Gingles factors but still have failed to establish a violation of § 2 under the totality of circumstances.” Teague, 92 F.3d at 292 ; Clark v. Calhoun Cnty., Miss., 88 F.3d 1393 , 1396 (5th Cir.1996) {“Clark IP’); Benavidez v. City of Irving, Tex., 638 F.Supp.2d 709, 712-13 (ND.Tex. 2009).

“Because the resolution of a voting dilution claim requires close analysis of unusually complex factual patterns, and because the decision of such a case has the potential for serious interference with state functions, ... district courts [must] explain with particularity their reasoning and the subsidiary factual conclusions underlying their reasoning.” Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir.1989) (“Westwego I”); Roscoe, 123 F.3d at 846 ; see also Fairley v. Hattiesburg, 584 F.3d 660, 668 , 668 n. 5 (5th Cir.2009). Although the Court is expected to consider all substantial evidence, Plaintiffs, at all times, bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance *701 of the evidence, that all of the Gingles preconditions have been met and that based on the totality of the circumstances, the challenged election device dilutes the voting strength of the minority group. Roscoe, 123 F.3d at 846 .

II. BACKGROUND 2

A. THE PARTIES & THEIR CONTENTIONS

Plaintiffs Edward Gonzalez, Orlando Ybarra, Patricia Gonzales, Reynaldo Guerra, and Sandra Puente all are Hispanic registered voters residing in Commissioners Court Precinct 2 in Harris County, Texas. (Instrument No. 91, at 14 ¶ 1). Plaintiffs Thomas Berg and James Rodriguez are not residents of Precinct 2. (Instrument No. 91, at 14 ¶ 2). Plaintiffs allege that the County’s Plan violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. As for the Section 2 claims, Plaintiffs contend that: (i) they can draw a precinct in which Latinos constitute a majority of the citizen voting age population; (ii) Latinos are politically cohesive; (iii) Anglos vote, as a bloc, to defeat the Latino-preferred candidate; and (iv) under the totality of the circumstances, the County’s plan dilutes the voting strength of the Latino residents of Precinct 2. As for the constitutional claims, Plaintiffs contend that the County’s Plan was drawn with an excessive and unjustified use of racial data and was drawn with the intent to discriminate against Latinos. Intervenor the League of United Latiii American Citizens (“LULAC”) agrees with Plaintiffs’ contentions.

Defendants Harris County, Texas, and Ed Emmett, in his capacity as Harris County Judge, have appeared and answered herein. (Instrument No. 91, at 14 ¶4). Defendants claim that the County Plan does not violate either Section 2 or the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Defendants .contend that their Plan does not violate Section 2 because: (i) Plaintiffs cannot show that Latinos constitute a majority of the citizen voting age population in a geographically compact district drawn in accordance with traditional redistricting principles; (ii) Plaintiffs cannot establish the existence of racial bloc voting because Plaintiffs cannot show that race, rather than some non-racial factor, such as partisanship, accounts for the differences in the voting patterns of Anglos and Latinos; and (iii) under the totality of the circumstances, Plaintiffs cannot show that the County’s Plan diminishes their opportunity to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice. Defendants further contend that the County’s Plan does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the Plan was not drawn with the intention to discriminate nor was it drawn with undue attention to race or racial considerations.

The Precinct 1 Intervenors, Senfronia Thompson, Harold Dutton, Bruce Austin, Willie Bell Boone, and Howard Middleton, are all African-American registered voters residing in Harris County Commissioners Precinct 1. (Instrument No. 91, at 14, 15 ¶ 3, 7). Harris County’s Commissioner Precinct 1 is an effective African-American opportunity precinct created in 1980 and is protected by the Voting Rights Act. (Instrument No. 91, at 14, 15 ¶ 3, 7). The Precinct 1 Intervenors also argue that the County’s Plan violates neither Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act nor the Fourteenth Amendment.

*702 B. CURRENT METHOD OF ELECTING COUNTY COMMISSIONERS & THE NEED FOR REDISTRICTING

Section 18 of Article V of the Texas Constitution provides, in relevant part, that:

Each county shall, in the manner provided for justice of the peace and constable precincts, be divided into four commissioners precincts in each of which there shall be elected by the qualified voters thereof one County Commissioner, who shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified. The County Commissioners so chosen, with the County Judge as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners Court, which shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed.

Tex. Const, art. V, § 18. In keeping with this constitutional dictate, Harris County government is organized into a commissioners court; the Harris County Commissioners Court, comprised of the county judge and four county commissioners, is tasked with the administration of the county’s business and legislative affairs. (Instrument No. 91, at 14 ¶ 5); see also City of San Antonio v. City ofBoeme, 111 S.W.3d 22, 27-28 (2003) (quoting Avery v. Midland Cnty., 406 S.W.2d 422, 426 (1966)); Louisianar-Pacific Corp. v. Newton Cnty., 149 S.W.3d 262, 263 (TexApp.-Eastland 2004, no pet.); Concerned Citizens for Equality v. McDonald, 863 F.Supp. 393, 395 (E.D.Tex.1994). The services provided by Harris County Commissioners to their constituents include drainage services, unincorporated road maintenance, emergency services, medical clinics, parks and recreational facilities, community centers, education centers, libraries, and precinct-wide community programs. (Instrument No. 91, at 14 ¶ 6).

Harris County has a competitive multiparty political system dominated by the two major political parties, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. (Instrument No. 91, at 19 ¶ 35). Candidates for County Commissioner run partisan campaigns. Democrat Sylvia Garcia, a Latina candidate, was first elected as Precinct 2 County Commissioner in 2002. She was re-elected in 2006, but was narrowly defeated in 2010 by Republican Jack Morman, an Anglo candidate. (Instrument No. 91, at 19 ¶36). Mr. Morman is the current commissioner for Precinct 2. (Instrument No. 91, at 19 ¶ 38).

Prior to 2011, Harris County commissioner precincts were last reapportioned in 2001, resulting in the 2001 map, depicted in the next diagram. (Instrument No. 91, at 15 ¶ 8).

[[Image here]]

Between 2001 and 2010, population changes and shifts occurred in Harris County that resulted in substantial numerical variation in the population of the four commissioner precincts, as reflected by 2010 Census data. (Instrument No. 91, at 15 ¶ 9). Based on data from the 2010 Census, the populations among the Commissioner Precincts, as drawn under the 2001 Map, ranged from a high in Precinct 3 of 1,148,890 to a low in Precinct 2 of *703 888,572, for a total top-to-bottom deviation of 25.44%. (Instrument No. 91, at 15 ¶ 10).

Following the publication of the 2010 Census data, the Harris County Commissioners Court announced its intent to redistrict the boundaries of its commissioner precincts. (Instrument-No. 91, at 15 ¶ 11). To assist the Commissioners Court in the evaluation of the new population statistics resulting from the 2010 Census and in drafting the proposed plan, the County retained the services of Drs. Richard Murray and David Branham and hired Andrews Kurth LLP as special counsel for the County on redistricting (collectively, the “Consultants”). (Instrument No. 91, at 15 ¶ 12).

On June 21, 2011, the Consultants made a presentation at a public meeting of the Commissioners Court concerning legal requirements for redistricting, the 2010 census data, and the need for adoption of principles to guide the redistricting. An opportunity was provided for public comment at this meeting. (Instrument No. 91, at 15 ¶ 13). On June 21, 2011, the Commissioners Court adopted an Order Adopting Priorities and Principles for Redistricting of Harris County Commissioner Precincts (the “Priorities and Principles”) to guide the formulation of the 'redistricting plan. (Instrument No. 91, at 15 ¶ 14). The Commissioners Court adopted the following Priorities and Principles:

(a) the four commissioner precincts should be of substantially equal population and, in no event, exceed a 10% top-to-bottom deviation;

(b) the four commissioner precincts should be contiguous and reasonably geographically compact;

(c) to the extent possible, the redistricting plan should use identifiable geographic boundaries as precinct boundaries, preserve natural historical boundaries, recognize identifiable communities of interest in a single precinct and avoid splitting neighborhoods when drawing precinct lines;

(d) to the extent possible, the four commissioner precincts should be based on existing composition of the precincts;

(e) the redistricting plan should use whole county voting precincts to draw commissioner precincts;

(f) the redistricting plan will adhere to (i) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and not use race as the predominate factor in establishing commissioner precincts and (ii) the Voting Rights Act and avoid retrogression in the position of racial, ethnic and language minorities with respect to the effective exercise of their right to vote or electoral franchise. The redistricting plan should not dilute voting strength of racial or language minority citizens and should not either fragment minority communities or pack them into precincts in concentrations greater than necessary to help them elect minority representation;

(g) recognizing the value of incumbent-constituency relations, the redistricting plan should seek to keep (i) existing commissioners in their existing precincts and (ii) facilities and service locations established by incumbent commissioners in the precincts of those commissioners;

(h) the redistricting plan should recognize the duties and obligations imposed by law on commissioners to provide services to the residents of precincts and the public investment in facilities, service locations and personnel that has been made to provide such services.

(Defendants’ Ex. 3, at 4); (Instrument No. 91, at 15-17 ¶ 15).

On July 12, 2011, in a public meeting, the Commissioners Court adopted Plan A- *704 1 for formal consideration and for presentation to the public. An opportunity was provided for public comment at the meeting. (Instrument No. 91, at 17 ¶ 16). In mid-July 2011, notice of the dates, times and locations for public hearings was published in English, Spanish and Vietnamese in newspapers of general circulation and in community newspapers. Notice was also provided in two separate locations on Harris County’s website with Plan A-l attached, along with the “Priorities and Principles of Redistricting” and census information. (Instrument No. 91, at 17 ¶ 17).

From July 25 to August 1, 2011, Plan A-1 was presented and public comment was received at four separate public hearings, one in each commissioner precinct. (Instrument No. 91, at 17 ¶ 18). At each public hearing, Douglas Ray, Assistant County Attorney, presided and a PowerPoint presentation was made that summarized the redistricting process, the legal considerations for redistricting, and the Principles and Priorities. Defendants’ expert Dr. Richard Murray presented a summary of the demographic considerations that went into the development of Plan A-1. (Instrument No. 91, at 17 ¶ 19). 3 Additionally, at each public hearing, 36-inch-by-48-inch mounted copies of maps of the existing districts and Plan A-l were displayed and printouts of the PowerPoint presentation as well as a chart depicting the voting precinct changes were available in English, Spanish, and Vietnamese. The County also engaged Spanish and Vietnamese interpreters for each public hearing. (Instrument No. 91, at 17 ¶ 20).

Members of the public were given an opportunity to make comments at the public hearings, and many did, including elected officials and members of the African-American community in Precinct 1 and the Hispanic community in Precinct 2. (Instrument No. 91, at 17 ¶ 21). At each of the public hearings, certain members of the public expressed opposition to the proposed plan in light of the impact the plan would have on the Hispanic community in Precinct 2. Other members of the public, including certain residents of Precinct 1, expressed support for the County’s Plan. (Instrument No. 91, at 17-18 ¶ 22). Latino citizens, Dr. Reynaldo Guerra and Robert Jara, however, presented a proposed alternative map (the “Guerra-Jara plan”) at the

*705 Precinct 3 public hearing. (Instrument No. 91, at 18 ¶ 23).

Following the first four public hearings, the Consultants revised draft Plan A-l in response to some of the concerns raised by members of the Hispanic Community, re-suiting in Revised Plan A-l (the “Revised Plan A-l”), depicted in the next diagram. 4

[[Image here]]

Specifically, Revised Plan A-l removed from Precinct 2 and placed back into Precinct 4 two majority-Anglo voting precincts (758 and 760) located in the Kingwood, Texas area. Revised Plan A-l also moved to Precinct 2 from Precinct 1 five heavily Hispanic whole voting precincts (737, 397, 792, 106, and 817) and five heavily Hispanic partial voting precincts (423B, 061B, 409B, 408B, 608B) in the Aldine area. (Instrument No. 91, at 18 ¶ 24). The changes made by the Consultants resulted in an increase in the Hispanic voting age population in Precinct 2 under Revised Plan A-l, as compared to Plan A-l. (Instrument No. 91, at 18 ¶ 25). 5

On August 5, 2011, notice of an additional public hearing and a copy of Revised Plan A-l were posted on the County’s website and the notice of public hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation. (Instrument No. 91, at 18 ¶ 27). On August 9, 2011, a final public hearing was held during which the public was invited to comment on redistricting generally and the proposed changes incorporated in Revised Plan A-l. (Instrument No. 91, at 18 ¶28). Following the final public hearing, on August 9, 2011, the Commissioners Court adopted Revised Plan A-l and authorized its submission to the United States Department of Justice (the “Justice Department”) for preclearance through an Order Establishing New Boundaries for Commissioner Precincts for Harris County, Texas. (Instrument No. 91, at 18 ¶ 29). 6

*706 On August 5, 2011, Plaintiffs filed the instant suit in the United States District Court in and for the Southern District of Texas. See (Instrument No. 1). In the suit, Plaintiffs claim that the County’s Plan violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because the County was attempting to employ a new map without first obtaining pre-clearance from the Justice Department. (Instrument No. 19). Plaintiffs further claim that the County’s Plan dilutes the voting- strength of politically cohesive Latinos in Precinct 2, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the County’s Plan violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because it allegedly was drawn (i) with the motive of intentional discrimination against Hispanics and (ii) with excessive and unjustified use of race and racial data. See (Instrument No. 19).

On October 19, 2011, a three-judge panel, composed of Judge Jennifer Elrod of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States District Judge Sim Lake of the Southern District of Tex-as, and United States District Judge Vanessa Gilmore of the Southern District of Texas, was convened to consider Plaintiffs’ Section 5 claims. On November 7, 2011, the three-judge panel determined the County was seeking preclearance of the Revised Plan A-l and did not intend to implement the Revised Plan A-l unless it obtained preclearance from the Justice Department. Accordingly, the three-judge panel concluded that the Section 5 claims should be held in abeyance unless the County attempted to implement a nonprecleared plan.

On November 14, 2011, this Court, acting of its own accord without the three-judge panel, held trial on the constitutionality of conducting the 2012 elections using the 2001 map, which was, at the time, the last precleared plan. At the end of trial, the Court found that the use of the existing plan would violate the constitution’s guarantee of one man, one vote and therefore concluded that the continued use of the existing plan was unconstitutional. Because the Revised Plan A-l had not at that time obtained preclearance from the Department of Justice, the County could not use that plan to conduct the 2012 election. Accordingly, the Court fashioned an interim map that was used to conduct the 2012 election (the “Interim Map”). See (Instrument No. 66). After slight modifications, neither party objected to the Court’s interim map. The interim map is depicted in the next diagram. 7

*707 [[Image here]]

On December 30, 2011, the Justice Department issued a letter stating that it would not interpose any objection to Revised Plan A-l under its authority granted under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Justice Department stated no opinions under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. (Instrument No. 91, at 19 ¶ 31). In the correspondence exchanged between Harris County and the Justice Department, the County took the position that Precinct 2 was not an effective opportunity district but was instead a Hispanic influence district. An opportunity district is a district in which members of a minority group (i.e. Latinos), alone, are able to elect candidates of their choice, whereas an influence district is a district in which members of a minority group (i.e. Latinos) are a minority of the voters, but “the minority population, at least potentially, is large enough to elect the candidate of its choice with help from voters who are members of the majority and who cross over to support the minority’s preferred candidate.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 , 129 S.Ct. 1231 , 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009). The County further argued that the Revised Plan A-l preserved Precinct 2’s status as an influence district. (Instrument No. 91, at 19 ¶ 32). The Justice Department preclearance letter stated in part, “the failure of the Attorney General to object does not bar subsequent litigation to enjoin enforcement of the change.” (Instrument No. 91, at 19 ¶ 33).

After the Justice Department precleared the map, the three-judge panel dismissed Plaintiffs’ Section 5 claims, leaving only the aforementioned Section 2 claims and the constitutional claims at issue in this lawsuit. Moreover, given that the County had obtained preclearance, it was free to implement the Revised Plan A-l. Nevertheless, because the County obtained preclearance so late in the electoral calendar, the County conducted the 2012 elections using the Court’s interim map, with the intention of conducting all future elections under the Revised Plan A-l. In the instant case, Plaintiffs challenge the Revised Plan A-l on the basis that the Plan dilutes the Latino vote in Precinct 2, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and the Plan was drawn with *708 discriminatory intent, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ultimately, Plaintiffs seek to establish Precinct 2 as a Latino opportunity district under the Voting Rights Act. (Instrument No. 91, at 19 ¶ 34).

C. POPULATION CHANGES AND DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

In 2000, there were 3,400,578 people living in Harris County. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 49, at 1, 2). Of that number, 1,432,264 (42.1%) were Anglo, 1,119,791 (32.9%) were Latino, 619,694 (18.2%) were African-American, and 228,869 (6.8%) were Asian and/or other racial background. Over the course of the decade, the total population of Harris County increased by 691,881 individuals. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 49, at 2); (Tr. 2:7). 8 During that time, the county-wide Anglo population shrunk by some 82,618 persons; the Latino population grew by 551,789 individuals; the African-American population grew by 134,564 persons; and the Asian and other population grew by 88,146 persons. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 49, at 2); (Tr. 2:7). At the end of the decade, Anglos accounted for 1,349,646 (33.0%) of the total population of Harris County; there were 1,671,540 (40.8%) Latinos; 754,258 were (18.4%) African American; and 317,015 (7.7%) were people of Asian or other descent.

TOTAL POPULATION AND VOTING AGE POPULATION (VAP) CHANGE WITHIN HARRIS COUNTY COMMISSIONER PRECINCTS BETWEEN 2000-2010 _BYRACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP 9 _

_Precinct 1_

_2000_2010_Change_

Total Pop._827,341 100% 930,613 100% 103,272 +12.48%

Anglos_188,270 22.76% 175,127 18.8% -13,143 -6.98%

Blacks_363,515 43.94% 346,810 37.3% -16,705 -4.6%

Latinos_263,792 28.62% 357,504 38.4% +93,712 +35.52%

Asians/Others_38,764 4.68% 51,172 5.5% +12,408 +32.01%

Voting Age Pop. 592,896 100% 680,238 100% +87,342 +14.73%

Anglos_158,278 26.70% 151,788 22.3% -6,490 -4.1%

Blacks_253,932 42.83% 256,488 37.7% +2,556 +1.01%

Latinos_150,706 25.42% 230,504 33.9% +79,798 +52.95%

Asians/Others_29,980 5.06% 41,458 6.1% +11,478 + 32.89%

_Precinct 2_

_2000_2010_Change

Total Pop._847,078 100% 888,572 100% +41,494 +4.90%

Anglos_312,717 36.92% 248,481 28.0% -64,236 -20.54%

Blacks_66,237 7.82% 77,933 8.8% +11,696 +17.66%

Latinos_441,508 52.12% 533,812 60.1% +92,304 + 20.91%

Asians/Others_26,616 3.14% 28,346 3.2% +1,730 + 6.5%

*709 [[Image here]]

Over the course of the decade, the racial composition of the four commissioner’s precincts, individually, as well as the racial composition of the County, as a whole, changed dramatically. See (Tr. 3: 185-87). Between 2000 and 2010, approximately 13,143 Anglo residents moved out of Precinct 1, reducing the Anglo population from 188,270 in 2000 to 175,127 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 1). The 175,127 Anglo residents who remained comprised 18.8% of the total population of Precinct 1 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 1); (Tr. 3:185). During that same period, the African-American population of Precinct 1 contracted by 16,705 residents (or 6.98%), decreasing the African-American population from 363,515 in 2000 to 346,810 in 2010. In 2010, the 346,810 African-American residents who remained accounted for 37.3% of the total population of Precinct 1. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 1); (Tr. 3:185). Over the course of the same period, the Latino population of Precinct 1 grew considerably. Between 2000 and 2010, an additional 93,-712 Latinos took residence in Precinct 1, increasing Precinct l’s Latino population from 263,792, in 2000 to 357,504 in 2010. By 2010, the 357,504 Latinos taking residence in Precinct 1 accounted for 38.4% of the entire population of Precinct 1. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 1); (Tr. 3:185).

*710 Over the same period, Precinct 2’s Anglo population declined precipitously; some 63,236 Anglo residents left Precinct 2, reducing the Anglo population from 312,717 in 2000 to 248,481 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 2); see also (Tr. 3:187). As of 2010, the 248,481 Anglo residents who remained comprised 28.0% of the total population of Precinct 2. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 2). From 2000 to 2010, the African-American population of Precinct 2 grew by 11,696 residents, increasing the African-American population from 66,237 in 2000 to 77,933, in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 2). In 2010, the 77,933 African-American residents of Precinct 2 accounted for 8.8% of the total population of Precinct 2. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 2). The Latino population of Precinct 2 blossomed as the decade unfolded. Between 2000 and 2010, an additional 92,304 Latinos took residence in Precinct 2, increasing Precinct 2’s Latino population from 441,508 in 2000 to 533,812 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 2); see also (Tr. 3:186). By 2010, the 553,812 Latinos residing in Precinct 2 accounted for 60.1% of the entire population of Precinct 2. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 2).

In Precinct 3, approximately 8,695 Anglo residents moved out of Precinct 3 over the course of the decade, reducing the Anglo population from 446,368 in 2000 to 437,673 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 3). In 2010, the 437,673 Anglo residents who remained comprised 38.1% of the total population of Precinct 3. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 3). During that same period, the African-American population of Precinct 3 grew by 62,-610 residents, increasing the African-American population from 108,465 in 2000 to 171,075 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 3). In 2010, the 171,075 African-American residents of Precinct 3 accounted for 14.9% of the total population of Precinct 3. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 3). Over the course of the same period, the Latino population of Precinct 3 swelled. Between 2000 and 2010, an additional 168,687 Latinos took residence in Precinct 3, increasing Precinct 3’s Latino population from 237,189 in 2000 to 405,876 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 3); see also (Tr. 3:187). By 2010, the 405,876 Latinos residing in Precinct 3 accounted for 35.3% of the entire population of Precinct 3. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 3).

Between 2000 and 2010, 3,456 Anglo residents moved to Precinct 4, increasing the Anglo population of Precinct 4 from 484,-909 in 2000 to 488,365 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 4). By 2010, Anglo residents comprised 43.4% of the total population of Precinct 4. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 4). During that same decade, the African-American population of Precinct 4 grew by 85,-964 residents, increasing the African-American population from 93,563 in 2000 to 179,527 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 4). In 2010, the 179,527 African-American residents of Precinct 4 accounted for 16.0% of the total population of Precinct 4. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 4). Over the course of the same period, an additional 168,687 Latinos took residence in Precinct 4, increasing Precinct 4’s Latino population from 204,-262 in 2000 to 374,348 in 2010. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 4); see also (Tr. 3:188). By 2010, the 374,348 Latinos residing in Precinct 4 accounted for 35.3% of the entire population of Precinct 4. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 4).

As Dr. Murray explained, over the course of the ten-year period beginning in 2000 and ending in 2010, Harris County experienced exponential growth. See (Tr. 3:188). That growth was fueled, in part, by robust growth in the Latino population. Although each of the four precincts experienced strong Latino growth, the most significant growth among the Latino population occurred in the western and northern portions of the County, in Precincts 3 and 4, respectively. (Tr. 3:188); see also (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24). Although Precinct 2 *711 had the largest total Latino population, it had the smallest growth among Latinos. (Tr. 3:187-88). In fact, Precinct 2’s Latino growth rate of 20.91%, which resulted in an additional 92,304 Latino residents in Precinct 2 by 2010, paled in comparison to the Latino growth rate in: (i) Precinct 1, which experienced a 35.52% increase in Latino population over the decade, resulting in an additional 93,712 Latino residents in Precinct 1, (ii) Precinct 3, which experienced a 71.12% increase in Latino population over the course of the decade, resulting in an additional 168,687 Latino residents in Precinct 3, and (iii) Precinct 4, which experienced an 83.27% increase in Latino population, resulting in an additional 170,086 Latino residents in Precinct 4. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 1-4). The graphs that follow depict the changes in the Latino distribution:

LATINO POPULATION GROWTH 10

PER SQUARE MILE IN HARRIS COUNTY

FROM 2000-2010

[[Image here]]

The western and central-western portions of the County experienced major growth in their Latino population, such that by the end of the decade all four precincts boasted sizable Latino populations.

LATINO DISTRIBUTION IN HARRIS COUNTY 11

[[Image here]]

Of course, this surge in Latino population in the northern and western portions of the County did not merely affect the distribution of the County’s Latino residents, but it also impacted the county-wide *712 population trends. The county-wide population trends tracked the Latino population trends, such that the county-wide population, just like the Latino population, experienced its most robust growth in the western and northern portions of the County, in what was then commissioner’s Precincts 3 and 4, respectively. (Tr. 3:230). This boom in population left Precincts 3 and 4 considerably over-populated while leaving Precincts 1 and 2 significantly under-populated by the end of the decade. (Tr. 3:181-82).

POPULATION CHANGE IN HARRIS COUNTY COMMISSIONER PRECINCTS: 2000-_2010 12 _

Precinct Population in Population in Change in Deviation from

_2000_2010_Population_2010 Mean

1_827,341_930,613 + 103,272 ( +12.48%) 92,502 (9.04%)

2_847,078_888,572 + 41,494 (+ 4.90%) -134,543 (13.15%)

3 889,646_1,148,890 + 259,244 (+ 29.14%) +125,775 ( +12.29%)

4_836,513_1,124,384 + 287,871 (+ 34.41%) +101,269 ( + 9.9%)

Between 2000 and 2010, Precinct 4 experienced a population increase of almost 288,000 people resulting in a 34% increase from the 2000 population. (Tr. 3:184); (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 23). Over the same period, Precinct 3, like Precinct 4, also experienced a dramatic population increase of almost 259,000 people, resulting in a 29% population increase between 2000 and 2010. (Tr. 3:184); (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 23). Precincts 1 and 2 grew, but their growth did not rival the robust growth of Precincts 3 and 4. In Precinct 1, for instance, the population grew by 12.8% between 2000 and 2010, resulting in a population increase of 103,000 persons over the course of the decade. (Tr. 3:184). Although Precinct 2 grew, its population grew at a much slower rate than the populations of either Precincts 1, 3, or 4. Over the course of the decade, Precinct 2 only experienced a 4.9% growth in population, which resulted in an additional 41,000 persons living in Precinct 2 at the end of the decade. (Tr. 3:184); (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 23).

Under the one-man, one-vote principle, the County’s population should be equally divided amongst the four commissioner precincts. See (Tr. 3:183). According to the 2010 census, there were 4,092,000 people living in the County. (Tr. 3:184). In light of these population equality principles, each precinct should have a population mean of 1,023,000 people. As the chart above indicates, Precincts 1 and 2 were well below the ideal population mean. In Precinct 1, the County would have to increase the population of the precinct by approximately 92,500 people in order attain the population mean. (Tr. 3:184); see also (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 23). In order for Precinct 2 to attain the population mean, the County would have to increase the population by more than 134,000 people. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 23); (Tr. 3:184). Conversely, Precincts 3 and 4 were over-populated. In order for the County to attain the population mean in Precinct 4, the County would have to remove more than 125,000 people from the precinct and relocate them to another precinct. In order for Precinct 4 to attain the population mean, the County would have to remove 101,000 people from the precinct and relocate them to another precinct. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 23).

*713 In addition to this surge in the overall population, the Latino citizen-voting age population also grew dramatically.

[[Image here]]

See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 39, at 2). From 2000 to 2009, the Latino citizen voting age population grew by 167,184 additional Latino adult citizens, growing from 374,227 persons in 2000 to 541,411 persons in 2009, resulting in a 44% increase in the Latino citizen voting age population over the course of the decade. During that same time the total citizen voting age population of Harris County increased from 1,964,970 in 2000 to 2,281,093 through the end of 2009, representing an estimated total growth of 316,213, or 16%. Of those 316,-123 individuals, 167,184 were Latinos. Thus, Latinos accounted for 53% of Harris County’s citizen voting age population growth during the first decade of the new millennium.

In examining how the Latino population changed over the course of the decade, Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Matt A. Barreto 13 explained that, when compared to the 2001 Map, the Revised Plan A-l boundaries reduce the overall Latino population and the Latino voting age population in Precinct 2. If the 2001 Map remained in place, then by 2010, 60.1% of Precinct 2’s population would be Latino and 55.2% of the precinct’s voting age population would be Latino. Under the Revised Plan A-l, however, only 58.2% of Precinct 2’s population is Latino and 53.4% of the precinct’s voting age population is Latino. Further, Dr. Barreto notes that county-wide the percentage of the population comprised by Latino residents increased by 19%, from 32.9% in 2000 to 40.8% in 2010. However, under the Revised Plan A-l, Precinct 2’s Latino fraction of the population only increased by 10.5%. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 39, at 3).

Moreover, Dr. Barreto explained that the Revised Plan A-l will also reduce the number of registered voters in the pre *714 cinct. Under the 2001 map, 34.9% of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population is Latino and 29.7% of registered voters are Spanish surnamed individuals (“SSRV”). 14 Under the Revised Plan A-l, only 33.8% of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population is Latino and 28.8% of registered voters are Spanish surnamed individuals. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 39, at 3).

D. REDISTRICTING: PRINCIPLES & PRIORITIES 1. Principles & Priorities

The first re-districting challenge to the Harris County Commissioner’s Court occurred in 1981. The litigation waged in connection with the 1981 redistricting ultimately resulted in the creation of Precinct 1 as an African-American opportunity district. (Tr. 3:176). In 1991, Dr. Murray assisted the County in making minor changes to the 1981 map to accommodate the minor population disparities that had formed since the authoring of the map. (Tr. 3:176). The changes, though, were relatively modest and were intended to preserve Precinct l’s status as an opportunity district. (Tr. 3:176). In 2001, Dr. Murray, once again, served as a general consultant in the redistricting process, advising the County on the ways in which to draw a map that complied with the constitution, the Voting Rights Act, and the County’s Priorities and Principles. See (Tr. 3:177). In the 2001 round of redistricting, the County’s main goal was to cure the population imbalance; in 2001, as was the case in the most recent round of redistricting, the population growth in the eastern portion of the County lagged behind the growth numbers in the countywide growth, leaving Precinct 2 underpopulated. (Tr. 3:178). To remedy the under-population problems, the County extended the Precinct northward above downtown into the heavily populated area along Hardy Road, Eastex Freeway. (Tr. 3:179). In 2001, the map-drawing process was guided by a statement of priorities and principles for redistricting of Harris County Commissioner’s precincts. (Tr. 3:179-180).

After the 2010 census, it was clear that the County would have to engage in another round of redistricting to remedy the population imbalance between the precincts that had occurred over the course of the previous decade.

On June 21, 2011, the Commissioner’s Court issued an order pronouncing the priorities and principles to be applied in the redistricting of the Harris County Commissioner’s Precincts (the “Priorities and Principles”). (Defendants’ Ex. 3). These Priorities and Principles were adopted at the inception of the redistricting process; the County did not initiate in any map drawing until after the adoption of the Priorities and Principles. (Tr. 3:188 — 89). 15

The first priority and principle requires the four commissioner precincts be of substantially equal population and, in no event, exceed a 10% top-to bottom deviation. (Defendants’ Ex. 3, at 4). Dr. Murray testified that the County implemented this principle to ensure that the County’s map did not violate the Constitution’s one man, one vote principle, which requires population equality. See (Tr. 3: 190).

The second priority and principle requires that the four commissioner pre *715 cincts be contiguous and reasonably geographically compact. (Defendants’ Ex. 3, at 4). Dr. Murray testified that the second priority, like the first, is designed to ensure that the County’s map does not violate constitutional redistricting safeguards. See (Tr. 3:190).

The third priority and principle states that, to the extent possible, the redistricting plan will use identifiable geographic boundaries as precinct boundaries, preserve natural historical boundaries, recognize identifiable communities of interest in a single precinct and avoid splitting neighborhoods when drawing precinct lines. (Defendants’ Ex. 3, at 4). According to Dr. Murray, the third priority recognizes that redistricting should be conducted in a manner that respects the conveniences and the communal integrity of the people being governed. (Tr. 3:191). In Dr. Murray’s view, the third priority’s admonishment against splitting communities of interest and heeding natural and/or historic borders accomplishes that goal of respect for the communal integrity of the people being governed. (Tr. 3:191).

The fourth priority and principle provides that to the extent possible, the four commissioner precincts should be based on existing composition of the precincts. (Defendants’ Ex. 3, at 4). Dr. Murray explained that the County’s adoption of this principle encourages the parties tasked with redistricting to use the 2001 map as a starting point for the redistricting process. (Tr. 3:191). Dr. Murray further explained that, in the absence of gerrymandering, the most recent previously employed map is often used as the basis for the redistricting process with modifications made to make the old map legal, in light of the intervening population changes in the years since that map was first adopted. See (Tr. 3:191-92).

The fifth priority and principle requires the redistricting plan use whole county voting precincts to draw commissioner’s precincts. (Defendants’ Ex. 3, at 4). Dr. Murray explained that when a voting precinct is split, it is divided amongst two commissioner’s precincts. Therefore, this priority is designed to minimize the impact of redistricting on the individual voting precincts by preserving the voting precincts as whole units, thereby limiting the need for realignment at the local voting place. (Tr. 3:192).

The sixth priority and principle requires that the redistricting plan adhere to (i) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and not use race as the predominate factor in establishing commissioner precincts and (ii) the Voting Rights Act and avoid (a) retrogression in the position of racial, ethnic and language minorities with respect to the effective exercise of their right to vote or electoral franchise and (b) dilution of the voting strength of racial or language minority citizens. (Defendants’ Ex. 3, at 4). Dr. Murray explained that this priority describes the delicate balancing of competing legal principles involved in the redistricting process. On the one hand, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the County from drawing a map solely on the basis of race, but on the other hand, compliance with the Voting Rights Act requires the County to take heed of the racial composition of the map in order to ensure that the map is neither retrogressive nor dilutive. See (Tr. 3:193).

The seventh priority and principle states the redistricting plan should, in recognition of the value of incumbent-constituent services, seek to keep (i) existing commissioners in their existing precincts and (ii) facilities and service locations established by incumbent commissioners in the precincts of those commissioners. (Defendants’ Ex. *716 3, at 4). Dr. Murray testified that this precept recognizes that in areas with both a sizeable urbanized population and a size-able unincorporated area, like .Harris County, service delivery and facilities takes on greater importance than it might in more urbanized counties or in purely legislative bodies. (Tr. 3:193-94). Harris County is unique in that it is one of the only counties in the nation that features a highly urbanized population that does not reside in incorporated cities. (Tr. 3:182). In Harris County, a sizeable faction of the population lives in unincorporated areas— i.e. territory within the bounds of Harris County that is not within the boundaries of a municipality. (Tr. 3:181-82). In 2010, approximately 1.6 million residents of Harris County lived in unincorporated areas. (Tr. 3:182). In unincorporated areas, basic services, such as road maintenance and facilities management, which ordinarily would be performed by' a municipal government, are instead provided by the Harris County Commissioner’s Court. (Tr. 3:183). According to Dr! Murray, this responsibility makes the delivery of constituent services more important in Harris County than it might be in other counties or purely legislative bodies where representatives are not responsible for the delivery of services. (Tr. 3:194).

The eighth priority and principle states that the redistricting plan should recognize the duties and obligations imposed by law on commissioners to provide services to the residents of precincts and the public investment in facilities, service locations and personnel that has been made to provide such services. (Defendants’ Ex. 3, at 4). Dr. Murray testified that the County and its residents have made large public investments in the County facilities and services and the redistricting plan should honor that investment. (Tr. 3:194).

Dr. Murray testified that the eight priorities and principles are not always harmonious in that adherence to one priority often necessitates the subordination of another priority. See (Tr. 3:192). Dr. Murray explained that these eight principles outline the goals of the redistricting process, but the application of these priorities and principles always involves a give and take. See (Tr. 3:192). The significance accorded to any single priority must, of course, be balanced against the importance of the other priorities. (Tr. 3:192). Thus, except for a few absolutes, such as the prohibition against a population deviation in excess of 10%, there is always an interplay between the principles and which priorities will take precedence in any given scenario. See (Tr. 3:192). Inevitably, sometimes the County must temper its adherence to one principle in order to preserve the integrity of the map as a whole. (Tr. 4:40).

2. Opportunity Districts and Influence Districts

Dr. Murray described Precinct 1 as an opportunity district but described Precinct 2 as an influence district. (Tr. 3:196). Dr. Murray explained that an opportunity district is a district where a protected minority can elect a candidate of their choice, although not necessarily of their race or ethnicity. In his view, a functioning opportunity district requires a sufficient population, number of registered voters, voter turnout, and cohesiveness. Dr. Murray stated that Precinct 1 has met this standard in every election since 1981. (Tr. 3:196). That said, Dr. Murray recognized that the population changes that had occurred over the course of the last decade threatened Precinct l’s ability to perform as an opportunity district. In 2000, almost 44% of the population of Precinct 1 was African-American. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 1); (Tr. 3:234). At the end of the decade, *717 African-Americans only accounted for 37.3% of Precinct l’s population. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 24, at 1); (Tr. 3:235). The evidence showed that the African-American population in Precinct 1 was on a downward trend. (Tr. 3:235). In order to preserve Precinct l’s status as a functioning opportunity district, the County would have to augment the African-American population of Precinct 1 to preserve this opportunity district.

On the other hand, Dr. Murray testified that Precinct 2 is a district that does not have a protected minority with sufficient population, registered voter population, voter turnout, and cohesion to elect a candidate of choice. (Tr. 3:196-97). Dr. Murray explained, for instance, that at the time of the 2001 redistricting, he did not believe Precinct 2 was a Latino opportunity district even though it experienced significant Latino growth over the course of the 1990s. (Tr. 3:178). Today, as was the case in 2001, Dr. Murray persists in his assessment that Precinct 2 is not an effective Latino opportunity district. See (Tr. 3:226).

In a memorandum authored by Dr. Murray, titled “Is Harris County Commissioner Precinct 2 an ‘Effective Latino Opportunity District’?” Dr. Murray examined the results of the 2002, 2006, and 2010 general elections to evaluate whether Precinct 2 was a Latino opportunity district. (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 3). 16 Dr. Murray explained that the data from these three election cycles demonstrated that the Latino-preferred candidate, who in every analyzed election was also the Democratic nominee, did not perform well in the general election. In 2002, “with the Latino turnout boost provided by Tony Sanchez’s well-funded gubernatorial campaign, the [Latino]-baeked candidates prevailed in 23 of 58 contests in Precinct 2.” (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 4); (Tr. 3:229). In 2006, Latino-preferred candidates only won six of the 27 contests in Precinct 2. (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 4); (Tr. 3:229). Finally, in 2010, only one Latino-preferred candidate, former Houston mayor Bill White, prevailed out of the 81 contested elections. (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 4): (Tr. 3:229).

PERFORMANCE OF LATINO-PREFERRED CANDIDATES IN PRECINCT 2 (AS FORMULATED UNDER THE 2001 MAP) IN THE 2002, 2006, and 2010 ELECTION _CYCLES 17 _

Election Number of Number of Number of % of Latino-Year Contested Latino-Preferred Latino-Preferred Preferred Elections in Candidates that Candidates Candidates _Precinct 2_Prevailed_Defeated_Prevailing

2002_58_23_35_39.7%

2006_27_6_21_22.2%

2010_81_1_80_1,2%

TOTAL_166_30_136_18.1%

According to Dr. Murray, this data clearly shows that Precinct 2 is not a Latino opportunity district because the Latino share of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population and the percentage of Spanish-surname registered voters in the *718 precinct are too low to enable Latino voters to elect the candidates of their choice. (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 4). Dr. Murray-testified that the low turnout amongst Latinos makes it “impossible for any candidate to win in Precinct 2 by [only] mobilizing Latinos.” (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 4). Dr. Murray thus concluded that “even if Latino voters were extremely cohesive and had very high turnout rates vis-a-vis other voters in Precinct 2, it would be extremely difficult for Latinos alone, to elect candidates of their choice given such low citizen voting age population and SSRV percentages.” (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 1); see also (Tr. 3:226-27).

Occasionally, however, Latino-preferred candidates can win in Precinct 2, but they win as a- part of broader coalition that includes African-Americans, cross-over Anglos, and occasionally a few Asian-American voters. (Tr. 3:227); (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 4). According to Dr. Murray, Senator Garcia’s 2002 electoral victory was the result of a coalition amongst Latinos, African-Americans, and inner-city Anglos in Precinct 2. See (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 4); (Tr. 3:227). And even in that 2002 contest, where Senator Garcia received 52.8% of the vote, less than half of her support came from Latinos. (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 4). In 2002, for instance, Latinos only made up 25% of the total vote in Precinct 2. (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 2). These coalitions, though occasionally effective, are also quite rare. In more than 80% of the contested elections in 2002, 2006, and 2010, the Latino-preferred candidate could not secure a majority of the vote in Precinct 2. (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 4).

Nevertheless, the Latino population is sizeable, and this sizeable number of minority voters can be influential in the election of a commissioner. (Tr. 3:197). Accordingly, Dr. Murray concluded that Precinct 2 is currently a Latino influence district rather than an opportunity district.

Dr. Murray further opined that transforming Precinct 2 into an performing opportunity district would be difficult because: (i) Harris County’s Latino population is geographically dispersed throughout the County and (ii) Latinos, generally, have low rates of political participation making it difficult for them to elect their preferred candidates. See (Tr. 3:227-231).

With respect to geographic dispersion, Dr. Murray explained that Harris County’s Latino is spread out over the four commissioner’s precincts, making it difficult to fashion a compact district in which Latinos constitute a majority of the citizen voting age population. (Tr. 3:230-31). Thus, for example, the distance between the growing Latino populations in the northern and western portion of the County and the established Latino population in the eastern portion of the County, makes it difficult to draw a compact and contiguous map that joins both populations. (Tr. 3:231). In his opinion, the geographic dispersion of Harris County’s Latino community makes it nearly impossible to create a geographically compact district, drawn, in accordance with traditional redistricting principles, where Latinos constitute a majority of the citizen voting age population. (Tr. 3:233).

Second, he claims that Latinos in Precinct 2 have low voter turnout, which precludes them from electing their candidates of choice. See (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 1); (Tr. 3:227). Dr. Murray explained that in 2010, before the adoption of the Revised A-l, 60.1% of the population in Precinct 2 was Latino, but only 34.9% of the citizen voting age population of Precinct 2 was Latino, (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 39, at 4); see also (Defendants’ Ex. 15, at 1), and only 29.7% *719 of Spanish-surname individuals in Precinct 2 were registered to vote. (Tr. 3:227); see also (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 39, at 3). The low percentage of Spanish surname registered voters and the relatively small number of Latino adult citizens in Precinct 2 limits the ability of Latinos to elect, by themselves, a candidate of their choice. (Tr. 3:227).

3. The County’s Approach to the 2011 Redistricting

In Dr. Murray’s view, there were several issues facing the County during this redistricting process. See (Tr. 3:195-96). First, the County had to equalize the distribution of the population across the commissioner’s precincts. At the end of the previous decade, there was too much deviation in population across the four precincts, so this time redistricting would require redistribution of a much larger share of the population than in prior redistrictings. (Tr. 3:195). Precincts 1 and 2 were under-populated, whereas Precincts 3 and 4 were over-populated. Under the 2001 map, Precinct 2 shared most of its border with Precinct 1. The County therefore anticipated the possibility of removing population from either Precinct 1 or Precinct 2 and adding it to the other precinct, which would of course worsen the under-population issues of the donating precinct. (Tr. 3:203). Dr. Murray further explained that Precinct 3 does not share a border with Precinct 2 and intimated that the Latino population in Precinct 3 was too geographically remote to remedy Precinct 2’s under-population problem. See (Tr. 3:187). This left Precinct 4, the only over-populated precinct adjacent to Precinct 2, as the most practical source of population to cure Precinct 2’s under-population problem.

Second, the County had to preserve Precinct l’s status as an effective minority-opportunity district. This would be a challenge because the black population in Precinct 1 was declining, while the Latino population in the precinct was growing. (Tr. 3:196). According to Dr. Murray, Precinct l’s negative African-American growth rate combined with the dramatic Latino growth rate made the task of maintaining Precinct l’s status as an effective opportunity district more challenging than in prior re-districtings. (Tr. 3:186). In 2000, for instance, African-Americans accounted for 44% of the population of Precinct 1, but after the intervening decade they now only accounted for 37.3% of the population,

Dr. Murray testified that the historic census data and population trends indicated that Latinos were moving into areas that were predominately African-American. (Tr. 4:35). In keeping with this trend, Latinos have migrated southward over the course of the last few decades, displacing traditionally African-American pockets of Harris County. (Tr. 4:35). This trend of Latino settlement in the southern portion of the County has changed the racial composition and complexion of the County, such that the Alief, Sunny Side, South Union, and South Park areas, areas which were historically African-American, are trending more multicultural and increasingly Latino, with a decreasing share of the population being African-American. (Tr. 4:36). Similarly, Latinos have moved into the area between 1-45 and 1-59, which had been referred to as “Redneck Alley,” in the north central part of the County, displacing the formerly Anglo-populated area. (Tr. 4:35).

Dr. Murray noted that in his years of experience, once an area begins to trend Latino it does not reverse course; he has never observed an area that was predominately non-Latino and then became predominately Latino revert back to being predominately non-Latino. (Tr. 4:36). Thus, if an area, like Alief, is currently *720 trending Latino, it is improbable that there will be an influx of non-Latinos (African-Americans or otherwise) over the next 10 to 20 years to reverse the trend of Latino settlement. (Tr. 4:36). In preserving Precinct 1 as an opportunity district, the County had to remain cognizant of these historic population patterns.

Third, with respect to Precinct 2, the County had to address the under-population problem plaguing the precinct, which meant that the County would have to find some way to increase the population of Precinct 2 by at least 100,000 people, (Tr. 3:198), while also trying to preserve Latino influence (Tr. 3:197). Dr. Murray appreciated that the mechanics of preserving Latino influence in Precinct 2 might be different under the new Republican Precinct 2 Commissioner Jack Morman than they were in the past under the former Democratic Precinct 2 commissioners. Dr. Murray suggested that under the new commissioner, the incumbency-protection considerations were probably different than they were under the former Democratic commissioners. (Tr. 3:197; Tr. 4:43).

It was clear that the four commissioners all had an interest in the outcome of the redistricting process, with each commissioner taking a keen interest in the way in which the redistricting would alter their precincts. (Tr. 3:198). Given that and the major issues related to population distribution, the preservation of Precinct l’s status as an opportunity district, and the preservation of minority influence in Precinct 2, the County understood the redistricting process would involve balancing the Priorities and Principles with the desires of the commissioners. (Tr. 3:198-99).

4. Performing the Redistricting

The County hired Dr. Murray to assist it with the redistricting process. Dr. Murray explained that he began by first considering how to equalize the distribution of the population across the four commissioner’s precincts. (Tr. 3:199). To that end, Dr. Murray drafted an email on June 18, 2011, identifying eight areas, mostly along the borders of the precincts, that were population rich and therefore could be appended to the adjacent precinct, to help correct the population imbalance. (Defendants’ Ex. 66); see also (Tr. 3:199).

a. Proposed Changes

The first locale Dr. Murray considered was. the area east of Lake Houston in northeast Harris County. The six precincts comprising the area east of Lake Houston had a total population of 32,000. (Defendants’ Ex. 66, at 1). Moreover, this area was in Precinct 4, which was overpopulated, and shared a border with Precinct 2, which was under-populated. (Tr. 3:200). Thus, this area east of Lake Houston presented an opportunity for a simple swap between Precinct 4 and Precinct 2. 18

The second area he considered was the Atascocita area, west of Lake Houston, because this area was in Precinct 4 and bordered the under-populated Precinct 2. The six voting precincts comprising the Atascocita area had a total population of approximately 24,000. See (Defendants’ Ex. 66, at 2); see also (Tr. 3:201).

Third, Dr. Murray considered the King-wood area, in north Harris County, because the twelve voting precincts comprising the Kingwood area had a population of 56,000 and this area was close to both Precincts 1 and 2. (Defendants’ Ex. 66, at 3); (Tr. 3:201).

*721 Fourth, Dr. Murray area considered the area located in the far southeast section of Harris County west of the Gulf Freeway. The eight voting precincts comprising this area have a total population of 28,229 residents. At the time, this area was located in the under-populated Precinct 1, but Dr. Murray thought these eight precincts could be moved to Precinct 2, thereby mitigating Precinct 2’s under-population problem. See (Tr. 3:201); (Defendants’ Ex. 66, at 4).

The fifth area considered was comprised of thirteen precincts in north central Harris County. The area, then located in Precinct 1, was close to the northern neck of Precinct 2 and boasted a population of approximately 78,400 people. (Defendants’ Ex. 66, at 5). If added to Precinct 2, this population-rich area would go a long way toward remedying Precinct 2’s underpopulation problem. (Tr. 3:202).

The sixth location considered was the Wallisville area north of Interstate 10. The nine voting precincts comprising the Wallisville area had a total population of 61,769. (Defendants’ Ex. 66, at 6). This area, then located in Precinct 2, lies along the border of Precinct 1; Wallisville has a growing black population and most residents are homeowners, rather than renters. (Tr. 3:204). Dr. Murray considered removing this area from Precinct 2 and adding it to Precinct 1 in an effort to temper Precinct l’s under-population problem. (Tr. 3:204).

The seventh area under consideration was the diverse and densely populated area of Alief. (Tr. 3:207). This area, then located in Precinct 3, was comprised of thirteen voting precincts that collectively boasted a population of almost 115,000. (Defendants’ Ex. 66, at 7). Dr. Murray testified that he discussed moving some of the population from Precinct 3’s Alief area to Precinct 1, as he did during the 2001 redistricting. (Tr: 3: 206). In the 2011 redistricting, Commissioner Radack, the commissioner of Precinct 3, had recommended that the population imbalance between Precinct 1 and 3 be addressed using the same method the County employed in 2001, taking population from the Alief area and adding it to Precinct 1. (Tr. 3: 206).

The eighth and final area under consideration was comprised of nine voting precincts in the Greenspoint/ Bush Airport area in north central Harris County. (Tr. 3:207); see also (Defendants’ Ex. 66, at 7). This area, then located in Precinct 4, had a population of approximately 85,300 and had a sizeable African-American population. (Tr.»3:207); see also (Defendants’ Ex. 66, at 7). This area, comprised almost entirely of home dwellers, had the fastest-growing African-American population in Harris County. (Tr. -3:207-08). Given that this area was located in Precinct 4, which was over-populated, the Bush Airport area was a natural contender for relocation to the Precinct 1, which was underpopulated. See (Tr. 3:207).

b. Implemented Changes

After conducting this population analysis, Dr. Murray then considered the eight Priorities and Principles and with these principles and population statistics in mind, Dr. Murray drafted approximately six preliminary maps for discussion with the attorneys for the County. (Tr. 3:205). Dr. Murray testified that he mainly interacted with the attorneys but also had some limited contact with the commissioners. Dr. Murray explained that this is a political process with four commissioners each with his own concerns. (Tr. 4:23). Dr. Murray admitted that the map would have come out differently if Sylvia Garcia was the Precinct 2 County commissioner, for she would have encouraged efforts to increase the number of Democratic voters in Precinct 2. (Tr. 4:43).

*722 Despite these political considerations, Dr. Murray contends that the Revised Plan A-l respects the County’s Redistricting Priorities and Principles in that it: (i) substantially equalizes the population, well within the permissible levels of deviation; (ii) creates contiguous commissioner precincts; (iii) was developed based on the existing precincts as they were fashioned in the 2001 map; (iv) minimally splits voting precincts, splitting only a dozen precincts; and (v) minimizes the number of people changing precincts, in that most residents are in the same precinct, under the Revised Plan A-l, as they were in under the 2001 map. (Tr. 3: 210-12).

In creating the Revised Plan A-l, the County made substantial changes,to both Precinct 1 and Precinct 2.

First, Precinct 1 is extended northward to Farm to Market Road 1960, picking up the sizeable Black homeowner population hving near the Bush Airport. (Tr. 3:212). This area has experienced substantial African-American growth and the homeowners who populate this area are a very important voting constituency. (Tr. 3:212).

Second, Precinct 1 also is extended eastward, picking up a sizeable group of voters from the Wallisville area, another area with a large number of Black homeowners. (Tr. 3:213).

Third, a small portion of the Alief area, which was previously in Precinct 3, was added to the southwest side of Precinct 1. However, the Revised A-l did not move all thirteen voting precincts of the Alief area. (Tr. 3:212). Dr. Murray explained that even though the County wanted to preserve Precinct l’s status as an opportunity district, which, of course, required the County to be mindful of the African-American population in Precinct 1, the County did not believe that bolstering Precinct l’s population with residents of Alief would best preserve Precinct l’s status as an opportunity district. (Tr. 3:213-14). According to Dr. Murray, the Alief area was rapidly built in the 1970s and was predominately Anglo, but after the oil boom bust the Anglos left. In the 1980s and 1990s, this was a major area of Black growth. As the millennium approached, the Black population in Alief began to move across the county line into Fort Bend County, but the Latino population in Alief flourished. (Tr. 3:214). Today, • the African-Americans who remain are mostly apartment-dwellers, because this area does not have many single family dwellings. (Tr. 3:215).

Given these demographic trends, Harris County chose not to go further west into Alief to remedy Precinct l’s under-population, but rather it chose to go further north into the Bush Airport area and the Wallisville area to pick up home-owning African-American populations with strong voter turnout! (Tr. 3:216). Again, Dr. Murray stressed that the Bush Airport area and Wallisville area are areas of African-American growth and both areas are populated with middle class home-owning voters. Therefore, the Bush Airport area and the Wallisville area were much better sources of voter population than Alief. (Tr. 3:216).

Fourth, there were also some small swaps in the Hobby Airport area, with one voting precinct, Precinct 285, moving from Precinct 2 to Precinct 1, and another precinct, Precinct 36, moving from Precinct 1 to Precinct 2. (Tr. 3:212). ■ Fifth, the Revised Plan A-l ensures that Precinct l’s significant service facilities remain in Precinct 1. Dr. Murray explained that the Revised A-l map keeps the Challenger Seven Memorial Park in the southeast portion of Precinct 1, the Deussen Park in the eastern part of the precinct, and the El Franco Lee Community Center and the Hardy Road facility in Precinct 1, as well. (Tr. 3:217).

*723 Ultimately, under the Revised A-l, the African-American population of Precinct 1 increased from 37.3% to 39%, mainly by the addition of the growth area in north central Harris County, near Bush Airport area. (Tr. 3:236). According to Dr. Murray, the addition of this area will compensate for the declining African-American population elsewhere and may reverse the trend of declining Black population in Precinct 1. (Tr. 3:236).

As for Precinct 2, the County had to remedy the precinct’s under-population problem and preserve Latino influence in the precinct. See (Tr. 3:197-98). The County addressed these issues by extending the eastern portion of the precinct northward into the existing Precinct 4 and adding thirteen precincts east and west of Lake Houston, to Precinct 2, and second, the County extended the neck of the precinct north of downtown. (Tr. 3:218). 19

5. Public Review of the Map: Opportunity for Public Comment

As part of the redistricting process, the County held numerous public hearings before adopting the Revised Plan A-l. (Tr. 3:220). The County held a hearing in each of the four precincts and then also held a meeting downtown at the County courthouse, for a total of five. (Tr. 3:220). The first of these five meetings was in Precinct 2. At that meeting, Dr. Murray made a presentation on the original A-l map. (Tr. 3:221). According to Dr. Murray, this meeting was well-attended and the public comments were polarized, with some attendees applauding the proposed map and others criticizing the County’s proposal. (Tr. 3:221). This was in sharp contrast to the public hearing that occurred in Precinct 1, in that most of the attendees at the Precinct 1 meeting favored the proposed changes to Precinct 1. (Tr. 3:221-22).

The County was responsive to the concerns expressed by the community and considered the concerns raised by the County’s residents. For instance, the County considered alternative plans that were proposed by citizens, such as the Guerra-Jara plan, which was proposed by members of Precinct 2’s Latino community. The County ultimately rejected this plan because the County determined that the Guerra-Jara plan was inconsistent with the priorities and principles the County had adopted and resulted in major service disruptions in Precinct 1, which would lose all four major service facilities. (Tr. 3:224). Although some concerns, like the Guerra-Jara plan, were rejected, others were implemented. For example, the original A-l map took two voting precincts from the Anglo populated Kingwood area, in Precinct 4, and added them to Precinct 2. (Tr. 3:222). After the hearings, these Republican-leaning Kingwood districts were left in Precinct 4. (Tr. 3:223). The Revised Plan A-l is the product of those revisions to the original A-l map.

6. Plaintiffs’ Criticism of the Revised Plan A-l

According to Plaintiffs, the Revised Plan A-l splits five communities of interest, which are census-designated places: Al-dine, Sheldon, Humble, Channelview, and Atascocita. (Tr. 4:26). In response to these concerns, Dr. Murray first noted that Aldine, Sheldon, Channelview, and Atascocita are not cities, although he conceded that each is, to a limited extent, a community of interest. See (Tr. 4:25-27). *724 Dr. Murray seems to intimate that even if these four locales are census-designated places, they are not municipalities and therefore splitting them does not carry the same import as splitting a municipality. See (Tr. 4:27). In his view, these are not well-defined communities. Second, even if Humble is a city and not merely a census designated place, any fracturing of Humble occasioned by the Revised Plan A-l is insignificant because Humble is a small city with a small population with limited prospects for growth given' that the city is circumscribed by the City of Houston. (Tr. 4:25, Tr. 4:41). Third, Dr. Murray testified that had the County brought in all of Atascocita in the Revised Plan A-l, rather than split it, that would have driven the Latino numbers down in Precinct 2, as this area is principally Anglo. (Tr. 4:42). Dr. Murray further testified that the same is true of Humble; if the entirety of Humble was added to Precinct 2 this would have impacted the Latino numbers, but the effect would have been minimal given that Humble is not a very large city. (Tr. 4:41-42).

E. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS

In summary, Plaintiffs allege that the County’s Plan violates Section 2 because the Revised Plan A-l dilutes the voting strength of Precinct 2’s Latino residents. According to Plaintiffs, Precinct 2 should be a Latino opportunity district. Plaintiffs also claim that the Revised Plan A-l is unconstitutional because it was designed with the purpose of discriminating against Latinos and because it was drawn with an excessive and unjustified use of racial data.

III. LAW & ANALYSIS: SECTION 2 CLAIMS

Plaintiffs first claim that the Revised Plan A-l dilutes their voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In order to prevail on this claim, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) Latinos are a sufficiently large and geographically compact group to constitute a majority in an additional single-member district; (2) the affected minority group is politically cohesive; and (3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it — in the absence of special circumstances — usually to defeat the minority group’s preferred candidates. Perry, 548 U.S. at 425 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 ; Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 ; Fairley, 584 F.3d at 667 . If these three preconditions are met, the district court must then examine a variety of other factors to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the Revised Plan A-l impairs the ability of the minority voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect a representative of their choice. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 ; Fairley, 584 F.3d at 667 .

A. GINGLES ONE: IS THE LATINO POPULATION OF PRECINCT 2 SUFFICIENTLY LARGE AND GEOGRAPHICALLY COMPACT TO CONSTITUTE A MAJORITY IN A SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICT?

The first Gingles precondition requires the plaintiff to show that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single^member district. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 425 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 ; see also Growe, 507 U.S. at 40 , 113 S.Ct. 1075 ; Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 . When the voting potential of a minority group that is large enough to form a majority in a district has been thwarted by the manipulation of district lines, minorities may justly claim that their “ability to elect” candidates has been diluted in violation of Section 2. *725 Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421 , 429 (4th Cir.2004).

In order to show that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district, the plaintiff must demonstrate “the possibility of creating more than the existing number of reasonably compact districts with a sufficiently large minority population to elect candidates of its choice.” De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1008 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 ; accord Perry, 548 U.S. at 429 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 . The first Gingles precondition thus consists of a numerosity requirement and a compactness requirement. De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 . Together, the numerosity and compactness components of the first Gingles precondition ensure that the affected minority group possesses the potential to elect representatives of its choice, in the absence of the dilutive election practice. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2752 ; LULAC III, 986 F.2d at 743; Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1117 , 1117 n. 9 (5th Cir.1991) (‘Westwego III”).

Because the very concept of vote dilution implies — and, indeed, necessitates — the existence of an undiluted practice against which the fact of dilution may be measured, a Section 2 Plaintiff will usually postulate a reasonable alternative voting practice to serve as the benchmark undiluted practice. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 480 , 117 S.Ct. 1491 , 137 L.Ed.2d 730 (1997) (quoting Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881 , 114 S.Ct. 2581 , 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994)); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 88 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The phrase vote dilution itself suggests a norm with respect to which the fact of dilution may be ascertained .... In order to decide whether an electoral system has made it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer, a court must have an idea in mind of how hard it should be for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an acceptable system.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, the plaintiff establishes this undiluted benchmark practice by proposing hypothetical redistricting schemes and presenting them to the district court in the form of illustrative plans. Fairley, 584 F.3d at 669 .

Where the plaintiff employs the use of illustrative maps to establish the first Gingles factor, the plaintiff must introduce a demonstration map that creates a geographically compact single-member district in which the majority of the citizen voting age population is Latino. Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 853. “Where the minority group meets these requirements, the representatives that it could elect in the hypothetical district ... in which it constitutes a majority will serve as the measure of its undiluted voting strength.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 90-91 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 (O’Connor, J., concurring). If the minority group is not sufficiently large and compact to allow an additional district to be drawn, then the Court has no means by which to construct a measure of the minority group’s undiluted voting strength. This, of course, precludes the court from determining whether the challenged practice makes it harder for minority voters to elect the candidate of their choice. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 88 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Accordingly, when the plaintiff fails to produce a measure of the undiluted practice, the plaintiff cannot show that the challenged electoral practice is actually responsible for the minority voters’ inability to elect their candidate of choice, defeating any claim of vote dilution. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (“Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they *726 cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice.”); see also Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 852-53; LULAC III, 986 F.2d at 743.

Plaintiffs have proposed seven Gingles plans which purport to demonstrate the ability of the Precinct 2’s Latino community to form a precinct where Latinos are geographically compact and constitute a majority of the citizen-age voting population of the precinct. Of the seven proposed plans, Plaintiffs’ expert, Mr. George Korbel, 20 authored four: Korbel 118, Korbel 257, Korbel 818, and Korbel 325. 21

1. Numerosity

To satisfy the numerosity requirement, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that it is possible to draw an additional single member election district in which the majority of the citizen voting age population is Latino. Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 853; Perez v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 368 , 372 (5th Cir.1999); Campos, 118 F.3d at 548.

This numerosity requirement relies on an objective, numerical test: Do Latinos make up more than 50 percent of the citizen voting age population in the relevant geographic area? Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 853.

a. Measuring the Citizen-Voting Age Population

i. Source of the Data

Historically, the citizen voting age of the proposed district was calculated as part of the Census. See, e.g., Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 853-54. Until recently, the Census consisted of a “Short Form,” which was received by every household in the United States, and a “Long Form,” sent to approximately one in every six households. The Short Form collected basic information, such as age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin, while the Long Form asked more detailed questions on topics such as citizenship and socioeconomic status. Dr. Barreto explained that although the Long-Form questionnaire was only distributed to a portion of the population, rendering the long-form a sample rather than an actual enumeration, the Long-Form data reliably estimated the citizenship data at various levels of geographic specificity (i.e. statewide, county-wide, by zip code, by census tract, and by census block). 22 , 23 Re *727 cently, the U.S. Census Bureau (“Census Bureau”) announced that it would not use the Long Form Questionnaire for the 2010 Census. Benavidez v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.Supp.2d 451, 454 (N.D.Tex. 2010).

In its place, the Census has developed the American Community Survey (“ACS”) to estimate the demographic composition of the United States. The ACS, like the Census Long-Form, is not an actual population count; instead, the ACS is an annual nationwide survey conducted by. the Census Bureau wherein the Census Bureau randomly samples a large portion of the total population. Those sampled are asked a series of questions designed to capture demographic information, including socioeconomic background, citizenship, educational attainment, and other information, much of which was formerly included on the Long Form questionnaire. (Tr. 1:48— 49). Thus, the ACS data, like the Long Form Questionnaire preceding it, provides an estimate of citizen voting age population of a community based on population samples, rather than an actual enumeration. Benavidez, 690 F.Supp.2d at 454 . According to Dr. Barreto, the ACS is the only reliable source for citizen voting age population data. (See 1:74).

Although ACS data are released annually, the Census Bureau recommends using the three-year or five-year aggregations of ACS data when working with smaller populations due to relatively small number of households surveyed. See generally U.S. Census Bureau, A Compass for Understanding and Using American Community Survey Data: What General Data Users Need to Know (Oct. 2008), http://www. census.gov/acs/www/guidance_ior_data^ users/estimates/.

The Fifth Circuit has not decided whether the five-year aggregation of ACS data is always sufficient to establish the citizenship voting age requirement. However, the Fifth Circuit has authorized the use of non-census data when that data is sufficiently probative on the issue of citizen voting age population. See Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 852;' Westwego Citizeris for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 906 F.2d 1042 , 1045 n. 3 (5th Cir.1990) (‘Westwego II”). In Westwego II, for instance, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs could establish the first Gingles precondition with non-census data, where the census data available did not include information on the minority voting-age population. Westwego II, 906 F.2d at 1045 n. 3.

In this case, the Court finds the ACS data sufficiently probative on the issue of citizen ■ voting; age population. First, as explained earlier, the Census Bureau no longer collects citizen voting-age population data on the official Census forms. Therefore, the citizenship data from the 2000 Census is the only official Census citizenship data available. However, this information is out-dated and, given the surge in population growth Harris County has experienced over the last ten years, therefore inaccurate and not probative on the question of citizenship status. Second, the ACS data is perhaps the best measure of citizen voting age data currently available; it is collected by the Census Bureau and the Census Bureau’s publication of and reliance on ACS data “suggests that the Bureau considers ACS data reliable and intends for it to be relied upon in decisions such as Voting Rights Act corn *728 pliance.” Benavidez v. City of Irving, Tex., 638 F.Supp.2d 709, 721 (N.D.Tex. 2009). Third, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Barre-to, offered un-rebutted testimony that the five-year aggregation provides a reliable measure of the citizen voting age population in Harris County because the ACS data proved to. be a reliable measure of voting age population. Dr. Barreto testified that he compared the voting age population estimates on the 2005-2009 five year aggregation of the ACS (the “2005-2009 ACS”) to the voting age population tallies on the 2010 Census and found that the ACS data accurately approximated the Census tallies. Because the sampling methodology employed by ACS yielded reliable measures of voting age population, Dr. Barreto deduced that the ACS data would also yield reliable measures of other demographic data, such as citizen voting age population. This testimony was not challenged at trial. Fourth, although Defendants’ expert, Dr. Alford, challenges the method by which Dr. Barreto has used the ACS data to extrapolate information about the wider population, see (Defendants’ Ex. 49, at 2-4), both parties have used the ACS citizenship data to approximate the citizen voting age population in Harris County. On this record, the Court concludes that the five-year aggregated ACS citizenship data is sufficiently probative on the issue of citizen voting age population and Plaintiffs may rely upon this data in establishing the first Gingles precondition.

Dr. Barreto, however, states that the five-year ACS data does not always yield adequate approximations of the number of Latino citizens, because the data is a composite of several years rather than a snap shot of any single year. For instance, Dr. Barreto explained that in the last several years there has been a sizeable increase in Harris County’s Latino citizen voting age population. Given the accelerated rate at which the Latino citizen voting age population is growing, Dr. Barreto contends that the ACS’ five-year aggregations include historic data that significantly underestimates Harris County’s Latino citizen voting age population. Given the dynamism of population trends in Harris County, Dr. Barreto suggests that the five year aggregates capture the population trends that occurred in the midpoint of the data set. Thus, for example, Dr. Barreto contends that the 2005-2009 ACS data estimates is a reflection of the Latino citizen voting age population in 2007, the mid-point of the 2005-2009 data set, but does not accurately approximate the Latino citizen voting age in 2009, the end point of the data set. In fact, Dr. Barreto hypothesizes that the 2005-2009 ACS data underestimates the Latino citizen voting age population in 2009 by one to two percent percentage points. (Tr. L57). 24

Although this testimony was un-rebutted at trial, the Court’s reliance on the ACS data will not be disturbed by the fact that this data is static and therefore fails to fully capture the dynamism óf Harris County’s population changes. The ACS is at present the only reliable source of citizen-voting age population data. And although the five-year arc of the ACS might diminish its ability to be perfectly reflective of current trends, this five-year aggregation enables the survey to, as Plaintiffs explained, reliably approximate Census tallies. The Court has determined that the ACS data can be used to demonstrate citizenship voting age pop *729 ulation data because of ACS’ ability to consistently approximate Census data. While Plaintiffs may be correct that the ACS data is not entirely accurate, it is the best alternative the parties have proposed, and Plaintiffs have not offered “concrete evidence” of' the under-count sufficient to overcome the presumption of accuracy of the ACS. See Perez v. Pasadena Independent School ■ Dist., 958 F.Supp. 1196, 1211 (S.D.Tex.1997) (noting that claims of Latino undercount in census had to be substantiated by concrete evidence before the court would entertain the possibility that the census data was inaccurate.) Inaccuracies, alone, will not render the ACS data inherently unreliable. See Campos v. City of Houston, 894 F.Supp. 1062, 1064 (internal citations omitted) (noting that although inaccuracies are inherent in census data, census data was not inherently unreliable). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ACS data is the only reliable indicia of citizen voting age population in the record,

ii. How Should the ACS Be Used

Having determined that the five-year aggregation of citizenship data provided by the ACS is a reliable indicator of the citizen voting-age population, the Court must now determine how the five-year aggregation should be considered. Again, the ACS produces estimates, rather than actual counts, of citizen voting age population. The estimates are denoted with a numeric estimate and then an accompanying margin of error. For example, a five-year ACS survey may estimate that the African-American population of a city is 1,000,000 (±15,000). Accordingly, the ACS provides an estimate of 1,000,000 with a margin of error of 15,000 persons.

Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Barreto, has used the ACS numeric estimate for citizen voting age population, without the accompanying margin of error, to approximate the actual count of the citizen voting age population of Harris County. Defendants’ expert, Dr. John Alford, 25 questions Dr. Barreto’s use of the ACS numeric estimate. According to Dr. Alford, it is statistically improper for Dr. Barreto to use the ACS numeric estimate of citizen voting age population to approximate the raw number of Latino adult citizens residing in Harris County. According to Dr. Alford, the ACS guidelines and the census handbook suggest that demographers and statisticians should not be making extrapolations to a raw number from the ACS data. (Defendants’ Ex. 49, at 2-4).

Dr. Barreto testified, however, that the ACS data can be used to approximate raw number estimates. Thus, for instance, the ACS’ citizen voting age population data, for Harris County, could be used to esti *730 mate the actual number of Latino citizens of voting age in Harris County. According to Dr. Barreto, the ACS data lends itself to this kind of extrapolation because the ACS data is collected from a large sample of the population. Although Dr. Barreto concedes that the ACS cautions against manipulating the data to produce raw number estimates, Dr. Barreto states that this warning is directed to a lay user, who lacks familiarity with proper extrapolation techniques and may be tempted to use ACS data to extrapolate population-wide data even when the sample from which the ACS data was collected is small. As Dr. Barreto explained, when the sample from which the ACS data is collected is small— as occurs when the ACS demographer is only able to survey a small number of people in the community — then the sample data will not yield accurate approximations of the population-wide demographics. Thus, for example, it would be inappropriate to use the ACS citizenship data from Polk County, Texas to extrapolate the number of Latino citizens in Polk County, because for small counties, like Polk, the number of people from whom the ACS collects data is very small. Accordingly, the data collected from this small sample cannot be used to determine population-wide (ie. county-wide) trends. However, in large counties, such as Harris County, the ACS collects data from a large segment of the population. In these counties, the ACS staff conducts many interviews, thereby increasing the reliability of the ACS data. In these large counties, the sample size from which the ACS data is collected is large enough that the sample data can produce reliable raw number estimates. Therefore, in large counties, ACS data describing the percentage of Latino citizens in the county could be used to determine the number of Latino citizens in that county. See (Tr. 1:135-36).

According to Dr. Barreto, demographers and others versed in surveying techniques can readily discern the difference between sample data and geography levels that lend themselves to extrapolation and sample data or geographies that are too small to yield reliable approximations of population-wide statistics. Moreover, the sample size used in compiling the ACS data for Harris County is large enough that the ACS data can yield very accurate approximations of population-wide data. Dr. Barreto thus concludes that it is not improper to use ACS sample data from Harris County to extrapolate raw number estimates. In fact, Dr. Barreto testified that he is confident that ACS citizenship data could yield very accurate estimates of the county-wide citizenship numbers, because the ACS sample data provide reliable estimates of other population-wide demographics. Upon comparing the voting age population, racial and ethnic group counts, and total population estimates for Harris County from the 2005-2009 ACS with the voting age population counts, racial and ethnic group counts, and total population data from the 2010 Census, Dr. Barreto found that the ACS data accurately approximated the Census tallies. Thus, for instance, in Harris County the ACS will publish an estimate of the number of Latino adult citizens residing in Harris County and alongside this number the ACS will also publish a margin of error for the estimate. According to Dr. Barreto, in counties as populous as Harris County, the margin of error for the estimate is small. Thus, for example, the ACS might estimate that there are 1,000,000 Latino voting age adults and the margin of error for that estimate may only be ±10,000. (Tr. 1:136-37). When those ACS estimates for Harris County are compared to actual Census data, the ACS data is incredibly accurate. In 2010, the ACS estimated that there were 1,092,000 Latino adults in Harris County and the Census estimated that *731 there were 1,082,000 Latino adults in Harris County. This demonstrates that the Latino voting age count extrapolated from the ACS sample accurately approximates the Latino voting age actual enumeration collected by the Census. (Tr.-1:137).

Because the sampling methodology employed by ACS yielded reliable measures of county-wide voting age population, county-wide racial and ethnic tallies, and the county-wide total population, as reflected in the Census tallies, Dr. Barreto reasoned that the ACS data would also yield reliable measures of other demographic data, such as citizen voting age population. (Tr 1:138-39). According to Dr. Barreto, the ACS is using the same principles to collect and organize data for voting age population as they would for other demographic markers. Dr. Barreto concludes that in large counties like Harris County, the ACS data is extremely accurate, because the sample size from which the data is collected is large and the point estimates supplied by the ACS closely approximate the actual enumerations gathered in the decennial census. (Tr. 1:139). 26

On review, the Court finds that trained professionals may use the numeric estimates to extrapolate raw number counts. The concerns pertaining to extrapolation raised by Dr. Alford, though serious, do not apply to the case at hand. The weight of the testimony at trial indicated that the sample size from .which the ACS draws its data is large enough that the sample data reliably estimates population-wide trends. As Dr. Barreto explained, the margin of error of the ACS’ citizen voting age population statistics is small. The evidence further shows that the admonishments of the ACS relating to the use of its estimates — admonishments echoed by Dr. Alford — are not really directed' at experienced demographers and academics, who have the ability to determine the appropriateness of any particular data manipulation techniques. Accordingly, the Court finds that the numeric estimate may be used to approximate the raw count totals,

iii. Which Five Year Aggregation Should Be Used

Having determined that the five-year aggregation of citizenship data provided by *732 the ACS is a reliable indicator of the citizen voting-age population, the Court must now determine which five-year aggregation should be considered. The bulk of Plaintiffs’ evidence challenging the Revised A-l relies on the 2005-2009 ACS. Plaintiffs testified, and Defendants have not rebutted, that this 2005-2009 ACS data was the only ACS data publicly available at the time the Revised Plan A-l was adopted in August 2011. After the adoption of the Revised Plan A-l, but before the commencement of trial, the 2006-2010 ACS was released to the public. There is some tension amongst the parties as to which set of ACS data should be considered. See (Tr. 2:64) (At trial Plaintiffs commented that it is “not clear, when a court considers a plan should it be looking at the ACS data office holders had at the time they drafted the map or can they look at newer data?”).

In light of the changing demographics of the population and the specialized need for fact findings that pay special heed to the local history and context, courts require Plaintiffs to provide reliable proof of a Section 2 violation, including reliable proof that the minority group is sufficiently geographically compact and numerous to constitute a majority in a single member district. See Perez, 958 F.Supp. at 1210 . The degree to which data may be relied upon to support a vote dilution is always dependent on the reliability of the data itself. See Westwego I, 906 F.2d at 1045 -46 n. 3; Perez, 958 F.Supp. at 1210-14 . Historically, our courts have allowed Plaintiffs to mount a Section 2 challenge using dated census data that was not entirely reflective of then-existing population trends. See e.g. Perez, 958 F.Supp. at 1213 . Campos v. City of Houston, 894 F.Supp. 1062 (S.D.Tex.1995). Dr. Barreto’s testimony suggests, as common sense would predict, that the further away in time one moves from the terminal year of the ACS aggregation period, the less reliable that data becomes. However, the mere fact that the static data, such as the 2005-2009 ACS, is, as a general proposition, less reliable as time progresses does not address whether the use of that data today is proper. But our past practice with the census is instructive. Historically, census data was presumed reliable unless there was evidence that the population dynamics had changed so dramatically and the census data was so outdated that it could no longer be deemed reflective of the population. See Perez, 958 F.Supp. at 1210 . “Proof of changed figures must be thoroughly documented, have a high degree of accuracy, and be clear, cogent, and convincing.” See Perez, 958 F.Supp. at 1210 . Under this formulation, the publication of subsequent ACS data could be proof of changed figures that would allow the Court to consider the later-published ACS data. 27 The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs may support their case with 2006-2010 ACS figures. Although Plaintiffs may support their case with the 2006-2010 ACS data, they are not bound to do such. Plaintiffs may also elect to support their case with the 2005-2009 ACS, as long as there is no proof that the older and inherently less reliable 2005-09 data has become so outdated that it is no longer probative on questions of demography. In this case, there has been no such showing. Accord *733 ingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs may rely on either the 2005-09 ACS data or the 2006-2010 data. 28

b. Numerosity: Do Plaintiffs’ Gingles Maps Demonstrate a Latino Majority?

Plaintiffs offered into evidence seven demonstration Gingles maps. Only three maps were discussed at trial: Korbel 257, Korbel 325, and Map 3. The other four maps — Map 1, Map 2, Korbel 118, and Korbel 318 — were merely included in the admitted exhibits. However, at the close of trial, counsel for Plaintiffs indicated that he wished to have the Court consider all of Plaintiffs’ demonstration plans.

i. Analysis of the Maps Discussed at Trial

Korbel 257

The first plan offered at trial was Korbel 257. The citizen-voting age population data associated with this map is depicted in the next chart.

CITIZEN-VOTING AGE POPULATION DATA FOR PLAINTIFFS’ KORBEL 257 _GINGLES MAP 29 _

_2010 Census Data 2005-2009 ACS Data_2006-2010 ACS Data

Pre. Total VAP CVAP % Latino CVAP % Latino __CVAP _CVAP

1 1,045,108 778,692 574,695 (±7,510) 16.9% 562,800 (±6,715) 17.7%

2 952,194 645,124 410,950 (±6,017) 52% 412,570 (±5,904) 53.8%

3 1,047,714 773,766 605,935 (±6,104) 14.3% 621,710 (±5,978) 15.4%

4 1,047,443 747,042 603,880 (± 6,323) ' 16.1% 633,415 (± 6,366) 17.9%

The 2005-2009 ACS data shows that, under Korbel 257, 52% of the citizen voting age population in Precinct 2 is Latino. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 46, at 5); (Tr. 2:49). The 2006-2010 ACS data, however, shows that 53.8% of the citizen voting age population in Precinct 2 is Latino, under Korbel 257. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 46, at 5); (Tr. 2:55). Under both sets of data, the majority of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population is Latino. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Korbel 257 map satisfies the numerosity component of the first Gingles factor.

Korbel 325

The second map offered at trial was Korbel 325. The citizen-voting age population data associated with Korbel 325 is depicted in the next chart.

*734 CITIZEN-VOTING AGE POPULATION DATA FOR PLAINTIFFS’ KORBEL 325 _GINGLES MAP 30 _

_2010 Census Data 2005-2009 ACS Data_2006-2010 ACS Data

Pre. Total VAP CVAP % Latino CVAP % Latino _CVAP_CVAP

1 996,174 737,277 542,400 (±7,384) 17.0% 529,000 (±6,566) 17.8%

2 994,188 674,439 437,800 (± 6,001) 50,1% 443,960 (± 6,010) 51.6%

3 1,051,668 771,108 603,030 (± 6,085) 13,0% 627,375 (±5,882) 14.4%

4 1,050,429 761,800 612,230 (± 6,502) 17.1% 630,160 (±6,510) 18.5%

The 2005-2009 ACS data shows that, under Korbel 325, 50.1% of the citizen voting age population in Precinct 2 is Latino. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 57, at 8). However, the 2006-2010 ACS data shows that 51.6% of the citizen voting age population in Precinct 2 is Latino under Korbel 325. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 57, at 6); (Tr. 2:62). Under both sets of data, the majority of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population is Latino. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Korbel 325 map satisfies the numerosity component of the first Cingles factor.

Map 3

The third plan offered at trial was Map 3. Mr. Korbel did not author this plan. See (Tr. 2:68); see also (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 3, at 1). According to Mr. Korbel, this plan was drawn by some community members in Houston at the time the County Commissioner’s map was being debated, in August 2011. See (Tr. 2:69). The citizen voting age population data accompanying this map is reproduced in the next chart.

CITIZEN-VOTING AGE POPULATION DATA FOR PLAINTIFFS’ MAP _3 GINGLES MAP 31 _

District Total VAP_CVAP_% Latino CVAP

1 1,026,179 749,368 549,705 (±7,545)_16.5%

2_960,495 655,752 415,010 (± 5,887)_50.9%

3 1,054,727 775,283 542,790(± 6,169)_16.6%

4 1,050,959 764,148 612,055 (±5,876)_13.6%

Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence (either testimonial or documentary) as to the source of this data; it is not clear if this data was supplied by the ACS or whether it was provided by some other source. Plaintiffs have not provided any means by which the Court could assess the reliability of the data offered and therefore the Court finds that this evidence is not probative on the citizen voting age population data for Plaintiffs’ third Cingles map.

Given that this is the only citizen voting age data Plaintiffs have submitted in connection with Plaintiffs’ third Cingles map, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not submitted reliable evidence of the citizen voting age population in Precinct 2 under Map 3. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Latinos constitute a majority of the citizen voting age population of Precinct 2 under the third Cingles map and thus have failed to establish the *735 numerosity requirement of the first Gingles factor. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Map 8 Gingles plan cannot give rise to a claim of vote dilution.

ii. Analysis of the Other Maps

In addition to the plans discussed at trial, Plaintiffs also submitted four additional plans into evidence: Map 1, Map 2, Korbel 118, and Korbel 318.

Map 1

Attached to Plaintiffs’ Map 1 was a chart detailing the 2005-2009 ACS citizen voting age population data for each of the commissioner’s precincts under Plaintiffs’ Map i. That data is reproduced in the chart that follows.

2005-2009 CITIZEN-VOTING AGE POPULATION DATA FOR _PLAINTIFF’S MAP 1 GINGLES MAP 32 _

District Total VAP' ‘ CVAP % Latino CVAP

1 1,023,902 745,3^8 584,490 (±7,663)_17.7%

2 1,017,706 708,120 506,600 (± 6,389)_42.6%

3 1,030,421 747,631 515,190 (±6,118)_17.9%

4 1,020,430 743,545 589,180 (±5,733)_14.2% •

Under Map 1, 42.6% of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population is Latino; Latinos do not constitute a majority of the citizen-voting age population of the precinct. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Map 1 satisfies the numerosity requirement of the first Gingles factor. Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 853; Campos, 113 F.3d at 548 . Accordingly, the Court finds that the Map 1 Gingles plan cannot give rise to a claim of vote dilution. Map 2

Attached to Plaintiffs’ Map 2 was a chart detailing the 2005-2009 ACS citizen voting age population data for each of the commissioner’s precincts under Plaintiffs’ Map 2., That data is reproduced in the chart that follows.

2005-2009 ACS CITIZEN-VOTING AGE POPULATION DATA FOR MAP _2 33 _

District Total VAP_CVAP % Latino CVAP

1 ■ 1,019,643 741,936 583,290 (±7,658)_17,7%

2 1,017,706 708,120 506,600 (± 6,389) '_42,6%

3 1,030,365 751,044 523,970 (±6,171)_17.5%

4 1,024,745 743,524 581,600 (±5,682) • 14.4%

Under Map 2, 42.6% of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population is Latino; Latinos do not constitute a majority of the citizen-voting age population of the precinct. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Map 2 satisfies the numerosity requirement of the first Gingles factor. Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 853; Campos, 113 F.3d at 548 . Accordingly, the Court finds that the Map 2 Gingles plan cannot give rise to a claim of vote dilution.

Korbel 118

The next map is Korbel 118. The citizen-voting age population data associated with Korbel 118 is depicted' in the next chart.

*736 CITIZEN-VOTING AGE POPULATION DATA FOR PLAINTIFF’S KORBEL 118 _GINGLES MAP 34 _

_2010 Census Data 2005-2009 ACS Data_2006-2010 ACS Data

Pre. Total VAP CVAP % Latí- CVAP % Latino

no

_CVAP_CVAP

1 1,039,016 772,266 573,465 (± 7,726) 16.5% 561,270 (±6,861) 17.6%

2 967,592 651,959 414,800 (± 5,870) 52.3% 420,485 (±5,893) 5 3.7%

3 1,044,999 771,077 600,850 (±6,273) 15.0% 614,385 (±5,995) 16.0%

4 1,040,852 749,322 606,345 (±6,028) 15.3% 634,355 (± 6,203) 17.0%

The 2005-2009 ACS data shows that, under Korbel 118, 52.3% of the citizen voting age population in Precinct 2 is Latino. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 45, at 5). The 2006-2010 ACS data shows that 53.7% of the citizen voting age population in Precinct 2 is Latino, under Korbel 118. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 45, at 5). Under both sets of data, the majority of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population is Latino. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Korbel 118 map satisfies the numerosity component of the first Gingles factor.

Korbel 818

The last map is Korbel 818. This exhibit does not include any citizen-voting age population data, but rather includes a chart detailing the voting age population data. The voting age data associated with Korbel 818 is depicted in the next chart.

VOTING AGE POPULATION DATA FOR KORBEL 318 35

District_Total_VAP_Latino VAP_% Latino VAP

1 1,031,414 767,310_259,887_37.7%

2_984,225 668,428 ' 461,140_69.0%

3 1,037,940 767,424_175,229_2208%

4 1,038,880 741,462_186,314_14.4%

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ evidence does not conclusively establish that Latinos in Precinct 2 constitute a majority of the citizen voting age population under Korbel 818, because the data submitted only analyzes voting age population data, rather than citizen voting age population data. That said, this map has a Spanish Surname registration rate of 47.1% and Latinos constitute 69% of the voting age population. This latter point is noteworthy because in Korbel 325, Latinos only constituted 68.2% of the voting age population of Precinct 2, but still constituted a majority of the citizen voting age population of Precinct 2. Given that, the fact that 69% of the voting age population is Latino, here, lends credence to the inference that Latinos constitute a majority of the citizen voting age population under Korbel 118. Nevertheless, our case law requires plaintiffs to establish each Gingles precondition and these inferences are insufficient to satisfy that burden, especially given the fact that the use of SSRV data is often a crude and imprecise measure of the Latino registered voter population, that tends “to misidentify Hispanic persons as non-Hispanic and viceversa ... [Therefore], without a strict showing of its probativeness, Spanish-surname data are disfavored” in the Section 2 *737 analysis. Rodriguez v. Bexar Cnty., 385 F.3d 853 , 867 n. 18 (5th Cir.2004). Accordingly, the Court finds that Korbel 318 cannot give rise to a claim of vote dilution. See Roscoe, 123 F.3d at 846 (noting that Section 2 plaintiffs must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that all of the Gingles preconditions were satisfied ... [,] therefore [a]ny lack of evidence in the record regarding a violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be attributed to [the plaintiffs]”).

iii. Summary

■ In summary, Plaintiffs submitted into evidence seven demonstration maps: (i) Korbel 257; (ii) Korbel 325, (iii) Map 3,- (iv) Map 1, (v) Map 2, (vi) Korbel 118, and (vii) Korbel 318. Of these maps, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Latinos constitute a majority of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population under Map 3, Map 1, Map 2 and Korbel 818.

Although Plaintiffs submitted data in Map 3 showing that the Latinos constituted a majority of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population, Plaintiffs did not provide any means for the Court to ascertain' the reliability of this data. The source of the data is unspecified and therefore the Court cannot attest to its reliability. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Latinos constitutéd a majority of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population in Map 3, using reliable data. As for Map 1 and Map 2, the data showed that Latinos constituted only a plurality, rather than a majority, of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population. Finally, as for Korbel 318, Plaintiffs failed to offer any statistical evidence on the citizen voting age population. Although Plaintiffs offered crude proxies for citizen voting age population, they failed to submit any evidence directly on point.

The Court did, however, find that Latinos constitute a majority of Precinct 2’s citizen voting age population under Korbel 257, Korbel 325, and Korbel 118. Accordingly, these three maps are the only bases for Plaintiffs’ claim of vote dilution.

2. Compactness

To satisfy the compactness requirement, the plaintiff must show that the minority population is geographically compact. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91-92 , 117 S.Ct. 1925 , 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997); accord Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir.2004). The compactness inquiry focuses on the “compactness of the minority population, not [ ] the compactness of the contested district.” LULAC, 548 U.S. at 433 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 . Stated otherwise, the compactness inquiry focuses on the population dispersal of the minority community, not on the geographic density of the proposed district. See Sensley 385 F.3d at 596 .

The compactness requirement is necessary to show that the challenged electoral practice, rather than the dispersion of the minority community, prevents the affected minority group from electing the candidates of their choice. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 , 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996) (plurality) (if, “because of the dispersion of the minority population, a reasonably compact majority-minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not require a majority-minority district.”); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 433, 435 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 (“[T]here is no basis to believe a district that combines two farflung segments of a racial group with disparate interests provides the opportunity the Section 2 requires .... The mathematical possibility of a racial bloc does not make a district compact.”). A district is sufficiently compact if it allows for effective representation. A district would not be sufficiently compact if it was so convoluted that there was no sense of community, that is, *738 if its members and its representative could not easily tell who actually lived in the district. Clark v. Calhoun County, Miss., 21 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir.1994) (Clark 7); Dillard, v. Baldwin County, 686 F.Supp. 1459,1466 (M.D.Ala.1988).

While no precise rule has emerged delimiting the scope of the compactness inquiry, the court must consider the shape of the plaintiffs proposed map, Sensley, 385 F.3d at 596 , and must also consider the degree to which the plaintiffs proposed demonstration maps comport with “traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries.” Sensley, 385 F.3d at 596 ; see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 433 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 (when conducting the compactness analysis, a district court must consider traditional districting principles); Fairley, 584 F.3d at 670 (in evaluating redistricting plans, courts are expected to “take into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries”).

In this case, three maps, i.e. Korbel 257, Korbel 325, and Korbel 118, satisfied the numerosity requirement. Therefore, the Court ordinarily would consider whether these three maps satisfied the compactness requirement as well. However, at trial, Plaintiffs only presented compactness evidence pertaining to Korbel 257 and Korbel 325. Plaintiffs did not present any compactness evidence on Korbel 118. To be sure, Plaintiffs have submitted evidence in support of Korbel 118, but none of the submitted evidence explains or permits the Court to understand to what extent Korbel 118 map comports with traditional redistricting principles. Without “sufficiently detailed evidence, a court is flatly unable to evaluate whether a possible redistricting scheme would establish legally adequate districts consistent with traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, maintaining communities of interest, and respect for incumbency.” Fairley, 584 F.3d at 669 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs, here, never explained how this map comports with those traditional redistricting criteria, leaving this Court “unable to determine whether [that compliance] would be met.” Fairley, 584 F.3d at 670 . Because Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing all three Cingles preconditions, “[a]ny lack of evidence in the record regarding a violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be attributed to [the plaintiffs].” Roscoe, 123 F.3d at 846 ; accord Fairley, 584 F.3d at 669 . Moreover, because Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Korbel 118 comports with traditional redistricting principles, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Korbel 118 meets the first Gingles precondition. Accordingly, Korbel 118 cannot give rise to a claim of vote dilution and the Court need not further consider this map.

a. Shape

As for the shape assessment, the plaintiffs burden is not onerous; this analysis does not require “some aesthetic ideal of compactness,” but rather considers whether the minority population is sufficiently compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. Clark I, 21 F.3d at 95 . By compactness, Gingles does not mean that a proposed district must meet, or attempt to achieve, some aesthetic absolute, such as symmetry or attractiveness. Geographical symmetry or attractiveness is a desirable consideration for districting, but only to the extent it facilitates the political process. Dillard, 686 F.Supp. at 1466 .

i. Measuring the Shape: Geometric Test

There are many methods by which to assess the shape of the district. One rec *739 ognized method is simply to examine the physical boundaries of the maps and the proposed districts and, based on that visual examination, determine if the district is strangely shaped. Sensley, 385 F.3d at 596 . This geometric test, though imprecise, offers some threshold assessment of compactness. The Court now turns to the shape of the two remaining demonstration plans, Korbel 257 and Korbel 325.

Mr. Korbel testified that the black population and Latino population in Harris County sit like an “X” and they pass each other right in downtown Houston. In order to fashion districts that preserve the voting strength of one community, without diluting the voting strength of the other community, legislatures or courts have traditionally drawn the Latino senatorial and congressional districts, which occupy the central-southeast portion ..of the county, such that it snakes around the black-population in central-southwest Harris County. (Tr. 2:29). , According to Mr. Korbel, the U.S. Congressional and Texas state senatorial districts that overlap with Harris County Commissioner’s Precincts 1 and 2 have “irregular shapes ... that are being drawn to fit the minority population.” (Tr. 2:26). For instance, Mr. Korbel examined the structure of Senate District 6, in effect from 2001 through 2010, and noted that Senate District 6, a Latino opportunity district, dances through the central and southwest Harris County going around the Senate District 13, the adjacent African-American opportunity district. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 50, at 4).

Mr. Korbel further explained that Korbel 257 and Korbel 325’s Precinct 2 was modeled after Senate district 6; in both Korbel 257 and Korbel 325, Precinct 2 wraps around the two arms of Precinct 1, in exactly the same pattern as the congressional and senate plans. (Tr. 2:80, 83). Accordingly, Mr. Korbel testified that this plan looks like the congressional and Senate plans, in that the black population lives in two arms of the district that protrude from downtown and go east and westward, and then the Latino opportunity district wraps around the black district. (Tr. 2:80).

Defendants claimed that, under Korbel 257 and Korbel 325, Precinct 2 extends as far east as Baytown and its westernmost point ends in Spring Branch, thus Precinct 2 spans a distance of almost forty miles east-to-west (Tr. 2:81). At first glance this seems alarming, however all the maps offered, both Plaintiffs’ maps and Defendants’ Revised A-l map, include precincts that traverse great expanses of the County. This, of course, is unsurprising given the size of Harris County. On review, the Court does not find Plaintiffs’ proposed maps particularly unusual; they are no more unusual than Defendants’ Revised Plan A-l. See Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp. 196, 207 (E.D.Ark.1989) (three-judge court) (“[Plaintiffs’] alternative districts are not materially stranger in shape than at least some of the districts contained in the present apportionment plan.”), affd mem., 498 U.S. 1019 , 111 S.Ct. 662 , 112 L.Ed.2d 656 (1991); Marylanders for Fair Representation v. Schaefer, 849 F.Supp. 1022, 1053-54 (D.Md. 1994). Although, the shape of the precincts contained in Korbel 257 and 325 are not Euclidean, the shapes are not so bizarre or irregular as to render them objectionable. Visually the maps appear to incorporate natural geographic boundaries and the maps replicate the historic patterns of the predominately Latino district sitting atop the predominately African-American opportunity district in the center of the County. The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs’ Korbel 257 and Korbel 325 are compactly shaped.

*740 ii. Measuring Shape: Statistical Measures of Compactness

Although the geometric assessment is valuable, its imprecision limits its utility. Knowing that, Section 2 litigants whenever possible should try to “adduce evidence systematically comparing proposed redistricting plans to either the plan being challenged or the predecessor plan in effect during the last relevant election.” Schaefer, 849 F.Supp. at 1053 . “Social scientists have developed a plethora of methodologies for objectively measuring the compactness of individual districts and of entire plans.” Schaefer, 849 F.Supp. at 1053 ; see also (Tr. 2:91).

Mr. Korbel testified that the compactness of his proposed Gingles map could be measured, in part, by reference to the compactness metrics employed by the Texas Legislative Council. At trial, Mr. Korbel testified that the Texas Legislative Council offers many different methods and statistics by which to assess the compactness of a proposed map. Mr. Korbel has decided to evaluate the compactness of his Gingles maps using three such compactness metrics: area rubber band, perimeter-to-area, and population-rubber band. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 48, at 3); (Tr. 2:24). Each metric is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating a non-compact area and a score of 1 indicating a perfectly compact area. (Tr. 2:94).

The area rubber band metric measures the “ratio of the area of the district to the area of the smallest convex polygon enclosing the district,” (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 62, at 1 n. 1), and symbolizes “how tightly packed or spread out the geography of a district is.” Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts, ” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L.Rev. 483, 554 (1993). Operationally, it involves taking the areas of the district and of the smallest circle that completely encloses the district. The ratio of the former to the latter yields the dispersion compactness score. Hence, a circular district is perfectly compact. A square district is relatively compact because, when one draws a circle around the district, there is little area inside the circle that is not also in the district. A long, narrow district, or'one with “fingers” or other extensions, is less compact because it takes a large circle to enclose the entire district, yet much of that circle is empty.

Mr. Korbel testified that the perimeter-to-area metric compares the perimeter of a district to the area that is contained within that perimeter; this metric captures the irregularity or jaggedness of a district’s border by calculating the ratio of the district’s area to the square of its perimeter. (Tr. 2:25); see also Perry, 548 U.S. at 455 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2594 . However, in another exhibit submitted by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs describe the perimeter to area metric as “the ratio of the area of a circle with the same perimeter as the district to the area of the district.” (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 62, at 1 n. 2). The latter definition coincides with the definition found in the case law and the definition proposed by commentators. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 , 349 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1769 , 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004); Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, 92 Mich. L.Rev. at 556; Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 301, 345 (1991). In either event, “the intuitive justification for this measure is that a given perimeter length will enclose the most area if the shape it surrounds is a circle.” Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, 92 Mich. L.Rev. at 555. In general, districts that have smooth borders and relatively regular shapes will have shorter bound *741 aries and enclose considerable area given the boundary length. They therefore score high on this perimeter measure. Jagged district borders substantially lengthen the boundary without enclosing more area and hence score low. Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, 92 Mich. L.Rev. at 556.

The population technique is designed to ascertain the distribution (or dispersion) of voters in the district. See (Tr. 2:92-93). The case law has described this metric as measuring the degree to which the population distribution deviates from the district’s population-weighted center of gravity. See (Tr. 2:25); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 , 756 n. 19, 103 S.Ct. 2653 , 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983) (Stevens, J.) (concurring); see also Polsby and Popper, The Third Criterion, 9 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 301, 345 (1991) (explaining the mechanics of the population rubber band method in the context of a constitutional compactness). In this measure, the population of a district is compared to the population of nearby territory by utilizing a ratio where the district’s population is the numerator and a “rubber band” area around the district is the denominator. Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, 92 Mich. L.Rev. at 557. The “rubber band” is “the area that would be inside a rubber band stretched tightly around the district.” Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, 92 Mich. L.Rev. at 556; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 349 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1769 .

In Perry, the Supreme Court acknowledged that district courts could use the quantitative measures of compactness to gauge the compactness of the proposed Gingles maps. See Perry, 548 U.S. at 455 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 (describing the perimeter-to-area metric as a “standard measure” of compactness in Section 2 cases); see generally Vieth, 541 U.S. at 348 , 124 S.Ct. 1769 (acknowledging the value of considering quantitative measures of compactness, like area rubber band, perimeter-to-area, and population rubber band, when evaluating the compactness of a map); Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, 92 Mich. L.Rev. at 553-59 (describing dispersion (area rubber band), perimeter (perimeter to area), and population (population rubber band) as robust statistical measures of compactness). Accordingly, the Court finds that the three quantitative metrics of compactness used by Plaintiffs are probative, but not themselves determinative, on the question of compactness. Mr. Korbel testified these compactness scores were calculated by the Texas Legislative Council. (Tr. 2:35). The Court thus finds that Plaintiffs’ compactness data is reliable. Accordingly, the compactness of Plaintiffs’ maps will be assessed, in part, by evaluating the compactness statistics supplied by the Texas Legislative Council.

In this case, Mr. Korbel compared the compactness metrics of Plaintiffs’ proposed plans to the Revised A-l map, and the 2001 map. The results are summarized in the next table.

COMPACTNESS: COMPARING THE COMPACTNESS METRICS OF PLAINTIFFS’ _PROPOSED PLANS. THE REVISED A-l MAP, and the 2001 MAP_

Plan Precinct Area Rubber Perimeter-to-Area Population

__Band_Band_Rubber Band

The 2001 Plan 36 1_0442_0082_0,403

2_0679_0208_0.754

3 0.796 0.298_0.801

4 0.573 0.165 0.573

*742 The Revised Plan _1_0.454_0.065_0.388

A-l 37 2_0.635_0,119_0.675

3_0/781_0.236_0.745

_4_0519_0108_0.542

Korbel 257 1_0,572_0.099_0.5 77

0Gingles Plan 2_0/513_0051_0.522

# 1) 38 3_0729_0.178_0.587

_4_0507_0084_0.387

Korbel 325 1_0554_0097_0.5 49

0Gingles Plan _2_0.541_0.056_0.574

# 2) 39 3_0597_0176_0.467

_4_0496_0061_0.353

(a) Korbel 257

Mr. Korbel testified that the compactness scores for Korbel 257 were better than the compactness scores of either the 2001 map or the Revised A-l map. (Tr. 2:32). The evidence shows that the area rubber band, perimeter-to-area, and population rubber band scores for Precinct 1 are higher in Korbel 257 than they are in both the 2001 Map and the Revised A-l map, (Tr. 2:35), but the area rubber band, perimeter-to-area, and population rubber band scores for precincts 2, 3, and 4 are worse under Korbel 257 than they are under either the 2001 map or the Revised Plan A-l. (Tr. 2:32). Mr. Korbel, however, stressed that the differences in the scores were slight; in his view, the area rubber band, perimeter to area, and population rubber band scores of all four precincts under all three maps are “so close that [he] wouldn’t judge them to be really very different.” (Tr. 2:47). Even though the 2001 Map and the Revised Plan A-l outperformed Korbel 257 in precincts 2, 3, and 4, Mr. Korbel contends that, in the aggregate, the compactness scores for all three plans are comparable. (Tr. 2:32). Moreover, Mr. Korbel explained that Korbel 257’s compactness scores were within the expected range for relatively compact districts drawn in a large urban area. (Tr. 2:89).

In fact, Mr. Korbel testified that Korbel 257’s compactness scores were similar to the compactness scores for the four Texas Senate districts covering Harris County. (Tr. 2:46). For instance, as detailed in the chart below, Texas Senate District 13, which covers much of Precinct 1 as that precinct is drawn in Revised A-l, has an area rubber band score of 0.529 and a perimeter-to-area score of 0.132. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 62.1, at 3). Senate District 6, which snakes around Senate District 13 in much the same way that Plaintiffs’ proposed Precinct 2 navigates around Plaintiffs’ proposed Precinct 1, has an area rubber band score of 0.516 and a perimeter-to-area score of 0.072. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 62.1, at 3). Senate District 15, which carves out the northeastern-north central *743 portion of Harris County, in much the same way as Plaintiffs’ proposed Precinct 4, has an area rubber band score of 0.510 and a perimeter-to-area score of 0.08. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 62.1, at 3). Finally, Senate District 7, which encompasses the north-central to north-western and western portions of the county, much like Plaintiffs’ proposed Precinct 3, has an area rubber band of 0.625 and a perimeter-to-area score of 0.187. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 62. 1, at 3).

COMPACTNESS: COMPACTNESS METRICS OF THE TEXAS STATE CONGRESSIONAL AND SENATORIAL DISTRICTS THAT ARE PRIMARILY IN HARRIS COUNTY 40

Plan District Area Rubber Band Perimeter-r-to-Area

2012 Texas Senate Districts 41 0.516 0.072:

0.625-0.187

13 0:529, 0.132 ■

15 0.510 0.08

2012 Texas Congressional 0.421 0.074

Districts 42 0.554 0.136

0.607 0.156

18 0.587 0.080

29 0.600 0.086

Accordingly, Mr. Korbel concluded that Korbel 257 was compact because the map’s compactness scores were comparable to the compactness scores for the County’s Plan and the compactness scores for other legislative districts in Harris County.

(b) Korbel 325

The compactness metrics for Korbel 325 are comparable to the compactness metrics for Korbel 257. For instance, under Korbel 325, Precinct 2 had an area rubber band of 0.541, a perimeter to area ratio of 0.056, and a population rubber band ratio of 0.574. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 57, at 5). Under the Revised A-l map, Precinct 2 has an area rubber band ratio of 0.635, a perimeter to area ratio of 0.119, and a population rubber band ratio of 0.675. (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 48, at 6). Mr. Korbel explained, however, that the area rubber band, perimeter-to-area, and population rubber band measures under Plaintiffs’ demonstration map falls, within the acceptable range of scores/ratios for election districts drawn for Harris County. Mr. Korbel opined that Korbel 325 was more compact than the Revised Plan A-l, because all three compactness metrics for Precinct 1 are higher under his plan than they are under the Revised Plan A-l and Precincts 2, 3, and 4 have approximately the same compactness ratios as the Revised Plan A-l. See (Tr. 2:67); compare (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 48, at 6) with (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 57, at 5) and (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 46, at 3). In his view, the plans are all essentially *744 the same in terms of compactness. (Tr. 2:67).

b. Compactness: Compliance With Traditional Redistricting Principles

As for the compliance with the traditional districting principles assessment, Plaintiffs and Defendants offer two competing theories for the way in which this assessment should be conducted. Under the case law, the- “[section] 2 compactness inquiry should take into account ‘traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest arid traditional boundaries.’ ” . Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 92 , 117 S.Ct. 1925 , 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997) (quoting Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 , 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996)); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 , 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (recognizing “respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests” as a traditional, race-neutral districting principle); Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 (identifying compactness and contiguity as traditional redistricting principles); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 651-52 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 , 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (identifying population equality as a traditional districting principle).

Defendants, relying on Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir.2004), argue that the compliance with traditional districting principles component of the compactness inquiry requires Plaintiffs to show that the Latino community in Harris County is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single commissioner precinct drawn in accordance with the traditional redistricting principles employed by Harris County when the county is formulating an electoral map. (Instrument No. 93, at 6-9; Instrument No. 92, at 11 ¶ 18; Instrument No. 104, at 8-18). Plaintiffs, however, object to Defendants’ interpretation. According to Plaintiffs, the compliance with traditional districting principles component of the compactness analysis is a malleable inquiry; therefore, while the demonstration maps must respect the County’s traditional redistricting principles, the demonstration maps do not have to comply with the traditional redistricting principles to the same degree as an adopted map. (Instrument No. 95, at 6). Thus, the parties’ dispute centers on the degree to which the demonstration maps must comport with the challenged jurisdiction’s traditional redistricting principles.

Both parties partially predicate their claims on Sensley. Sensley simply stands for the proposition that the first Gingles factor requires Plaintiffs to show that their map comports with traditional redistricting principles. Sensley does not, however, address the degree to which the demonstration maps must comply with these principles.

Political subdivisions, like Harris County, have many tools with which to craft a dilutive map. See generally Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 153-54, 113 S.Ct. 1149 (explaining how political subdivisions may manipulate district lines to dilute the voting strength of a politically cohesive minority group). To be sure, this Court does not mean to suggest that Harris County has intentionally wielded those tools of dilution to devise a dilutive map. However, the Section 2 analysis focuses on effect, not intent. “The essence of a Section 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [Latino] and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 ; see also De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1006-07 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 .

In this case, Harris County has selected eight traditional redistricting principles to *745 guide the County in its redistricting efforts. See (Instrument No. 91, at 15-17 ¶ 14-15). Thus, any electoral map drafted by the County is drafted in accordance with these eight redistricting principles. When a Section 2 plaintiff challenges the defendants’ redistricting scheme, the plaintiff is implicitly asserting that the County’s application of these eight districting principles operates to deprive the plaintiff and other members of her protected class the opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. In essence, the plaintiff alleges that the County’s choice and application of redistricting principles interacts with social and historical conditions to impair the ability of the protected class to equally participate in the political process. See De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1007 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 .

Given that Plaintiffs contend that the selection and application of the traditional redistricting principles chosen by the County dilutes their voting power, it would be unfair to require Plaintiffs to draw maps in strict accordance with the County’s priorities. Under this scheme, the entire Section 2 analysis is infected by which traditional redistricting principles the County has prioritized, thereby precluding any meaningful review of the dilutive effect, if any, of the County’s choice and application of its chosen redistricting principles. If compliance with the traditional redistricting principles is defined as rigidly as Defendants propose, then voting rights cases could be defeated at the outset by the very barriers to political participation that Congress has sought to remove: legislative bodies could evade compliance with the Voting Rights Act by carefully selecting an array of redistricting principles such that it would be difficult for a plaintiff to draw a demonstration map that would both differ from the defendant’s map and yet still comply with each of the defendant’s redistricting principles. Surely, Congress did not intend for the broad remedial scope of Section 2 to be so easily evaded by a defendants’ selection of redistricting principles. The scope of the statute must be construed to avoid this anomalous result. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403-04 , 111 S.Ct. 2354 , 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 , 89 - S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) (the Voting Rights Act should be interpreted in' a manner that provides “the broadest possible scope” in combating racial discrimination). •

Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants’ rigid formulation of the traditional redistricting principles is inconsistent with the litigation framework contemplated by Gingles and its progeny, in that it conflates the liability analysis with the remedy analysis. In a Section 2 case, the plaintiffs must prove that, under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged redistricting scheme dilutes the minority group’s voting power. If the plaintiffs successfully prove dilution, then the defendant jurisdiction must modify its map to cure the dilution; the defendant does not, however, have to adopt the maps proposed by the plaintiffs. Clark II, 88 F.3d at 1407; Westwego III, 946 F.2d at 1124 . Thus, every Section 2 case may be divided into two phases: a liability phase, where the Court determines whether the challenged electoral- device dilutes minority voting power, and a remedy phase, where the challenged jurisdiction remedies the dilution. Under this scheme, the ultimate viability and effectiveness of a remedy is considered at the remedial stage of litigation and not during analysis of the Gingles preconditions. Clark II, 88 F.3d at 1407. According to the County, a rigid formulation of the compliance with traditional redistricting principles inquiry ensures that the demonstration maps are viable and stable alternatives to the defendant’s re *746 districting scheme. Although the logic of this contention is seductive, the argument misconstrues the goal of the first Gingles precondition. The ultimate end of the first Gingles precondition is to prove that a solution is possible, not necessarily to present the ultimate solution to the problem. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2752 ; Houston v. Lafayette Cnty., 56 F.3d 606, 612 (5th Cir.1995). In “Gingles, the Court provided that it is sufficient that a plaintiff show that a workable plan for another minority-controlled voting district is possible; the plaintiffs plan need not be an ultimate solution.” Fairley, 584 F.3d at 671 . Defendants’ reading collapses the liability and remedy determinations into a single threshold analysis. This is plainly' at odds with the scope of the first Gingles precondition because the first question asks only whether any violation has occurred at all, not whether a remedy is possible.

Aside from these theoretical and structural objections, the Court rejects Defendánts’ reading because it is impractical. Map-drawing rarely, if ever, involves rote application of the redistricting principles chosen by the state or county. Even in a case like the one at hand, where the defendant’s redistricting efforts are informed by a handful of traditional redistricting precepts, these principles are applied dexterously, with the defendant balancing many competing considerations. A defendant does not assign each of the selected redistricting principles the same importance; it prioritizes these principles, such that some of these principles anchor the redistricting process whereas others are merely-buoys demarcating the outer bounds of the redistricting process. Despite this prioritization, occasionally, the defendant’s redistricting principles will be in tension with one another, such that'adherence to one redistricting principle necessitates the subjugation of a competing principle. Given the nuance and discretion involved in the redistricting calculus, a defendant would always be able to object to a plaintiffs demonstration map on the grounds that the plaintiff did not weigh competing considerations in the same manner as the defendant would have.

While Plaintiffs are obligated to show that their maps comply with traditional redistricting principles, Plaintiffs are not required to prioritize those principles in the same manner as Defendants. Plaintiffs need only show a “well-developed, legally-adequate plan that can be adjusted during [the remedial stage].” Fairley, 584 F.3d at 671 n. 14.

i. Preserving Communities of Interest (a) Korbel 257

In composing Korbel 257, Mr. Korbel’s main priorities were to: (1) draw a map with majority Latino CVAP (2) without cutting or splitting any cities or census-designated places and (3) maintain a top-to-bottom deviation of 10% or less. (Tr. 2:30-31). Mr. Korbel testified that Korbel 257 does not split any voting precincts or voting tabulation districts, whereas the Revised Plan A-l split fourteen districts. (Tr. 2:34). According to Mr. Korbel, if he cut the same number of precincts in his map as the County did in its Revised A-l map, then he could have reduced the total population deviation to near zero. (Tr. 2:30).

Although the map does not split any voting districts, it does split two cities, Baytown and Pasadena, and one census-designated place, Channelview. (Tr. 2:86). Mr. Korbel testified that the condition that the map not split any cities or census-designated places makes it more difficult to reduce the top-to-bottom deviation. According to Mr. Korbel, he split Baytown because if he left the city whole then there was no way for him to draw a map that *747 would get through to the rest of the less urban areas in Harris County. (Tr. 2:87). Although Mr. Korbel didn’t explain the reason he split Pasadena, he testified that after splitting the city, he did not think to reassemble the City because even with Pasadena split between two commissioner’s precincts, Precinct 2 had enough population that it was no longer unconstitutionally under-populated. See (Tr. 2:87). Although Mr. Korbel admitted that under both Korbel 257 and Korbel 325 Precinct 2 is the most under-populated, see (Tr. 2:87); see also (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 46, at 6); (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 57, at 1), Mr. Korbel admitted that the reason he underpopulated Precinct 2 was so that he could maximize the Latino population. (Tr. 2:88).

Defendants, however, point out that under Korbel 257, two commissioners are co-located in the same precinct and two commissioners have been moved out of their precincts. Under Korbel 257, Commissioner Morman, who is the commissioner for Precinct 2, would reside in Precinct 4 and Commissioner Cagle, the commissioner of Precinct 4, would reside in Precinct 3 with Commissioner Radack, the commissioner for Precinct 3. (Tr. 3: 239); (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 16; Plaintiffs’ Ex. 46). Mr. Korbel admitted that when he drew his two Gingles plans, he drew them without consideration of where the incumbent commissioners resided. (Tr. 2:81). Mr. Korbel further testified that drawing compact commissioner’s court precincts in Harris County is a challenge because three of the commissioners (the commissioners for Precinct 1, 3, and 4) all live within close proximity to one another, see (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 52, at 6), making it difficult to draw a compact and normal shaped map in which each commissioner lives in his or her respective commissioner precinct. (Tr. 2:18).

In Dr. Murray’s view, Korbel 257 reaches into the heart of Baytown to remove a sizeable Latino population; divides Pasadena; then loops around to Redneck Alley; then moves west, before finally moving south into Spring Branch, in an effort to amass sizeable concentrations of Latino population. (Tr. 3:238). According to Dr. Murray, the impact of splitting Pasadena and Baytown cannot be overstated. Dr. Murray testified that, historically, these cities have always been in Precinct 2 and thus have always had one commissioner. If Korbel 257 was implemented, then part of both cities would be in Precinct 4 while the other portion of the cities would remain in Precinct 2. Coordination of service delivery is far more difficult when a city is represented by two Commissioners rather than one. (Tr. 3:240).

In Dr. Murray’s view, this map was designed to maximize the Latino population in the district. (Tr. 3:238). Dr. Murray believes this map would dramatically alter Precinct 2 from its present state,

(b) Korbel 325

As for Plaintiffs’ second plan, Korbel 325, Plaintiffs contend that Korbel 325 is, in large part, the same map as Korbel 257. (Tr. 2:58). However, Korbel 325 differs from Korbel 257 in that Korbel 325 cuts fewer cities and census designated places and it also ensures that none of the four commissioners are co-located in the same precinct. See (Tr. 2:58). This map also differs from Korbel 257 in that Korbel 325 splits two voting tabulation districts (VTDs); under this map, VTD #220 is split between Precincts 2 and 4, and VTD # 346 is split between Precincts 2 and 4. See (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 57, at 5); (Tr. 2:65). Mr. Korbel explained that these two voting tabulation districts were split to maintain the boundary lines of a city and another census-designated place. (Tr. 2:65). In order to keep the city together, he had to cut the two voting tabulation districts (VTD 220 and VTD 346). In his view, it *748 was an either-or scenario, where Mr. Korbel was forced to choose between cutting a city and retaining the integrity (and unity) of all the voting tabulation districts or cutting two voting tabulation precincts, but preserving the integrity (and unity) of all the cities in Harris County.

Dr. Murray testified that while this map essentially realigns Precincts 3 and 4, the map is really designed with Precincts 1 and 2 in mind. (Tr. 3:244). According to Dr. Murray, Korbel 325 is essentially the same map as Korbel 257 and every criticism leveled against that map applies with equal force to this map. (Tr. 3:245). The only real difference between Korbel 257 and Korbel 325 is that in Korbel 325, Commissioners Cagle, Radack, and Morman are no longer co-located in Precinct 4: (Tr. 3:245). The map does not, however, resolve any of the issues in Precinct 1; this map, like Korbel 257, continues to divest Precinct 1 of all its important service facilities and adds population in Alief, which does not comport well with Precinct l’s status as a performing opportunity district. (Tr. 3: 245).

ii. Incumbent-Constituency Relations

Mr. Korbel explained that when he draws a Gingles map he does not pay attention to the number of constituents that are actually moved to a different precinct. (Tr. 2:73). In his view, Gingles maps are not bound by the prior maps; thus, he when he drafts a map, he does not always start with the existing map and then draw a map that cures the dilution existing therein. (Tr. 2:78).. Therefore, when he drew his Gingles maps, he did not use the existing County map as his tempr late, but rather started whole-cloth, because he thinks that is a better way to draw a Gingles map. (Tr. 2:79).

Dr. Alford testified that in reviewing Plaintiffs’ plans, he performed an analysis on the number of people shifted to new commissioners court precincts under Plaintiffs’ plan. (Tr. 4:47). The results from Dr. Alford’s analysis, which are included in Defendants’ Exhibit 67, are replicated in the table below. According to Dr. Alford, the chart below is the end product of a standard .analysis performed by TLC that details the proportion of the population moved in a redistricting plan compared to a base plan. (Tr. 4:48). The table below describes the population moved out of each precinct under Plaintiffs’ proposed plans and under the County’s Revised Plan A-l. (Tr. 4:48).

Dr. Alford explained that he undertook this analysis because there has been a great deal of discussion concerning the disruption of services and population occasioned by the irregular nature of Plaintiffs’ proposed districts. (Tr. 4:51). His analysis offers a means by which to gauge the real impact of that disruption by examining the number of people the map moves. According to Dr. Alford, evaluating the effect of the maps based on the number of peoplé the map moves rather than the amount of physical territory the map moves is a better measure of the real impact of the map. This is because sometimes a map might incur major territorial disruptions while looking on a map, but those territorial disruptions may not involve a lot of people. On the other hand, sometimes a small territorial disruption may be densely populated, affecting a large share of the population. Therefore, merely examining the territorial shifts occasioned by the map does not always offer insight into-the scope and impact of the proposed redistricting change. (Tr. 4:51).

*749 VOTING AGE POPULATION MOVED TO A NEW COMMISSIONER’S PRECINCT FROM THE BASE (THE 2001 MAP) OF THE EXISTING 2010 EXISTING _PRECINCTS 43 _

_Korbel 257_Korbel 325_Revised Plan A-l

Moved out of Precinct 1_292,586 (38.3%) 298,248 (40.5%) 48.799 (6.6%)

Moved out of Precinct 2_275,346 (36.0%) 236,463 (32.1%) 29,344 (4.0%)

Moved out of Precinct 3_314,085 (41.1%) 327.113 (44.4%) 65,935 (8.9%)

Moved out of Precinct 4_373,015 (48.8%) 361,269 (49.0%) 112,82 2 (15.2%)

Total Moved County-wide 1.255.032 (42.6%) 1,223,093 (41.5%) 256.900 (8.7%)

Dr. Alford explained that Plaintiffs’ Korbel 257 moves 1,255,032 people; this map would, if implemented, move almost 43% of the voting age population of Harris County. (Tr. 4:49); (Defendants’ Ex. 67). Korbel 325 offers a slight improvement over Korbel 257, in that it only moves 1,233,093 people, or approximately 42% of the county-wide voting age population. (Tr. 4:49). Under either Korbel 257 or Korbel 325, Plaintiffs’ plan contemplates shifting almost two-fifths of the county-wide voting age population. In contrast, the County’s Revised Plan A-l only moves 256,900 adults. Thus, it only moves approximately 9% of the county-wide adult population. (Tr. 4:51).

Defendants’ fact witness Mr. Frank King, the County director of budget and planning, examined Plaintiffs’ Gingles maps and assessed the impact those maps would have on facilities and real estate in the County. 44 His results are encapsulated in the charts below.

FACILITIES AND REAL ESTATE: EFFECT OF REDISTRICTING ON COUNTY ASSETS _(NUMBER OF ASSETS CHANGED)

45

_Korbel 257_Korbel 325_Revised Plan A-l

Road Miles (Unincorporated Areas)_2,207_2,489_1,035_

Bridge Miles 46 _8_9_3_

Number of Maintenance Camps_5_6_2_

Acres of Parks 47 _6,869_9,749_520

Number of Senior/Community Centers 48 _5_21_._3_

Libraries 49 _10_12_4_

Physical Ar

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