Mark Robbins v. Randy Becker, Sr.

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 12-3113

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Mark Robbins; Gail Robbins; I-44 Truck Center and Wrecker Service, LLC; I-44

Wrecker Service, LLC

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

Randy Becker, Sr., in his individual capacity; James Cox, in his individual

capacity; Ryan A. Burckhardt, in his individual capacity; Daniel E. Dicus, in his

individual capacity; Travis Inman, in his individual capacity; Ronald Johnson, in

his individual capacity; Jeremie Keathely, in his individual capacity; Lee A.

Kenley, in her individual capacity; Keith Lichay, in his individual capacity; Justin

McCullough, in his individual capacity; Brent Moore, in his individual capacity;

John Oliveras, in his individual capacity; Duane L. Robinson, in his individual

capacity; Rhonda Shanika, in her individual capacity

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants

John Does, Police Officers, in their individual capacities; John Does, Dispatchers,

in their individual capacities; Jane Does, Dispatchers, in their individual capacities

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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Submitted: April 9, 2013

Filed: May 22, 2013

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BYE and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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RILEY, Chief Judge.

This interlocutory appeal arises out of the district court’s denial of summary

judgment on defendants’, Missouri State Highway Patrol Officers’ (officers), qualified

immunity defenses to the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1-2, claims. The officers contend we should address the merits of their qualified

immunity defenses. We decline to do so. Following our well established precedents,

“we remand because the [district court’s] analysis [denying summary judgment] is so

scant that we are unable to discern if the district court even applied both steps of the

qualified immunity inquiry to all of the summary judgment claims.” Jones v.

McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158, 1163 (8th Cir. 2012).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

Mark Robbins and Gail Robbins operate I-44 Truck Center and Wrecker

Service, LLC, and I-44 Wrecker Service, LLC (I-44 and, collectively, Robbins). I-44

provides towing and wrecker services to semi tractor-trailers and other private and

commercial vehicles along the Interstate 44 corridor in the St. Louis, Missouri, area.

From approximately 1996 to 2006, the officers maintained a “rotation list” for

1

Our decision to remand in this case does not depend upon the evidence

developed for summary judgment. For background purposes, we summarize the

statement of facts from the plaintiff’s complaint, without considering whether these

facts were properly supported by admissible evidence. Cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.

304, 313 (1995) (stating, in many cases “‘[a]n appellate court reviewing the denial of

the defendant’s claim of immunity need not consider the correctness of the plaintiff’s

version of the facts’” (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985))

(alteration in original)).

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selecting wrecker and towing companies to respond to highway accidents. The

Robbins allege I-44 was excluded from the list after Mark Robbins had a

confrontation with some of the officers in 1999. The Robbins further allege that,

following this 1999 incident, the officers maliciously conspired with each other and

third parties to prevent I-44 from providing towing services to I-44’s clients.

B. Procedural History

The Robbins brought suit against fourteen individually named officers and at

least three “John Doe” officers, alleging (1) violations of their due process and equal

protection rights under § 1983; (2) conspiracy to violate Robbins’ constitutional

rights; (3) violations of the Sherman Act; and (4) Missouri state law claims. After

discovery, the officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.

The district court denied summary judgment, concluding “genuine issues of material

fact remain” in dispute.

The district court did not discuss the qualified immunity standard and made no

showing that it was applying the two-step qualified immunity analysis to the

defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The district court’s order did not discuss

the material facts in dispute, nor did it identify the material legal issues pertinent to

the facts alleged. The district court’s order did not discuss the Robbins’ separate

claims or identify what facts the Robbins presented which were sufficient to overcome

the officers’ qualified immunity defense.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

We have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial

of qualified immunity under the collateral order doctrine. See McNeese, 675 F.3d at

1161. “‘[A]n order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable even

though it is interlocutory; otherwise, it would be effectively unreviewable.’” Id. at

1160 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 n.2 (2007)) (alteration in original).

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Our interlocutory jurisdiction is limited. See id. at 1160. We may review a district

court’s order denying qualified immunity “‘to the extent that it turns on an issue of

law.’” Id. at 1160-61 (quoting Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886, 889-90 (8th Cir.

2011)). We have no jurisdiction to determine “‘whether or not the pretrial record sets

forth a “genuine” issue of fact for trial.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 320).

As we recognized in McNeese, our interlocutory jurisdiction turns on whether

the appellant asserting qualified immunity raises predominantly legal, or

predominantly factual, issues. See id. We had jurisdiction in McNeese because the

appellant’s arguments “challenge[d] the district court’s application of qualified

immunity principles to the established summary judgment facts.” Id. In the instant

case the officers’ arguments do not call for us to “‘resolve any disputed issues of

evidentiary sufficiency.’” Id. (quoting Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 595

F.3d 798, 806 (8th Cir. 2010)). The officers raise only legal issues regarding “the

application of qualified immunity principles” to the facts of this case, id., and we thus

have jurisdiction to address the qualified immunity issue.

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity is “‘immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S.

at 526) (emphasis in original). For this reason, the Supreme Court

“repeatedly [has] stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the

earliest possible stage in litigation.” Id. The district court must resolve immunity

questions with sufficient clarity for the court of appeals effectively to exercise its

interlocutory review of the legal issues surrounding the denial of summary judgment

based on qualified immunity.

We have “rejected attempts [by district courts] to enter truncated orders that did

not provide a ‘thorough determination of [the defendants’] claim of qualified

immunity.’” McNeese, 675 F.3d at 1162 (quoting O’Neil v. City of Iowa City, Iowa,

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496 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2007)). “[R]ecogniz[ing] the importance of a thorough

qualified immunity analysis,” id., we repeatedly have remanded where the district

court’s “analysis is so scant that we are unable to discern if the district court even

applied both steps of the qualified immunity inquiry to all of the summary judgment

claims,” id. at 1162-63. See id. at 1161-63; O’Neil, 496 F.3d at 917-18 (reasoning,

“a thorough determination” is necessary if “immunity is to mean anything”); see also

Solomon v. Petray, 699 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (8th Cir. 2012) (remanding because of

“the complete absence in the [district court’s] order of any explicit reference to, or

analysis of, [the defendants’] claims of qualified immunity which leaves [the appellate

court] unable to determine whether the district court even considered the issue of

qualified immunity before denying the motion for summary judgment”); Handt v.

Lynch, 681 F.3d 939, 944-45 (8th Cir. 2012) (remanding because the district court just

stated “there were material issues of fact in dispute,” rather than determining the facts

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and deciding whether those

assumed facts “demonstrate a constitutional violation that is clearly established”);

Katosang v. Wasson-Hunt, 392 F. App’x 511, 513-14 (8th Cir. 2010) (unpublished

per curiam).

Due to the significance of an early resolution for qualified immunity

issues—with an effective interlocutory appellate review—we consequently require

findings of fact and conclusions of law, similar by analogy to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2)

(addressing “an interlocutory injunction”), sufficient to permit our court (1) to

determine what facts the district court assumed, in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and (2) to evaluate the district court’s individualized legal analysis.2

2

We exercise our “supervisory authority.” See Starr v. Mandanici, 152 F.3d

741, 750 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is well-established that courts of appeal may exercise

supervisory authority over lower courts.”); see also La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352

U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957) (explaining, “supervisory control of the District Courts by

the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal

system”); see, e.g., Osthus v. Whitesell Corp., 639 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2011)

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Like in Solomon, Handt, McNeese, Katosang, and O’Neil, the district court in

this case failed to discuss the qualified immunity standard or otherwise demonstrate

it was applying the two-step qualified immunity analysis. See Solomon, 699 F.3d at

1038-39; Handt, 681 F.3d at 944-45; McNeese, 675 F.3d at 1161-63; O’Neil, 496 F.3d

at 917-18; Katosang, 392 F. App’x at 513-14. The officers “are entitled to a thorough

determination of their claim of qualified immunity.” O’Neil, 496 F.3d at 918. “[W]e

can neither affirm nor reverse the denial of qualified immunity based on the cursory

commentary advanced by the district court in its denial order.” Id.

III. CONCLUSION

We remand to the district court for a more detailed consideration and

explanation, consistent with this opinion, of the officers’ claims of qualified

immunity.

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(remanding an interlocutory preliminary injunction because the district court’s order

did “not specifically find facts or explain how . . . the requirements for an injunction”

were met, commenting “‘[w]ithout that information, we cannot fulfill our function of

review’” (quoting Johansen v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 745 F.2d

1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1984))).

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