Mary Lankford, in her official capacity as Sublette County Clerk v. Paul Rock, Dari Quirk, & Ernest Kawa

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2013 WY 61

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2013

May 17, 2013

PAUL ROCK, DARI QUIRK &

ERNEST KAWA,

Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

v.

MARY LANKFORD, in her official

capacity as Sublette County Clerk,

Appellee

(Defendant).

S-12-0216, S-12-0217

MARY LANKFORD, in her official

capacity as Sublette County Clerk,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

PAUL ROCK, DARI QUIRK, &

ERNEST KAWA,

Appellees

(Plaintiffs).

Appeals from the District Court of Sublette County

The Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Paul Rock, Dari Quirk, and Ernest Kawa:

Sky D. Phifer, Phifer Law Office, Lander, Wyoming

Representing Mary Lankford, in her official capacity as Sublette County Clerk:

Neal R. Stelting, Sublette County and Prosecuting Attorney, Pinedale, Wyoming

Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building,

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be

made before final publication in the permanent volume.

DAVIS, Justice.

[¶1] In August of 2011, the voters of Sublette County approved a ballot proposition

increasing the size of the county commission from three to five. Before the proposed

change could be implemented in the primary and general elections to be held in 2012, a

second ballot proposition reducing the size of the commission from five back to three was

submitted to the voters in May of 2012. The proposition passed, and Sublette County

Clerk Mary Lankford determined that the second proposition returned the size of the

commission to three, and therefore held an election for the one commission seat which

would have been open if there had been no ballot propositions.

[¶2] Appellants Rock, Quirk, and Kawa challenged Lankford’s decision, claiming that

the additional seats permitted by the August 2011 ballot proposition could not be

eliminated until they were filled, and that the May 2012 special election decreasing the

number of seats was improper and void. Lankford disagreed with Appellants’

interpretation of the applicable statutes, and she moved to dismiss the complaint because

it was untimely and brought by an insufficient number of electors under statutes

governing ballot proposition contests. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but

agreed with Lankford that the May 2012 election was proper, and granted her summary

judgment.

[¶3] The case came to us as two separate appeals. Appellants Rock, Quirk, and Kawa

challenge the district court’s decision as to the interpretation of the statute governing

increases and decreases in county commissions in Case No. S-12-0216. Lankford

appeals the district court’s decision denying her motion to dismiss in Case No. S-12-

0217, and raises the same issue as an alternative ground for affirmance in Case No. S-12-

0216. We find that Appellants’ claims are an election contest, that they were not timely

filed or brought by a sufficient number of electors, and that the district court lacked

jurisdiction to consider the claims. Although our decision upholds the 2012 election as

did that of the district court, we find its decision to be void, and we remand for dismissal.

ISSUES

[¶4] 1. Did Appellants’ claim amount to an election contest of a May 2012 ballot

proposition under Wyoming Statute § 22-17-105?

2. If so, did Appellants meet the requirements to maintain a ballot contest

pursuant to the above statute so that the district court had jurisdiction over the dispute?

FACTS

[¶5] Sublette County has historically been governed by a three-member Board of

County Commissioners. In 2011, a group of citizens submitted a valid petition for a

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ballot proposition to increase the number of commissioners from three to five as

permitted by Wyoming Statute § 18-3-501(b) (LexisNexis 2011). The ballot proposition

was submitted to the voters at a special election held on August 16, 2011. Voter turnout

was 28.67%, and the ballot proposition passed by thirty-one votes.

[¶6] Wyoming Statute § 18-3-501(b)1 requires that additional commissioner seats

created in odd-numbered years be filled at the next general election, meaning that the

voters would have chosen the new commissioners in the primary and general elections to

be held in August and November of 2012 if other events had not transpired. However, a

valid petition to decrease the number of commissioners from five back to three as

arguably permitted by Wyoming Statute § 18-3-501(f) was filed on March 1, 2012.

Sublette County Clerk Mary Lankford (Lankford) certified the petition and placed the

proposition on the ballot in a special election held on May 8, 2012. The percentage of

registered voters exercising their franchise was 45.88%, and the proposition passed by

142 votes.

[¶7] Lankford determined that the second ballot proposition eliminated the two

additional commission seats created by the first proposition. It would appear that she

concluded that the 2012 ballot proposition cancelled the 2011 proposition. She released a

proclamation indicating that one county commissioner seat occupied by a sitting

commissioner and open without regard to the ballot propositions would be submitted to

the voters at the 2012 primary and general elections.

[¶8] After a false start involving the filing of a soon-dismissed petition for review of

Lankford’s action, Paul Rock, Dari Quirk, and Ernest Kawa filed a complaint for

declaratory relief and for a writ of mandamus in the District Court within and for Sublette

County on June 18, 2012. We will refer to the plaintiffs below as “Appellants” for the

sake of brevity, although they are also Appellees as to Lankford’s appeal. All three

claimed to be citizens injured by deprivation of their right to vote for three county

commission candidates. Rock and Kawa also claimed somewhat enigmatically to have

1

The Wyoming Legislature amended several portions of § 18-3-501 while this action was pending on

appeal. See 2013 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 64. Wyoming Statute § 8-1-107, titled “Effect of amendment or

repeal on pending actions,” provides as follows:

If a statute is repealed or amended, the repeal or amendment

does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, civil or

criminal. If the repeal or amendment relates to the remedy, it does not

affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceedings, unless so expressed,

nor shall any repeal or amendment affect causes of action, prosecutions

or proceedings existing at the time of the amendment or repeal, unless

otherwise expressly provided in the amending or repealing act.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-107 (LexisNexis 2011). The amendments to § 18-3-501 did not expressly provide

that they applied to pending actions, and we therefore do not consider their effect on this appeal. See id.

2

suffered additional injury because they could not both be elected in 2012, apparently

meaning that they were or would have been candidates for the two additional seats

authorized by the 2011 ballot proposition.

[¶9] Appellants asked the district court to declare that three commission seats (the two

additional seats authorized by the 2011 vote plus one seat which came up for election

from the preexisting three-member commission) had to be filled in the 2012 election.

They also asked the district court to declare the May 2012 special election void ab initio.

They sought a writ of mandamus directing Lankford to issue a proclamation that three

seats (one already in existence and two new ones) would be voted upon in the 2012

primary and general elections. Appellants also sued Secretary of State Max Maxfield in

his official capacity, seeking the same relief. Secretary Maxfield was subsequently

dismissed from the case, and that dismissal has not been challenged in these appeals.

[¶10] Lankford filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the only remedy

available to the plaintiffs was to have the May 2012 vote set aside in an election contest

under Wyoming Statute § 22-17-105, which permits electors to contest a successful ballot

proposition. She contended that the Appellants’ complaint was in substance an election

contest, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear such a contest because the

complaint was not filed within fifteen days of certification of the election results by the

canvassing board, and because it was filed by three rather than five electors as required

by statute. She also contended that mandamus was not available in proceedings of this

kind.

[¶11] Appellants’ brief in response to the motion to dismiss is not part of the appellate

record. However, as discussed below, they argue here that their action was not an

election contest governed by § 22-17-105, but that it was instead an effort to determine

the effect of the successful 2011 ballot proposition. They therefore contend that their

action did not have to be brought by five electors rather than three. They also argue that

the applicable statute of limitations or repose is four years rather than fifteen days,

because this is an action for injury to their rights “not arising in contract and not herein

enumerated” under Wyoming Statute § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C).

[¶12] The parties also filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Appellants claimed

that § 18-3-501(b) and (f) governing increase and decrease in commission membership

required Lankford to implement the 2011 ballot proposition when the two subsections are

read together. They contended that she was therefore required to issue a proclamation for

the election of two additional commissioners in the 2012 primary and general elections,

that it was improper to hold the 2012 special election concerning a decrease in the

number of commissioners, and that the results of that election were therefore void ab

initio.

3

[¶13] Lankford responded that § 18-3-501(f) required her to hold the May 2012 special

election upon presentation of a proper petition. She contended that the successful ballot

proposition returned the commission to a three-member body, and that she therefore

properly planned to hold an election for the one commission seat which would have been

open in that year if neither proposition had been submitted to the voters.

[¶14] The district court expedited briefing and argument because of the imminent 2012

primary election. It entered a brief order dismissing Appellants’ complaint for

declaratory relief on July 25, 2012. On August 6, 2012, it entered a second order

granting Lankford’s motion to dismiss as to Appellants’ mandamus claim, but denying it

as to her claim that the complaint was barred because it was an election contest filed after

the passage of fifteen days and not on behalf of five electors. The court concluded that

Lankford “did not meet her burden of establishing that Plaintiffs’ Complaint constitutes

an election contest pursuant to W.S. §22-17-105 and §22-17-106.”

[¶15] On August 10, 2012, the court entered yet another order explaining and

conforming its decision of July 25, 2012. It found that the decision to implement the

2012 special election and to proclaim only one seat open for election was proper,

explaining succinctly as follows:

Subsection (f) [of § 18-3-501] addresses the situation

where the voters decide to decrease of [sic] the membership

of the Board of Commissioners. The term “decrease the

membership” has been argued by the Plaintiffs to indicate that

the legislature intended that no vote to decrease the

membership could occur unless those offices have been filled

with members. Until then, they argue, there is no

membership to decrease. Admittedly, this logic has some

appeal. But the term “increase the membership” is used in

subsections (b) and (c) along with the term “additional offices

created”. Obviously the term “increase the membership” is

nothing more than a synonym for “creating additional

offices”. Similarly, decreasing the membership as contained

in subsection (f) means to decrease the number of offices

previously created. Because the number of offices [sic] were

created or membership increased by the vote of the 2011

election, the increased number of offices created by the 2011

election could be decreased by the voters after that.

The court also concluded that the timing of the election was proper under § 18-3-501.

[¶16] Appellants appealed the foregoing decision in Case No. S-12-0216. Lankford

raised the election contest statute as an alternative ground for affirmance in that case, but

4

also filed a separate appeal challenging the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss

on those same grounds in Case No. S-12-0217. The appeals were consolidated for

argument and decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶17] Both of these appeals require us to interpret statutes. “Statutory construction is a

question of law, so our standard of review is de novo.” Redco Const. v. Profile Props.,

LLC, 2012 WY 24, ¶ 26, 271 P.3d 408, 415 (Wyo. 2012).

[¶18] Jurisdictional issues are also questions of law which we review de novo. DeLoge

v. Homar, 2013 WY 33, ¶ 10, 297 P.3d 117, 120 (Wyo. 2013) (citing Hall v. Park Cnty.,

2010 WY 124, ¶ 3, 238 P.3d 580, 581 (Wyo. 2010)). “If the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction, this Court has jurisdiction on appeal, not on the merits, but only as to

the jurisdictional issue.” Hall, ¶ 3, 238 P.3d at 581 (citing NMC v. JLW ex rel. NAW,

2004 WY 56, ¶ 9, 90 P.3d 93, 96 (Wyo. 2004)). See also Lankford v. City of Laramie,

2004 WY 143, ¶ 23, 100 P.3d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 2004) (“[W]e have no better jurisdiction

than did the district court.”) (citation omitted). If a judgment below “was rendered

without jurisdiction, an appellate court must ordinarily reverse and remand for

dismissal.” Bruns v. TW Servs., Inc., 2001 WY 127, ¶ 18, 36 P.3d 608, 614 (Wyo. 2001)

(quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 814 at 473 (1995)).

DISCUSSION

[¶19] In her response to the appeal filed by Rock, Quirk and Kawa as well as in her

separate appeal, Lankford challenges the district court’s jurisdiction to hear Appellants’

complaint under the statutes governing contest of a successful ballot proposition. It is

appropriate to summarize the general rules of statutory construction before we examine

the governing statutes.

In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to

determine the legislature’s intent. All statutes must be

construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of

a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having

the same general purpose must be considered and construed

in harmony. Statutory construction is a question of law, so

our standard of review is de novo. We endeavor to interpret

statutes in accordance with the legislature’s intent. We begin

by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious

meaning of the words employed according to their

arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a

whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and

we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia. When a

5

statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect

to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not

resort to the rules of statutory construction. Moreover, we

must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its

operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation.

Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or

extend a statute to matters that do not fall within its express

provisions.

Only if we determine the language of a statute is

ambiguous will we proceed to the next step, which involves

applying general principles of statutory construction to the

language of the statute in order to construe any ambiguous

language to accurately reflect the intent of the legislature. If

this Court determines that the language of the statute is not

ambiguous, there is no room for further construction. We

will apply the language of the statute using its ordinary and

obvious meaning.

Whether a statute is ambiguous is a question of law.

A statute is unambiguous if reasonable persons are able to

agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability,

while a statute is ambiguous if it is vague or uncertain and

subject to varying interpretations.

Redco Const., ¶ 26, 271 P.3d at 415–16 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Applicable Statutes

[¶20] Wyoming Statute § 22-17-105 provides that ballot propositions are contestable if

certain requirements are met:

A ballot proposition which may by law be submitted to

a vote of the people of a county, city or town, district, or other

political subdivision may be contested by a petition of five (5)

registered electors of the county, city or town, district or other

political subdivision filed in the district court of the county

not later than fifteen (15) days after the results of the election

have been certified by the canvassing board. A ballot

proposition contest is a civil action.

6

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-17-105 (LexisNexis 2011).

[¶21] Section 22-17-106 lists the grounds for contesting a successful ballot proposition:

(a) A ballot proposition may be contested for any of the

following reasons:

(i) Misconduct or material negligence of an election

official which affected the result of the election;

(ii) The election result was influenced by a bribe;

(iii) Illegal votes were counted or legal votes were not

counted.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-17-106 (LexisNexis 2011).

[¶22] The terms “ballot” and “proposition” are used in the statute providing for an

increase or decrease in commission membership. § 18-3-501(b),(c), and (d).2 We

therefore reach the unremarkable conclusion that the “proposition” to be placed on the

“ballot” under § 18-3-501 is in fact a “ballot proposition” under §§ 22-17-105 and 106.

[¶23] Lankford argues that the statutes allowing citizens to contest a ballot proposition

provide the exclusive means to challenge a proposition approved by the voters, and that

§ 22-17-106 provides the exclusive grounds for such a contest. Therefore, she argues, the

2

These provisions provide as follows:

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, any county

may increase the membership of its board of county commissioners from

three (3) to five (5) members if a proposition for the increase is

submitted to a vote of the qualified electors of the county and a majority

of those casting their ballots vote in favor of the increase. . . .

(c) The proposition to increase the membership of the board of

county commissioners shall be at the expense of the county and be

submitted to the electors of the county upon receipt by the county clerk

of a petition requesting the election signed by at least ten percent (10%)

of the qualified electors of the county. . . .

(d) The proposition may be submitted at any general election or

at an election date authorized under W.S. 22-21-1 0 3 . A notice of

election shall be given in at least one (1) newspaper of general

circulation published in the county wherein the election is to be held and

shall specify the object of the election. The notice shall be published at

least once each week for a thirty (30) day period preceding the election.

At the election the ballots shall contain the words “for increasing the

membership of the board of county commissioners from three (3) to five

(5) members”, and “against increasing the membership of the board of

county commissioners from three (3) to five (5) members”.

§ 18-3-501(b), (c), (d) (emphasis added).

7

district court lacked jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the May 2012 special election

because it was filed more than fifteen days after the results of the election were certified,

and because the petition was filed by three electors rather than five.

[¶24] Appellants argue that they do not contest the manner in which Lankford conducted

the May 2012 special election, but rather seek a determination of the significance of the

August 2011 proposition increasing commission membership. They do not dispute that

the May 2012 election was conducted fairly. Instead, they contend that the May 2012

election should not have been held under Wyoming Statute § 18-3-501. They argue that

the May 2012 election was void ab initio, but if not, that commissioners had to be seated

before their membership could be reduced. They argue that the district court had

jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act, that no particular number of electors is

required for claims of this kind, and that the applicable statute of limitations is four years.

The substance of their argument is that § 22-17-106 does not provide exclusive grounds

to challenge the 2012 special election.

Case Law Governing Election Contests

[¶25] We do not believe that the election contest statutes are ambiguous, but we do

believe they must be read in context. As this Court observed forty years ago:

The constitutions and statutes of most jurisdictions provide,

as a part of the machinery of elections, a procedure by which

election results may be contested. Such contests are regulated

wholly by the constitutional or statutory provisions. They are

not actions at law or suits in equity, and were unknown to the

common law. The proceedings are special and summary in

their nature. A strict observance of the steps necessary to

give jurisdiction is required and the jurisdictional facts must

appear on the face of the proceedings. If these steps are not

followed, courts are powerless to entertain such proceedings.

Johnson v. City of Cheyenne, 504 P.2d 1081, 1082 (Wyo. 1973) (quoting 26 Am. Jur. 2d,

Elections, § 318). Accord Ex parte Vines, 456 So. 2d 26, 28 (Ala. 1984); Griffin v.

Buzard, 342 P.2d 201, 202 (Ariz. 1959); Republican Party of Garland Cnty. v. Johnson,

193 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Ark. 2004); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ill. 1990);

Bauman v. Maple Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 649 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 2002); Payne v.

Blanton, 229 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Ky. 1950); State ex rel. Vullo v. Plaquemines Parish

Police Jury, 115 So. 2d 368, 373 (La. 1959); Mo. ex rel. Bouchard v. Grady, 86 S.W.3d

121, 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Taylor v. Roche, 248 S.E. 2d 580, 582 (S.C. 1978); Dick

v. Kazen, 292 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. 1956); 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections § 382 (2004);

Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 Ind. L.J. 1, 3, 34

8

(2013); 3 Eugene McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 12:48, at 244–45

(2012); Barry H. Weinberg, The Resolution of Election Disputes 1–2 (2006).

[¶26] As one judge observed, election contests draw courts into political matters:

The court must be ever mindful in an election contest

that it has been delegated responsibility in a basically political

matter and is not free to create criteria that may, in its

opinion, be more suitable than those the legislature has

established.

Mirlisena v. Fellerhoff, 463 N.E.2d 115, 118-19 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1984). See also

Dornan v. Sanchez, 978 F. Supp. 1315, 1327 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“An election contest, and

allegations of misconduct in its discovery and adjudication, involve political questions

which courts should refrain from adjudicating.”); Simpson v. City of Los Angeles, 253

P.2d 464, 468 (Cal. 1953) (“Courts are reluctant to defeat the fair expression of popular

will in elections and will not do so unless required by the plain mandate of the law.”);

Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1249 (Fla. 2000) (“[C]ourts are, and should be,

reluctant to interject themselves in essentially political controversies . . . .”), rev’d on

other grounds by Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 525, 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2000);

Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 265, 306 (2007)

(“[E]lection contests often put courts in the position of ‘kingmaker’ without giving them

clear, objective standards that might insulate them from charges of political meddling.”).

[¶27] Other courts have been called upon to determine whether a given lawsuit is an

election contest or another type of claim. The Supreme Court of Alaska developed a

meaningful distinction in an election contest case:

The purpose of an election contest is to ascertain

whether the alleged impropriety in fact establishes doubt as to

the validity of the election result. For this reason, whether a

cause of action should be deemed an election contest turns on

the remedy sought. If the plaintiff’s proposed remedy would

defeat the public interest in the stability and finality of

election results, it is appropriate to deem the cause of action

an election contest and to require compliance with the

procedures for such contests. A cause of action is deemed not

to be an election challenge only if the remedy will not affect

the stability and finality of the election result.

Braun v. Borough, 193 P.3d 719, 731–32 (Alaska 2008) (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted). See also State ex rel. Mackey v. Blackwell, 834 N.E.2d 346,

349 (Ohio 2005) (“[I]nsofar as appellants sought to change any of the November 2, 2004

9

election results, ‘[a]n election contest is the specific remedy provided by statute for the

corrections of all errors, frauds and mistakes which may occur in an election.’” (quoting

State ex rel. Byrd v. Summit Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 417 N.E.2d 1375 (Ohio 1981); State

ex rel. Shriver v. Hayes, 76 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio 1947))).

[¶28] Some courts have held that statutory or constitutional grounds contained in

provisions for election contests are exclusive, and that no other grounds may be

considered because of the unique character of those proceedings. 3 Mackey, 834 N.E.2d at

349 (citing State ex rel. Daoust v. Smith, 371 N.E.2d 536 (Ohio 1977)); Braun, 193 P.3d

at 731–32; Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra Madre, 19 P.3d 567, 584–86 (Cal.

2001); Duncan v. McMurray, 249 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Ky. 1952); Hancock v. Lewis, 122

N.W.2d 592, 594 (Minn. 1963)); Pierce v. Drobny, 777 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Neb. 2010);

Barrett v. Monmouth Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 704 A.2d 1053, 1056 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.

Div. 1997); Becker v. Cnty. of Pierce, 890 P.2d 1055, 1058–59 (Wash. 1995); 3

McQuillin, supra, § 12:49, at 254; 26 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, at § 389; George L. Blum,

Annotation, Validity, Construction and Application of State Statutory Limitations Periods

Governing Election Contests, 60 A.L.R.6th 481 (2010) (“The applicable statutes

governing election contests are generally held to be the exclusive remedy for deciding

such contests.”).

[¶29] Other courts have held that although the procedures for election contests are

exclusive, the grounds for an election contest may be found in other statutory or

constitutional provisions outside a state’s election code. Kacoonis v. City of Mountain

View, 160 S.E.2d 364, 366 (Ga. 1968) (quoting Coleman v. Bd. of Ed. of Emanuel Cnty.,

63 S.E. 41, 44 (Ga. 1908)); Dorf v. Skolnik, 371 A.2d 1094, 1099–1100 (Md. 1977); City

of Nameoki v. Granite City, 95 N.E.2d 920, 921–22 (Ill. 1951); Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d

1008, 1015 (N.M. 2001); State ex rel. Olson v. Bakken, 329 N.W.2d 575, 580 (N.D.

1983); Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. Town of Galax, 4 S.E.2d 390, 392 (Va. 1939); 26

Am. Jur. 2d, supra, at § 389.

[¶30] We believe that all of these cases are generally consistent with our decision in

Johnson v. City of Cheyenne, supra, as well as that in Snell v. Johnson County School

District No. 1, 2004 WY 19, 86 P.3d 248 (Wyo. 2004), at least as they relate to the

procedural requirements which must be met to challenge an election. In Snell, plaintiffs

challenged the use proposed for bond election proceeds. The bond election contest

3

This case does not involve a challenge based on the right to vote under the federal or Wyoming

constitutions, and we do not address those complex issues here. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.

380, 403 n.31, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2368 n.31, 115 L. Ed. 2d 348 (1991) (“The conception of political

equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,

Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” (quoting

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381, 83 S. Ct. 801, 809, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1963))); Brimmer v. Thomson,

521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974) (“The right to vote is a fundamental right entitled to the strict protection

of the courts.”) (citation omitted).

10

statutes in force at the time required that a contest be filed within fourteen days. The

Court noted that it required strict observance of the requirements of the election contest

statutes in Johnson. However, it held that the strict time limits applicable to such a

contest did not apply in cases in which plaintiffs challenged the use of the bond election

proceeds rather than the validity or conduct of the election itself. Id. at ¶¶ 15–16, 86 P.3d

at 255.

[¶31] Statutes creating the right to contest elections generally impose strict, short, and

mandatory deadlines for the commencement of election contests. Douglas, supra, at 34-

36; 3 McQuillan, supra, at § 12:51; 26 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, at §§ 384, 393. This is for the

obvious reason that government business cannot be brought to a standstill pending the

outcome of a drawn-out election contest. Plyman v. Glynn Cnty., 578 S.E.2d 124, 126

(Ga. 2003). “[T]he purpose of election contests is to aid the democratic processes upon

which our system of government is based by providing a ready remedy whereby

compliance with election laws may be assured to facilitate, not hinder by technical

requirements, the quick initiation and disposition of such contests.” Tate-Smith v.

Cupples, 134 S.W.3d 535, 538–39 (Ark. 2003).

Analysis

Character of Action

[¶32] As noted above, Appellants contend that their lawsuit is not an election contest,

but rather an effort to obtain a declaration as to the implementation of the 2011 election

contest. We disagree. Appellants seek to have us declare the 2012 election “null and

void,” and to direct Lankford to hold an election for three commissioners to serve the

remaining 2012 to 2016 terms, or in the alternative, to declare that an election must be

held in 2014. As already discussed, a lawsuit is an election contest if it seeks a remedy

which would “defeat the public interest in the stability and finality of election results.”

Braun, 193 P.3d at 732. See also Mackey, 834 N.E.2d at 349.

[¶33] The remedy Appellants seek would clearly affect the result of the 2012 special

election and the primary and general elections which followed. Even if Appellants only

sought the filling of two seats in 2014, which would at best require this Court to engage

in creative interpretation of the applicable statutes, the 2012 special election would have

to be determined to be a nullity. However, Appellants ask us to find that Lankford must

hold an election for three commission seats in 2014. The voters in the 2012 primary and

general elections chose a commissioner whose term might be cut short, meaning that the

results of more than one election could be affected by the remedy they seek. This case is

readily distinguishable from Snell, in which the use of funds resulting from a bond

election was challenged–the outcome of that case could not have affected the validity of

the underlying bond election.

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[¶34] The outcome Appellants seek could only result from a declaration that the 2012

special election was void, which is the very essence of an election contest. The remedy

to be granted in a successful election contest is statutory:

A judgment of the court in an election contest shall

confirm or annul the election or declare elected a qualified

candidate receiving the highest number of legal votes, or

declare the result of the election on each contested ballot

proposition. The election of a candidate receiving the highest

number of legal votes but disqualified for any other legal

reason shall be declared null and void and a vacancy will be

declared to exist. For offices to be filled by more than one (1)

candidate, the election shall not be declared null and void but

the qualified candidates receiving the highest number of legal

votes shall be declared elected.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-17-108 (LexisNexis 2011).

[¶35] We believe the term “contest” as used in §§ 22-17-105 and 106 is unambiguous

when viewed in context. The legislature is presumed to have chosen that term with full

knowledge of its interpretation by other courts:

All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with

full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference

thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony

with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and uniform

system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be

determined in connection, not only with the common law and

the constitution, but also with reference to the decisions of the

courts.

In re RB, 2013 WY 15, ¶ 34, 294 P.3d 24, 33–34 (Wyo. 2013) (quoting Hall, ¶ 19, 238

P.3d at 586).

[¶36] Appellants argue that Wyoming’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat.

Ann. §§ 1-37-101 to -115 (LexisNexis 2011), provides the remedy they seek. The Act

grants courts of record (in Wyoming’s case, the district courts) the power to “declare

rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be

claimed.” § 1-37-102. The Act allows district judges to construe various kinds of

documents, to declare a fiduciary’s rights, and to make determinations of water rights

disputes. §§ 1-37-103 to -106. The Act even provides that the enumeration of specific

kinds of declarations which can be made is not a limitation on a court’s power to render a

declaratory judgment relating to other kinds of disputes. § 1-37-107.

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[¶37] However, specific statutes control over general ones dealing with the same subject

when they are in apparent conflict. Gronberg v. Teton Cnty. Housing Authority, 2011

WY 13, ¶ 45, 247 P.3d 35, 45 (Wyo. 2011); Hall, ¶ 12, 238 P.3d at 584; Horse Creek

Conservation Dist. v. State ex rel. Wyo. Att’y General, 2009 WY 143, ¶ 39, 221 P.3d 306,

318 (Wyo. 2009) (citing Coffinberry v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of the Cnty. of Hot Springs,

2008 WY 110, ¶ 7, 192 P.3d 978, 980 (Wyo. 2008)). The statute allowing electors to

contest a ballot proposition is quite specific. The legislature granted the courts limited

powers in an area traditionally entrusted to the political arena. We therefore find that the

legislature intended to make contest of a ballot proposition an exclusive remedy for

challenging a successful ballot proposition, and that it did not intend for the Uniform

Declaratory Judgments Act to render those limitations meaningless.

[¶38] We are further buttressed in this conclusion by the presumption that our legislature

acts in a reasonable and thoughtful manner. Redco Const., ¶ 37, 271 P.3d at 418. We can

conceive of no reason why a reasonable legislature, having created an election contest

statute with a fifteen-day period of limitation or repose, would intend at the same time to

allow a challenge to the outcome of a ballot proposition any time within four years.

Stable government requires the very prompt resolution of election disputes. In this case,

the 2012 primary and general elections would be affected by a successful challenge to the

May 2012 special election decreasing the size of the county commission. A thoughtful

legislature would not intend to maintain a state of instability for four years.

Time Limitations and Jurisdiction

[¶39] There is no dispute that this case was filed well over fifteen days after the

canvassing board certified the May 2012 special election results. Lankford points out

that the fifteen-day limitation in § 22-17-105 might better be characterized as a statute of

repose than a statute of limitation, but the distinction makes little difference. There is

likewise no dispute that this case was not brought by five electors as also required by

§ 22-17-105.

[¶40] In Johnson, 504 P.2d at 1082, a single citizen challenged a bond election. We

affirmed the district court’s ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the contest

because the governing statute required that a bond election contest be brought by five

electors. The district court lacked jurisdiction in this case for the same reason, and also

because the challenge was untimely under § 22-17-105.

[¶41] Because we have reached this conclusion regarding jurisdiction, we find it

unnecessary to decide whether the grounds for challenging a ballot proposition in § 22-

17-106 are exclusive, as some courts have held, or whether additional statutory or

constitutional grounds might exist, as other courts have decided. Those courts finding

exclusive grounds note that the political arena provides a sufficient remedy for certain

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kinds of claimed election errors. They believe that not all remedies need to be judicial in

origin. Other courts conclude that the legislature intended to allow courts some

flexibility to provide relief from election errors. Compare, e.g., Repsold v. Indep. Sch.

Dist. No. 8, 285 N.W. 827, 829 (Minn. 1939) (“[C]ourts should be reluctant to interfere

with political matters by granting equitable relief [outside the scope of election contest

statutes].”), with Bakken, 329 N.W.2d at 580 (affirming the trial court’s grant of equitable

relief in an election contest because “[e]xperience tells us that neither a statute, rule, nor

regulation can pragmatically cover every situation that may arise . . . .”).

[¶42] We decide only that Appellants contested the May 2012 ballot proposition, and

that they failed to do so within the time specified in and through the five electors required

by § 22-17-105. We likewise do not address the merits of the arguments concerning the

application of Wyoming Statute § 18-3-501 under these unusual circumstances.

CONCLUSION

[¶43] Because we find that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants

Rock, Quirk and Kawa’s challenge to the May 2012 special election, we find its decision

to be void and remand for dismissal.

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