The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2380
VIDYA SAGAR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ORACLE CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-2487
VIDYA SAGAR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ORACLE CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:10-cv-03510-PJM)
Submitted: April 23, 2013 Decided: May 2, 2013
Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Vidya Sagar, Appellant Pro Se. Edward Lee Isler, Lori Hunt
Turner, ISLER, DARE, RAY, RADCLIFFE & CONNOLLY, PC, Vienna,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Vidya Sagar filed a civil action against his former
employer, Oracle Corporation (“Oracle”), alleging wrongful
termination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34 (West 2008 &
Supp. 2012) (“ADEA”). In these consolidated appeals, Sagar
appeals the district court’s orders denying his “Motion to
Challenge Routine Designation of Confidential” and “Corrected
Motion to Challenge Routine Designation of Confidential.” Sagar
also appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of Oracle and denying his cross-motion for
summary judgment. We affirm.
In appeal 12-2380, Sagar challenges the district
court’s denial of his motion and corrected motion to “Challenge
Routine Designation of Confidential.” ∗ This court gives district
courts “wide latitude in controlling discovery” and will not
disturb discovery orders “absent a showing of clear abuse of
∗
Sagar also challenges the magistrate judge’s denial of his
motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to compel
discovery. Sagar’s notice of appeal, however, failed to
designate the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion for
reconsideration as an order for which he sought review, as
required by Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). Moreover, because it does
not appear from the record that the parties consented to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the magistrate judge, and Sagar did
not appeal the magistrate judge’s order to the district court,
the magistrate judge’s order is not subject to appellate review
in this court.
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discretion.” Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 195
(4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because
Sagar does not assert that he has been unable to access Oracle’s
records or demonstrate that the documents at issue are not
sensitive in nature, he fails to establish that the district
court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motions.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Sagar’s
motions.
This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th
Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To withstand a motion
for summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce
competent evidence to reveal the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. See Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Conclusory or
speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does a mere
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scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving party’s]
case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The ADEA forbids “an employer . . . to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a) (2006). Absent direct evidence of intentional
discrimination, this Court analyzes ADEA claims under the
burden-shifting framework established for Title VII claims in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Warch v.
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 513-14 (4th Cir. 2006). Under
this framework, Sagar must first establish a prima facie case of
age discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at
513. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Sagar
must demonstrate that: “(1) he is a member of the protected
class; (2) he was qualified for the job and met [Oracle]’s
legitimate expectations; (3) he was discharged despite his
qualifications and performance; and (4) following his discharge,
he was replaced by a substantially younger individual with
comparable qualifications.” Id.
If a prima facie case is established, the burden
shifts to Oracle to demonstrate “a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason” for Sagar’s termination. Warch, 435 F.3d
at 513-14. If Oracle meets this burden, “the presumption of
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discrimination created by the prima facie case disappears from
the case and the plaintiff must prove that the proffered
justification is pretextual.” Id. at 514 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Oracle. Sagar’s claims fail at the prima facie
stage because he does not offer any evidence from which a
factfinder could conclude that, at the time of his discharge, he
was meeting Oracle’s legitimate expectations. Sagar also fails
to establish that, following his discharge, he was replaced by a
substantially younger individual with comparable qualifications.
Further, even assuming, as the district court did, that Sagar
made a prima facie showing, he fails to establish that Oracle’s
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging him were a
pretext for intentional discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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