P. v. Penaloza CA4/3

Filed 4/17/13 P. v. Penaloza CA4/3

Opinion following recall of remittitur

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G044756

v. (Super. Ct. No. 10CF0027)

ALBERTO PENALOZA, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gregg L.

Prickett, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Edward J. Haggerty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant

Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Annie Featherman

Fraser, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *

In our prior nonpublished case, People v. Penaloza (June 28, 2012,

G044756), we affirmed defendant’s convictions for assault with a firearm, felon in

possession of a firearm, possession of methamphetamine while armed with a loaded

firearm, and two counts of active participation in a criminal street gang. After our

decision, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Rodriguez (2012)

55 Cal.4th 1125 (Rodriguez), and concluded that a defendant who acts alone cannot be

convicted of the substantive offense of active participation in a criminal street gang. This

was one of the grounds defendant raised on appeal.

On March 22, 2013, relying on People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389 [recall

of remittitur adjunct to writ of habeas corpus and proper to implement defendant’s right

to habeas corpus where defendant convicted under statute that did not prohibit his

conduct at the time], defendant’s appellate counsel and the Attorney General filed an

application and a stipulation requesting that we recall the remittitur, vacate our prior

opinion, and issue a new opinion reversing defendant’s convictions for active

participation in a criminal street gang. Under these circumstances, we grant the motion

as defendant stands convicted and sentenced under an invalid theory of active

participation in a criminal street gang. We shall recall the remittitur, vacate our prior

opinion, and order that a new remittitur issue that reverses the active participation in a

criminal street gang convictions and affirms defendant’s remaining convictions.

I

FACTS

A jury convicted defendant of assaulting Katherine J. with a firearm (Pen.

Code § 245, subd. (a)(2); all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise

stated; count three), felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1) (Stats.

2008, ch. 599, § 4); count five), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§

186.22, subd. (a); count eight) on December 31, 2009. It also convicted him of

possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count six),

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possession of methamphetamine while armed with a loaded firearm (Health & Saf. Code,

§ 11370.1, subd. (a)(1); count seven), and active participation in a criminal street gang

(count 10) on January 3, 2010. The jury found defendant was personally armed with a

firearm (§ 12022, subd. (c)) in connection with the possession of methamphetamine for

sale. The remaining charges of residential robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 213, subd.

(a)(1)(A); count one), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count two), dissuading a

witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count four), and enhancements alleged in connection

therewith, were dismissed by the court at the close of the prosecution’s case when the

alleged victim in those counts, Ruby R., refused to testify, even after being granted

immunity and held in contempt.

In the bifurcated portion of the trial, the court found defendant had

previously been convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), suffered a prior

conviction under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b),

(c)(1)) and served three prior terms in state prison (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

The court denied defendant’s invitation to strike his prior strike conviction

for sentencing purposes pursuant to section 1385 and sentenced him to an aggregate term

of 17 years in prison. The court imposed a principal term of six years (upper term of

three years doubled, based on defendant’s prior strike conviction) for possession of

methamphetamine for sale, a consecutive four-year term for the section 12022,

subdivision (c) (personally armed with a firearm) enhancement attached to that count, a

consecutive two-year term for defendant’s conviction for assault with a firearm (one-third

the midterm doubled), and a consecutive five-year term on the serious felony prior

conviction enhancement. Terms on other counts were either ordered to run concurrently

or were stayed pursuant to section 654. The terms for defendant having served prior

terms in state prison were stricken for sentencing purposes.

Katherine J. placed an advertisement for an additional roommate for her

three-bedroom apartment on Craig’s List. By New Year’s Eve 2009, Ruby R. responded

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to the ad and moved in. About 7:00 or 8:00 that evening, Ruby R. came home and

prepared to go out to a club. Katherine J. was in her room and heard what sounded like

whimpering. She left her room to check on Ruby R. In the living room, she saw

defendant hitting Ruby R. Ruby R. was on the corner of the couch, curled up into a ball,

with her hands covering her head. Defendant stood over Ruby R., and hit her three or

four times with his fists. He also hit her with a black gun.1

Katherine J. called out for defendant to stop. Defendant then pointed the

black gun at her. Katherine J. screamed, ran back to her bedroom, closed the door,

locked it, went into the closet, and called 911. The police arrived and had Katherine J. sit

on the steps outside her apartment while they conducted a “sweep” to determine if

anyone was in the apartment. They found Ruby R. inside Katherine J.’s closet. An

officer noticed a bruise on Ruby R.’s right arm and had photographs taken of her injuries.

Three days after the incident, Ruby R. said she sustained multiple bruises in the beating.

A pair of black Oakley sunglasses was obtained from the apartment and

swabbed for the presence of DNA. Tests on the swab revealed there were multiple

sources of DNA on the glasses. Defendant’s DNA matched that of one of the two major

contributors of the DNA on the sunglasses. Defendant’s DNA profile “is rarer than one

in 70 million.”

Detective Colton Kirwan of the Tustin Police Department was dispatched

to Katherine J.’s location. Upon arriving, he saw a black Lexus drive out of the complex,

turn right, and head northbound on Williams Street. It was moving rapidly with its

headlights off. Kirwan could not tell whether the first digit on the license plate was a 3 or

an 8 because there was some kind of mark on the plate. Officer Charles Mitchell was

dispatched to the area and was told to be on the lookout for a black sedan with no

headlights on. He saw a vehicle matching the description northbound on Williams Street.

1 The parties stipulated defendant had previously been convicted of a

felony.

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He pulled his squad car in behind the vehicle and attempted to stop the vehicle. When he

turned on his overhead lights, the vehicle continued driving normally. But when he

turned on his siren, the vehicle sped up. At one point during the chase, the vehicle drove

the wrong way on a one-way street. Mitchell lost sight of the vehicle when it was

travelling the wrong way on the one-way street. The vehicle was found later that night in

territory claimed by the McClay Street gang.

On January 3, 2010, Detective James Mansoor was part of a surveillance

being conducted on an apartment on Santa Clara in Santa Ana. He was looking for

defendant and saw him leaving the apartment. He ordered defendant to stop and put his

hands up, but defendant ran in the opposite direction, throwing his jacket to the ground.

A search of the jacket revealed two syringes and a plastic baggie containing what was

believed to be methamphetamine.

Mansoor searched the apartment under surveillance. In a bedroom believed

to be defendant’s, he found defendant’s driver’s license, Social Security card, and pay

stubs. He also located several documents bearing defendant’s name in a vanity in the

bathroom connected to the bedroom. A loaded Smith and Wesson nine-millimeter

semiautomatic handgun was found between the mattress and the box spring of the one

bed in the bedroom. A Tupperware container containing 3.25 grams of

methamphetamine was found approximately six feet from the bed. A baggie found in the

bathroom contained .69 grams of methamphetamine. Another contained .44 grams of

methamphetamine. No drugs were located in any other bedroom or in any common area.

Mansoor also found a digital scale and a pay-owe sheet. The scale was on

the vanity in the bathroom. The pay-owe sheet was found in the nightstand of the

bedroom. “McClay Street” was written on the inside cover of the spiral notebook

containing the pay-owe sheet. “Scrappy” was also written on the notebook.

Mansoor said drug dealers use such scales, and a pay-owe sheet is a “crude

accounting” method for street level drug dealers. He added that the amount of

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methamphetamine found in the apartment was substantial and is not commonly found on

the street. He opined the methamphetamine was possessed for sale and based his opinion

on the amount of methamphetamine and the presence of the pay-owe sheet and scales.

Gang Evidence

Nicholas Lopez of the Tustin Police Department testified as a gang expert.

He said McClay Street is a Hispanic street gang and described the territory claimed by

the gang. He also testified about two predicate offenses committed by McClay Street

gang members. The gang’s primary activities include felony possession of firearms and

narcotic sales. The area in which the chase of the black Lexus ended is in McClay Street

territory.

“Respect” is important to gangs. Members seek respect from other gangs

by committing crimes of violence and bragging about their crimes. Carrying guns, even

by one prohibited from possessing a firearm, furthers the member’s reputation and assists

in the commission of criminal acts. Gangs view tattoos as badges of honor. Tattoos

involve a level of commitment and demonstrate the individual’s loyalty to the gang: the

more tattoos, the more loyalty.

Defendant has a number of McClay Street tattoos. He has a tattoo on his

neck signifying alliance with southern Hispanic gangs. He has a tattoo representing the

number 13. The 13th letter in the alphabet (M) refers to the Mexican Mafia. “McClay

Street” is tattooed on his left forearm. He also has a “MC” tattoo and one of the gang’s

symbol — “Magicos” — tattooed across his stomach. Additionally, he has a tattoo

referring to another gang member.

A month before his arrest, defendant wrote “McClay St” in concrete by his

residence. The notebook containing the pay-owe sheet contained his moniker, Scrappy.

People who are not members of a gang do not claim to be in the gang. A false claim of

membership risks physical harm. Lopez opined defendant was an active participant in the

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McClay Street gang on the charged dates. In reaching this conclusion, he considered a

field investigation card and a STEP2 notice served on defendant in 2006, four or five

police reports involving defendant, and that defendant previously admitted he committed

a felony for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the McClay Street

gang, and admitted he actively participated in the gang.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Gang Evidence Issues

1. The Expert’s Opinion That Defendant was an Active Participant

Trial courts have wide discretion in determining the relevance of evidence.

(Evid. Code, § 350; People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681.) “‘Broadly speaking,

an appellate court reviews any ruling by a trial court as to the admissibility of evidence

for abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.] This standard of review applies to a trial court’s

determination of the relevance of evidence, as well as to whether the evidence’s probative

value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. [Citations.] The trial court’s

‘discretion is only abused where there is a clear showing [it] exceeded the bounds of

reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’ [Citation.]” (People ex rel. Lockyer

v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 639-640.) The same holds true

when the evidence under consideration is a gang expert’s testimony. “As a general rule,

a trial court has wide discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony. [Citations.] An

appellate court may not interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless it is clearly

abused. [Citation.]” (People v. Page (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 161, 187.)

Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the gang expert to

testify defendant was an active participant in the McClay Street gang. He argues an

expert opinion was unnecessary because the jury was equally able to decide whether

2 STEP is an acronym for Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention.

(See § 186.20.)

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defendant’s tattoos, his prior convictions, the gang writing in the small notebook, and the

other facts of the case prove he was an active participant in a criminal street gang.

In discussing gang expert testimony in People v. Olguin (1994) 31

Cal.App.4th 1355, another panel of this court held “[t]he requirements for expert

testimony are that it relate to a subject sufficiently beyond common experience as to

assist the trier of fact and be based on matter that is reasonably relied upon by an expert

in forming an opinion on the subject to which his or her testimony relates. [Citations.]

Such evidence is admissible even though it encompasses the ultimate issue in the case.

[Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1371.) “Otherwise admissible expert opinion testimony which

embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact is admissible. (Evid. Code,

§ 805.)” (People v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 651.) “‘There is no hard and

fast rule that the expert cannot be asked a question that coincides with the ultimate issue

in the case.’ [Citations.] ‘“[T]he true rule is that admissibility depends on the nature of

the issue and the circumstances of the case, there being a large element of judicial

discretion involved . . . . Oftentimes an opinion may be received on a simple ultimate

issue, even when it is the sole one, . . . because it cannot be further simplified and cannot

be fully tried without hearing opinions from those in better position to form them than the

jury can be placed in.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 507.)

Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the expert’s conclusion that defendant was an active

participant in the criminal street gang did not “direct[] the jury to find the active

participation element true” any more than any other expert opinion involving an ultimate

issue.

An expert’s opinion is not admissible when it merely “‘consists of

inferences and conclusions which can be drawn as easily and intelligently by the trier of

fact as by the witness.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Valdez, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.)

The opinion was appropriately admitted in this case. The McClay Street gang is no

fraternity. It apparently does not have rules and regulations reduced to writing, such that

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a jury may simply look to the writing to determine whether an individual is an active

member. As a criminal street gang, its culture, habits, and psychology are still

“‘sufficiently beyond common experience’” such that the opinion of an expert may be

deemed helpful to the jury. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the trial court reasonably concluded the

testimony would assist the jury in determining whether defendant was an active

participant in the gang. Because we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

permitting the gang expert to opine defendant was an active participant in the gang, we

necessarily find the trial court did not usurp the jury’s role and did not deny defendant

due process.

2. Insufficient Evidence of the Gang Offenses (Counts Eight and Ten)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of active participation in a criminal

street gang in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a). He contends the evidence was

insufficient to support those convictions in that the prosecution failed to present any

evidence he aided or abetted any felony conduct by members of the McClay Street gang.

We agree.

“The substantive offense defined in section 186.22[, subdivision] (a) has

three elements. Active participation in a criminal street gang, in the sense of participation

that is more than nominal or passive, is the first element of the substantive offense

defined in section 186.22 [, subdivision] (a). The second element is ‘knowledge that [the

gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,’ and

the third element is that the person ‘willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any

felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lamas

(2007) 42 Cal.4th 516, 523.)

In Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at page 1128, defendant acted alone in

committing an attempted robbery. A jury convicted him of attempted robbery and active

participation in a criminal street gang under section 186.22, subdivision (a). (Id. at p.

1129.) The issue in Rodriguez, like the issue raised here, was whether the third element

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of the crime described in section 186.22, subdivision (a)—willfully promoting,

furthering, or assisting in any felonious criminal conduct by members of the defendant’s

gang—can be satisfied by felonious criminal conduct committed by the defendant acting

alone. (Ibid.) The court held that it cannot, and expressly disapproved of prior cases to

the extent they are inconsistent with Rodriguez. (Id. at p. 1137, fn. 8.)

Section 186.22 requires the criminal conduct must be committed “‘by

members of that gang.’” (Rodriguez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1131.) The Rodriguez court

noted “members” is a plural noun (id. at p. 1132), and concluded “[t]he plain meaning of

section 186.22[, subdivision] (a) requires that felonious criminal conduct be committed

by at least two gang members, one of whom can include the defendant if he is a gang

member. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The court held the defendant could not be convicted of

violating section 186.22, subdivision (a) because he had acted alone in committing the

attempted robbery. (Id. at p. 1139.)

Rodriguez is controlling here. Because defendant acted alone in

committing the crimes upon which the prosecution relied to establish the third element of

the substantive gang offense, the evidence is insufficient to support defendant’s gang

convictions. Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s convictions on count eight and 10.

B. Jury Instruction Issues

Defendant alleges the court erred in instructing the jury in three instances.

“The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether

instructions correctly state the law [citations] and also whether instructions effectively

direct a finding adverse to a defendant by removing an issue from the jury’s consideration

[citations].” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) If an instruction is found to

have lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof, a majority of the courts have found the

error requires reversal unless the prosecution can establish beyond a reasonable doubt the

10

error was harmless. (People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491, 504.)3

1. CALCRIM No. 3131

Defendant was charged with being personally armed while he possessed

methamphetamine for sale. The methamphetamine he was charged with possessing for

sale was found in what the jury could reasonably have concluded was his bedroom at a

time when defendant was not present. The police also found a loaded nine-millimeter

semiautomatic handgun underneath the mattress to the bed that was but six feet away

from the methamphetamine.

In People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, a case involving an analogous

scenario, the Supreme Court found Bland subject to the section 12022, subdivision (c)

enhancement for being personally armed while possessing drugs, notwithstanding the fact

that he was not present when the drugs and firearm were discovered. The court held “a

defendant convicted of a possessory drug offense [is] subject to [a section 12022]

‘arming’ enhancement when the defendant possesses both drugs and a gun, and keeps

them together, but is not present when the police seize them from the defendant’s house.”

(People v. Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 995.)

Noting one is armed within the meaning of the statute if the individual has

the firearm “available for use, either offensively or defensively” (People v. Bland, supra,

10 Cal.4th at p. 997), the court concluded that drug possession is a crime of a continuing

nature and if the defendant “has a weapon available at any time during the felony to aid

in its commission, the defendant is ‘armed with a firearm in the commission . . . of a

felony.’” (Id. at p. 999.) The court summarized its holding as follows: “[W]hen the

prosecution has proved a charge of felony drug possession, and the evidence at trial

shows that a firearm was found in close proximity to the illegal drugs in a place

3 Because we have concluded the evidence does not support defendant’s

convictions for violating section 186.22, subdivision (a), we do not address his argument

that CALCRIM No. 1400 misstates the law.

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frequented by the defendant, a jury may reasonably infer (1) that the defendant knew of

the firearm’s presence, (2) that its presence together with the drugs was not accidental or

coincidental, and (3) that, at some point during the period of illegal drug possession, the

defendant was present with both the drugs and the firearm and thus that the firearm was

available for the defendant to put to immediate use to aid in the drug possession. These

reasonable inferences, if not refuted by defense evidence, are sufficient to warrant a

determination that the defendant was ‘armed with a firearm in the commission’ of a

felony within the meaning of section 12022.” (Id. at pp. 1002-1003.)

In connection with the personally armed firearm enhancement (§ 12022,

subd. (c)) attached to count six (possession of methamphetamine for sale), the court

instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3131. The modified instruction included

the following language based on the Bland decision to which defendant objects: “If the

People have proved that a firearm was found close to the methamphetamine in a place

where the defendant was frequently present, you may, but are not required to conclude

that: [¶] 1. The defendant knew the firearm was present; [¶] 2. It was not accidental or

coincidental that the firearm was present together with the drugs; and [¶] 3. During at

least part of the time[] the defendant allegedly possessed the illegal drug, he had the

firearm close at hand or available for immediate use to aid in the drug offense. [¶] If you

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence supports these conclusions, you may but

are not required to conclude that the defendant was personally armed with a firearm in

the commission of count six.” He contends the quoted portion of instruction, although a

correct statement of the law, was argumentative, improperly pointed the jury to specific

prosecution evidence and directed the jury how it should interpret that evidence, reducing

the prosecution’s burden of proof and denying him a fair trial.

Defendant did not object to the instruction. Although one must generally

object to an instruction correct in the law in order to raise the issue on appeal, we may

consider the issue if it affects the defendant’s substantial rights. (People v. Zamudio

12

(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 353.) We may also address the issue to preclude a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1141,

1156.) The latter reason is founded on a desire to preserve limited judicial resources and

may be particularly appropriate when the relative merit of the underlying contention —

that the instruction was improper — can easily be resolved on the initial appeal. (See

People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 682, disapproved on another ground in People v.

Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)

Defendant cites cases standing for the proposition that instructions that

“invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of

evidence” are impermissible, because such instructions are argumentative. (People v.

Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1276; People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135-

1138.) He cites Quercia v. United States (1932) 289 U.S. 466, for the proposition that a

court may not instruct a jury with instructions favoring one of the parties. Quercia is

inapposite. In Quercia, the complaint was not with the trial court’s instructions. Rather,

the defendant’s complaint had to do with the judge’s comments on the evidence: “‘And

now I am going to tell you what I think of the defendant’s testimony. You may have

noticed, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, that he wiped his hands during his testimony. It is

rather a curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying. Why it should be

so we don’t know, but that is the fact. I think that every single word that man said,

except when he agreed with the Government’s testimony, was a lie.” (Id. at p. 468.) The

high court found the trial judge overstepped his bounds in declaring his belief the

defendant was lying. “His definite and concrete assertion of fact, which he had made

with all the persuasiveness of judicial utterance, as to the basis of his opinion, was not

withdrawn. His characterization of the manner and testimony of the accused was of a

sort most likely to remain firmly lodged in the memory of the jury and to excite a

prejudice which would preclude a fair and dispassionate consideration of the evidence.”

(Id. at p. 472.)

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The trial judge in the present matter did not comment on whether he

believed or disbelieved any of the evidence. Rather, he simply instructed the jury

pursuant to the recommended modification of CALCRIM No. 3131. The instruction was

even-handed. Unlike the impermissibly slanted instruction provided in People v. Owens

(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1155,4 the court did not instruct the jury that the prosecution had

introduced evidence “‘tending to prove’” the defendant committed the charged acts. As

the court in Owens noted, “Instructing the jury that the People have introduced evidence

‘tending to prove’ appellant’s guilt carries the inference that the People have, in fact,

established guilt.” (Id. at p. 1158.) In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury

it may, but is not required to, make certain conclusions “[i]f the People have proved that a

firearm was found close to the methamphetamine in a place where the defendant was

frequently present.” (Italics added.)

It has long been the law in this state that a court may properly instruct a

jury as to inferences it may, but is not required to, draw from the evidence. (People v.

Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 773.)5 Indeed, CALCRIM is replete with instructions

permitting, but not requiring, a jury to draw certain inferences from evidence. (See e.g,

CALCRIM Nos. 371 [consciousness of guilt, suppression or fabrication of evidence], 372

[defendant’s flight], 376 [possession of recently stolen property], 1860 [opinion of value

of property], 2100 [if .08 blood-alcohol level when tested, may infer defendant was under

the influence when driving], 2101 [if .08 blood-alcohol level when tested, may infer

4“‘The People have introduced evidence tending to prove that there are

more than three acts of substantial sexual conduct or lewd and lascivious conduct upon

which a conviction in Count I may be based. Defendant may be found guilty if the proof

shows beyond a reasonable doubt and you unanimously agree that the defendant

committed three such acts.’” (People v. Owens, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158, italics

added.)

5 Of course a court may not instruct the jury the same evidence creates a

presumption that the fact to be inferred has been established. (People v. Roder (1983) 33

Cal.3d 491, 504-505.)

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defendant had .08 level when driving], 2220 [may infer defendant knew license was

suspended if prosecution proves notice of suspension mailed to most recent address and

not returned as undeliverable or unclaimed], 2641 [if defendant made statements different

from those in affidavit, may find statements in affidavit are false], 2801 [if prosecutor

proved beyond a reasonable doubt certificate from Franchise Tax Board stating no tax

return was filed, may conclude return was not filed], 2981 [may find failure to support

was willful if prosecutor proved defendant knew of child and failed to provide support],

2811 [if proved defendant’s name is signed on tax return, may conclude defendant was

signer].)

The instruction was an accurate statement of the law. (People v. Bland,

supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 1002-1003.) It was not slanted in favor of the prosecution and

merely informed the jury as to a permissible inference it could draw from testimony if it

accepted the evidence as true.6

2. CALCRIM No. 372

CALCRIM No. 372 is the standardized flight instruction. The court

instructed the jury as follows: “If the defendant fled or tried to flee immediately after the

crimes charged on January 3rd of 2010, or after he was accused of committing a crime,

that conduct may show he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled

or tried to flee, [it is] up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.

However, evidence that the defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.”

Defendant contends the instruction was improper in that it permitted the jury to infer

defendant’s guilt from his flight and in this case, the inference lacked a rational basis.

The constitutionality of CALCRIM No. 1400 has been upheld by the courts. (See e.g.,

6 Although we find the court did not err in instructing the jury pursuant to

the modified version of CALCRIM No. 3131, we reject respondent’s characterization of

the instruction. The court did not instruct the jury defendant was personally armed with a

firearm while possessing drugs for sale. Had the court done so, it would have denied

defendant due process of law. (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503.)

15

People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 30; People v. Hernández Ríos (2007)

151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 179-180

[upholding CALJIC flight instruction as constitutional].) In fact, defendant’s argument

was expressly rejected in People v. Hernández Ríos, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1158-

1159.) We agree with the Hernández Ríos court’s holding.

Contrary to defendant’s contention, CALCRIM No. 372 did not permit the

jury to draw an irrational inference from his flight. When defendant fled from the police,

he threw aside his jacket, which incidentally contained the evidence of his possession of

methamphetamine. Inside the abandoned jacket, the police found a plastic baggie

containing what was believed to be methamphetamine, as well as two syringes. While it

could be argued he got rid of the jacket to make himself lighter and faster in an effort to

make his getaway, it was not unreasonable to infer defendant ran and got rid of his jacket

during the flight because he did not wish to get caught with the contraband on his person.

A flight “instruction is properly given if the jury could reasonably infer that the

defendant’s flight reflected consciousness of guilt. [Citatation.]” (People v. Howard

(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1020-1021.) Consequently, the court did not err in instructing

the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 372.

C. Defendant’s Romero Motion

A trial court has the discretion to strike for purposes of sentencing a prior

conviction found true under the Three Strikes law. (People v. Superior Court (Romero)

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530.) We review a trial court’s refusal to strike a prior strike

conviction for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162.)

“‘[D]iscretion is abused only if the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the

circumstances being considered. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Green (1995) 34

Cal.App.4th 165, 182-183.)

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The purpose of the Three Strikes law is to punish recidivism (People v.

Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 155) by providing longer prison sentences for individuals

who “‘have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.’” (In re

Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 909.) In deciding whether to strike a prior conviction and

remove the defendant from the enhanced sentencing scheme provided by the Three

Strikes law, the court “‘must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of

his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the

particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed

outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he

had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’

[Citation.]” (In re Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 552.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this matter. As the court

found, defendant’s prior “strike” conviction for robbery not only qualifies as a serious

felony (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(19)), it also qualifies as a violent felony (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9))

and was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).

Although the prior conviction occurred in 1999, 10 years before the instant offenses,

defendant committed other felonies in the interim and served state prison terms for those

violations. The triggering “strike” prior conviction cannot, given this circumstance, be

deemed remote. (See People v. Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 183 [20-year-old

felony prior conviction admissible to impeach despite remoteness because the witness

“did not subsequently lead a blameless life”].) In this matter defendant was convicted of

two counts of active participation in the same criminal street gang he previously

committed a crime for, as well as another serious felony. (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); § 1192.7,

subd. (c) [assault with a firearm is a serious felony].) Additionally he was convicted of

possessing methamphetamine for sale. The sale of narcotics is one of his gang’s primary

activities. And, in both instances defendant was armed with a firearm, something he is

not permitted to possess even if possession was not in connection with felonies. Even

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after being arrested on this matter, defendant has been unable to bring his conduct in line.

He received write-ups in jail for possessing “pruno” (see People v. Abilez (2007) 41

Cal.4th 472, 489 [“an alcoholic drink brewed illicitly in county jail by inmates”]) and

Seroquel. Defendant is not outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law; he is the

dangerous, violent repeat offender the statutory scheme was meant to affect. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s invitation to strike his sole prior

“strike” conviction.

III

DISPOSITION

The application to recall the remittitur is granted. We recall the remittitur,

vacate our prior opinion, and order a new remittitur issue that reverses defendant’s

convictions for active participation in a criminal street gang (counts eight and 10). The

clerk of the superior court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and

send a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other

respects the judgment is affirmed.

MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

BEDSWORTH, J.

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