Opinion

West Run Student Housing Associates, LLC v. Huntington National Bank

  • 712 F.3d 165
  • 85 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 502
  • 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6804
  • 2013 WL 1338986
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Apr 4, 2013
Status
Published
Author
Hardiman
On the bench
Hardiman, Aldisert, Stark
Cited by
456 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.3%

stating that dismissal was not “warranted because Plaintiffs sought to ‘take a contrary position ... to avoid dismissal’!;] [p]laintiffs routinely amend complaints to correct factual inadequacies in response to a motion to dismiss [-] even when the proposed amendment flatly contradicts the initial allegation”

How later courts described this case

  • stating that dismissal was not “warranted because Plaintiffs sought to ‘take a contrary position ... to avoid dismissal’!;] [p]laintiffs routinely amend complaints to correct factual inadequacies in response to a motion to dismiss [-] even when the proposed amendment flatly contradicts the initial allegation”
  • holding that facts in a complaint can be withdrawn by an amended complaint and cannot be used against plaintiff on a motion to dismiss unless repeated or incorporated in the new pleading
  • stating that “judicial admissions” alleged in prior complaint were no longer before court, because amended complaint, which became operative complaint, withdrew such admissions “by amendment”
  • explaining that the liberal amendments standard permits amendment of the complaint even when proposed amendments “flatly contradict[]” earlier allegations

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 12-2430

___________________

WEST RUN STUDENT HOUSING ASSOCIATES, LLC;

CAMPUS VIEW JMU, LLC; MT. TABOR VILLAGE, LLC,

Appellants

v.

HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK

__________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 12-cv-00076)

District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry

__________________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 11, 2013

Before: HARDIMAN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

and STARK*, District Judge

*

The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, District Judge for the

(Filed: April 4, 2013)

James R. Cooney

Robert O. Lampl

Robert O. Lampl & Associates

960 Penn Avenue

The Convention Tower, Suite 1200

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Rudy A. Fabian

1623 Shady Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15217

Attorneys for Appellants

Kathleen J. Goldman

Peter S. Russ

Renee M. Schwerdt

Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney

301 Grant Street

One Oxford Centre, 20th Floor

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Attorneys for Appellee

__________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________________

United States District Court for the District of Delaware,

sitting by designation.

2

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

West Run Student Housing Associates, LLC (West Run),

Mt. Tabor Village, LLC (Mt. Tabor), and Campus View JMU,

LLC (Campus View) (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal the District

Court‘s order dismissing their amended complaint against

Huntington National Bank. We will affirm in part, vacate in

part, and remand.

I

This lawsuit arose from three commercial real estate

development projects for student housing at West Virginia

University (the West Run Project), Virginia Tech (the Mt. Tabor

Project), and James Madison University1 (the Campus View

Project). The same group of individuals (Sponsors) sponsored

each project.

A. The West Run Project

In August 2006, the Sponsors formed West Run to

facilitate the construction and management of off-campus

housing at West Virginia University in Morgantown, West

Virginia. West Run retained CBRE/Melody, a real estate

broker, for the purpose of securing bank financing for the

project. CBRE/Melody provided prospective lenders with

1

In the pleadings, the District Court opinion, and the

appellate briefs, this university is referred to as ―James Mason

University.‖ No such institution exists. The record cites a

school in Harrisonburg, Virginia, where James Madison

University is located.

3

confidential and proprietary information, consisting of ―an

‗underwriting,‘ a ‗bank package,‘ a loan request, a front end

appraisal of the project . . . , and financial information for each

of the Sponsors,‖ in conjunction with its efforts to secure bank

financing. Amended Compl. ¶ 9. In September 2006, West Run

selected Sky Bank to provide financing for the project, and the

bank agreed to loan West Run $39.975 million. On July 1,

2007, Huntington National Bank (Huntington) became the

successor-by-merger to Sky Bank‘s rights and obligations under

the West Run loan transaction.

The West Run Project was to be constructed in two

phases. Phase I was completed on schedule in August 2007.

The apartments completed during that phase had an occupancy

rate of 95% in the fall of 2007. Construction of Phase II was

completed in August 2008.

In the fall of 2008, as the West Run Project was being

completed, construction commenced on an unrelated student

housing project known as the Copper Beech Townhomes

(Copper Beech), located across the street from the West Run

Project. By the spring of 2009, a number of the Copper Beech

units were available for rent in competition with those in the

West Run Project. According to the amended complaint, it was

at this time that West Run first learned that ―Huntington had

participated, to the extent of $20 million, in the financing of

Copper Beech.‖ Id. ¶ 32. West Run also alleges that

Huntington divulged to the Copper Beech developers the

proprietary West Run information that had been provided by

CBRE/Melody to Huntington‘s predecessor, Sky Bank.

The West Run Project‘s overall occupancy dropped from

95% in the fall of 2007 to 64% in the fall of 2009, which greatly

4

decreased West Run‘s available cash flow. Consequently, West

Run anticipated that it would be unable to make the principal

and interest payments due to Huntington by December 1, 2009.

West Run contends that its ―occupancy crisis was caused by

Huntington‘s financing of Copper Beech, with its resulting

diminishment of [the West Run Project‘s] revenues.‖ Id. ¶ 40.

B. The Mt. Tabor Project

In October 2007, the Sponsors formed Mt. Tabor to

facilitate the construction and management of an off-campus

housing project at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia. The

Mt. Tabor Project was smaller than the West Run Project,

consisting of only thirty-eight condominium units. Huntington

agreed to finance this development with a $6 million loan, to be

disbursed in installments. The loan agreement, however,

required Mt. Tabor to sell at least twenty-nine units before

Huntington was required to fund the entire project. In the spring

of 2009, as the project was nearing completion, Huntington

refused to provide the last construction advance, and the project

failed.

C. The Campus View Project

In February 2008, the Sponsors formed Campus View to

facilitate the construction and management of an off-campus

housing project at James Madison University in Harrisonburg,

Virginia. The Campus View Project consisted of one hundred

sixty-eight condominium units to be constructed in three phases.

Huntington agreed to finance the Campus View Project with a

$10.5 million revolving line of credit, which was secured by a

mortgage on the property. The loan agreement required Campus

View to sell at least fifty-four units before Huntington was

5

required to fund Phase II. In or around August 2009,

Huntington refused to extend further construction advances to

Campus View.

II

On December 22, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a three-count

verified complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny

County, Pennsylvania. In Count I, West Run alleged that

Huntington had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing

by financing the Copper Beech project. In Counts II and III,

Campus View and Mt. Tabor each alleged breach of contract

based on Huntington‘s failure to provide funds under their

respective construction loan agreements.

On January 20, 2012, Huntington removed the case to the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania. A week later, Huntington filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The motion argued that West Run‘s claim (Count I)

should be dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim. It also

argued that Mt. Tabor‘s and Campus View‘s claims (Counts II

and III) should be dismissed because the number of pre-sold

condominium units listed in the complaint established that they

had sold an insufficient number of units to require Huntington to

disburse additional funds pursuant to the construction loan

agreements.2

2

In the original complaint, Mt. Tabor averred that it

had pre-sold twenty-seven units and Campus View averred

that it had pre-sold thirty-six units.

6

In response to Huntington‘s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs

filed an amended complaint, which simply omitted the factual

allegations regarding the number of pre-sold units. The

amended complaint also included a new count, listed as Count I,

in which West Run alleged that Huntington had breached its

duty of good faith and fair dealing by disclosing confidential

information it had received from CBRE/Melody to the Copper

Beech developers. The other counts were renumbered Counts

II, III, and IV, in the same order as they originally appeared.

Huntington then filed a motion to dismiss the amended

complaint, again arguing that West Run‘s claims should be

dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim. As to the claims

of Mt. Tabor and Campus View, Huntington argued that they

failed to state a claim based on the admissions as to the pre-sales

deficiencies contained in the original complaint.

The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the

amended complaint in its entirety with prejudice. W. Run

Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2012 WL

1739820, at *7 (W.D. Pa. May 15, 2012). This appeal

followed.3

3

The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review of a district

court‘s dismissal order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

7

III

Plaintiffs raise three arguments on appeal: (1) the District

Court erred when it concluded that West Run did not plead

sufficient facts to support its allegation that Huntington provided

confidential information regarding the West Run Project to the

Copper Beech developers; (2) the District Court erred when it

concluded that Huntington had no duty to West Run to refrain

from financing Copper Beech; and (3) the District Court erred

by deeming the unit pre-sale numbers listed in the superseded

original complaint to be binding judicial admissions. We will

examine each argument in turn.

A

The District Court determined that West Run alleged

insufficient facts to support the conclusion that Huntington

provided any proprietary information regarding the West Run

Project to the Copper Beech developers. We agree. To survive

a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of a complaint ―must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level‖

and the complaining party must offer ―more than labels and

conclusions‖ or ―a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action.‖ Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).

Just as the complaint in Twombly contained only ―an

allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of

conspiracy,‖ 550 U.S. at 556, here West Run offers no more

than an allegation that confidential information was disclosed

and a bare assertion that this violated the duty of good faith and

fair dealing. West Run does not plead facts regarding the nature

of the disclosed information, who disclosed it, or when it was

8

disclosed. Nor does the amended complaint contain any

corroborating factual averments that confidential information

was disclosed at all. ―[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not

‗show[n]‘—‗that the pleader is entitled to relief.‘‖ Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Accordingly, we

will affirm the District Court‘s dismissal of Count I.

B

In Count II, West Run alleges that Huntington breached

the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by providing a

loan to Copper Beech for a competing housing development

near the West Run Project. The District Court dismissed this

claim after observing that the loan agreement between West Run

and Huntington contained no language that would bar

Huntington from making loans to Copper Beech, and finding

that West Run‘s broad conception of the implied duty of good

faith and fair dealing would essentially bar Huntington from

financing anyone West Run considers a competitor.

Although ―[e]very contract imposes upon each party a

duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its

enforcement,‖ Kaplan v. Cablevision of PA, Inc., 671 A.2d 716,

722 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of

Contracts, § 205) (internal quotation marks omitted), that duty is

not limitless. Rather, there must be some relationship to the

provisions of the contract itself to invoke the duty of good faith.

See id. at 721–22; Agrecycle, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 783

A.2d 863, 867 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (―The good faith

obligation may be implied to allow enforcement of the contract

terms in a manner that is consistent with the parties‘ reasonable

9

expectations.‖). Otherwise, the court would violate the axiom

that it ―not imply a different contract than that which the parties

have expressly adopted.‖ Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp.,

519 A.2d 385, 388 (Pa. 1986). In other words, the duty of good

faith and fair dealing does not license courts to interpose

contractual terms to which the parties never assented.

In this case, we agree with the District Court that the

implied duty of good faith and fair dealing did not extend as far

as Plaintiffs suggest. West Run argues for a duty of good faith

external to its contract with Huntington. Pennsylvania courts

have rejected such attempts to rewrite a contract. See, e.g.,

Kaplan, 671 A.2d at 721–22 (defendant cable companies did not

breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing by allegedly

providing ―insufficient, confusing and misleading

representations regarding the subscribers‘ right to credit for

service interruptions‖ because the cable companies ―were not

contractually bound to provide such service or credit and

. . . made no representations regarding the right to such credits‖).

We do likewise and hold that the District Court did not err

when it dismissed Count II.

C

Plaintiffs‘ final argument is that the District Court erred

by deeming pre-sale numbers in the original complaint to be

binding judicial admissions, notwithstanding the fact that the

original complaint had been superseded by an amended

complaint.

The loan agreements at issue explicitly conditioned

Huntington‘s obligation to fund construction advances upon Mt.

Tabor and Campus View achieving a certain level of pre-sold

10

condominium units. In the original complaint, Mt. Tabor

averred that it had pre-sold twenty-seven units and Campus

View averred that it had pre-sold thirty-six units. Because the

number of units listed in the original complaint was insufficient

to trigger Huntington‘s obligation to fund the loans, Huntington

moved to dismiss. In response, Plaintiffs filed an amended

complaint that omitted those pre-sale averments after they

―realiz[ed] that the presale numbers in the original Complaint

were in error.‖ Appellants‘ Br. 26. Thereafter, Huntington filed

another motion to dismiss, contending that the District Court

should accept the averments in the original complaint as judicial

admissions. The District Court agreed and granted the motion.

As we shall explain, the District Court erred given the

procedural posture of the case.

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

a party to amend its pleading once as a matter of course within

21 days after serving it or within 21 days after service of a

responsive pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). ―[T]he amended

complaint ‗supersedes the original and renders it of no legal

effect, unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or

adopts the earlier pleading.‘‖ New Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v.

Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1504 (3d

Cir. 1996) (quoting Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d

504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985)). This approach ―ensures that a

particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on

technicalities.‖ Dole v. Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 487 (3d

Cir. 1990); see also 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1474 (3d ed. 2008) (―A

liberal policy toward allowing amendments to correct errors in

the pleadings clearly is desirable and furthers one of the basic

objectives of the federal rules—the determination of cases on

their merits.‖).

11

Although the District Court acknowledged these

principles, it reasoned that ―a plaintiff is not permitted to take a

contrary position in a complaint in order to avoid dismissal.‖ W.

Run, 2012 WL 1739820, at *6. The District Court relied on two

of our decisions for this proposition: Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s

Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2008), and

Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 275 (3d

Cir. 2004). See W. Run, 2012 WL 1739820, at *6. But neither

of those decisions involved the question of whether a plaintiff

could amend a complaint to cure a purported factual mistake. In

Sovereign Bank, a party attempted to take a legal position on

appeal that was contradicted by an allegation in its complaint,

and we held that the allegation was a binding judicial admission.

See Sovereign Bank, 533 F.3d at 181. In Parilla, we denied the

appellee‘s motion to dismiss an appeal for lack of standing

because, inter alia, factual concessions in her own complaint

revealed the basis for appellants‘ standing. See Parilla, 368

F.3d at 275.

Even if Plaintiffs‘ allegations in the original complaint

constituted judicial admissions, it does not follow that they may

not amend them. This Court and several of our sister courts

have recognized that judicial admissions may be withdrawn by

amendment. See Giannone v. U.S. Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544,

547 (3d Cir. 1956) (recognizing that ―withdrawn or superseded

pleadings‖ do not constitute judicial admissions); see also, e.g.,

InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 144–45 (1st Cir. 2003)

(―An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, and

facts that are neither repeated nor otherwise incorporated into

the amended complaint no longer bind the pleader.‖); 188 LLC

v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (―When

a party has amended a pleading, allegations and statements in

earlier pleadings are not considered judicial admissions.‖); Huey

12

v. Honeywell, Inc., 82 F.3d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1996) (―When a

pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded portion

ceases to be a conclusive judicial admission . . . .‖ (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)); Hibernia Nat’l Bank v.

Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 101 (5th Cir. 1993) (―To the extent that

Hibernia did make a ‗judicial confession[]‘ [in its original

complaint,] that confession was amended away.‖ (citations

omitted)). Indeed, effectively disallowing amendment by

looking to the original pleading is contrary to the liberal

amendment policy embodied in Rule 15.

Nor was dismissal warranted because Plaintiffs sought to

―take a contrary position . . . to avoid dismissal.‖ W. Run, 2012

WL 1739820, at *6. Plaintiffs routinely amend complaints to

correct factual inadequacies in response to a motion to dismiss.

See 6 Wright & Miller, supra § 1474 (―Perhaps the most

common use of Rule 15(a) is by a party seeking to amend in

order to cure a defective pleading.‖). That is so even when the

proposed amendment flatly contradicts the initial allegation.

See, e.g., 188 LLC, 300 F.3d at 734–36 (noting that district court

permitted plaintiff to amend complaint to assert a contradictory

factual position in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and

holding that earlier allegation was no longer a binding judicial

admission in light of that amendment); cf. Gray v. Phillips

Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 612 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting that

ADEA plaintiff amended his complaint as of right in response to

motion to dismiss to ―change[] the date of the alleged

discriminatory action‖ for statute of limitations purposes,

―ma[king] the filing of the discrimination charge timely under

the pleadings‖).

We find the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in Kelley v.

Crosfield Catalysts, 135 F.3d 1202 (7th Cir. 1998), particularly

13

instructive because it considered the question presented in this

appeal under nearly identical procedural circumstances. In

Kelley, the plaintiff filed a Family and Medical Leave Act

(FMLA) action against his employer. He alleged in his

complaint that he had been fired because he took leave from

work to ―obtain custody of [his] kids.‖ Id. at 1203. The

employer filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that

seeking custody of one‘s own children was not covered by the

FMLA. Id. The plaintiff later filed an amended complaint that

omitted that assertion. Id. The employer again moved to

dismiss, arguing that the admissions contained in the original

complaint were binding. Id. at 1203–04. The district court

granted the motion. Id. at 1204.

The Seventh Circuit reversed. It first noted that ―[i]t is

well-established that an amended pleading supersedes the

original pleading; facts not incorporated into the amended

pleading are considered functus officio.‖ Id. It then explained

that ―[i]f certain facts or admissions from the original complaint

become functus officio, they cannot be considered by the court

on a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. A court cannot

resuscitate these facts when assessing whether the amended

complaint states a viable claim.‖ Id. at 1205. Applying these

principles, the court concluded:

Any facts that Kelley had pleaded in his first two

complaints were effectively nullified for 12(b)(6)

purposes when he filed his Second Amended

Complaint, which did not reference those facts.

There was no longer any ―confession‖ in the

pleadings on which the district court could rely

when reviewing Crosfield‘s motion to dismiss the

Second Amended Complaint.

14

Id. This approach is consistent with how other courts of appeals

have treated the issue. See, e.g., InterGen, 344 F.3d at 144–45;

Huey, 82 F.3d at 333; Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 997 F.2d at 101.

This is not to say, however, that a party‘s assertion of

contrary factual positions in the pleadings is without

consequence. A superseded pleading may be offered as

evidence rebutting a subsequent contrary assertion. See

Giannone, 238 F.2d at 547; see also InterGen, 344 F.3d at 144–

45; 188 LLC, 300 F.3d at 736; Huey, 82 F.3d at 333; Andrews v.

Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1989);

Raulie v. United States, 400 F.2d 487, 526 (10th Cir. 1968). For

example, at the summary judgment stage, a district court may

consider a statement or allegation in a superseded complaint as

rebuttable evidence when determining whether summary

judgment is proper. See 188 LLC, 300 F.3d at 735–36.

However, at the motion to dismiss stage, when the district court

typically may not look outside the four corners of the amended

complaint, the plaintiff cannot be bound by allegations in the

superseded complaint.

Applying these principles to this appeal, the District

Court was required to convert Huntington‘s motion to dismiss

into a motion for summary judgment before looking beyond the

amended complaint to the pre-sale numbers contained in the

original complaint. See Kelley, 135 F.3d at 1204. We will

vacate and remand so the District Court can give Plaintiffs a

chance to provide evidence showing that the pre-sale numbers in

the original complaint were incorrect (as they now claim) and

15

that the real numbers meet the contractual requirements.4

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District

Court with respect to its dismissal of Counts I and II of the

amended complaint, and we will vacate and remand with respect

to Counts III and IV.

4

We note that the original complaint, filed in state court,

was verified as true and correct under penalty of perjury by

Russell P. Mills, the manager of West Run. Although the fact

that the original complaint was verified does not alter the

principle that an amended complaint will supersede the original,

see King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per

curiam), that verification places a heavy burden on Plaintiffs to

explain why the number of pre-sold units was incorrect.

We also note that although complaints filed in federal

court are usually not verified by the parties, Rule 11 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires an attorney to certify

that a pleading ―is not being presented for any improper

purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or

needlessly increase the cost of litigation‖ and that ―the factual

contentions have evidentiary support.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1),

(3).

16

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