recognizing that “a defendant’s financial resources are more appropriately determined not at the time of initial sentencing but at the conclusion of incarceration, thus allowing consideration of whether the defendant may have accumulated assets through inheritance or otherwise”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “a defendant’s financial resources are more appropriately determined not at the time of initial sentencing but at the conclusion of incarceration, thus allowing consideration of whether the defendant may have accumulated assets through inheritance or otherwise”
- explaining that “a defendant’s financial resources are more appropriately determined not at the time of initial sentencing but at the conclusion of incarceration, thus allowing consideration of whether the defendant may have accumulated assets through inheritance or otherwise”
- explaining that the incredible dubiosity rule applies only “where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or coerced and there is a lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt”
- concluding that a trial court may impose fines or costs upon an indigent defendant, but cannot imprison the indigent defendant for failure to pay the fines or costs
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Victoria Ursulskis Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Christopher L. Lafuse
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
In The
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
ALEXA WHEDON, )
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) 49S00-0009-CR-540
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
Plaintiff-Appellee. )
________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Patricia J. Gifford, Judge[1]
Cause No. 49G04-9903-CF-035467
________________________________________________
On Direct Appeal
April 16, 2002
DICKSON, Justice
The defendant, Alexa Whedon, was convicted of murder[2] for the 1998
killing of Shanna Sheese.[3] In this appeal, she presents issues regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence and the language of the sentencing order.
The defendant first contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that she aided and abetted the murder. In
addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court must
consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting
the judgment, without weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility,
and determine therefrom whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Marcum v. State, 725
N.E.2d 852, 863 (Ind. 2000).
Under Indiana's accomplice liability statute, a person "who knowingly
or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an
offense commits that offense." Ind.Code § 35-41-2-4. Factors considered
by the fact-finder to determine whether a defendant aided another in the
commission of a crime include: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2)
companionship with another engaged in a crime; (3) failure to oppose the
commission of the crime; and (4) the course of conduct before, during, and
after the occurrence of the crime. Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185,
1193 (Ind. 1996); Johnson v. State, 490 N.E.2d 333, 334 (Ind. 1986). While
the defendant's presence during the commission of the crime or her failure
to oppose the crime are, by themselves, insufficient to establish
accomplice liability, the trier of fact may consider them along with the
factors above to determine participation. Echols v. State, 722 N.E.2d 805,
807 (Ind. 2000); Burkes v. State, 445 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ind. 1983); Harris
v. State, 425 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Ind. 1981).
Applying the standard of review, the evidence shows that the victim's
body was discovered in a vacant lot, her death resulting from head wounds
inflicted with a heavy, blunt object. Around the time of the murder, one
witness saw the defendant, along with Vanessa Thompson, Malcolm Wilson, and
another individual get out of a pick-up truck at a crack house. In the
back of the truck was something covered by a tarp. The witness saw a pair
of white low top tennis shoes sticking out from the edge of the tarp. The
shoes seemed to be on feet because they were pointed up. Thompson quickly
covered the feet with the tarp. The victim had been seen wearing the same
type of shoes. Several witnesses testified regarding admissions made by
the defendant of her involvement in the murder. She variously stated that
she hit the victim in the head with a brick, that she held the victim down
while Thompson hit her in the head, that she watched Thompson hold down the
victim as a man named "Darrell" beat the victim in the head with a brick,
that she was just a look-out, and that she helped hide the body. While the
details and extent of the admissions vary, her statements were consistent
that she was involved in the killing.
The defendant argues that the various statements attributed to her
show inherent material contradictions and vacillation. She urges
application of the incredible dubiosity rule. Under this rule, a reviewing
court may reverse if it finds "'inherently improbable' testimony or
coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of 'incredible
dubiosity.'" Rodgers v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (Ind. 1981)(citations
omitted). Application of the rule is limited, however, to cases where a
sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal
or coerced and there is a lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt. White
v. State, 706 N.E.2d 1078, 1079-80 (Ind. 1999).
In the present case, the supporting evidence comes from the testimony
of several witnesses. Furthermore, even though this evidence primarily
consists of the defendant's various statements to these witnesses, the
substance of most of these statements consistently shows her role in aiding
and abetting the murder. This evidence establishes the defendant's
presence at the scene of the crime, her companionship with others engaged
in the crime, her failure to oppose the crime, and her conduct during the
crime.
We find from the evidence favorable to the judgment that a reasonable
fact-finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either
killed or aided and abetted the killing of the victim.
The defendant also contends that the trial court erred in its
sentencing order when, after finding the defendant indigent, it imposed
costs without expressly prohibiting incarceration for failure to pay those
costs. The State argues in response that the prohibition upon imprisonment
for failing to pay fines and restitution does not apply to court costs.
The trial court judgment stated in part: "The Court imposes as it must
by law, $125 in court costs. The Court finds that you're indigent as to
any other fines, costs or fees in regard to this matter." Record at 543.
Our cases do not provide a conclusive resolution regarding whether the
rule requiring express prohibition of imprisonment for non-payment of fines
applies equally to costs. In Fry v. State, 447 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 1983), the
trial court sentenced the defendant to a period of imprisonment and imposed
a fine of $500. We summarily rejected the defendant's claim that the fine
was imposed without the trial court first determining his status as an
indigent, noting that the judgment included the statement: "The Defendant
being indigent shall not be imprisoned for failure to pay any such costs
and fine." Id. at 573. Four years later, in Whitehead v. State, 511
N.E.2d 284 (Ind. 1987), the defendant alleged error in the imposition of a
$1000 fine and ordered $4,418.32 paid in restitution. Without analyzing
the issue, we noted the State's concession that "when a fine is imposed
upon an indigent, the trial court must expressly state that the defendant
shall not be imprisoned for failing to pay the fine." Id. at 296 (emphasis
added). We declared our agreement, referring to Fry, and remanded the case
to the trial court for the purpose of adding the indicated language. This
Court thereafter interpreted Whitehead to hold "that when fines or costs
are imposed upon an indigent, the trial court must expressly state that the
defendant shall not be imprisoned for failing to pay the fine." Petty v.
State, 532 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 1989)(emphasis added). We found that the
trial court "was correct in stating that she may not suspend or waive the
costs, but that she will not and may not enforce the order of costs against
an indigent." Id. at 612 (emphasis added). We found this expression of
"non-enforcement of the costs" to satisfy the express statement
requirement. Id. (emphasis added). In Lock v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1155
(Ind. 1991), we remanded to permit the trial court to amend its judgment
imposing fines of $10,000 on each of two convictions, "to state that [the
defendant] shall not be imprisoned for failing to pay the fines assessed."
Id. at 1161 (emphasis added). We likewise remanded for the addition of
similar additional language in Ridley v. State, 690 N.E.2d 177, 182 (Ind.
1997), where the trial court assessed $30,000 in fines and $10,000 for the
cost of representation, finding that the appointment of pauper appellate
counsel indicated the trial court's awareness of the defendant's indigence.
Although we note that most of our prior decisions primarily involved
the imposition of fines, we have indicated our approval of the same
sentencing language requirement for court costs as well. See Petty, 532
N.E.2d at 612. Furthermore, our legislature requires indigency hearings
both as to the imposition of fines, Ind.Code § 35-38-1-18(a), and costs,
Ind.Code § 33-19-2-3(a). We conclude that when fines or costs are imposed
upon an indigent defendant, such a person may not be imprisoned for failure
to pay the fines or costs.
We note, however, the dubious origin of the rule declaring that trial
courts' sentencing orders must necessarily recite an express prohibition
upon imprisonment for failure to pay fines or costs. Remanding to insist
that this warning be included in every order sentencing an indigent
defendant does not substantially serve defendants or the just and efficient
administration of justice. Moreover, a defendant's financial resources are
more appropriately determined not at the time of initial sentencing but at
the conclusion of incarceration, thus allowing consideration of whether the
defendant may have accumulated assets through inheritance or otherwise.
Finding the supporting precedents insufficiently grounded and the rule
lacking sound and substantial purpose, we overrule our precedents declaring
that that sentencing orders must include the prohibition against
imprisonment for failure to pay fines or costs.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] The bench trial and sentencing hearing were conducted by Diane
Marger Moore, Master Commissioner.
[2] Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
[3] The defendant was originally charged along with Malcolm Wilson and
Vanessa K. Thompson for the murder of Shanna Sheese. Following severance
upon motion of the State, each defendant was tried separately.