Opinion

Bushong v. Williamson

  • 790 N.E.2d 467
  • 2003 Ind. LEXIS 571
  • 2003 WL 21489735
Court
Indiana Supreme Court
Filed
Jun 27, 2003
Status
Published
Author
Rucker
On the bench
Rucker, Shepard, Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm
Cited by
162 cases
Authority
More cited than 96.8%

holding that, despite conflicting facts and inferences on some elements of a claim, summary judgment may be proper Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 78A01-1411-CC-477 | August 11, 2015 Page 8 of 9 where there is no dispute or conflict regarding a fact that is dispositive of the claim

How later courts described this case

  • holding that, despite conflicting facts and inferences on some elements of a claim, summary judgment may be proper Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 78A01-1411-CC-477 | August 11, 2015 Page 8 of 9 where there is no dispute or conflict regarding a fact that is dispositive of the claim
  • holding the same language under a prior version of the statute is “fairly explicit” that “a plaintiff may not now sue a governmental employee personally if the complaint, on its face, alleges that the employee’s acts leading to the claim occurred within the scope of employment”
  • explaining that whether a person’s acts are within the scope of his or her employment is usually a question of fact, although it can be determined as a matter of law in certain circumstances
  • explaining that the ITCA “governs lawsuits against political subdivisions and their employees” and “provides substantial immunity for conduct within the scope of the employee's employment”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

JAMES E. AYERS SHANNON L. ROBINSON

Wernle, Ristine & Ayers Kelley, Belcher & Brown

Crawfordsville, Indiana Bloomington, Indiana

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

DONNA BUSHONG and GARY BUSHONG, )

Parents of JONATHAN BUSHONG, )

) Supreme Court Cause Number

Appellants (Plaintiffs), ) 54S01-0205-CV-267

)

v. )

) Court of Appeals Cause Number

DAVID WILLIAMSON, ) 54A01-0103-CV-100

)

Appellee (Defendant). )

APPEAL FROM THE MONTGOMERY SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable David A. Ault, Judge

Cause No. 54D01-0003-CP-84

CIVIL TRANSFER

June 27, 2003

RUCKER, Justice

This case presents the question of whether in a tort action against a

public employee, a trial court may examine evidence outside of the

complaint to determine whether the employee was acting within the scope of

employment. We hold that it may.

Facts and Procedural History

David Williamson is a teacher for the South Montgomery School

Corporation. Jonathan Bushong was a student in Williamson’s fifth grade

physical education class. On March 20, 1998, while playing kickball with

the class, Williamson tagged Jonathan out. In response, Jonathan kicked

Williamson in the buttocks. After being admonished not to do so again,

Jonathan attempted to kick Williamson a second time. At that point,

Williamson caught Jonathan’s ankle in mid-air, lifted Jonathan from the

ground, and struck him on the back, legs, and buttocks with his hand.

Jonathan sustained bruises as a result.

On August 4, 1998, Jonathan’s parents, Gary and Donna Bushong (“the

Bushongs”), filed on Jonathan’s behalf a tort claims notice with the South

Montgomery School Corporation and the Indiana Political Subdivision Risk

Management Commission. See Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8. The Bushongs did not

pursue a claim against the school. However, on March 16, 2000, the

Bushongs filed a complaint against Williamson personally seeking damages

for the loss of their son’s consortium, love, and companionship. After

conducting discovery, Williamson filed a motion for summary judgment. The

trial court granted the motion concluding: (i) the Bushongs’ pleadings and

discovery responses showed that Williamson’s actions were done within the

scope of his employment; and (ii) the Bushongs failed to give Williamson

notice as required by the Indiana Tort Claims Act. On review, a divided

panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and

remanded the cause for further proceedings. In so doing, the majority

determined: (1) under the Tort Claims Act as amended in 1995, the trial

court was precluded from considering documents outside of the complaint in

determining whether the defendant’s acts occurred within the scope of

employment; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether

Williamson’s act occurred in the scope of employment. Bushong v.

Williamson, 760 N.E.2d 1090, 1095, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The Court of

Appeals also determined that the trial court erred in determining that the

Bushongs were required to give Williamson notice under the Indiana Tort

Claims Act. Id. at 1098. We previously granted transfer thereby vacating

the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Bushong v. Williamson, 774 N.E.2d 514 (Ind.

2002).

Discussion

Prior to a 1995 amendment to Indiana’s Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”), a

plaintiff was permitted to sue a governmental employee in tort for acts

committed within the scope of the employee’s employment. See I.C. § 34-4-

16.5-5 (repealed 1995). The plaintiff could sue either the employer or the

employee, and the “notice requirement of the Tort Claims Act applie[d] not

only to political subdivisions, but also employees of political

subdivisions as well.” VanValkenburg v. Warner, 602 N.E.2d 1046, 1048

(Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Poole v. Clase, 476 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. 1985)),

trans. denied. However, where the plaintiff elected to sue only the

governmental employee, notice was required under the ITCA “only if the act

or omission causing the plaintiff’s loss is within the scope of defendant’s

employment.” Id. at 1049. The notice requirement was based on provisions

in the ITCA requiring the government entity to defend an employee sued

within the scope of employment, even if the government entity was not named

as a defendant and regardless of whether the employee could be held

personally liable for the loss. Poole, 476 N.E.2d at 830-31 (citing

provisions of the statute currently codified at I.C. § 34-13-3-5(d), (e)).

Although it appears that the notice provision still remains intact,

amendments to the ITCA, effective July 1, 1995, limit when a plaintiff may

sue a governmental employee personally. At the time this incident

occurred, Indiana Code section 34-13-3-5(a)[1] in pertinent part provided:

“[a] lawsuit alleging that an employee acted within the scope of the

employee’s employment must be exclusive to the complaint and bars an action

by the claimant against the employee personally.”[2] Indiana Code section

34-13-3-5(b)[3] provided:

A lawsuit filed against an employee personally must allege that an act

or omission of the employee that causes a loss is:

(1) criminal;

(2) clearly outside the scope of the employee’s employment;

(3) malicious;

(4) willful and wanton; or

(5) calculated to benefit the employee personally.

The complaint must contain a reasonable factual basis supporting the

allegations.

I.C. § 34-13-3-5(b) (current version at I.C. § 34-13-3-5(c)).

In this case, the Court of Appeals majority held that the language of

the pre-2001 revision of section 5(a) meant that a plaintiff may not now

sue a governmental employee personally if the complaint, on its face,

alleges that the employee’s acts leading to the claim occurred within the

scope of employment. Bushong, 760 N.E.2d at 1095. We agree. The statute

seems fairly explicit on this point. However, we disagree with our

colleagues that the portion of section 5(a) that says the scope of

employment allegation must be “exclusive to the complaint,” means that the

trial court is confined to looking only to the face of the complaint in

determining whether the defendant’s acts occurred in the scope of

employment. Id.

When interpreting a statute, the express language of the statute

controls the interpretation and the rules of statutory construction apply.

This Court is required to determine, give effect to, and implement the

legislative intent underlying the statute and to construe the statute in

such a way as to prevent absurdity and hardship and to favor public

convenience. Livingston v. Fast Cash USA, Inc., 753 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ind.

2001). In so doing, we should consider the objects and purposes of the

statute as well as the effects and repercussions of such an interpretation.

Id. The legislative intent as ascertained from the provision as a whole

prevails over the strict literal meaning of any word or term. Shell Oil

Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 970 (Ind. 1998).

The ITCA, Indiana Code section 34-13-3-1 et seq., governs lawsuits

against political subdivisions and their employees. Among other things the

statute provides substantial immunity for conduct within the scope of the

employee’s employment. See I.C. § 34-13-3-3 (setting forth twenty-two

separate categories for which immunity attaches). Immunity assumes

negligence but denies liability. Catt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox County,

779 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2002). “‘The purpose of immunity is to ensure that

public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry

out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of

litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.’”

Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind. 2000)

(quoting Ind. Dep’t of Corr. v. Stagg, 556 N.E.2d 1338, 1343 (Ind. Ct. App.

1990), trans. denied).

It is true that the 1995 amendment barring lawsuits against government

employees personally was not included as a part of the specific immunity

provision of Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3. However, the effect of the

amendment produces the same result. That is to say, the amendment allows

government employees acting in the scope of their employment the freedom to

carry out their duties without the fear of litigation. It does not appear

to us that the Legislature intended to alter this result by its use of the

phrase “exclusive to the complaint.” In our view the Legislature merely

intended that if a plaintiff alleges that an employee acted within the

scope of employment then those allegations must appear on the face of the

complaint. This provides an immediate and early indication that the

employee is not personally liable. In the paraphrased words of the

statute, the action against the employee is “bar[red].” See I.C. § 34-13-3-

5(a) (current version at I.C. § 34-13-3-5(b)). However, the statute is

simply silent and does not speak to what happens when no “scope of

employment” allegation is made in the complaint. In that event, the

government employee is in the same position as any other defendant in a

lawsuit where an allegation is made that the defendant’s tortious or

negligent conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury. The difference is that a

government employee defendant has a complete defense: the action occurred

within the scope of employment. If post-complaint discovery supports this

claim, then it is appropriate that the defendant file a motion for summary

judgment.[4]

Because Williamson is employed by a political subdivision he is a

government employee.[5] The trial court granted Williamson’s motion for

summary judgment on grounds that the Indiana Trial Rule 56 materials

demonstrated, among other things, that Williamson’s conduct giving rise to

the Bushongs’ complaint occurred within the scope of employment. We will

address this issue in more detail below. We pause here to address a claim

made by the Bushongs. They insist that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment because their complaint specifically alleged that

Williamson committed battery on Jonathan, which was a criminal act. Thus,

according to the Bushongs, Williamson ipso facto was acting outside the

scope of his employment.

It is correct to say that a government employee may be sued personally

where the complaint alleges the act or omission causing the loss is

criminal. See I.C. § 34-13-3-5(c)(1). However the fact of criminal

conduct standing alone is not dispositive of whether the employee was

acting outside the scope of employment. We have recently explained,

“conduct . . . of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental

to the conduct authorized,” is within the employee’s scope of employment.

Celebration Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at 453 (quoting Restatement (Second) of

Agency § 229 (1958)). An act is incidental to authorized conduct when it

“is subordinate to or pertinent to an act which the servant is employed to

perform,” id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 cmt. b (1958)),

or when it is done “to an appreciable extent, to further his employer’s

business.” Id. (quoting Kemezy v. Peters, 622 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ind.

1993)). Even criminal acts may be considered as being within the scope of

employment if “the criminal acts originated in activities so closely

associated with the employment relationship as to fall within its scope.”

Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d

244, 247 (Ind. 1989). Generally, whether the tortious act of an employee

is within the scope of employment is a question of fact. However, under

certain circumstances the question may be determined as a matter of law.

Kemezy, 662 N.E.2d at 1298. In this case, the trial court determined that

the discovery materials conclusively demonstrated that Williamson was

acting in the scope of employment as a matter of law. The trial court was

correct in examining the Trial Rule 56 materials to make this

determination. We also conclude the trial court was correct in granting

summary judgment in Williamson’s favor.

Our standard of review for summary judgment is that used in the trial

court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence shows there

is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Tom-Wat, Inc. v. Fink,

741 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ind. 2001). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn

from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Tom-Wat,

741 N.E.2d at 346. Also, review of a summary judgment motion is limited to

those materials designated to the trial court. Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t of

Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. 2001).

To support his motion for summary judgment, Williamson relied in

pertinent part on the Bushongs’ complaint; his own affidavit, which

included the Bushongs’ Notice of Tort Claims; and the Bushongs’ answers to

interrogatories. The relevant portion of the Bushongs’ complaint recounted

the events giving rise to the lawsuit and alleged that Williamson’s conduct

was criminal. Although the allegations of the complaint shed little light

on whether Williamson was acting in the scope of employment, the additional

materials are more instructive. The Bushongs’ Notice of Tort Claims

alleged in relevant part that Williamson’s acts “were done within the scope

of Williamson’s employment with the South Montgomery School Corporation.”

App. of Appellee at 15. In similar fashion, relevant portions of the

Bushongs’ answers to interrogatories said “Mr. Williamson[] . . . inflicted

bodily injury as an employee of a school corporation, while engaged in his

official duty on school property . . . .” Id. at 58. In opposition to

Williamson’s motion for summary judgment, the Bushongs tendered their own

affidavits along with other evidentiary materials. However, other than

insisting that Williamson’s conduct was criminal, a point that is not

dispositive, none of the materials raised a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether Williamson was acting in the scope of employment when he

struck Jonathan. In essence the Bushongs conceded this point in their

Notice of Tort Claims and supplemented this concession by their

interrogatory answers.

"The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about

which there can be no factual dispute and which may be determined as a

matter of law." Kottlowski v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 670 N.E.2d 78, 82

(Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. Once the moving party has sustained

its initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law, the party

opposing summary judgment must respond by designating specific facts

establishing a genuine issue for trial. Stephenson v. Ledbetter, 596

N.E.2d 1369, 1371 (Ind. 1992). A factual issue is material for the

purposes of Trial Rule 56(C) if it bears on the ultimate resolution of a

relevant issue. Blackwell v. Dykes Funeral Homes, Inc., 771 N.E.2d 692,

695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. A factual issue is genuine if it

is not capable of being conclusively foreclosed by reference to undisputed

facts. Id. As a result, despite conflicting facts and inferences on some

elements of a claim, summary judgment may be proper where there is no

dispute or conflict regarding a fact that is dispositive of the claim. Id.

If the opposing party fails to meet its responsive burden, the court shall

render summary judgment. Krueger v. Hogan, 780 N.E.2d 1199, 1201 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2003).

In this case Williamson carried his initial burden of demonstrating

that he was acting within the scope of employment, a fact that is

dispositive of the Bushongs’ claim for relief. Because the Bushongs failed

to designate evidentiary materials showing a factual dispute on this

dispositive issue, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in

Williamson’s favor.

Conclusion

The 1995 amendment to the Tort Claims Act, barring lawsuits against

government employees personally, does not preclude the trial court from

examining evidence outside of the complaint to determine whether the

employee was acting within the scope of employment. Thus, the trial court

in this case properly examined the parties’ submissions in support of and

in opposition to a motion for summary judgment to determine this point.

Because there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether

Williamson’s complained-of conduct was committed within the scope of

employment, summary judgment in his favor was correct. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.

-----------------------

[1] Amended by P.L. 192-2001, § 2.

[2] The full text of the statute read:

A judgment rendered with respect to or a settlement made by a

governmental entity bars

an action by the claimant against an employee whose conduct gave

rise to the claim resulting in that judgment or settlement. A

lawsuit alleging that an employee acted within the scope of the

employee’s employment must be exclusive to the complaint and

bars an action by the claimant against the employee personally.

However, if the governmental entity answers that the employee

acted outside the scope of the employee’s employment, the

plaintiff may amend the complaint and sue the employee

personally. An amendment to the complaint by the plaintiff

under this subsection must be filed not later than one hundred

eighty (180) days from the date the answer was filed and may be

filed notwithstanding the fact that the statute of limitations

has run.

I.C. § 34-13-3-5(a) (current version at I.C. § 34-13-3-5(b)).

[3] Amended by P.L. 192-2001, § 2.

[4] On the other hand, if the complaint alleges that a government

employee acted within the scope of employment, then a motion to dismiss

under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) would be the appropriate course of action.

[5] See I.C. § 34-6-2-110 (providing in pertinent part, “[p]olitical

subdivision, for purposes of I.C. § 34-13-3, means a . . . (9) school

corporation”).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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