holding that if a trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant, “remand for resentencing may be the appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that if a trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant, “remand for resentencing may be the appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.”
- explaining that if a trial court abuses its sentencing discretion, remand for resentencing is required “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record”
- concluding that trial court did not err in failing to recognize guilty plea as a significant mitigating factor where the State agreed to dismiss other pending charges and where evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming
- observing that the general proposition that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing to consider a mitigating factor that was not raised at sentencing “has at least one important exception, namely: pleas of guilty,” holding that “[a]lthough Anglemyer did not argue before the sentencing court that his guilty plea was a mitigating factor, this does not preclude him from raising the issue for the first time on appeal,” and examining the trial court’s failure to mention this factor under the abuse of discretion standard of review
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joel M. Schumm Steve Carter
Indiana University School of Law Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Michael W. Reed Deputy Attorney General
Reed & Earhart Attorneys at Law, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana
Warsaw, Indiana
______________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 43S05-0606-CR-230
ALEXANDER J. ANGLEMYER,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
_________________________________
Appeal from the Kosciusko Superior Court, No. 43D01-0505-FB-76
The Honorable Duane G. Huffer, Judge
_________________________________
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
_________________________________
October 30, 2007
Rucker, Justice.
The defendant-petitioner, Alexander J. Anglemyer, seeks rehearing following our
decision affirming his sentences for robbery and battery. We grant rehearing solely to clarify
that a defendant who pleads guilty does not forfeit the opportunity to claim on appeal that the
trial court should have considered his guilty plea a mitigating circumstance even though the
defendant failed to assert this claim at sentencing.
A detailed recitation of the facts, procedural history, and background of this case is set
forth in our original opinion. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007). Here, we
recite only the facts necessary to our decision on rehearing. For his conduct in beating, kicking,
and taking money from a pizza delivery driver, Anglemyer was charged with robbery as a Class
B felony and battery as a Class C felony. Anglemyer was arrested shortly after the assault.
More specifically, the record shows an officer on bicycle patrol apprehended Anglemyer within
minutes of the crime. Anglemyer later explained to a booking officer that “he thought it was
going to be an easy steal” and that “he did not think he would get caught by a bike cop.” App. at
25.
Anglemyer pleaded guilty as charged under terms of a plea agreement that provided in
part that the “sentence will not exceed sixteen (16) years executed.” App. at 8. The trial court
imposed a sixteen-year sentence. On appeal, Anglemyer challenged his sentence as
inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). He also alleged trial court error in identifying
and weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. Addressing this latter claim only, the Court of
Appeals focused upon the scope of appellate review, as well as whether trial courts were still
required to enter sentencing statements in light of the 2005 amendments to Indiana’s sentencing
statutes. We granted transfer to address these issues. However, we also addressed Anglemyer’s
claim about the inappropriateness of his sentence and his claim of trial court error in imposing
sentence. Among other things, Anglemyer argued that the trial court overlooked as a mitigating
factor his plea of guilty to the charges. Disposing of this argument, we observed that at his
sentencing hearing Anglemyer did not mention his guilty plea as a factor in mitigation. We cited
the general proposition that “the trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing to consider a
mitigating factor that was not raised at sentencing.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492 (citing
Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (Ind. 2000) and Creekmore v. State, 853 N.E.2d
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523, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)); see also Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000) (“If
the defendant does not advance a factor to be mitigating at sentencing, this Court will presume
that the factor is not significant and the defendant is precluded from advancing it as a mitigating
circumstance for the first time on appeal.”). We concluded, therefore, that this alleged mitigating
circumstance was precluded from review. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492.
We acknowledge that this general proposition has at least one important exception,
namely: pleas of guilty. As we observed in a footnote in Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237
n.2 (Ind. 2004), “Because a sentencing court is inherently aware of the fact that a guilty plea is a
mitigating circumstance, the language from [Spears, supra] . . . is not applicable.” The same
applies here. Although Anglemyer did not argue before the sentencing court that his guilty plea
was a mitigating factor, this does not preclude him from raising the issue for the first time on
appeal. We thus examine the trial court’s failure to mention this factor under our abuse of
discretion standard of review. This is so because one of the ways in which a trial court may
abuse its discretion is by entering a sentencing statement which “omits reasons that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration. . . .” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91.
We have held that a defendant who pleads guilty deserves “some” mitigating weight be
given to the plea in return. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 591 (Ind. 2007) (citing Cotto v.
State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ind. 2005)). But an allegation that the trial court failed to identify or
find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is not
only supported by the record but also that the mitigating evidence is significant. See Anglemyer,
868 N.E.2d at 490-91. And the significance of a guilty plea as a mitigating factor varies from
case to case. Francis, 817 N.E.2d at 238 n.3. For example, a guilty plea may not be significantly
mitigating when it does not demonstrate the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, id., or
when the defendant receives a substantial benefit in return for the plea. Sensback v. State, 720
N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 1999).
Here, faced with a Class B and a Class C felony, Anglemyer was exposed to a potential
maximum sentence of twenty-eight years. In exchange for his plea, Anglemyer received the
benefit of a twelve-year reduction in sentence. This alone was a substantial benefit. Further,
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several additional charges, including possession of marijuana as a Class A misdemeanor, false
informing as a Class B misdemeanor, and illegal possession of alcohol by a minor as a Class C
misdemeanor, were pending against Anglemyer at the time of his arrest. These charges were
dismissed in exchange for Anglemyer’s guilty plea. App. at 8, 14. This was a benefit as well.
As for the acceptance of responsibility, the record shows that the plea agreement was
“more likely the result of pragmatism than acceptance of responsibility and remorse.” Mull v.
State, 770 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted). This is so because the evidence
against Anglemyer was overwhelming. See Primmer v. State, 857 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), trans. denied (declaring a plea may “be considered less significant if there was substantial
admissible evidence of the defendant’s guilt”). And although Anglemyer expressed some
remorse for his actions, stating, “I would just like to tell [the victim] myself, personally that I am
very sorry. . . . I am very, very sorry,” Tr. at 16, Anglemyer attempted to minimize his
culpability by relying upon his lack of employment, mental impairment, and history of emotional
and behavioral problems. Tr. at 13-15. In this case, Anglemyer has not demonstrated that his
guilty plea was a significant mitigating circumstance. We therefore conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by omitting reference to the plea when imposing sentence.
We grant rehearing and modify our original opinion as set forth herein. In all other
respects the original opinion is affirmed.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.
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