Opinion

Foley Bey v. Prator

  • 53 F.4th 854
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Nov 17, 2022
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Prisoner w/ out Counsel
Cited by
18 cases
Authority
More cited than 64.2%

affirming qualified immunity for officers who arrested the plaintiff for trespass because the officers could have reasonably believed that probable cause was present

How later courts described this case

  • affirming qualified immunity for officers who arrested the plaintiff for trespass because the officers could have reasonably believed that probable cause was present
  • “It is not clearly established that the officers were required to allow plaintiffs to pass through security screening; nor is it clearly established that the officers were not allowed to ask them to leave once they refused and then arrest them once they would not leave after being told to do so.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 21-30489 Document: 00516548855 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/17/2022

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 17, 2022

No. 21-30489 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Rene Joseph Foley Bey; Julia Mae Foley Bey,

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Steve Prator, Sheriff; Mark Terry, Deputy Sheriff;

L. C. Cope, Deputy Sheriff; Glyn Best, Deputy Sheriff,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

No. 5:19-CV-1262

Before Smith, Barksdale, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

Rene Foley Bey and Julia Foley Bey (“plaintiffs”) appeal a summary

judgment and the denial of recusal. We find no error and affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs, who identify as Moorish Americans, sought to enter the

Caddo Parish Courthouse to file documents with the court clerk. Upon arriv-

ing at the security-screening station, plaintiffs informed the officers on duty

that they wished to enter without passing through the security screening,

Case: 21-30489 Document: 00516548855 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/17/2022

No. 21-30489

which, they asserted, would violate their rights under the Fourth Amend-

ment and their rights as Moorish Americans under the United States-

Morocco Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The officers informed plaintiffs

that they could not enter without being screened and were required to leave

the courthouse if they did not agree. After plaintiffs’ repeated refusals to

depart, the officers stated they would count to three and, if plaintiffs refused

to leave, they would be arrested. They did not depart and were arrested,

charged with violating Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:63.3, “Entry on or

remaining in places or on land after being forbidden.”

Plaintiffs were taken to the courthouse basement, searched, and taken

to the Caddo Correctional Center. They allege that, during that search, the

officers removed their religious headwear, namely, a fez worn by Rene Foley

Bey and a turban worn by Julia Foley Bey. Plaintiffs also assert that they were

“subjected to mistreatment and harsh conditions” while in custody. They

were released early the next day after friends posted bail; the district attorney

ultimately dismissed the charges.

Proceeding pro se, plaintiffs brought a litany of claims against various

officials serving in Caddo Parish and the Louisiana state government based

on their actions taken during the arrest. Some of the defendants were

dropped from the amended complaint, while others successfully moved to

dismiss. 1 Ultimately, federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law

claims against the three arresting officers (Mark Terry, L.C. Cope, and Glyn

Best), and state-law claims against Sheriff Steve Prator remained. The four

remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the offi-

cers were protected by qualified immunity, which the district court granted

on the magistrate judge’s recommendation. Plaintiffs also moved for recusal

1

Plaintiffs do not appeal these dismissals.

2

Case: 21-30489 Document: 00516548855 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/17/2022

No. 21-30489

of the magistrate judge, which the district court denied. Plaintiffs, pro se,

timely appeal.

II.

“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money

damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly estab-

lished’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” 2 Consistent with our

standard of review for summary judgments, the legal issues underlying the

district court’s qualified-immunity ruling is reviewed de novo. 3 When

considering whether summary judgment was appropriate, “we ‘view the

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all

reasonable inferences in its favor.’” 4 “A qualified immunity defense alters

the usual summary judgment burden of proof” because the plaintiff, to

overcome qualified immunity, “must rebut the defense by establishing a

genuine [dispute of material fact] as to whether the official’s allegedly

wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Brown v. Callahan, 623

F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).

Although the complaint raised claims running the gamut from false

arrest to genocide, the district court isolated the claims as being two-fold:

The officers (1) perpetrated a false arrest without probable cause in violation

of the Fourth Amendment and (2) violated plaintiffs’ religious rights by

removing and searching their religious headgear during that arrest. “A search

2

Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).

3

Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 338 (5th Cir. 2017).

4

Hanks, 853 F.3d at 743 (quoting Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir.

2016)).

3

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No. 21-30489

and seizure of a person must be based on probable cause particularized with

respect to that person unless a constitutionally adequate substitute for proba-

ble cause exists.” Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 208 (5th Cir.

2009). Because of the possibility of qualified immunity, however, a plaintiff

seeking to recover damages ion an action under § 1983 for a false arrest must

prove not only that probable cause did not exist but also that “the officers

were objectively unreasonable in believing there was probable cause for the

arrest.” Davidson, 848 F.3d at 391. Therefore, even those officers “who ‘rea-

sonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present’ are entitled

to immunity.” 5

The plaintiffs have not met that standard. The officers arrested them

for violating Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:63.3, which states,

No person shall without authority go into or upon or remain

in or upon . . . any structure . . . which belongs to another, in-

cluding public buildings and structures . . . after having been

forbidden to do so, either orally or in writing, . . . by any owner,

lessee, or custodian of the property or by any other authorized

person.

The summary judgment evidence, including videos of plaintiffs’

encounter with the officers and their own and the officers’ affidavits, demon-

strate that, at the very least, the officers reasonably thought there was proba-

ble cause to arrest under that statute. The plaintiffs attempted to enter the

courthouse without passing through security screening. The officers, who

are authorized to control entry into the courthouse, refused and told the

plaintiffs that if they would not pass through security, they had to leave. They

refused (i.e., remained in a structure after having been forbidden to do so).

5

Club Retro, 568 F.3d at 206 (quoting Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th

Cir. 2000)).

4

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No. 21-30489

There was at least arguable probable cause to arrest under Section 14:63.3, so

the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Nor can plaintiffs point to any other clearly established law that ren-

dered the officers’ actions objectively unreasonable. They cannot point to

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that clearly establishes that the officers

were required to allow plaintiffs into the courthouse without passing through

routine security screening. Indeed, the relevant authorities suggest the oppo-

site and certainly do not clearly establish that the screening was unconstitu-

tional. 6 Plaintiffs also cannot point to the 1836 United States-Morocco

Treaty of Peace and Friendship as clearly establishing a right for Moorish

Americans to enter the courthouse as a port of commerce without any screen-

ing. 7 It is not clearly established that the officers were required to allow plain-

tiffs to pass through security screening; nor is it clearly established that the

officers were not allowed to ask them to leave once they refused and then

arrest them once they would not leave after being told to do so.

Further, it was not clearly established that once plaintiffs had been

arrested, the officers were not allowed to search their headgear solely because

it had religious significance. “When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the

arresting officer to search the person arrested.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.

752, 762–63 (1969). Moreover, plaintiffs have pointed to no precedent that

abrogates the general “search incident to arrest” rule when religious head-

wear is involved. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary

6

See, e.g., McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 899–900 (9th Cir. 1978); Justice v.

Elrod, 832 F.2d 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1987).

7

Cf. United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “an

ancient treaty between the United States and Morocco” does not allow those within the

United States to ignore its laws because “[l]aws of the United States apply to all persons

within its borders”).

5

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No. 21-30489

judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. 8

There is no error in the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion

for recusal of the magistrate judge. Plaintiffs rely on 28 U.S.C. § 455, which

requires recusal “in any proceeding in which [the judge’s] impartiality might

reasonably be questioned,” when the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice

concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts con-

cerning the proceeding,” or when the judge either “served as [a] lawyer in

the matter in controversy” or “a lawyer with whom he previously practiced

law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter.” “A

motion to disqualify brought under 28 U.S.C. § 455 is ‘committed to the

sound discretion of the district judge,’” and so we review for abuse of discre-

tion. 9

The magistrate judge did not work on this case in private practice nor

work with the defendants’ counsel in the practice of law while he was working

on this case. Nor is there evidence of any bias or knowledge of the case that

would have required the district court, in its discretion, to order recusal. The

most that plaintiffs can point to is that the magistrate judge went to law school

8

For the same reasons, the district court was correct to grant summary judgment

on the state-law false-arrest claims and to grant summary judgment for Sheriff Prator, who

remained in the case only on the ground that he could be vicariously liable should the state-

law claims succeed.

Lastly, plaintiffs are unable to save their case by pointing to any actions taken at the

Caddo Criminal Center. The district court was correct that the named defendants asso-

ciated with the Criminal Center had been dismissed and that the remaining named defen-

dants were not present at the Criminal Center and had no role in the processing of plaintiffs

there. Plaintiffs had the opportunity to conduct discovery and amend their complaint to

add defendants who plaintiffs believed violated their rights during processing. They have

not done so and therefore have no claims they can maintain based on those later events;

final judgment was appropriate on all claims asserted.

9

Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 598 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chitimacha Tribe

v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir. 1982)).

6

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No. 21-30489

with defendants’ counsel and then served as a law clerk alongside him over

thirty years ago. That is insufficient to require recusal, so the district court

did not abuse its discretion. See In re United States (Franco), 158 F.3d 26, 33–

34 (1st Cir. 1998).

AFFIRMED.

7

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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